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Abstract
This thesis examines the demise of the Jewish community in Afghanistan. In the 
early 1930s, an influx of Soviet refugees was a source of great concern for the Afghan 
government. Bukharan Jewish refugees were considered very dangerous, and potential 
Soviet agents. Afghan suspicion then extended to the local Jewish population. Security 
considerations were linked to the economic sector, and a series of discriminatory 
regulations were enacted against the entire Jewish community. Jews were forbidden 
from engaging in trade, and had to reside in Herat, Kabul or Kandahar. These policies 
caused impoverishment and an internal refugee crisis.
The Afghan government based its plan for economic development on a 
monopolisation system, and much of the discrimination that the Jewish community 
faced was directed through the Ministry of National Economy and the Afghan National 
Bank. This strategy was adopted ostensibly as a way to limit Soviet influence in 
Afghanistan, and benefitted die Pashtun majority.
Historiographically, the most contentious debate centres on the extent of Nazi 
influence in Afghanistan. ‘ Abd al-Majid Khan, the instigator of nativist economic 
policies, was also the primary negotiator with Berlin. The Third Reich influenced some 
aspects of Afghan policy, however it was predominantly indirect and confined to the 
economic sector. After World War II, the economy plunged, and a famine engulfed the 
region. When the state of Israel was established, Jews in Afghanistan saw it as a 
fulfillment of biblical prophecy, and most left as soon as legal emigration was 
authorized.
This work shows that once nationalism appears on the horizon, and the processes 
of modem development begin, the condition of a very small, easily distinguishable, 
specialized group is endangered. It also examines the rich congruities between the 
political and economic history of Afghanistan and one of its smallest minorities.
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Various Va’adoti An Explanatory Note
Va ’ad (va ’ada [f.], va ’adot [pi.]) is a general term in Hebrew used to describe any 
committee. While the most commonly known va ’ad outside of Israel is the Va ’ad 
Leumi, or Executive Committee of the Yishuv, many other organisations appear in this 
work, most notably those of Afghanistani Jews in Palestine and later Israel.
The first va ’ad active amongst the Afghanistani Jewish community was founded in 
Jerusalem. In the 1930s, it was known as the Va ’ad Edat Yehudei Afghanistan b ’Eretz 
Yisrael. Its English name was the Committee of the Afghanistan Jewish Community in 
Palestine. Here it is called the Jerusalem Va’ad.
The second Afghanistani va ’ad was founded in Tel Aviv in the late 1940s, and called 
the Va ’ad Hitahadut Yehudei Olei Afghanistan. In English, its title was translated as 
the Committee of Jewish Immigrants of Afghanistan in Tel Aviv and Jaffa. (In Hebrew, 
however, the term refers to a united organisation.) This work will refer to the 
committee as the Tel Aviv Va’ad.
After the Afghanistani community began to arrive in Israel en masse, a second va ’ad 
was formed in Tel Aviv. It was called: Ha-Va ’ada 1 ’Tipul b ’Olei Afghanistan, the 
Committee to Care for Immigrants from Afghanistan. It is not known if this was a fully 
independent organisation, or an offshoot of the first Tel Aviv Va’ad. At any rate, this 
committee did not engage in much political activity, and it is not referred to in an 
abbreviated format.
Also mentioned in the text is the Va ’ad Edat Sefardim, the Committee of the Sephardic 
Community, an umbrella organisation for Asian and African Jews in Eretz Yisrael.
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Ahl al-dhimma 
‘Aliya 
Allah Daad
Anus (Anusim, pi.) 
Ashkenazi
Badal 
Beit Din 
Chala
Eretz Yisrael
Erev
Firman
Galut
Gzerah
Halachah
Hammam
Hevrah Kadishah
(Ha-) Histadrut 
ha-Tzioni ha-‘01amit
Jadid al-Islam 
Jadidim
Glossary of Terms
People of the covenant, protected people. (Arabic)
‘To ascend,’ or immigrate to Israel. (Hebrew)
‘G-d gave,’ refers to 1839 forcible conversion of 
Mashhad’s Jewish community. (Persian)
One who is forcibly converted, or raped. (Hebrew)
Jewish community originating in Eastern Europe and 
Germany. (Hebrew)
Blood feud. (Pashtu)
Law court. (Hebrew)
‘Half-Baked,’ derisive term for forcible converts to Islam 
in the Emirate of Bukhara. (Tajik)
The Land of Israel. (Hebrew)
Evening, often refers to the eve of a holiday. (Hebrew)
A royal or governmental decree. (Persian)
Exile, Diaspora. (Hebrew)
Evil decree. (Hebrew)
Jewish religious law. (Hebrew)
Bath, often public. (Arabic)
‘Holy Society,’ association that prepares a body for burial. 
(Hebrew)
World Zionist Organisation. (Hebrew)
‘New to Islam,’ term for new converts, most often refers to 
Mashhadi anusim. (Arabic)
The Hebraicized plural for those who became Jadid al- 
Islam.
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Jizya
Kalantar
Khelat
Kashrut
Kehilat Kedoshah 
Loya Jirga 
Mahallah 
Majlis 
Marrano
Mashhade
Mikvah
Mizrahi
Moledet
Muhajirun
Nassi
‘Olim
(‘Oleh [m.], ‘Oleh [f.])
Sardar
Sephardi
Tribute or poll tax levied on non-Muslims. (Arabic)
Literally: ‘bigger,’ secular community leader, or chief 
personage in a town, often responsible for tax collection. 
(Persian and Judeo-Persian)
Robes of honour, often bestowed by the ruler. (Arabic)
Jewish dietary laws. (Hebrew)
‘Holy Community.’ (Hebrew)
Grand tribal assembly. (Pashtu)
Neighbourhood, quarter of a town. (Arabic, Persian)
Assembly or Parliament. (Arabic)
Literally: ‘pig,’ derogatory term for forcible convert, 
especially to Catholicism. (Spanish)
‘Hair comber,’ older woman who accompanied and assisted 
the bride, also known as abruchin in northern Afghanistan, 
and dimvardar in Mashhad. (Judeo-Persian)
Ritual public bath, especially important to maintain family 
purity laws. (Hebrew)
‘Eastern,’ refers to Jews from Asia and Africa, who are not 
descendents from the Spanish expulsion. (Hebrew)
Homeland, place where one was bom. (Hebrew)
Migrants. (Arabic)
Secular community leader. (Hebrew)
Immigrant to Israel, literally: one who has ascended. 
(Hebrew)
Military commander. (Persian)
Jews whose ancestors originated in Spain. (Hebrew)
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Shahadah
Shaliah 
Shehita 
Shurut ‘Umar
Sochnut l’Eretz Yisrael
Va’ad(a)
Va’ad Leumi 
l’Eretz Yisrael
Waqf
Yishuv
Muslim confession of faith: “There is no god but Allah and 
Muhammad is his prophet.” (Arabic)
Emissary, one who is sent. (Hebrew)
Kosher butchering practices. (Hebrew)
Pact of Umar, restrictions placed upon non-Muslims. 
(Arabic)
Jewish Agency for Palestine/Israel. (Hebrew)
Committee. (Hebrew)
General Council (also known as the Executive Committee) 
of the Yishuv. (Hebrew)
Property turned into an irrevocable religious trust. (Arabic)
Jewish community in Eretz Yisrael, most often used to refer 
to the pre-1948 population. (Hebrew)
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Note on Hebrew Transliteration
According to Mrs. liana Tahan, Hebrew Librarian at the India Office, there is no 
universally recognised system of Hebrew transliteration. This causes a series of 
difficulties for researchers. Often titles are simply translated, as in the Israeli journal 
for Mizrahi studies, Pe ’amim. In an attempt to assist readers unfamiliar with the 
Hebrew script, this work provides a transliteration based on the Library of Congress’ 
system, accompanied with an English translation.
Some modifications were made to the Library of Congress’s system. They are as 
follows:
Vuv 0) is written as a ‘v’ not as a ‘w.’
Tzade (x) is written as ‘tz’ not as ‘ts.’
Aleph (N) is written as an ‘a’ not as a mere ’, except when silent, and then it is not 
written at all.
‘Ain (y) is written with an ‘e or an ‘a, depending upon the vowel.
The normally silent vowel sheva (, ) is written as a’ when it is part of a conjunction or 
prefix. (Such as b’, 1’, v’)
The mark (which looks like a hirik) under the koof and het has been omitted.
Finally, no differentiation has been made between ‘ and ’ .
The author hopes this modified system will facilitate ease of reading.
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Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review
This thesis tells the story of the Jews of Afghanistan - both long-term residents 
and refugees fleeing from the Soviet Union - between 1933 and 1952. It explores the 
role of the Jewish community that lived among other non-Sunni minorities in a 
mountainous land wedged between the Soviet Union, British India, China, and Iran. Its 
experience was moulded by the cataclysmic first half of the twentieth century. Within 
Afghanistan, the Jews faced the impact of full political independence from Britain and 
attempts at modernisation. Yet soon the proverbial wolf was at the door, as larger 
forces intervened. The foundation of the Soviet Union and Stalin's purges led to an 
influx of Bukharan Jewish refugees, which worsened the fragile position of the native 
community. Concurrently, the rise of Nazi Germany brought a new kind of anti- 
Semitism to Afghanistan, while in the 1940s, World War II and India’s partition caused 
further peril. When the modem state of Israel emerged, the promises of messianic 
Zionism were too much to resist, and almost all of the Jewish community in 
Afghanistan emigrated.
General works on Afghanistan normally only provide several sentences on the 
Jewish community. Meanwhile, Afghanistani Jewish history is often included within 
the scholarship of the larger Persian or Central Asian Jewish sphere.1 Unfortunately,
’indeed, the concept o f an Afghan Jew could be somewhat o f a misnomer, as all members of the 
Pashtun ethnicity are Muslim. While living in Afghanistan, the Jewish community never called 
themselves Afghan. Ironically, individuals began to use the term only after leaving the country. This 
change is striking as it occurred not only upon arrival in Israel, and also during the journey, while waiting 
as close as in Iran or India. Through the action o f crossing the border, the terms changed. (See Central 
Zionist Archives S6/6787, communal letter from ‘Afghani refugees’ (Teheran) to the Director o f the 
Office of Immigration, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) 30 January 1952.) A similar process may have 
occurred among Hazara Shiites who fled to Iran after the Soviet invasion in 1979. In Iran, they were 
viewed as Afghan because they came from the country o f Afghanistan, although clearly they were not 
Pashtun.
Despite this variation, I have chosen to use the term ‘Afghanistani’ because ‘Afghan’ is often 
synonymous with ‘Pashtun’. As half of Afghanistan’s population is non-Pashtun, ‘Afghanistani’ seems 
to be a more inclusive usage. (Though this may be changing. In a recent article, Michael Ignatieff
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historians examining the Jewish experience frequently overlook vital events occurring 
in Muslim society, and the impact of larger social forces on the minority Jewish 
community. Sometimes their marginal status provided a buffer, as the Jews were never 
a part of Pashtun blood feuds. More frequently, however, their vulnerable position as 
ahl al-dhimma (protected, yet second class citizens) meant that they were at greater risk 
of violence. This work breaks new ground by placing Mizrahi Jewish history in a 
wider context, and emphasizing local and national processes in the state of 
Afghanistan.2
For the most part, the modem history of Afghanistan has been written as the 
history of the dominant Pashtun ethnicity. Far less emphasis is placed upon the other 
groups, such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Nuristanis, Baluchis, Turkmens, and Farsiwans. In 
many ways, just as the Hazaras were ‘pacified,’3 their voices were also silenced.4 This 
work is unusual in focusing on the experiences of a non-Muslim, non-Pashtun minority 
using records outside of Afghanistan. Because many Jews were literate and had 
international contacts, documentation about their experiences survives all over the 
world. They were preserved, even though much of Afghanistan’s history was never 
recorded or crucial documents were lost in the Soviet invasion and its aftermath. The 
sources for this thesis come from Britain, Israel, France, Germany and the United 
States. The Jewish refugees described in these pages left forty years before the more 
recent waves of Afghanistanis fled their homeland, for Pakistan and Iran. The Jews 
then resettled in Israel during the 1940s and 1950s, guarding their ancient heritage in an 
old but also new land.
writes: “most Afghans feel they are Afghans first and Uzbeks, Hazaras, Tajiks or Pashtuns second.” 
“Nation-Building Lite” New York Times Magazine, Sunday 28 July 2002.)
Currently, a similar phenomenon is occurring in Kazakhstan where ‘Kazakh’ refers to the specific 
ethnicity, while ‘Kazakhistani’ may be used by any citizen of this new nation. In a small way, the use o f  
these terms may work against the discrimination faced by non-titular communities.
2Mizrahi literally means ‘eastern’ in Hebrew, and refers to Jews from places like: Iran, Iraq, 
Yemen, and India. They are distinguished from those who originated in Eastern Europe (Ashkenazi) or 
those who lived in Spain before the Inquisition (Sephardi).
3See Hasan K. Kakar, The Pacification o f  the Hazaras o f Afghanistan (New York: The 
Afghanistan Council, Asia Society, 1973). Note that later his name is spelled Kaker.
4See Sayed Askar Mousavi, The Hazaras o f  Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and 
Political Study. (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1998), 5-10. While Mousavi does not say that the voices of  
the Hazaras were silenced, it does appear to be a core theme within his work, and surfaces directly in a 
discussion of Afghan nationalism.
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While this thesis contributes to Afghanistani history, it is also rooted in Jewish 
studies. As Hannah Arendt said in 1943: “For the first time Jewish history is not 
separate but tied up with that of all other nations.”5 Much of the secondary literature 
about Judaism in the 1930s and 1940s is connected with responses to the Holocaust. 
Within this context, it may seem like an aside to the far larger events which occurred in 
the middle of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, this history reflects a distinct 
experience. It illuminates the difficulties a middleman minority faced after the advent 
of nationalist ideas, and with pressures for changing the traditional economic structure 
of the country. It also sheds light upon another kind of anti-Semitism, sometimes more 
subtle and flexible within the confines of the Muslim world, and other times just as 
pernicious as the imported European variety.
During the period examined, the Afghanistani Jewish community only reached 
approximately 5,000 individuals. It was composed of mainly merchants and traders 
who spoke Judeo-Persian at home.6 Bukharan Jewish refugees in Kabul may have 
considered themselves worse off than the Jews of Germany in 1934,7 but ten years 
later, the majority of them were still alive. While the Afghan government did not want 
Jews dwelling in their midst, it was not willing to embark upon genocide. Nonetheless, 
some governmental actions, especially those of the Minister of National Economy,
‘ Abd al-Majid Zabuli, can be compared with the early anti-Semitic legislation of Nazi 
Germany. The narrow Afghan leadership received some westernised education, and 
were aware of technological advances and philosophic conceptions popular in Europe. 
They wanted full control of the lucrative karakul skin trade that had been partially
Q
conducted within a historic Jewish economic niche. This goal was achieved through
5Hannah Arendt, “We Refugees” in Menorah Journal (January 1943): 69-77 reprinted in ed. Ron 
Feldman, Hannah Arendt The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age (New 
York: Grove Press, 1978), 66.
6 Walter Fischel, “The Jews o f Afghanistan,” Jewish Chronicle, 26 March 1937, supplement 4-6.
7See Board o f Deputies of British Jews’ records at the London Metropolitan Archives: (hereafter: 
BoD) ACC/3121/E3/506/2 Letter from Yosef to Jewish community in England, 13 Dec 1934. (While 
Yosef signs his full name, it is illegible.)
8 Jewish traders were deeply involved in the karakul trade, though precise statistics are 
unavailable. See chapter 5 for further details.
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sometimes brutal measures. Despite large differences of perspective, geography, and 
culture, there is some congruence between early German and Afghan anti-Semitism in 
the 1930s. The experience of the Jews in Afghanistan does reflect the Zeitgeist of the 
mid-twentieth century.
In addition to the specific regional and religious history, this study of 
Afghanistani Jewry not only fills a gap in the historiography of the region and of Jewish 
experience in the twentieth century, but also contributes to the study of entrepreneurial 
or trade minorities.9 Explanations about the advent of trade minorities help to explain 
the Jewish presence in Afghanistan. In pastoral and tribal economies, peripheral groups 
could engage more easily in trade. Unlike the general population, trade minorities did 
not encounter a network of kin ties to impede their ability to loan money, charge 
interest, or trade with communities hostile towards each other. Ernest Gellner 
explains that local ‘insiders’ found trade minorities attractive business partners because 
“those who lack status can honor a contract.”10 They were able to attend to commerce 
without the impediment of reciprocity incumbent upon equals or kin members.11 On a 
congruent note, elites found pariah groups or outsiders useful because while they might 
wield one kind of power, most notably economic, they did not have political or social 
might.12 This kept them easily taxable, defenceless and tied to the rulers. These groups 
could be intimidated and milked for revenue if leaders deemed it necessary. In addition 
to Jews, other groups have long histories as entrepreneurial minorities, for example: 
Greeks, Armenians, and Zoroastrians, all of whom lived under Muslim rule.13
In Afghanistan, Hindus had a longer continuous history as an entrepreneurial 
minority than Jews did, though the two communities shared much in common. Both 
groups’ settlements were directly related to trade, and both disrupted more normative 
domestic patterns to engage in commerce. Jewish men often left their families in Herat
9 The term middlemen minorities is also used.
10 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 104.
11 Walter P. Zenner, Minorities in the Middle: A Cross-Cultural Analysis (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1991), 15.
12 While economic power was prevalent among marginalized groups, they could also wield 
magical power (like Roma fortune tellers) or military power (like the Mamluks or Hessians).
13 Gellner, 102-5.
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and travelled to remote caravanserais to conduct business and live in solely male 
communities for most of the year.14 However, as noted, entrepreneurial minorities were 
not integrated into the social structure of Afghanistan. Because of their marginal status, 
they were unable to foster economic development. They mainly functioned as “a 
middle or lower economic caste with specific economic functions.”15
Encountering Nationalist Sentiments in Afghanistan
While Afghanistan clearly met the definition of a state, its transition to a nation 
was far more cursory in the period examined. When nationalist currents began to 
appear, non-Muslim entrepreneurial minorities faced new difficulties and increasing 
hostility. The demise of the Jewish community is linked to the inability of including 
non-Muslims in an early concept of the Afghan nation. Descent from the ancient tribes 
of Israel features prominently in the Pashtun myth of ethnogenesis. This is particularly 
uncharacteristic of Muslim groups.16 Despite this unusual connection, Jews in modem 
times had a far more difficult struggle to gain acceptance. As the largest, and generally 
most powerful ethnicity, the Pashtun image of itself impacted the entire country. The 
Pashtun belief in being lost children of Israel could sometimes ameliorate the condition 
of the modem Jewish community. While ancient Jewry was essential for the creation 
of the Afghan tribes, modem Jews were viewed ambivalently. For the most part Jews 
were marginalized in mid-twentieth century Afghanistan, and their place in society 
remained peripheral. When the first concepts of nationalism, particularly of economic 
nationalism began to appear in Afghanistan, the condition of the Jewish community 
became even more precarious.
14 Erich Brauer, “The Jews of Afghanistan: An Anthropological Report,” in Jewish Social Studies 
vol. IV (1942): 123-24. See chapter two for further detail.
15 Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence o f Modern Afghanistan: Politics o f  Reform and 
Modernization, 1880-1946 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 61-62.
16 Certain American Christian religions, like the Church of the Latter-Day Saints, envision the 
Western hemisphere as a new Holy Land. This may partially explain some o f the tolerance Jews have 
experienced in the United States, and certainly in Utah. While these groups practice customs linked to 
the Old Testament, they do not claim to be physically descended from Jews.
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During the middle of the twentieth-century, Afghanistan fit into widely accepted 
definitions of a state, though not a nation. Invoking the work of Max Weber, Ernest 
Gellner defines a state as “that agency within society which possesses the monopoly of 
legitimate violence.”17 Feliks Gross offers a similar definition which basically rings 
true for Afghanistan: “a state is a coercive institution (organization) that has supreme 
power over a definite territory and its inhabitants and is vested with monopoly of the
1 ftuse of physical power.” These definitions do not account for some of the nuances of 
Afghanistan’s political structures.
It may be fairer to describe Afghanistan in this time period as a tribal state, “based 
on the myth of common ethnic or racial ancestry, with rights, even privileges, granted 
solely to the dominant ethnic group (in practice to the governing political elite and 
associated political classes).”19 Gross highlights two different types of ‘tribal’ states. 
However, this author finds it more appropriate to term the first group jasVieo-tribal or 
even pseudo-tribal. A neo-tribal society has already developed into a nation, and its 
most extreme versions lead to persecution, expulsion, and genocide. The state’s 
“legitimacy is linked to ancient, but primitive, roots, brutalized by pseudoscientific 
theory.”20 Clearly, Gross’ reference is to the Third Reich and Mussolini’s Italy.
A second kind of tribal state is also described, which is found particularly in
Africa. This polity is older, and resembles the structure of an extended family. It is
0 1based on a shared kinship. Afghanistan’s political structure belongs more to the latter 
type of tribal state, as it is based more upon family ties than ideology. However, this 
thesis will examine ways in which the Afghan state also drew upon European neo-tribal 
nationalist influences in its dealings with the Jewish community.
17 Gellner, 3.
18 Feliks Gross, The Civic and the Tribal State: The State, Ethnicity, and the Multiethnic State 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 8.
19 Ibid, 12.
20 Ibid, xi.
21 Ibid, xii.
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Like Gross, Gellner describes a similar sub-category of states. They still fit the
definition of a state while unable to “monopolize legitimate violence.” Gellner points
out that a “feudal state does not necessarily object to private wars between its fief-
00holders, provided they also fulfill their obligations to their overlord.” In Afghanistan, 
the government became involved in tribal disputes when feuds began to engulf a 
region, or when larger crises loomed. Indeed, this was a very serious issue for the 
Jewish community throughout its modem history in Afghanistan. Jews could be 
subjected to mob violence, particularly in Herat. They often moved to Kabul, where 
the central government could protect them more easily.
Before examining the development of Afghan nationalism, it is important to 
provide a definition. This is not a simple task when considering the literature devoted 
to the subject. While Max Weber’s description of a state is succinct and often utilized, 
his definition of a nation is far more vague and circular. In one article, he writes that: 
“a nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state 
of its own.” This “community of sentiment” is described as “something homogenous” 
which leans “towards an autonomous state.”23 Elie Kedourie views nationalism as an 
ideology in order “to contrast it with constitutional politics.”24 Perhaps Gellner defines 
nationalism more clearly as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the 
political and the nation unit should be congruent.” He then explains that the 
“nationalist principle” can be violated in several different ways. “The political 
boundary of a given state can fail to include all the members of the appropriate nation; 
or it can include them all but also include some foreigners; or it can fail in both these 
ways at once, not incorporating all the nationals and yet also including some non­
nationals.”25 For many Pashtuns, Afghanistan must have appeared to fail in both 
ways 26
22 Gellner, 3-4.
23 Max Weber, “The Nation,” in ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 25.
24 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism: Fourth, expanded edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), xiii.
25 Gellner, 1.
26 Even Afghanistan’s leadership expressed some uncertainty that conceptions of nationality could 
be based upon place of birth rather than ethnicity. In an interview with a British representative, the 
Prime Minister, Muhammad Hashim Khan expressed a degree of confusion that he could be considered
23
Pockets within Afghanistani society felt the strains presented by the idea of 
nationalism long before the wider Sunni Muslim public was exposed to similar 
| challenges. In the early twentieth-century, Afghanistan’s international trade was
iI
j limited to a few items, most importantly, karakul skins and dried fruits. Other attempts
i  at industrialization, such as the construction of factories and mass education were
limited. Despite this, anti-Semitic actions often associated with a later stage of 
economic development are present paradoxically in an overwhelmingly agricultural and 
nomadic society grappling with the challenges presented by the initial stages of 
development. This may be explained through the behavior of elites who are often the
• 97first or only group to show hostility towards entrepreneurial minonties.
In Afghanistan, the types of anti-Semitism demonstrated by the leaders and the 
populace were very different. Elites, especially those within the Ministry of National 
Economy, displayed hostility similar to that described in Gross’ ‘neo-tribal’ society. 
However, the general population’s treatment of the Jewish community was more 
common to that found in early modem Muslim societies. It also varied according to the 
practices of the majority. In Herat, the hostility the Jewish community faced was 
similar, though for the most part less severe than that found in Qajar Iran.
As previously noted, there is a regulated place for entrepreneurial minorities as 
outsiders in a traditional society. They are able to wield power in a particular area only 
because they are impotent in other fields. However, as the patterns of societal 
relationships change, the status of trade minorities also shifts, and it becomes evident 
just how fragile their situation is. When the Afghan economy started to pursue 
development strategies, it became less viable for one ethnic group to control a 
particular trade. Full members of society were now tmsted to fill a role previously
Indian based upon where his mother gave birth. (India Office and Library [hereafter: IOL] L/PS/12/1789, 
G.F. Squire (Kabul) to H. Weightman (New Delhi), 17 September 1943.)
27 For a description o f the way elites can create a defensive nationalism among the populace, see 
Charles Taylor, “Nationalism and Modernity” in ed. John A. Hall, The State o f  the Nation: Ernest 
Gellner and the Theory o f Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 209-11. See 
also Zenner, 13.
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considered too dangerous for them. The need for entrepreneurial minorities lessened as 
‘insiders’ found the outsiders’ economic activity desirable and lucrative. This 
happened in Afghanistan even without the arrival of a “mobile, anonymous, centralized
ORmass society” as Gellner describes. Rather when the first rays of the concept of 
development appeared, Pashtun leaders became aware of the potential to generate 
wealth for themselves and hard currency for the national treasury through the karakul 
trade. If they were able to achieve this and get rid of an undesired, non-Islamic group, 
then so much the better. The term nationalism is seldom described in the archival 
literature examined. Remarkably, it is present in a discussion about the economic 
motives of the Afghan government, and its effects on the Jewish community. The 
British Minister to Afghanistan, Richard Maconachie notes that within the economy 
“the nationalist idea ... finds expression in the theory that profits from Afghan trade
9Qshould go into Afghan pockets.” When this was combined with the suspicions that 
Bukharan Jewish refugees were actually Soviet agents, the way was paved for an 
internal refugee crisis, which ultimately led to the dissolution of the community.
While the literature on nationalism in general fails to apply to the larger political 
currents present in Afghanistan in the 1930s and 1940s, it is striking to note that 
Gellner’s description of Diaspora nationalism fits well into an examination of the 
Jewish community at this time. This demonstrates that the processes of emerging 
nationalism in Afghanistan are more multi-faceted than they may appear initially. 
Gellner writes that “disastrous and tragic consequences” occur in modem times to 
groups who combine “economic superiority and cultural identifiability with political 
and military weakness.” In the worst cases, genocide occurs, but also the gamut runs 
towards expulsion, or even a tenuous truce. As the “age of specialized communities” 
begins to fade, the government faces a very different set of pressures which leads to 
new decisions, generally far less protective of minorities. Gellner writes that the 
government becomes interested in taking away the trade minority’s lucrative niche, and
28 Gellner, 103.
29IOL R/12/19, Memorandum respecting the Commercial Policy of the Afghan Government 
1930-34, sent by Machonachie (Kabul) to the Department o f Overseas Trade (London) 15 June 1934, 8- 
10 .
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due to this group’s “visibility, and wealth, it can buy off a great deal of discontent in the 
wider population by dispossessing and persecuting it; and so the inevitable happens.” 
The demise of the Jewish community in Afghanistan is directly linked to these forces.
Once nationalism appears on the horizon, and processes of modem development 
begin, the condition of a very small, easily distinguishable, specialized group is 
endangered. The following work traces this process within Afghanistan in painstaking 
detail. It reconstructs the history of a people who are no longer resident, and shows the 
rich congruities between the political and economic history of Afghanistan and one of 
its smallest minorities. Despite a wealth of primary sources, the Jewish history in 
Afghanistan during the first half of the twentieth century has only been partially 
explored. Perhaps this is because it describes the history of a marginalized group of 
people that included both long-term residents and refugees.
Contemporaneous Secondary Literature
The secondary literature on the Jews of Afghanistan is limited. While many 
short, introductory pieces written by journalists, travellers or members of the 
community in Israel are available, very few detailed articles or books have been 
published. This section will examine these important scholarly works thoroughly. 
Other sources of congruent information, such as the history of the Mashhadi 
community and the economy of the region will also be viewed to shed light upon this 
community. Due to the small size of this group and its frequent isolation, inaccurate 
information is often presented. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, 
Western sources grossly overestimated the population of the Jews in Afghanistan, with 
a number of 40,000 commonly cited.33 This work seeks to clarify these common errors
30 Gellner, 105-7.
31 With special thanks to Ali Ahsani for guiding me through the literature o f nationalism theories.
32 This author often found snippets o f information in unlikely places. For example, two travel 
accounts published in 1937 mention the Jews’ expulsion from northern Afghanistan, and their loss of 
business in the karakul trade. See Rosita Forbes, Forbidden Road -  Kabul to Samarkand (London: 
Cassell, 1937), 59; and Robert Byron, The Road to Oxiana (London: Macmillian, 1937), 119,237,294-5.
33 Jewish Encyclopedia (London: Funk and Wagnalls, 1925) s.v. “Afghanistan;” and “The Jews of 
Afghanistan” in Jewish Chronicle, 3 February 1950,13. Both of these sources exaggerate Afghanistan’s
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by drawing upon a diverse range of materials. For example, while the information 
found in western Jewish encyclopaedias was inaccurate, a Russian version published in 
St. Petersburg before the October Revolution provides far more precise information 
about the Jewish population in Afghanistan and throughout Central Asia. It estimates 
that approximately 2,000 Jews lived in Afghanistan, 1,000 in Khiva, 9,000 in Bukhara 
and 8,300 in the Ferghana Oblast.34
Until 1998, when the Israel Museum in Jerusalem presented an exhibition on the 
Jews of Afghanistan (with an accompanying text), the most detailed work in English 
published on the daily life of the Jews of Afghanistan was an anthropological study by 
Erich Brauer written in 1942. The few academics like Vartan Gregorian, who examine 
the Jewish community as a part of a larger discussion about Afghanistan, often cite 
Brauer. For half a century his work was unrivalled. While other dedicated authors 
contributed articles and even a few books in the intervening years, for the most part, 
their work was not of as high a quality. Brauer is unusual as he was a professionally 
trained anthropologist who conducted original research and included theoretical 
rationale in his work.
Erich Brauer (1895-1942) was a German anthropologist who arrived in Jerusalem 
in 1925. He was a research fellow at Hebrew University and a pioneer in the field of 
Jewish ethnology. Brauer spent six years studying new immigrants from Yemen in 
Jerusalem, and published the first ethnological monograph on a Jewish community, 
entitled Ethnologie der jemenitischen Juden. In 1931 he returned to Germany, but due 
to the rise of the Third Reich, he set out again for Jerusalem in 1934. Brauer spent the
Jewish population by a factor of ten. See Itzhak Bezalel, “ ‘Edah bfnai 'Etzmah” in Pe'amim 79 (Spring 
1999): 16 for a discussion o f Afghanistan’s Jewish population, accurate and otherwise. Inaccuracies may 
have occurred because these sources relied upon a traveller who never visited Afghanistan. (See Erich 
Brauer, The Jews o f  Kurdistan. Edited by Raphael Patai [Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993], 
38.) He concludes that Benjamin of Tudela never actually visited Amadiya in the twelfth century 
because of his over-estimation of the Jewish community’s population. A similar situation may have 
occurred in the late nineteenth-century in Afghanistan.)
MEvreiskaya Enziklopediya (St Petersburg, n.d., c. 1907-1917), s.v. “Aziya,” by G. Krasnii and 
Israel Levy. The edition at the Central Zionist Archives was from the personal collection o f Nahum 
Sokolow, president of the World Zionist Congress (1931-1936), and prolific author.
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rest of his life in Palestine and died from ill health in 1942.35 He was a staunch 
member of the Kulturkreislehre or a school of thought known as the Culture-Circle 
Theory. Raphael Patai describes this as a theory which holds that “component parts or 
traits of cultures have an innate coherence and travel in closed ‘circles.’” When these 
circles (or perhaps a better English translation conceives them as spheres) interact with 
other ones, they clash, and this leads to an amalgamation of the two, or a domination of 
one over the other. Despite being a strong proponent of Kulturekreislehre, Patai reports 
that Brauer sought to present only facts. Due to his “scientific integrity ... he excluded 
every theoretical discussion most conscientiously.” In addition to his work on 
Yemeni Jews, Brauer almost completed a book on Kurdish Jews, which Patai translated 
into Hebrew in 1946, and presented in its original English in 1993.
All of Brauer’s work on the Jews of Afghanistan was published posthumously.
An article in Jewish Social Studies was published a few months after his death. Brauer 
wrote in German or in English, though a Hebrew version of his article in Jewish Social
37Studies was published in 1944 by the journal Sinai. Brauer was the first author to 
stress how many communal aspects were profoundly unusual, and his insight and detail 
were unrivalled. As is true of the field of Jewish ethnography in general, as well as the 
specific study of Yemeni and Kurdish communities, Brauer’s work comprises the basis 
of study in the field of Afghanistan! Jewry.
While most of Brauer’s article in Sinai is a direct translation from the original 
article published in Jewish Social Studies, there are important differences. These 
provide one of the very few windows into the historiography of this community. The 
English article from 1942 is mostly descriptive, and corresponds closely to Patai’s 
appraisal of Brauer’s work. It refrains from heavy indictments against the community 
for matters as trivial as their alleged lack of zeal for horticultural pursuits. Yet, when 
the Hebrew piece shifts away from the English one, puzzling statements appear.
35 Brauer 1993, 23-4.
36 Ibid, 26-7.
37 Erich Brauer, “The Jews o f Afghanistan, An Anthropological Report,” Jewish Social Studies 4 
(1942): 121-138; and “Yehudei Afghanistan,” Sinai 4:12 (1944): 324-342.
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It is this author’s opinion that the most controversial sections of the Hebrew 
article were not written by Brauer. Most notably, the article was published two years 
after his death, in a language Brauer may not have been fully comfortable writing. 
Indeed, in a lengthy work on Kurdish Jews, Brauer does not engage in moralizing 
statements, even when they may be justified. When describing domestic violence 
among Kurdish Jews, he manages to maintain an almost neutral tone towards a practice 
many deem repulsive. He writes that they: “have a tendency to be brutal to their wives 
and to beat them -  often so cruelly that the women must take to their beds.” He 
describes that at wedding feasts, the women who bring their husbands food later than 
other wives “are beaten by their husbands in the presence of the other men. The 
husband wishes thereby to display his might before the other men.” With this line, the 
section entitled: Treatment of Women ends.38 One feels certain that Brauer would not 
have lashed out against Afghanistani Jews for as slight a matter as the subjects of their 
folksongs or the size of their gardens. This unknown editor has a very different 
perspective from Brauer. It is crucial to differentiate between these two articles as the 
additions of the Sinai piece undermine this anthropologist’s clearly original work.
Despite the editorial mystery, the Sinai article does provide valuable insight into 
the shifting Jewish academic perspectives that occurred during the 1940s. Afghanistani 
Jews are presented according to their ‘physiometric-racial’ grouping, yet anti-Semitic 
rhetoric is transformed in an effort to show how Jewish physical characteristics are 
handsome and positive. Later the article charges the Jews of Afghanistan with not 
retroactively embracing secular Zionist ideals. This editor’s outlook was shaped by his 
(or her) political and emotional attachment to modem Zionism. A moral value was 
assigned for cultural practices and living patterns Brauer documented.
In contrast to the English article, the study in Sinai also attempts to explain the 
racial origin of the Jewish people, and then specifically Afghanistani Jewry. It notes 
that there was a fusion between the Eastern and Armenian races which created the
38 Brauer 1993, 179-80.
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Jewish race, and that the Jews from Afghanistan (like other Mizrahi communities) are 
part of the ancient proto-Semitic racial group. This group existed before the destruction 
of the Second Temple, whereas Ashkenazi and Sephardi communities belong to a more 
recent racial type.39 The article published in Sinai appears to have a much stronger 
stamp of anthropological opinions current in the early twentieth century. However, 
when going through a detailed examination of the physionomy of Afghanistani Jews, it 
does not conclude that they are racially inferior. Rather the article notes that Brauer’s 
primary informant, Hacham Abraham Shabbetai, was as tall as a European or American 
at 1.73 m, and that his body had a “statuesque quality.”40 Despite the incipient currents 
of anti-Semitism found in the contemporary literature, with the Sinai article it is 
transformed to become somewhat positive.41
Immediately after the discussion on race, the Sinai article weighs the Afghanistani 
Jews on the scale of secular Zionism. They are condemned as “completely urban in the 
worst sense of the term.” It continues by saying: “They have no connection to the land 
or to the earth, and lack any sign of a spiritual connection to nature. They are like cave- 
dwellers who never see the sun.” Their lack of folk songs or lullabies about nature or 
the weather is lamented, and the article chides the Jews of Afghanistan by saying that 
Kurdish and even Yemenite Jews possess these kinds of songs. (Although Yemenis 
sing more about the Land of Israel than the earth of Yemen.) Further, the article notes 
that Afghanistan supports a significant nomadic economy while none of its Jewish 
population is nomadic.42
39 Brauer 1944, 325.
40 English phrase used. Brauer 1944, 325.
41 A far more extreme example is found in an article entitled “Jews and Eugenics” (Jewish 
Chronicle, 16 April 1915, 16). It states that Jewish children in England are healthier than non-Jewish 
children even in poor families, because the Jewish mother is “innately superior” due to “long ages of  
stringent parental selection.” Then the article shifts to partially refute eugenics while still embracing 
aspects of this theory. Quoting the obstetrician C.W. Saleeby, the article argues that “the chief ‘racial 
poisons,’ ... are: alcohol, venereal disease, and to some extent lead. The slums directly conduce [sic] to 
alcoholism and sexual immorality, and thus to racial poisoning and destruction. The pseudo-Darwinian 
theory o f the immune race is disproved, except in the single instance of the Jews who prove my general 
contention, for they have always protected their race from alcoholism and venereal disease.” This clearly 
shows that while some of the arguments surrounding eugenics in the early twentieth century were 
embraced, the Jewish community still sought to shift the conclusions from negative to positive.
42 Brauer 1944, 326.
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After these two critiques, the rest of the Sinai article’s tone softens, and it 
basically resembles the piece found in Jewish Social Studies. It explains why the 
Jewish community did not engage in agriculture, as it was small and vulnerable to 
attack, the countryside was far from secure, and as ‘ahl al-dhimma they had an 
additional tax burden.43 The last page of the Hebrew article finds room to pardon the 
Afghanistanis for their lack of contact with nature, as they do have “various rain- 
making ceremonies.”44 This article also has a harsh note for the rulers of Afghanistan. 
It accuses them of fascism and self-enrichment, making extremist decisions leading to 
the destruction of the Jewish community.45
Most outside writers of this era mention Afghanistani Jewry as an aside to a 
longer discussion on the whereabouts of the ten lost tribes of Israel.46 To his credit, 
Brauer only tangentially mentions the theory that the Pashtuns are a lost tribe, and then 
quickly dismisses it. The discrepancies in these two articles offer insight into the 
currents that shaped the thinking about Afghanistani Jewry when it was first studied. 
Clearly, our mystery editor was not as forward thinking as Brauer. His (or her) dismay 
at trivial matters like the lack of songs about nature seems out of place, though Zionist 
mores at the end of the Yishuv period are visibly demonstrated through this 
commentary 47 On the other hand, Brauer was a careful researcher whose observations 
are confirmed by many other sources. He was a pioneering academic in Judaic studies 
who continues to make a significant contribution to the field.
One contemporary of Brauer was Walter J. Fischel, a professor at Hebrew 
University. He conducted early studies on the Jews of Central Asia and Iran, and the
43 Brauer 1942, 126.
44 Ibid, 138.
45 Brauer 1944, 331.
46 For example, when Yitzhak Ben-Zvi interviews a Bukharan Jew who just arrived from Pakistan, 
he also adds an extra page about the alleged Jewish descent among the Pashtun -  that the Afridi are 
actually the lost tribe o f Ephraim, etc. CZA S6/4577, notes on Ben-Zvi’s interview with Mr. Borukhov 
about the state of the Jewish communities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 15-16 January 1948.
47 See: “From Betrothal to Marriage” in ed. N o’am Bar‘am-BenYossef, Brides and Betrothals: 
Jewish Wedding Rituals in Afghanistan (Jerusalem: Israel Museum, 1998): 43-54. With special thanks to 
Tamara Kawam for this gift.
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Afttwo men travelled together. They reported their findings to the Alliance Israelite 
Universelle and the Jewish Agency in Palestine.49 Fischel helped to explain the 
significance of events during the 1930s and 1940s to the British Jewish public. His 
articles in The Jewish Chronicle provide solid historical information. However, 
Fischel’s primary interests were in medieval history, as well as the Jewish communities 
of Iran and India. His articles on Afghanistan do not often cross the threshold between 
description and analysis.50
Other contemporary sources include Abraham Emanuelson, who published a 
booklet entitled The Remnant o f the Jews.51 Emanuelson was from Afghanistan, 
though he represented Bukharan Jewry at the Nineteenth World Zionist Congress.52 
Itzhak Bezalel remarked that before the Russian Revolution, many Jews from 
Afghanistan would claim to be Bukharan as it was more prestigious. In Palestine, after 
Bukharans became impoverished, Jews from Afghanistan began to refer to themselves
48Some of his publications include: “The Jews of Central Asia (Khorasan) in Medieval Hebrew 
and Islamic Literature” reprinted for private circulation from Historia Judaica 7:1 (April 1945); “The 
Leaders o f the Jews o f Bokhara,” L. Jung, Jewish Leaders (1750-1940) (Jerusalem: 1964); “The Jews in 
Mediaeval Iran from the 16th to the 18th centuries: Political, Economic, and Communal aspects,” ed. 
Shaul Shaked, lrano-Judaica 1 (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1982): 265-291; “The Jews of Persia, 1795- 
1940” Jewish Social Studies XII (1950): 119-160; “Khurasan” and “Judeo-Persian Literature” s.v. 
Encyclopaedia Judaica (Jerusalem: Keter, 1971).
4 See Alliance Israelite Universelle [hereafter: AIU] microfilm roll 3, Iran (Hamadan) IC  2, letter 
from Cohen (Hamadan) to AIU (Paris), 11 February 1931 regarding Fischel’s activities.
50Fischel also appears in the Board of Deputies' archives, when he asks for funding for a proposed 
research trip to Iran and Afghanistan. Just like Emanuelson, he was unceremoniously rejected. See BoD, 
ACC/3121/E3/506/1, letter from Walter Fischel o f Hebrew University, Jerusalem, to N. Laski, president 
o f the Board of Deputies, 16 January 1934; and also file ACC/3121/B4/FI/11 entitled: “Correspondence 
with Dr. Fischel about his report on the Jews of Persia,” 1931. Fischel is just one of the contemporary 
scholars to appear in the Board o f Deputies' archives.
After World War II, the leadership o f the Board of Deputies changed to include newer immigrants 
from Eastern Europe who embraced Zionism like Selig Brodetsky, and worked to sweep away intra- 
Jewish prejudice. The destruction of European Jewry meant that the plight o f Mizrahi communities was 
taken far more seriously. The Board worked strenously to assist Jews overseas. Bernard Lewis,
(reported as being: “Head of Department o f M.E. History, School of Oriental Studies”) advised the Board 
on how help Mizrahi communities who were facing increasing hostility in the Muslim world as the 
Zionist dream came to fruition. See: BoD, ACC/3121/Cl 1/13/31, “Jews in Oriental Countries: 
Suggestions by Dr. B. Lewis,” 5-6.
51 Abraham Emanuelson, The Remnant o f the Jews (New York: privately published, 1929).
52 Emanuelson (who changed his name to Emanueli when emigrating to Palestine) represented 
Bukharan Jewry at the World Zionist Congress in Lucerne during August 1935. See BoD,
ACC/3121/E3/506/2, and author’s interview with Ben-Zion Yehoshua, Jerusalem, 15 July 2001.
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a separate group.53 These distinctions do not seem to have hindered Emanuelson, who 
embraced Bukharans, Afghanistanis and even Ashkenazim as his own. In 
Emanuelson’s 1929 work, he stresses the importance of gathering the Jews of Asia and 
Africa in Eretz Yisrael “to start building the Third Temple.”54 There is a religious, 
national, and humanitarian duty to help Mizrahi Jewry.
Our attitude towards our co-religionists in Asiatic, African, and Eastern 
European countries must be the attitude of a father toward his illiterate 
children. He must educate and help them all and not make any favorites 
among them. This is his duty and he cannot avoid it.55
Emanueison presents an interesting twist to the idea of white man's burden. In his 
interactions with the Board of Deputies in the 1930s, he comes across as being far more 
empathetic to the plight of the Jewish refugees and settled Jewish community in 
Afghanistan than many others, as one might expect considering his background.56
Comparisons with Mashhadi Jewish Experience
The literature surrounding the experiences of the Jews of Mashhad is considerably
C 7
larger than that for Afghanistani Jewry. The present author has relied upon a 1992 
literature review of works in Russian by M.S. Kupovetsky. Kupovetsky says that the 
historiography of the Jews of Iran and Afghanistan before they migrated to Central Asia 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is fragmentary.58 However, several 
relevant works have been recently published in English. These include Raphael Patai's 
Jadid al-Islam: The Jewish "New Muslims" o f Meshhed, and a privately published work
53 Interview with Itzhak Bezalel, 4 July 2001, Jerusalem, see also his “ ’Edah b ’fnai \Atsmah” in 
P e ’amim 79 (spring 1999): 15-40.
54Emanuelson, 19.
55 Ibid, 24-5.
56 See BoD files: ACC/3121/B4/EM/3 and ACC/3121/C 12/4 Abraham Emanueli (Binyamina) to 
Sir Herbert Samuel (London), 28 January 1935.
57See for example: Re’uven Kashani, Anusei Mashad (Jerusalem: Va’ad Adat ha Sefardim, 1979) 
and Amnon Netzer, “Korot Anusei Mashad VfiYa ’akov Dilmaniyari’ (The History o f  the Forced 
Converts o f Mashad according to Ya’akov Daylamgan) in Pe'amim 42 (winter 1990): 127-156.
58 M.S. Kupovetsky, “Evreii iz Mesheda i Gerata v Srednei A zir  in Ethnograficheskoe Obozreniye 
5 (September/October 1992): 55.
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by Azaria Levy.59 Levy’s section on the expulsion of Jews from Herat is of particular 
importance to the present work, as he shows there was a historical precedent for the 
Jewish expulsion within Afghanistan, and describes the effects of war on this 
beleaguered minority.
Patai's Jadid al-Islam is a popular history of the Jews of Mashhad from their 
settlement in the 1740s to their emigration and dispersion over two hundred years later. 
He mentions Afghanistan, but only in so far as it pertains directly to Mashhadi 
experience. More helpful is a chapter where original ethnographic research on the 
Mashadi community in Jerusalem is presented. Patai offers a translation of memoirs 
written by Farajullah NasrullayofFLivian in 1944.60 Perhaps the most important aspect 
of this section is an account of Jewish business practices in the region. Through 
Livian’s descriptions, both oral and written, one gains an understanding of ethnic 
identity and markers for a people who were tightly bound, yet spatially diffuse. This 
account supplements knowledge about the Jewish experience in Afghanistan, as most 
of Afghanistan’s modem Jewish community fled Mashhad in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. However, they retained a similar dialect of Juedo-Persian, cooking 
styles, religious rituals, and business practices.
Israeli Secondary Sources
Apart from those already mentioned, almost all secondary sources about the Jews 
of Afghanistan have been written in Hebrew. While two works are published in 
English, Afghanistan: The Synagogue and the Jewish Home and Brides and Betrothals: 
Jewish Wedding Rituals in Afghanistan both are translations from Hebrew and 
concentrate on religious and cultural practices.61 Only one chapter in each book is 
devoted to the history of the community. Ben-Zion Yehoshua-Raz’s MiNidhei Yisrael
59Raphael Patai, Jadid al-Islam: The Jewish "New Muslims" o f  Meshhed (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1997) and Azaria Levy, The Jews of Mashad (Jerusalem: privately published, 1998)
60Patai, 112.
61 Zohar Hanegbi and Bracha Yaniv, Afghanistan: The Synagogue and the Jewish Home 
(Jerusalem: Center for Jewish Art, Hebrew University, 1991); and ed. N o’am Bar ‘am-BenYossef, Brides 
and Betrothals: Jewish Wedding Rituals in Afghanistan (Jerusalem: Israel Museum, 1998).
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b ’Afghanistan I ’Anusei Mashhad b ’Iran is the most comprehensive historical work, 
spanning a thousand years, 500 pages, and including a forty-page bibliography. It is by 
far the field’s most comprehensive work.62 Some of Yehoshua’s chapters were 
published first as journal articles. Unfortunately, this text must be used with caution. 
Many primary sources are reprinted verbatim, without sufficient analysis. Some of 
Yehoshua’s conclusions are not grounded in his source material, and other claims are 
problematic. Nonetheless, his work makes a significant contribution to our 
understanding of the history of the Jews of Afghanistan, and is used throughout this 
thesis, where supported by original archival material.
No’am Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef is a curator of Jewish ethnography at the Israel 
Museum, and Brides and Betrothals was published as an accompaniment to the 1998 to 
1999 exhibition on wedding customs in Afghanistan. It focused on material culture, 
and traditional rituals, many of which are no longer observed in Israel. Accompanying 
the exhibition, the journal Pe ’amim (which is devoted to researching Mizrahi 
communities) produced an issue about the Jews of Afghanistan, Bukhara, and Iran.64 
Many articles in it were based on lectures given at the museum during the exhibition. 
Itzhak Bezalel’s article is of particular importance as it describes identity formation 
among the Afghanistani community, especially after their arrival in Eretz Yisrael.65
Reuven Kashani published many small articles between the late 1950s to the mid 
1980s. He generally provides basic information about the community, its immigration 
to Israel, or holiday celebrations. Some of his works reached an English speaking 
audience through the Jewish Chronicle, though most were published in Israel,
62 Ben-Zion Yehoshua-Raz, MiNidhei Yisrael b ’Afghanistan I ’Anusei Mashhadb 'Iran (Jerusalem: 
Bialik Institute, 1992). In all other works, the author goes by Yehoshua alone, though for his opus, he 
chose to invoke the family’s original surname of Raz. It had been changed when his uncle, Yaakov Raz 
committed suicide by bleeding to death in a hospital to avoid interrogation by the British after placing a 
bomb in an Arab market. In this way, the family sought to avoid collective punishment. Interview with 
author on 15 July 2001 in Jerusalem. Ben-Zion Yehoshua also published a book of his father’s folktales 
from Herat, called: Tapuah me- ‘etz ha-da 'at: hamishim sipurei 'am mi- ‘Afghanistan (Jerusalem: Zur-Ot, 
1986).
63 See chapter 6, section entitled “Anti-Semitism and the Influence o f Nazi Ideology” for full 
details.
64 P e ’amim 79 (spring 1999).
65 Itzhak Bezalel, “ ’Edah b ’fnai ‘Etsmah” in P e ’amim 79 (spring 1999): 15-40.
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especially in the journals Mahanaim, Shevet Va ’am, and Ba-Ma ’arakhah. He also 
published a book entitled simply Yehudei Afghanistan (The Jews of Afghanistan) in 
1975. The information provided on nineteenth century history and male settlements in 
northern Afghanistan is particularly useful, and confirms Brauer’s research. Zebulon 
Kort wrote two books on folklore, and numerous articles that examine various holiday 
rituals.66 His greatest contribution to the field is the preservation of a large number of 
audio recordings of folktales recounted in Israel. Another individual, Yisrael Mishael
f \  7provides an autobiographical account of the process of immigration. This work does
not examine folklore in any detail, and spends a limited amount of time on the 
community’s settlement in Israel. Consequently, neither book is studied in detail.
Kashani, like others in the field, including Ze’ev Gul and Azaria Levy, resorted to 
printing his own manuscript, as he was unable to find a commercial publisher.68 
Apparently, the history of the Jews of Afghanistan is only of limited interest to the 
Israeli public. Perhaps this is because all the descendents of Afghanistani Jews could 
barely fill a small town. Most of the Israeli authors study their own roots and ethnic 
community. Indeed, very few outsiders have researched them, and this handful have all 
been Jewish. Some authors spent a portion of their lives in Afghanistan, while others 
were bom in Israel to parents from Afghanistan. Almost all share family and 
communal connections. The tone of their interactions can be compared to the way 
members of an extended family behave -  full of love, respect, jealousy, and even petty 
intrigue.
Historiographical Trends
As Guy Matalon states: “Most of the literature about the Jews of Afghanistan and 
Iran is inaccessible to most of the scholars who concentrate on this geographical
66 Zebulon Kort, ‘Sipurai- ‘Am m ’p i Yehudei Afghanistan (Jerusalem: D ’vir, 1983) and Bat Ha- 
Melech she-Hafechah I'Zer Prahim (Tel Aviv, 1974).
67 Yisrael Mishael, Bein Afghanistan I ’Eretz-Yisrael (Jerusalem: Va’ad Edat ha-Sefardim, 1981).
68 Reuven Kashani, Yehudei Afghanistan (Jerusalem: privately published, 1975); Ze’ev Gul, 
Kehilat Herat: 1839-1976 (Jerusalem: privately published, 1984); and Azaria Levy, The Jews o f  Mashad 
(Jerusalem: privately published, 1998).
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area.”69 All pivotal sources are published in Hebrew. Recently, key works have begun 
to be translated into English, though they are not obtained easily outside of Israel. 
Perhaps because of this difficulty, or because of disinterest, scholars of the mainstream 
history of Afghanistan mention the Jews only in passing, and without bothering to 
check their facts. One such example is the work of Louis Dupree, a prominent scholar 
of Afghanistan. His short extracts on the Jewish community are riddled with errors. In 
1980 he wrote:
Small Jewish (Yahudi) business communities with active synagogues exist 
in Kabul, Herat, and Qandahar. Many Jews initially emigrated [sic] to 
Israel, but most returned because of the discrimination they and other 
Sephardic and oriental Jews suffered under the dominant European 
Ashkenazim. Many have since emigrated to the U.S.A.70
This passage is inaccurate. The centre of Jewish life in Afghanistan was Herat, though 
by the 1930s, Kabul gained increasing importance, often through duress. Very few 
Jews lived in Kandahar. Almost all of the community immigrated permanently to 
Israel. If a handful returned to Afghanistan, they left again after the Soviet invasion in 
1979. There is a small community of Afghanistani Jews in New York, with two 
synagogues. The reasons they left Israel arguably have more to do with business 
opportunities. While intra-Jewish prejudice is a problem in Israel, perhaps twice as 
many Ashkenazim live in the United States. Mizrahim comprise a tiny fraction of the 
American Jewish population. Generally, yerida (emigration from Israel) affects thirty 
per cent of any wave of immigration. The numbers for Afghanistani Jews were far 
lower.71
Five years after publishing the above book, Dupree wrote an article on the 
ethnography of Afghanistan. He stated that the language of the Jewish community was
69 Guy Matalon, “The ‘Other’ in ‘Afghan’ Identity: Medieval Jewish community o f Afghanistan” 
found on www.afghan-web.com/historv/articles/iews.html in November 2001. It was originally 
published in Mardom Nama-e Bakhter, eds. Latif Tabibi and Daud Saba. Matalon continues that most of 
the material written on Jewish history is “saturated with folklore and little concrete, archeological 
evidence.”
70 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 111.
71 Bezalel in Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 31; and Yehoshua 1992, 306, 324.
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Hebrew, though “all speak Dari or Pashto or both.” He reported that they were
77“merchants or moneylenders” and that their “physical type is Mediterranean.” Once 
again, while some accurate information is presented, every sentence contains 
misinformation. Linguistically, Jews from Afghanistan speak a form of Judeo-Persian, 
which resembles that of the former hidden community in Mashhad. Judeo-Persian is 
like other diasporic Jewish languages in that it is written in a Hebrew script but its 
structure more closely resembles the language spoken by the region’s non-Jews (much 
like Yiddish, Ladino, and Judeo-Arabic). Outside of the home, men spoke many 
languages including Dari and Pashtu to facilitate business transactions, though they also 
spoke English, Russian, and Hebrew when necessary. While the Jewish community 
was predominantly composed of merchants and traders, most had been ousted from 
moneylending by stiff Hindu competition. However, in the 1950s, there were three or 
four Jewish foreign exchange dealers in Kabul’s money bazaar. One, Ibrahim Aranov 
immigrated to the United States in 1963, and Dupree may have known of this man.
7^Aranov’s experiences were not typical of the community. As for ‘physical type,’ this 
is open to debate, and there has been no anthropological work that studies Jews 
alongside other minorities of Afghanistan in any depth.
Another troubling work is Hasan Kaker’s Government and Society in Afghanistan 
published in 1979. While writing about the reign of ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan, his 
description of the Jewish community directly repeats the views current in the India 
Office records of the 1930s and 1940s. The author does not view these sources 
critically, though they recapitulate British intelligence reports regarding official Afghan 
attitudes.74 Kaker closely follows the opinions of his sources with very little reflection 
into their weaknesses. He repeats the prejudices of one time when explaining more
72 Ehsan Yarshater, ed. Encyclopaedia Iranica (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), s.v. 
“Afghanistan IV. Ethnography,” by Louis Dupree. Dupree characterizes the Sikh community in similar 
terms, noting that: “their basic physical type is Mediterranean, with extreme hirsuteness.”
73 Maxwell Fry, The Afghan Economy: Money, Finance, and the Critical Constraints to Economic 
Development (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 236.
4 See Hasan K. Kaker, Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign o f  Amir ‘Abd al- 
Rahman Khan (Austin: University of Texas, 1979), 149 and 282 notes 15 and 16. Kaker takes his 
information about Jews in the 1880s and 1890s directly from this source: Note on the Jews of  
Afghanistan, Squire (Kabul) to Eden (London), 29 December 1944, in IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll 3/93, 45.
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distant events. In his discussion of ‘Abd al-Rahman’s rule, he brings in material from a 
discussion of Soviet espionage at the India Office during the 1940s.75 Kaker’s work is 
often cited by others in the secondary literature, though recently some scholars have 
become more cautious about his tendency to repeat older views.76
One of the exceptions to this trend of misinformation is Vartan Gregorian's The 
Emergence o f Modern Afghanistan published in 1969. Gregorian is the only author I 
have encountered who weaves the history of the Jewish community into a larger work 
about Afghanistan. He reviews the history of the Jews in a section about cosmopolitan 
minorities, comparing their experiences to the Hindu and Armenian communities. By 
placing them in the context of urban trading minorities, a great deal of insight is gained 
about their function in a traditional economy.77 Gregorian offers a rare bibliography on 
the Jews of Afghanistan in English.78 He also states that the ancient Jewish community 
was constantly receiving waves of immigrants from Bukhara, Persia, and Georgia, and 
that they maintained contact with Russia and Europe through “ their sister communities 
in Khiva, Bukhara, Tashkent, and Samarkand.”79 However, Gregorian discards news 
reports and intelligence information about Jews in Afghanistan received in the 1930s, 
as he was unable to verify this information through the archives. He published his 
study several decades before Western records fully opened.80 Gregorian provides the 
best example of a work which includes non-Islamic groups within a general history of 
Afghanistan. However, he still leaves room for further analysis, as his work is more a 
general survey and some twentieth century archival sources were unavailable to him.
75 Kaker ascribes the expulsion of the Jews from northern Afghanistan to the presence of Soviet 
agents, just as British officials did. In many ways, Kaker is not particularly socially liberal. He claims 
that one of the reasons (along with the lack of cultivable land) that the Tajiks o f Badakhshan were poor 
was because of their 'conspicuous' practice of homosexuality, which led to smaller sized families. (185) 
His source for this piece of highly suspect demographic analysis comes from Charles E. Yate, Northern 
Afghanistan (London: William Blackwood, 1888).
76 See Richard Tapper, The Conflict o f Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (London: Croom 
Helm, 1983), 34-35. However, when discussing the subjugation of the Hazaras, Mousavi writes: 
“Kakar’s view bears a close resemblance to the very words used by Abdur Rahman himself.” (116-17).
77 Gregorian, 61.
78 It even rivals some bibliographies published in Israel. Demography and Statistics o f Diaspora 
Jewry 1920 -1970  Bibliography vol.l (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1976); and Shlomo Deshen 
Yehudim b ’Mizrah: Bibliografyah Sotziyologit Nivheret (Tel Aviv: University Institute for Social 
Research, 1978).
79Gregorian, 63-4.
80 Ibid, 346.
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As this thesis seeks to link the Jewish experience to the larger history of 
Afghanistan, general secondary sources were used, sometimes intensively, as a way of 
providing sufficient contextualisation. The literature on Afghanistan is quite 
substantial, and peaks with each new conflict or war. However, careful political 
histories based on archival materials are far more rare. This work relies on a small 
number of rigorous studies. Jonathan Lee presents a revised picture o f 4 Abd al-
01
Rahman’s rule (1880-1901) which examines the roots of later inter-ethnic strife.
o9
Senzil Nawid looks at the reforms of Amanullah from the perspective of the ulama. 
Robert McChesney presents a Hazara scribe’s account of the reign of Habibullah 
Kalakani in 1929.83 The most eminent historian of Afghanistan currently working in 
English is Ludwig Adamec. His books are a pivotal source in understanding the 
political history of Afghanistan during the first half of the twentieth century.84 While 
Milan Hauner examines Indian politics during World War II, his use of German
QC
archives helps to paint a far clearer portrait of Hitler’s goals in the region. Used in 
conjunction with Documents on German Foreign Policy, his work helps to illuminate 
the extent of Nazi activity in Afghanistan during the war years.
The Jewish community was predominantly involved in commercial activities. 
Consequently, the economic climate in the 1930s and 1940s will be presented in some 
detail, by drawing heavily upon archival sources, particularly the India Office. 
However, there is a small secondary literature about Afghanistan’s economy, found 
mainly amongst journal articles written in the late 1940s and 1950s. These works are
81 J.L. Lee, The 'Ancient Supremacy’: Bukhara, Afghanistan, and the Battle for Balkh, 1731-1901 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996).
82 Senzil K. Nawid, Religious Response to Social Change in Afghanistan 1919-1929: KingAman- 
Allah and the Afghan Ulama (Costa Mesa: Mazda, 1999).
83 Robert McChesney, Kabul Under Siege: Fayz Muhammad’s Account o f  the 1929 Uprising 
(Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1999).
84 Ludwig Adamec, Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century (Tucson: 
University of Arizona, 1974) and Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History (Berkeley: University 
o f California, 1967). A bibliography charting Afghanistan’s political history says simply: “The 1921-47 
gap has been filled by the ambitious work o f L.W. Adamec.” Ehsan Yarshater, ed. Encyclopaedia 
Iranica. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), s.v. “Afghanistan X. Political History,” by D. 
Balland.
85 Milan Hauner, India in Axis Strategy: Germany, Japan, and Indian Nationalists in the Second 
World War (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981).
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more complete than modem sources as the authors had access to Afghan governmental 
records which were later destroyed. They include Peter Franck’s work, and an article
or
by a former employee of the Afghan National Bank, Vladimir Cervin. This is
supplemented by Maxwell Fry’s book, which sketches developments in the 1930s and 
1940s as a way of introducing the processes of development in the 1950s and 1960s.87 
These works are helpful because they supplement archival records, and enlarge a 
picture often encumbered by details. Once again, Gregorian’s book presents important, 
basic information. Unlike most authors, he devotes sections to Afghan economic 
policy, and its sociological consequences during all of the time periods examined.
(Less emphasis is placed on political causation during the time period, though as noted, 
Gregorian was writing without the benefit of a fully open archival record.) This study 
explores the political causes and societal costs of economic policies, especially 
monopolisation. It is original in its detailed examination of the economic history of the 
Jews of Afghanistan.
Archival Sources
Communal Jewish archives may not be as strictly organised as government 
repositories, and the cultural dimensions and peculiarities of Jewish archives restrict the 
availability of documents. However, the religious injunction against the disposal of 
paper with the name of G-d written upon it has many interrelated effects. It became 
difficult to throw away any important piece of paper, and often, large numbers of 
documents were preserved in this manner. Perhaps the best-known result of this was 
the discovery of the Cairo Geniza early in the twentieth-century. This repository 
preserved a thousand years of history, highlighting commerce of the Mediterranean in 
particular. The official representative of British Jewry, the Board of Deputies collected 
and generated an encyclopaedic range of materials. Founded in 1760, as a joint venture
86 Vladimir Cervin, “Problems in the Integration of the Afgan Nation,” Middle East Journal 6:4 
(Autumn 1952): 400-416; Peter G. Franck, “Problems of Economic Development in Afghanistan” part I: 
The Impact of World Conditions, Middle East Journal 3:3 (July 1949): 293-314, and part II: Planning 
and Finance, Middle East Journal 3:4 (October 1949): 421-440; and “Economic Progress in an Encircled 
Land” Middle East Journal 10:1 (Winter 1956): 43-59.
87 Maxwell J. Fry, The Afghan Economy (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974).
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between the Ashkenazi and Sephardi communities of London, records are available 
from 1830. The Board often intervened to assist Jewish communities overseas, and 
could sometimes influence British governmental policy. Although only loosely 
organized, this archive is an invaluable source for Judaic and diasporic history. The 
present study only touches upon the riches available.
The records for the Board of Deputies of British Jews (BoD) are stored at the 
London Metropolitan Archives. In-coming and out-going correspondence of the Board 
is preserved, as well as some letter drafts, and notes summarising previous policy 
written for the benefit of later staff. The Board of Deputies’ archives contain detail of 
intra-Jewish communal activity, as well as the relationship between the Board and the 
Afghan Ambassador in London, the British Foreign Office, and its Legation in Kabul. 
This archive presents intricate patterns of correspondence. For example, one file has 
letters from Bukharan Jewish refugees in Kabul that were smuggled out to Peshawar, 
and then transmitted to the Bukharan community in Jerusalem, who passed them to the 
Bukharan Jews in London.88 This group would translate the document (if written in 
Judeo-Persian) or submit it directly to the Board of Deputies if already in English.
Later, the letter could be passed on to the Foreign Office, who contacted the British 
Legation in Kabul; thus completing the cycle. As far as I am aware, no other researcher 
has delved into the Board’s archives on Afghanistan. While Audrey Burton examined 
this vast cache of documents at the London Metropolitan Archives, she only mentions it
89m passing.
Scholars have made much more use of the holdings of the India Office Library 
(IOL). One of the most valuable files on the Jews of Afghanistan contains more than 
three hundred pages that deal solely with the situation of the Jewish refugees and 
residents there in the 1930s. Material in the Public Records Office (PRO) often 
overlaps with that found in the India Office. However, the records this author viewed
88 See BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1 and 2 and Appendix 1 for a diagram of the patterns of Jewish 
correspondence in the 1930s.
89 “The plight of the Bukharan Jews stranded in Persia and Afghanistan in the early 1930s is fully 
documented and makes sad reading, but it would take too long to recount.” Audrey Burton, “Bukharan 
Jews, ancient and modem,” Jewish Historical Studies 34 (1994-6): 63.
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were compiled by date not by subject. Thus, collating material was far more time- 
consuming. Records about the Jewish community were grouped with many other 
subjects, spanning topics as diffuse as exchange rates and frontier intrigues. British 
archives contain a large amount of detailed information about Afghanistan’s political 
and economic situation. It was of pivotal strategic importance to the empire, as this 
country guarded the way to India.
The diplomatic archives at the French Foreign Ministry in Paris, Quai d’Orsay 
(Qd’O) offer a different perspective. French diplomatic officials sent home less 
quantitative information, and tended to concentrate on analysing the origins and 
meanings of events. Curiously, the French Foreign Minister was highly critical of his 
Kabuli Legation in 1936. He felt that it was only an observation post, which did not 
have any political or economic influence.90 Indeed, this lack of activity made the 
reports sent to Paris more thoughtful, and French officials often spotted trends years 
before the British, who were entangled in the minutiae of frontier intrigues, and the 
fringes of imperial administration. French sources, especially those written by Gabriel 
Bonneau are particularly astute when describing events of the late 1930s. They are all 
the more helpful when used in conjunction with American sources, as the charge 
d’affaires fled Kabul in 1941, and joined the Free French in Cairo.91
The Alliance Israelite Universelle (AIU) is a similar source to the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews. This organisation built Jewish schools throughout the Muslim 
Middle East, from Morocco to Iran, often providing the first opportunity for secular 
education for Jewish (and some non-Jewish) children in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The Alliance’s head teachers and country coordinators could 
become community leaders and unofficial representatives to the central government, 
especially in Iran where the arrival of a teacher was prayed for and greeted with great
90 Quai d’Orsay, (hereafter: Qd’O) Asie 1918-1940, Afghanistan, vol. 44, Note from Foreign 
Minister (Paris), 6 February 1936.
91 United States National Archives (hereafter: USNA), General Records of the Department o f  
State, Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-44, Box 5814, 890H.00/197, Bert Fish (Cairo) to Secretary 
of State (Washington), “Notes on the Situation in Kabul,” 5 February 1941.
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joy.92 The Alliance dealt with the situation of Bukharan refugees in Iran. Their 
methods differed considerably from those of British Jews who assisted their co­
religionists in Afghanistan. The Alliance was far more content to let their ‘man on the 
scene’ take the measures he deemed necessary, whereas the Board of Deputies 
maintained executive control from London. Occasionally, the secretary of the Alliance 
would offer critiques after a crisis had passed; but sometimes more concern was 
expressed about standards of French orthography. The Alliance’s archives show 
similar political developments in Iran and Afghanistan. In Iran, regional governors 
wanted to take harsh punitive measures against the refugees, but the strength of the 
central government appears to have mitigated some of this brutality and so the refugees 
fared better. This distinction is all the more interesting considering that Jews fleeing 
the Soviet Union and Afghanistan met with open hostility amongst some segments of 
the Iranian Jewish population, often the Alliance and the hidden community in 
Mashhad were the only sources of assistance.
The Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (CDJC) is the repository of 
documents on the Holocaust in France. In addition to a memorial and a museum, it 
contains all of the records of Vichy’s Comissariat General aux Questions Juives, as 
well as the files for the Drancy and Compiegne concentration camps. This archive has 
information on the plight of Jews from Afghanistan and Central Asia in France during 
the war. Scholars examining the Juguti episode particularly use this archive. In France, 
Georgian, Central Asian, Afghanistani, and Iranian Jews managed to avoid the 
Holocaust by walking precariously to safety through the nascent diplomatic ties 
between the Georgian government in exile and the occupying German authorities.
92 See for example, The Alliance Israelite Universelle’s archive in Paris, (hereafter: AIU) 
microfilm roll 6, Iran (Yezd) IIC 8, letter from Habbib Nehorai (London) to AIU (Paris), 31 January 
1928. (A copy is also provided for the Israeli National Library at Hebrew University, Givat Ram, 
Jerusalem.) This correspondence includes a letter from the Jewish community of Yazd which asks 
“respected Merchants of London” for assistance in sending a teacher from the AIU. They write: “Since 
many years of hardship, toil, persecutions and real ‘Galout’ [exile] we come to understand that the only 
mean of relief is Education and Education alone.”
92 In the 1920s, the AIU even provided stationary imprinted with the following injunction: “Toutes
les letters doivent porter un num6ro d’ordre. ... Ce papier ne peut servir que pour la correspondence des 
directeiirs avec le Comitd Central.... Toutes les letters doivent commencer par les mots: ‘Monsieur le 
President.’” (“All letters must be numbered. ... This stationary can only be used for correspondence with 
the directors of the Central Committee.... All letters must start with the words: ‘Mister President.’”)
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These Georgian leaders fled the Soviet Union in the 1920s, and settled in Paris. They 
maintained some contact with Nazi officials who hoped to use them after conquering 
the Caucasus. The Georgian representatives were highly protective of their Jewish 
compatriots in France and went to extraordinary lengths to ensure their safety. They 
claimed that their fellow Georgians were not Jews but ‘ Juguti,’ who happened to 
practice the ‘Israelite’ faith. This movement spread to include the Mizrahi communities 
of the region. A series of courageous individuals created this elaborate charade, 
including Asaf Atchildi, bom in Bukhara to a Chala family.94 This archive is valuable 
in the current study as it illuminates the condition of Afghanistani Jews in Europe and 
the lengths that Afghan diplomats went to protect them.
I did not examine German archives in situ, though some sources were available at 
the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, India Office, and US National 
Archives. Instead, this work relies/the Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918- 
1945, a published compilation of documents confiscated by the allies after World War 
II.95 Mainly, they clarify the negotiations of the Minister of National Economy, ‘Abd 
al-Majid Khan Zabuli in Berlin. This helps to partially explain the actions he took 
against the Jewish community in Afghanistan.
In Jerusalem, the Central Zionist Archives (CZA) contain the files of the World 
Zionist Organisation (ha-Histadrut ha-Tzionit ha- ‘Olamit), the Jewish Agency (Sochnut 
I ’Eretz Yisrael), and other affiliated organisations including those of the Yishuv such as 
the General Council of the Jews of Palestine (Va *ad Leumi). Israeli researchers have 
examined these files intensively, but the material has seldom been presented in English.
94Chalas were Jews who had been targeted, and forcibly converted to Islam as individuals in the 
Emirate o f Bukhara. See Ehsan Yarshater, ed. Encyclopaedia Iranica (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1990), s.v. “Bukharan Jews” by Michael Zand. For the full Juguti story, see: Levi Eligulashvili 
“How the Jews of Gruziya in Occupied France were Saved” and Asaf Atchildi “Rescue o f Jews o f  
Bukharan, Iranian and Afghan Origin in Occupied France (1940-1944)” both in Yad Vashem Studies VI 
(1967): 251-281; Warren Green, “The Fate o f Oriental Jews in Vichy France,” Wiener Library Bulletin 
xxxii: [new series] 49-50 (1979): 40-50; Binyamim Ben-David, “Hatzlat Yehudei Bukhara she-b ’Paris,” 
Pe ’amim 27 (1986): 26-9; or Ahmad Mahrad, “Iranian Jews in Europe during World War II,” (in Farsi) 
in ed. Homa Sarshar, The History o f  Contemporary Iranian Jews, vol. Ill (Beverly Hills: Center for 
Iranian Jewish Oral History, Winter 1999).
95 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
1954). (Hereafter: DGFP)
45
The files of the U.S. mission to Afghanistan are held at the National Archives 
(USNA) near Washington D.C. While the records have a similar structure to British 
diplomatic sources, and document the daily operations of the American presence in 
Kabul, the emphasis is more on economic growth and development projects. Detailed 
political intelligence is far less prominent than among British sources. An American 
mission was first established in 1942, and archives from those early years are more 
personal than other records. Jokes are circulated, and details of foreign women’s 
activities and social events in Kabul are included. American diplomats maintained 
friendships with Afghan officials, and this interaction was crucial in ameliorating the 
position of the Jews during the late 1940s. Anti-Semitic slurs or stereotypes, which are 
common in British and French official documents, do not appear in the U.S. material.
This is the first work on the Jews of Afghanistan that predominantly uses archival 
material in English, both from the United Kingdom and the United States. Generally 
Israeli scholars use archival material from Israel, though Ben-Zion Yehoshua examined 
documents in the German Bundesarchiv, the Centre de Documentation Juive 
Contemporaine, and the Alliance Israelite Universelle in Paris. For Jewish history, 
large national archives like the India Office, Public Records Office, the United States’ 
National Archives, or even the Quai d’Orsay remain under utilized. Yet all of the 
major researchers in mainstream Afghan history use national archives to underpin their 
work. Once more, this shows the gulf between the Judaic and general studies of 
Afghanistan. This thesis aims to build a bridge, connecting histories that occurred 
together, but which have been remembered and recorded separately.
The following chapter examines the beginning of Jewish settlement in modem 
Afghanistan. It traces the patterns of their daily lives, specifically their role in trade, 
and the unusual domestic arrangements that supported this economic niche. Chapter 3 
discusses the historical background of Afghanistan between 1747 and 1933. It 
examines the rulers’ strategies, particularly towards minorities and the Jewish 
community when available. The economic policies of Muhammad Nadir Shah (r.
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1929-33) are viewed in detail, as they precipitated the suffering of the community. In 
the year 1933 sharp change occurred as the king was assassinated, and a refugee crisis 
engulfed the northern tier of the country. Chapter 4 discusses the impact of Soviet 
refugees upon the political and economic policies of Afghanistan. The government’s 
attitude towards Bukharan Jews who fled the excesses of Stalin had a profound impact 
on the indigenous Jewish community. Afghan authorities viewed both groups in an 
equivalent and hostile manner. They were thought to be potential Soviet spies, and 
forced to leave northern Afghanistan. This marked a radical disruption of settlement 
and employment patterns, and signalled the beginning of the demise of the Afghanistani 
Jewish community. Chapter 5 examines the rationale behind the Jewish expulsion from 
northern Afghanistan in greater detail, particularly the government’s policies of 
monopolizing wide swathes of the export and import trade. The advent of World War 
II caused anxiety for the government as Afghanistan tried to remain neutral. However, 
Afghanistan frequently used Germany’s status as a balance between the Soviet Union 
and Great Britain. Chapter 6 examines German influence in Afghanistan and how it 
impacted the Jewish community. Contacts between Afghan authorities and the Yishuv 
are discussed, along with an examination of the volatile shifts in the economy during 
the 1940s. After the war, intra-Jewish relations were transformed. While still unequal, 
the relationship between Ashkenzim, Sephardim and Mizrahim became far more 
equalitarian, as each community realised how its survival was linked to the others. 
Chapter 7 discusses the physical departure of the community, as they made contact with 
the newly established government of Israel and gradually made their way westward.
In some ways, the story of the Jewish community in Afghanistan is a microcosm 
of the convulsions of the mid-twentieth century. Their experiences precede European 
Jewish history, and simultaneously reverse fundamental assumptions within Judaic 
studies. These include the idea that only German Jewry suffered from the Third 
Reich’s early policies, and that the position of Jews in the Muslim world fell after 
World War II, with the growth of Zionism. This history shows that the situation of a 
remote Mizrahi community changed well before the creation of Israel - and the 
consequent Muslim response - endangered their continued existence.
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Chapter Two:
Jewish Settlement in Afghanistan: Origins and Customs 
Synopsis
This chapter will present information on the origins and early settlement 
of Jews in Afghanistan. It will particularly study the more traumatic events of the 
nineteenth century, which helped to shape the community. Most notably, this includes 
the forcible mass conversion of the Mashhadi Jews in 1839, and the expulsion from 
Herat seventeen years later. The second section of this chapter examines aspects of 
daily life from a more anthropological perspective, as well as the commuity’s economic 
relationships with other ethnic groups, especially the Turkmen tribes.
Theories on the Origins of Afghanistani Jewry
Reliable information about the Jews of Afghanistan before the nineteenth-centuiy 
is difficult to obtain. The ancient Jewish community was well known among horrified 
rabbis of Baghdad for its colourful heretics or freethinkers, most notably Hiwi al- 
Balkhi, who lived in the second half of the ninth century. Before the thirteenth-century, 
Afghanistan was a crossroads for many of the world’s religions. Hiwi was influenced 
by this chorus of perspectives, and wrote a polemic work that contained two hundred 
criticisms of the Bible.1 After the Mongol invasion in 1220, this record becomes 
fragmentary. For the next five hundred years, very little is known. Clearly, the Jewish 
community suffered along with the rest of the populace under successive waves of wars 
and massacres. Between the reigns of G{i£n^is Khan and Nadir Shah, there is little if 
any information about this remote group. Even data on the far larger Persian Jewish 
community are sparse. A notable exception is the pioneering work of Vera Moreen.
1 Encyclopaedia Judaica (Jerusalem: Keter, 1971), s.v. “Hiwi al-Balkhi.”
2See Vera Moreen, Iranian Jewry’s Hour o f Peril and Heroism: A Study o f  Babai Ibn Luft’s 
Chronicle (New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1987) and Iranian Jewry during the 
Afghan Invasion: The Kitab-i Sar Guzasht-i Kashan o f Babai B. Farhad (Stuttgard: Franz Steiner Verlag, 
1990).
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One way to obtain information about this group when no written evidence is 
extant is by examining religious rituals, as Zohar Hanegbi and Bracha Yaniv do in their 
work on the synagogue. Afghanistani Jews preserve ancient customs that have been 
lost among almost all other Jewish communities in the world.3 While the history of the 
Jewish community of Afghanistan can only be documented with some certainty for the 
period between the 1740s and 1980s, traces of older, unique influences were preserved 
in the religious rituals and oral culture of the community. A small number of 
individuals may have survived the isolation and endemic warfare of the region, 
transmitting specifically Afghanistani Jewish customs to later arrivals.
Another means of thinking about Jewish history in this region is to see it as 
closely linked to the geographic memory of ancient Khorasan. By examining these 
ancient delimitations, one gains a context for the migrations and ties of later centuries. 
The Jews of Afghanistan are a part of a cultural continuum that stretches from Mashhad 
to Herat, Merv, Bukhara, and Samarkand. In some ways this history has been dwarfed 
by the experiences of their more populous Mashhadi and Bukharan Jewish neighbours. 
Fischel defines Khorasan as an area whose borders were never fixed, yet included: 
Eastern Persia, Afghanistan, part of Turkestan, and Transoxiana.4 While this view only 
encompasses the political geography of the eighth to the thirteenth-centuries, and stops 
abruptly with the Mongol invasions, nonetheless, it is an important concept to grasp 
when attempting to characterise later regional history. Khorasan’s boundaries shrank 
considerably with the advent of the Safavids in the sixteenth-century, and the term “lost 
its all-embracing medieval connotation.”5 By the twentieth-century, it only 
characterised a province in northeastern Iran, which was itself only a small part of 
ancient Khorasan. Nonetheless, the wider geographical concept, which was used by the 
inhabitants of the far older area, seems to have persisted. Sayed Askar Mousavi
3Hanegbi and Yaniv, see page 22 for a discussion of the Malbush and page 33 regarding the 
custom of nine distinct lamps instead of a Hanukkiyah.
4Walter J. Fischel, “The Jews o f Central Asia (Khorasan) in Medieval Hebrew and Islamic 
Literature,” reprinted for private circulation from Historia Judaica, VII: 1 (April 1945): 30. Another 
definition for Khorasan is “... a vast country to the east of Iran, comprising the lands situated to the south 
o f the Amu-Darya ... and to the north of the Hindu kush, but embracing also politically Ma-wara al-Nahr 
(Transoxiana) and Sidjistan (Sakastana).” Encyclopedia o f Islam, 1927 ed., s.v. “Khorasan.”
5 Fischel 1945, 50.
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contends that Afghanistan was not given its current name until the second half of the 
nineteenth century.6 The country was known as Khorasan, and only changed its name 
later, under the influence of Pashtun nationalism. Mousavi contends that even today, it
• * 7may be more accurate to call non-Pashtun residents of Afghanistan “Khorasam.”
A second way of conceptualising the post-Mongol Jewish community is to see it 
as developing along the frontiers of the Safavid (1500-1736) and Mughal (1500-1857) 
empires, and the northern Uzbek khanates. During the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the territory that later became Afghanistan was governed by the Mughal 
Empire in the east, the Safavids in the west, and Uzbek khanates in the north. Both 
empires faced considerable difficulties maintaining authority over Pashtun tribes. (As 
there were few Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan, the Uzbeks did not face this 
challenge.) The Mughal leadership in Kabul found that military action was often 
unsuccessful, and instead “pursued a delicate policy of divide and rule, hoping that the 
Afghans would dissipate their energies in tribal warfare.” The Safavid strategy was far 
more intrusive and disruptive but ultimately effective. They conscripted tribesmen into 
the imperial army, placated or banished troublesome Pashtun leaders, and even 
transplanted large groups of people. For example, Shah Abbas I (1588-1624) 
transferred most of the ‘ Abdali tribe from Kandahar to Herat.8
As the Safavids rose to power during the sixteenth-century, Persian Jewry was 
divided between those living in Persia itself and the Sunni khanates. On the northern 
rim of what later became known as Afghanistan, a small Jewish presence began to 
settle, most frequently amongst the Sunni Muslim Tajik population, as these groups 
filled a similar economic niche, that of trade and mercantile activity which was, as 
Elphinstone noted, renounced by the Afghans themselves.9 This population found it 
difficult to survive, and smaller Jewish settlements were unable to interact with each
6 Mousavi, 3.
7 In justifying the use o f this term, Mousavi writes: “Khorasan was a country in whose cultural, 
economic, and political development they have taken part, without submission to domination or 
monopoly of power by any one nationality or tribe.” (Ibid, 5)
8 Gregorian, 44.
9 Mountstuart Elphinstone, An Account o f  the Kingdom o f Caubul and its dependencies in Persia, 
Tartary, and India (Graz: Akademische Druck, 1969), 312. This is a reprint o f an 1815 edition.
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other because of “the extreme animosity of warring feudal despots.”10 The 
communities became isolated and many withered away. Walter J. Fischel suggests that 
a small number of Persian Jews, followers of Sabbetai Zvi, may have emigrated after 
the Messiah failed to appear and converted to Islam in 1666. Owing to the harshness of 
their existence, Persian Jewry was particularly suspectible to messianic movements. 
After one more disappointment, they may have sought a physical escape, to lands with 
greater religious tolerance. Possibly, they settled in Georgia, Afghanistan, the cities of 
Central Asia, or even Baghdad.11 While the debacle of false prophet turned apostate 
may have caused some to emigrate, an even simpler rationale can be spotted. 
Throughout Safavid rule, but particularly during its decline, religious and secular
1 9leaders tried to “cleanse” Persia of the ritual “pollution” of unbelievers.
In the seventeenth-century, Persian Jewry was subjected to further oppression, as
1 ^Iran became even more firmly Shi’i. At first Turkmen and Sunnis within the empire 
were targeted; later non-Muslims groups, Armenian Christians, Zoroastrians, and Jews 
also fell victim. Between 1656-1662, almost all of the Jewish communities in Persia 
were forcibly converted to Shi’i Islam.14 The sole exception was Yazd where Muslim 
inhabitants came to the defence of their Jewish neighbours.15 Jews were given the 
choice of conversion, migration, or martyrdom. Very few chose to migrate, as they felt 
attached to their homeland, though small numbers did leave. This may be significant 
when assessing the birth of the modem Afghanistan! Jewish community. A small 
number of new arrivals may have had a significant impact. Few Persian Jews were 
killed for their faith except for the Farahabad community. Most instead chose the path
10 Kupovetsky, 55.
11 Walter J. Fischel, “The Jews o f Medieval Iran from the 16th to the 18th centuries: Political, 
Economic, and Communal Aspects.” In Irano-Judaica I ed. Shaul Shaked (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute, 
1982): 285. Sabbetai Zvi sent emissaries far and wide, and therefore gained a following even in Russia 
and Persia. Most followers of Sabbetai Zvi returned to normative Judaism, though some of his most 
faithful supporters also outwardly converted to Islam and are known today as D5nme.
12 This often occurred during the onset o f a Shah’s reign. See Rudi Matthee, “The Career of 
Mohammad Beg, Grand Vizier of Shah ‘Abbas II (r. 1642-1666)” in Iranian Studies 1-4:24 (1991): 27-9.
13 Vera Moreen, “The Problems o f Conversion among Iranian Jews in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries” in Studies in Islamic and Judaic Traditions, eds. William Brinner and Stephen 
Ricks (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989): 159-162.
14 Moreen 1989, 158.
15 Fischel 1982, 279.
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of the anusim (forcible conversion) while maintaining as many Jewish customs as 
possible in secret. When Muhammad Beg, Grand Vizir of Shah Abbas II (r. 1642- 
1666) fell from power in 1662, the crypto-Jewish community was allowed to revert to 
an open practice of their religious heritage upon payment of large fines.16
Jewish Settlement in Mashhad
Nadir Shah Afshaijj a^unni Turkman general who dismantled the Safavid 
dynasty from within in 1736, targeted members of the Qazvin Jewish community for 
resettlement. In this respect, his aims seem to have been somewhat more pacific than 
his forcible resettlements of large tribes throughout Persian territory. Elphinstone 
remarked that Nadir Shah, like his predecessors, used population transfers to achieve 
three objectives: punish recalcitrant groups, achieve military aims, and stimulate trade. 
The latter issue was clearly the motivation for his treatment of the Jewish community, 
as it did not pose a military threat.17 However, one may detect an underlying element 
of anti-Shi’i aggression. Nadir Shah established new Jewish and Christian 
communities in Mashhad and Kabul as a conscious affront to Shi’i sensibilities. Some 
scholars argue that the Afshari Shah was a religious reformer who showed “an amazing 
degree of tolerance towards non-Muslims.”18 Vera Moreen disputes this explanation, 
and suspects an alternative rationale, particularly regarding settlement in the holy city 
of Mashhad. She writes that the settlement of dhimmis was meant “partly to irritate the 
Shi’is ... and partly no doubt, because he would not have considered the maltreatment 
of these dhimmis as a serious loss.”19
A third explanation is that Nadir Shah did not mean for Jews to settle in Mashhad 
at all, but rather that they were stranded there after his death. Although very little 
historical documentation is available on the settlement of Jews in Mashhad, Raphael 
Patai was able to supplement it through the “practically unanimous folk tradition”
16 Moreen 1989, 159-162.
17 Elphinstone, 321-2.
18 Fischel 1982, 283.
19 Moreen 1989, 168 note 41.
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recounted by recent Mashhadi arrivals to Jerusalem in the 1940s. According to what 
Patai discovered, Nadir Shah brought back an enormous amount of precious loot after 
his invasion of India in 1740. He wanted to build a secure place to store his treasure, 
and selected an old mountain fortress, Qalat, fifty miles north of Mashhad. Indians 
reinforced this structure, and Nadir did not trust Shi’i Persians to guard his cache. He 
asked the city of Kazvin to send forty Jewish families, as they were considered more 
reliable. When Nadir was assassinated in 1747, “only seventeen of them had arrived in 
Qalat, while sixteen had only got as far as Mashhad, and the remaining seven had only 
reached Sabzawar.” Thus, the Jewish community of Mashhad was established fully 
only after the death of Nadir Shah, as the appointed families in Qalat and Sabzawar all
90joined those who had already reached the holy city.
Whatever the reasons, it is clear that large numbers of people were brought into 
Mashhad and the Khorasan province during Nadir Shah’s reign. Perhaps as many as 
60,000 families (approx. 300,000 individuals) became part of the enormous population 
transfer.21 Jews and Armenian Christians comprised a small current of this torrent.
Jewish Settlement in Afghanistan
Far less information is available on the establishment of the Jewish community in 
Kabul. Gregorian is one of the rare authors who provide information on the Kabuli 
community before 1839, as it was a very small group. The majority of the Jews in 
Afghanistan arrived in the middle of the nineteenth century, mostly settling in Herat 
after the forcible conversion of the Mashhadi community (described below). Gregorian 
confirms that Nadir Shah settled many Jews in Kabul as a way to encourage trade
99between India and Persia in 1736. While the precise number of Jews is unknown, it 
seems that Nadir Shah made an unambiguous decision to stimulate trade through the 
placement of religious minorities in strategic sites.
20 Patai 1997, 26.
21 Azaria Levy, “Evidence and Documents concerning the History o f the Jews of Mashad,” chapter 
in The Jews o f Mashad (Jerusalem: privately published, 1998), 1; citing L. Lockhart, Nadir Shah 
(London: 1938): 51-2, 54, 89, 91.
22 Gregorian, 63.
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Hindus, Armenians, and Jews were considered vital to the successful flow of
i
trade, because they were not subject to Islamic injunctions against usury, and therefore 
could lend and exchange currency.23 Evidence of the Armenian community’s 
foundation supports what is known of the reasons for Jewish settlement as well. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries, Armenian traders were found in Kabul, Herat,
| Jalalabad, and Kandahar. By 1670, they were flourishing, and less than forty years
later the Armenians managed to persuade the Mughal authorities to lift some of the 
more onerous conditions of the Pact of ‘Umar.24 One year after the arrival of Jews in 
Kabul, the Armenian community received an infusion of two to three hundred families 
also sent on Nadir’s orders.25 It seems clear that the establishment of non-Muslim 
entrepreneurial minorities was meant to encourage regional trade.
At this juncture, it is also important to stress the close links between settlement 
and trade. The modem Jewish community’s initial arrival in Afghanistan was due to 
the potential for commercial activities. Throughout the next two hundred years, as 
these opportunities narrowed, the community also shrank. Economic options became 
one of the most significant factors for this remote, and often isolated Jewish 
community. Until anusim refugees fled from Mashhad, Afghanistan’s Jewish 
population was still very small (perhaps no more than a thousand souls).
23 Ibid, 24; and Lee, 84.
24 This was a “writ o f protection” whereby non-Muslims could remain Jewish, Christian, or 
Zoroastrian by paying extra taxes, and generally behaving as a conquered people. Some restrictions were 
meant to be demeaning, like being forbidden from riding a horse, having to use rope as a belt, or wear 
two different coloured shoes. Norman Stillman, The Jews o f  Arab Lands (Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publication Society, 1979), 25-6; Bat Ye’or, Dhimmi Peoples: Oppressed Nations (Geneva: Editions de 
1’Avenir, 1978), 4. In 1870, J. Alexander described the restrictions incumbent upon the Jews in Bukhara. 
“[TJheir head-dress consists o f small caps of dark-coloured cloth, instead o f the usual turban [and] no 
Jew is permitted to ride either on horseback or on asses, within the precincts o f the towns. This 
prohibition is a very vexatious one, owing to the wretched state o f the streets in those parts during the 
rainy season. Moreover, there is no law to prevent any Mussulman from striking a Jew within the town, 
and even killing him outside the walls.” J. Alexander, The Jews: Their Past, Present, and Future: being 
a succinct History o f  G od’s Ancient people in all Ages; together with a brief account o f the origin and 
formation o f the Talmud (London: S.W. Partridge, 1870), 104.
25 Gregorian, 65.
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The Forcible Conversion of the Mashhadi Community
In 1839, the final and most definitive act of forcible mass conversion to Shi'i 
Islam occurred in Mashhad. It became known as Allah Daad or 'God Gave,' meaning 
perhaps that God gave the Muslims more converts. These Jews were never allowed to 
return to an open practice of Judaism in Persia. In March 1839, the Jewish community 
was accused of insulting the prophet Muhammad, and a riot commenced. In order to 
avoid widespread murder, the city's religious authorities intervened, and presented 
conversion as an alternative. This was accepted, and the newcomers were fittingly 
called Jadid al-Islam, or ‘New Muslims.’26
While the forcible conversion of Mashhad's Jewish community does have a 
precedent in Persian history, it also appears to be directly related to the political 
situation at that time. The riot or pogrom against the Jewish community, instigated by 
the local Shi'i population had social and economic roots, such as anger at the Jewish 
presence in Mashhad, as well as their apparent economic success without a 
demonstration of sufficient subservience.27 Yet, perhaps the most important factor was 
the war between Persia and the ruler of Herat, which precipitated British involvement 
and the First Anglo-Afghan War. In July 1837, the Qajar shah besieged Herat seeking 
to: “extend Persia's influence up to the Amu Darya and to deal out retribution to the 
slave-trading amirs of Badghis, Turkistan and Khwarazm, who had turned much ... of
A O
Khurasan into wasteland.” However, the shah was unsuccessful, and in September 
1838, after the British landed on the Persian Gulf island of Kharak, the Persians were 
forced to retreat.29
Not surprisingly, Khorasan's political and economic climate was destabilized after 
the defeat. The resulting strains meant that the fragile truce made ninety years before
26For a compilation o f all of the various accounts o f this event, see Patai 1997, 51-64.
27 “The motivation of simple robbery seems likely. ... So is the mob action, upon incitement by a 
Sayyid and without the knowledge of the leading religious authorities of the city.” Patai, 1997, 53.
28Lee, 148.
29Adamec, Dictionary o f  Afghan Wars, Revolutions, and Insurgencies (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow 
Press, 1996), 125.
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tolerating a Jewish presence in the holy city was broken. Two months after Allah 
Daad, a man simply known as Samuel wrote a note inside the binding of a prayer book 
describing the forcible conversion.
'A memorial. In the year 5599 [1839] evildoers calumnated the Jews. On 
the 12th of Nissan they broke into the camp [quarter] of the Jews and 
killed about 32 of them. The others they forced to convert - had they not 
converted, they would have killed all of them, Israelites, judges, Kohens 
and Levites. Having no choice all of them said La Ilaha ill’Allah. ... Now 
we have no other hope, unless, first, God has mercy upon us; second, King 
Messiah comes; and third, the English come and save u s ....'30
It is fascinating that the only non-divine option is British intervention. From Samuel's 
note, it seems likely that the Jews were familiar with British strength and their influence 
upon the Qajar dynasty. This hope was not unusual. Even the famous shaliah 
(emissary engaged for fundraising by the four holy communities of Tiberias, Safed, 
Hebron, and Jerusalem) sent to the Emirate of Bukhara in the early nineteenth-century, 
Joseph Maman from Tetuan, said: “ ‘Oh Lord! When will the time come that the 
followers of Jesus shall take possession of this country?’”31 In fact, British influence in 
Persia started with the Napoleonic Wars and grew throughout the nineteenth centuiy. 
Great Britain wanted to control the Southern and Eastern parts of Persia to protect 
entrance to India. Nikki Keddie writes that the British wished to assist the development 
of trade and the safety of foreigners who sought to do business. As Jews were often 
involved in trade and linked to communities far beyond the borders of Persia, they were 
early British allies. Consequently, it follows that British strength was known and 
admired among the Khorasani Jewish community.
30 Patai 1997,59.
31Jewish Encyclopedia, 1906 ed., s.v. “Bokhara.” While hoping for Christian, European political 
control, this same man did not hesitate publicly to bum a Hebrew translation o f  the New Testament. See 
Audrey Burton, “Bukharan Jews, ancient and modem.” Transactions o f  the Jewish Historical Society o f  
England,, 34 (1994-96), 50.
32 Nikki Keddie, “Iran under the later Qajars, 1848-1922,” ed. Peter Avery et al., Cambridge 
History o f  Iran: from Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, vol.7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 179-180.
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Soon after the forcible conversion, the Mashhadi community divided into two 
groups. Those known as Talebin al-Islam remained in Mashhad for up to two hundred 
years. They were wealthier crypto-Jews who had close connections with the Muslims. 
They took Persian names, went to the mosque frequently, and travelled on pilgrimage 
to Karbala and Mecca (often stopping in Jerusalem on the way back). They would 
invite Shi’i dignitaries into their homes for celebrations, and some even became 
important officials of the Great Mosque of Imam Reza. The other group was known as 
the Mitasebin and they performed the minimum of Islamic rituals necessary to avoid 
the suspicion of their Muslim neighbours. They were poorer and very devout; 
consequently, they quickly left Mashhad, fleeing into the northern desert. Some 
joined Turkmen tribes who fought against the Persians and the Emir of Bukhara, while 
others took refuge with the neighbouring Jewish communities in Khiva and Bukhara, 
and especially Herat.34
The flight from Mashhad marks the beginning of a more substantial Jewish 
community in Afghanistan, and Joseph Wolff reports that the Jadidim were able to 
bribe their way out of Mashhad.35 Others appear to have simply fled to Afghanistan 
and Central Asia.36 It is interesting to note that Afghanistan’s largest Jewish 
populations stemmed from waves of refugees, first in the 1830s they came from Persia, 
while one hundred years later, they fled Soviet Central Asia.
The Persian Siege of Herat
Many former Mashhadi anusim returned to Judaism in the closest Afghan city, 
Herat, despite the marked brutality of its ruler. Between 1839 and 1856, Herat remained
33 Azaria Levy, “Evidence and Documents Concerning the History o f the Jews of Mashad,” 
chapter in Levy 1998,10.
34Joseph Wolff, Narrative o f  a Mission to Bokhara, in the years 1843-45, to ascertain the fa te o f  
Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly, vol. 2,2nd ed. (London: John W. Parker, 1845), 157-9.
35“Mirza ‘ Askari is very fond of money, and after receiving a few tomans from a Jewish family, he 
allowed a considerable number o f them to emigrate to Herat, Yazd, and Teheran, where they live again 
as Jews.” Patai 1997, 54, citing Joseph Wolff, Narrative o f a Mission to Bokhara, in the years 1843-45 
(London: 1845), 394.
36Patai 1997, 59, citing Samad Aqa ben Yosef Dilmani. Unpublished document in the Central 
Zionist Archives, Jerusalem. Doc. no. S25/5291.
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a de facto independent state, although closely allied to Persia. In the autumn of 1855, 
Shahzada Muhammad Yusuf, the grandson of the Persian Shah Zaman, then claimed 
Herat for himself. Persia recognised the new ruler, although he was not as pliant as his 
predecessor.37
When the Afghan amir, Dost Muhammad took Kandahar in 1855, Muhammad 
Yusuf became concerned that his territory would be targeted next, and asked the 
Persian shah for help. Shah Nasir al-Din was more than happy to oblige and soon
20,000 troops arrived. With the assistance of his vizir, Muhammad Yusuf was 
overthrown. At this point, the Persian army had agreed to withdraw. However, the 
governor of Mashhad and Khorasan ordered the city gates of Herat open. When the 
townsfolk refused, the Persian army put Herat under siege from March to October 
1856. Persia then chose Ahmad Khan, nephew to Dost Muhammad Khan as Herat’s 
next leader.
Just as in 1838, Britain stopped the Shah’s military operation in Herat by attacking 
the Persian Gulf in Bushire with forces proceeding towards Shiraz in December 1856.39 
Within weeks Nasir al-Din backed down, and the Treaty of Paris was signed on March 
26th, 1857, bringing the short Anglo-Persian War to a close.40 Persia was forced to 
withdraw from Herat and abandon all future aggression against the city 41
During the Persian retreat in March 1857, the army assembled the entire Jewish 
community, ex-Jadid al-Islam and long-time residents alike. After all of their property 
was looted, hundreds of families were put in chains, and forced to walk to Mashhad. It 
was almost as if they were treated as spoils of war, especially the Jadidis who dared to 
break the law by fleeing Persia and returning to Judaism.42
37 Lee, 185,218,243,250.
38 Lee, 251 and Levy ,“The Expulsion of the Jews of Mashad from Herat, 1856-1859” chapter in 
Levy 1998, 8.
39 Levy, 9.
40 Nikki Keddie in ed. Peter Avery, et al., 183.
40 Lee, 185 and 218.
41 Gregorian, 104.
42 Levy, 1 and 9.
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After twenty days of marching, the Herati Jews were “imprisoned in a dilapidated, 
abandoned inn known as Baba Qudrat” on the edge of Mashhad. One survivor of this 
event wrote that:
Even the non-Jews cried over our fate. So numerous were the cripples, 
converts, children, poor and elderly who could not comprehend the words 
said to them, who returned their souls to God in this way — out of hunger, 
thirst, cold, the hardships of the journey, the fear of the regiment and 
(beneath) its horses.43
Estimates at that time state that between three and four hundred people died within the 
first year. Many more could have perished if it were not for the assistance of the 
annsim remaining in Mashhad, who risked their own lives to bring the prisoners food.44
The Persians claimed that the Mashhadi Jews were Persian subjects who migrated 
against the wishes of the Shah. In one letter the ruler of Herat told the British 
representative that Persia considered the Jews “deserters and traitors” who had illegally 
fled the land of their birth, committed apostasy by returning to Judaism and treason by 
aiding the Afghans and British. While this might explain part of the behaviour towards 
the once hidden community, it does not clarify the Persians’ actions against long- 
resident Herati Jews. Another rationale is that the Persians suspected them of 
collaborating both with the Herati Sunnis and with the British.45 While it is true that a 
handful of Mashhadi anusim worked for the British in the 1840s in Bukhara, the charge 
of espionage at this juncture appears to stem from misinformation.46 While the Herati 
Jews’ property had been looted, they were still required to pay a ransom of 15,000
43 Ibid, 11.
44 Ibid, 13, 16-7. A British major also helped organize a distribution of food, (see Lee, 253, ft
188)
45 Ibid, 10. “Persia refused to accept that the Herat Jews in Mashhad were covered by the terms of  
the Treaty of Paris, which required all prisoners to be returned to their homelands.” (Lee, 253, ft 188)
46Patai 1997, 65-7; and Levy, 9. Persian officers found a letter on one former Mashhadi resident 
addressed to the British in Kandahar. It protested the Persian army's treatment o f the population, which 
included robbery, rape, and murder. The officers came to their own conclusion that this letter had 
prompted the Shah's call for retreat, rather than the (then unknown) British invasion of Bushire.
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Tomans to the Persian government, while the governor of Khorasan demanded another
7,000 Tomans for his own personal enrichment.47
Two years after the mass imprisonment, Herati Jews were released following the 
intercession of daring anusim emissaries. Karbilai Ismail Dilmani and Aqa ‘ Abd al- 
Rahman Aharon pleaded their case before the shah, who gave the men an order for the 
release of the Herati Jewish community 48 The shah may not have been aware of the 
actions of his military leadership. Later, the British forced the amir of Herat to pay 
Jewish merchants 700 Tomans in compensation for the funds extorted before the 
expulsion.49 In fact, every time the property of the Jews was looted in Herat, the 
Jadidim of Mashad would send money, food, and clothing to assist them.50
However, the suffering of the Jewish community did not end with their return to 
Herat. Only four years later, in 1863, the Afghan ruler Dost Muhammad Khan 
conquered the city.51 After the capture, he looted the property of the Jews. This was 
not terribly unusual, for during difficult times, the Jewish Quarter was often attacked, 
money extorted, or notables imprisoned. Members of the community would then flee 
to the countryside.52
During the second half of the nineteenth-century, the economic role of the Jews 
declined. This was due to a deteriorating economic situation within the country, the 
incorporation of large parts of Central Asia into the Russian Empire, and increasing 
discrimination against the Jewish community in Afghanistan. Vartan Gregorian states 
that many Jews left Afghanistan secretly in the years between 1860 and 1866. Their 
activities were no longer predominantly commercial, as they were overwhelmed by
47 Levy, 14-17.
48 Ibid, 16.
49 Public Records Office (hereafter: PRO) FO/60/240 Letter from William Doria (Goolehek) to 
Charles Wood (Teheran), 17 October 1859 (received 19 Nov.) With thanks to Michael Rubin for 
bringing this file to my attention.
50 Patai 1997,71.
51 Some British officials in the mid-twentieth centuiy considered this to be the crowning 
achievement of Afghanistan's greatest ruler. See IOL L/PS/12/1321: A Survey of Anglo-Afghan 
Relations, Part I, 1747-1919, 3.
52 Bezalel in Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 20-1.
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Hindu competition. Instead, Jewish men found new roles as shopkeepers, physicians, 
chemists, distillers, or karakul traders.53
The position of the Jews was often precarious, and the nineteenth-century is rife 
with examples of death and destruction. In addition to other difficulties, the community 
could be blamed for natural disasters. In 1871, they were attacked during a famine, 
though the precise cause of this attack is unknown. Political events also left their mark 
upon the Jews of Afghanistan. In 1876, a revolt by Uzbeks in Maimana led to a 
massacre of eleven rabbis and two students. This was a great blow to the community, 
and even a hundred years later the anniversary of these men’s deaths was still being 
commemorated.54 In 1879, members of the Herati community were harmed during a 
rebellion against the British, which degenerated into a riot.55 Thousands of Jews fled to 
Persia in 1870 and 1878. In the first instance, they were forced to pay a large war tax 
(harbiyeh) and provide 300 labourers for the army. The community correctly viewed 
this as a sign of coming persecution.56 In 1878, a military draft was instituted and
2,000 Jews escaped to Persia.57 In parallel with the human destruction, the synagogues 
in Maimana, Balkh, and Herat all collapsed through neglect.58 The Jewish 
community’s position only improved during Habibullah’s reign in 1901.59
Daily Life among the Jews of Afghanistan
Most of what is known about the communal life of Afghan Jewry comes from the 
early twentieth-century, as this is the apex of their modem history in Afghanistan. The 
information about quotidian patterns comes from writings on the ethnography of the 
community, particularly the work of Erich Brauer, Raphael Patai, and No’am Bar ‘am-
53 Gregorian, 65.
54 Reuven Kashani, Yehudei Afghanistan (Jerusalem: privately published, 1975), 11.
55 Hanegbi and Yaniv,15.
56 S. Landshut, Jewish Communities in the Muslim Countries o f  the Middle East (London: Jewish 
Chronicle, 1950), 68; and Nehemiah Robinson, La Perse, L ’Afghanistan et Les Communautes Juives de 
Ces Deux Pays (New York: World Jewish Congress, 1953), 27. This document appears to be a French 
translation of the English original.
57 Hanegbi and Yaniv, 16.
58 Lee, xxix.
59 Hanegbi and Yaniv, 16.
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Ben Yossef, and mostly refers to events during the reigns of Habibullah (r. 1901-1919) 
and Amanuallah (r. 1919-1929). While these sources are limited, they provide enough 
to sketch information about the community’s basic patterns. Indeed, the specific 
restrictions imposed upon the Jewish community in the 1930s and 1940s can be 
understood only after an account of older quotidian patterns. Without an explanation of 
the centrality of trade for the Jewish community of Afghanistan, for example, it would 
be difficult to understand why being prohibited from the northern rim of the country 
was so disabling. This section will describe domestic conditions, the status of women, 
and men’s occupations, as well as communal structures, economic patterns, and 
international connections. These last factors were particularly important, as 
communication was funnelled through trade routes. Ultimately, this led to awareness 
and assistance from elsewhere, and accounts for the documentation of part of this 
history in London archives.
Like those of their Bukharan co-religionists, the houses of Afghanistani Jews 
differed from their Muslim neighbours in that there were no separate quarters for men 
and women.60 Most of the life of women and children took place in the home. In 
Herat, between three and seven nuclear families shared one large household that 
consisted of a two- or three-storied residence built around a courtyard. The house was 
divided into summer and winter quarters (on the north side, ground floor, or on the 
south side, first floor, respectively) and contained a courtyard with a well, storage 
rooms for food, firewood, a small garden, a chicken coop, and a shed for cows or sheep. 
The men would buy large quantities of staple foods that would be stored in adobe silos. 
Often homes were built so close together that it was possible to pass from the roof of 
one to another without descending into the street. Roofs were also actively used in the 
summer months for socializing or sleeping.61
60 Valery Dymshits,ed. Facing West: Oriental Jews o f  Central Asia and the Caucasus (Zwolle: 
Waanders Uitgevers, n.d. [1997?]), 64.
61 Bar ‘am- Ben Yossef, 33-4.
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Betrothal and Marriage Customs
Jews would marry very young, even younger than their Muslim neighbours. A 
woman could die at thirteen while giving birth, or conversely, become a great 
grandmother at forty.62 If a family lost several children, at the next birth a mock 
marriage between an elderly person and the infant would be held. This would be done 
to trick the evil eye.63 At every festival, the parents would send customary gifts to the 
elderly individual, as if s/he were really engaged to the child. Early marriage guarded 
against assimilation.64 This may have been more common among the Herati 
community as many of them came from Mashhad. When they were leading crypto- 
Jewish lives in Persia, parents would betroth their infants as a way of preventing 
marriage, or conflicts over arranging marriages, with normative Muslims. They were 
even known to make provisional arrangements during a woman’s pregnancy.65 Patai 
tells the story of how one girl in Mashhad was not married by age eight. One night the 
head of the community came to her father and told him to marry her off immediately in 
case a Muslim family were to enquire after her. She was married before turning nine to 
a young man of seventeen. However, several years passed before the marriage was 
consummated, and she did not give birth until age sixteen.66 In other parts of 
Afghanistan, the community did not feel under such pressure; and marriages would be 
conducted with young men older than fifteen, and young women aged nine to 
fourteen.67 Just as in Mashhad, when marriages occurred between children, the 
relationship would not be consummated immediately.
One of only two books translated into English about the Jews of Afghanistan 
examines wedding customs in detail. As these sources are more easily available to a
62Gershom Gorenberg, “Territory of Myth,” Jerusalem Report, 16 July 1992,49.
63 In a similar vein, Brauer reports that while Kurdish Jews did not “marry o ff’ babies thought to 
be in danger other measures were taken to trick the evil eye. These include “selling” the child to a 
female relative, or pretending that the baby is a pauper, or even symbolically trading the baby for a 
puppy. Brauer 1993, 172-3.
64 Bar’am-Ben Yossef, 43.
65 In the early 1940s, Brauer reported that his informant, Abraham Shabetai said that “just before 
his birth his father said to his uncle, who had an infant daughter, ‘If a son is bom to me I should like to 
marry him to your daughter,’ and in due time the match was arranged.” Brauer 1942, 127.
66 Patai 1997, 232.
67 Brauer 1942, 127, and Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 43.
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Western audience, only a brief sketch of the elaborate rituals will be provided here. 
Unlike the practice in Muslim communities, great pains were taken to ensure that the 
expenses of the wedding festivities were divided equally between both families. The 
bride’s mother would prepare “clothing, bathing and cosmetic accessories, curtains, 
tablecloths, bedding, pillows and pillowcases, fabrics and sewing items, and kitchen 
and serving utensils, as well as personal gifts to the bridegroom.” The groom’s mother 
would arrange “jewelry, dresses, scarves, fabrics, part of the bedding, and other
/ 'O
furnishings of the room set aside for the couple.” The groom’s family would pay for 
the expenses of the bride’s party at the hammam, just as the bride’s family paid for 
groom’s hammam expenses. Two betrothal ceremonies or shirinikhori (literally ‘eating 
the sweets’) would be held, one at the bride’s house, and one at the groom’s. This was 
similar to the Muslim ceremony called shirinbori (‘cutting the sweets’) common 
throughout Central Asia and Afghanistan.69
Many Jewish ceremonies resembled those of their Muslim neighbours. The 
custom of decorating the bride’s forehead with sequins is thought to hearken back to 
the fashions of the early nineteenth-century Qajar court. However, Uzbek and Tajik 
brides also share similar customs.70 Other Jewish practices were unusual. For a year 
before the wedding, the groom’s female relatives spent a great deal of effort pleasing 
the betrothed girl. Special gifts and trays of decorated food were sent to the bride on 
every religious holiday (with the exception of Rosh Hashana and Passover, as there was 
too much work for the women to complete). On Purim, a brightly painted white hen, 
with cloth ‘shoes’ was sent to the bride, and would remain with her until her first child 
was bom. The hen was given to amuse the very young bride and her family.71 It was 
treated somewhat like a pet, perhaps serving as a way for her to practice mothering 
skills.
68 Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 51-52.
69 Ibid, 43-45.
70 Ibid, 61-65.
71 Ibid, 48-51.
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A week before the wedding, the groom and his family would spend the night in 
the bride’s home, and they would all attend Sabbath services together. On the night 
before the wedding, the henna ceremony was performed in the bride’s house. This was 
similarly elaborate to the party held after the wedding in the groom’s house. The 
religious ceremony itself was conducted in the bride’s house, and then she would be led 
in a festive procession to the groom’s residence. With the exception of the first two 
nights, the bride’s mother would stay with her daughter and new in-laws during this
77 • •week of wedding festivities. Perhaps this was to ease her young daughter’s transition. 
Aharon Bezalel recalls his older sister’s wedding, and being invited to breakfast with 
her and her bridegroom.73 “A tablecloth spread on the carpeted floor was set with a 
tray of fragrant, freshly baked bread and cups of sweet tea. I will never forget the cozy 
tranquility I felt in that room.”74 These rituals helped to keep a small community 
united, as the responsibility for the various ceremonies was shared. Many of the 
customs that the Jewish community performed were similar to those of the surrounding 
Muslim population.
Women’s Experiences
While the entire Jewish community of Afghanistan voluntarily separated itself 
from the larger populace, this situation was far more extreme for women and children. 
They seldom left their courtyard - let alone the Jewish quarter.75 Women did not visit 
their parents very frequently, and would only leave the mahalla or neighbourhood 
several times a year, generally to picnic or visit gardens especially in the days after 
Passover or Shavuot.76 Erich Brauer describes the women that he interviewed in 
Jerusalem as very anxious.77 However, they differed from Muslim women as they 
mixed freely with the men in their homes. In the streets, however, they wore a dark
72 Ibid, 51,67-8.
73 While no date is provided, it is my estimation that this wedding would have occured in the 
1920s or early 1930s, as the author is now an elderly man.
74 Aharon Bezalel, “A Wedding in the Family: Childhood Memories” in ed. Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef,
122 .
75 Robinson, 28.
76 Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 95; and Brauer 1942, 137.
77 Brauer 1942, 131.
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blue burqa to avoid trouble.78 At this time, Muslim women wore a white burqa so that 
the Jewish women, while veiled, were instantly recognizable, and thus very vulnerable. 
Muslim women also had a similarly circumscribed life, yet without the chronic fear of
• 70being attacked or kidnapped on the street under religious pretense.
Jewish women’s lives revolved around household chores performed communally 
in the courtyard, such as grinding flour, cooking, baking and washing, as well as 
spinning, sewing, embroidery, and knitting. They made objects for domestic purposes, 
and festive and ceremonial occasions; they especially concentrated on preparing their 
daughters’ trousseaus. Women made clothing for themselves and their children as well 
as some items for the men and the family’s linens including pillowcases, blankets, 
curtains, and assorted bags. Sewing was a social occasion especially in the preparations 
for Rosh Hashanah and Passover, when all family members received a new outfit, three 
months before a wedding, and when a woman was in the third month of her 
pregnancy.80
Several occupations were available to Jewish women in Afghanistan, they either 
made goods for outsiders or performed a role for the benefit of the Jewish community. 
The most common form of employment was the manufacturing of silk thread that 
would then be sold and sent to Persia. Perhaps women also engaged in other cottage
o 1
industries, as did the Jews of Mashhad, who produced silk clothes for the Turkmen. 
Arguably, the most interesting role was that of a mashhade or literally a hair comber. 
These women were beauticians and advisors who accompanied the bride at all times in 
the three days before her wedding, and helped her prepare physically and emotionally 
for this great change. They were skilled with their hands, yet the mashhade's role was 
not limited to wedding preparations. She also delivered babies, took care of sick 
children, embroidered, spun, and wove cloth, and decorated the sugar cones that were
78 Rudolf Lowenthal, The Jews o f Bukhara (Washington D.C., Central Asian Collectanea, 1961),
9.
79 Brauer 1942, 132.
80 Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 34 and 95.
81 Azariya Levy, “Azizallahoff-Levy Family -  A History,” chapter in Levy, 40-1.
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an integral part of wedding ceremonies. A similar female role was also found in Jewish 
communities in Georgia, Yemen, and Cochin, India.
The mashhades were often widows who had to support themselves. Poor widows 
would struggle with having enough to eat. Divorce was unheard of, and men would be 
publicly shamed or threatened with excommunication if they asked for one. Instead,
o - l
and especially if no male children were bom, they would take a second wife. While 
this custom ended 1,000 years ago among the Ashkenazim, it remained an occasional
QA
practice into the twentieth century among Jews in the Muslim world. As for women 
married unhappily, they normally suffered, but no change occurred. However, No’am 
Bar ‘am-BenYossef writes “despite the absence of protected rights and independent 
means of sustenance, women generally had an honored position and influence in the 
family.”85 While such a statement is difficult to assess, it is certainly true that men 
would often travel for long amounts of time, leaving the women in charge of a female- 
centred household. This may have provided the women with more autonomy and 
control.
In many cases, women would give birth every year, and the infant mortality rate 
was very high -  perhaps half of the infants did not survive. There appears to have been 
a very meagre tradition of indigenous medical practices, and most rituals were done 
solely to keep away evil spirits. When a woman discovered her pregnancy, she would 
invite guests over and have a ceremony conducted during which an amulet was created 
to preserve her until the birth of her infant.
In the 1930s, children’s lives were even more circumscribed than those of the 
adult women. In the 1940s, some boys who recently arrived in Jerusalem told Erich
82 Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 55.
83 Brauer 1942, 132.
84 In Israel, new immigrant Jewish men from Muslim countries are allowed to keep second wives 
they married before arrival, though they are forbidden from taking any more wives. This was especially 
common among Yemeni immigrants during the 1950s. See Sholom Barer, The Magic Carpet (London: 
Seeker and Warburg, 1952).
85 Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 25.
86 Brauer 1942, 132.
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Brauer that they would not even dare to go out of their courtyard for fear of the Muslim 
children who taunted and threw stones at them. Yet, their childhood occurred during a 
time of crisis for the community. Earlier generations were not as terrorized. One 
informant explained how her grandfather was taken north as a child. In the early years 
of the twentieth-century, he lived with his father, and accompanied him on trading 
missions, often into Russia, and once as far west as France. He spoke seven or eight 
languages and was educated in a traditional Jewish school. This man’s son did not 
travel during his childhood, as he was bom in 1935, after numerous restrictions 
commenced.87
Boys started their private, religious education at three or four years of age and 
could continue to fifteen or sixteen. They learned to read and translate the Bible, 
prayers, and the Mishna, as well as some rudimentary arithmetic. Upon completion of 
their education, the young men could read the weekly Torah portion. Until 
Amanullah’s reign in the 1920s, Jewish girls received no education and remained 
illiterate. The present author did not hear of any girls who learned to read at home, 
though this occurred in many other communities. Instead, girls’ primary tasks were 
assisting their mothers with household duties and childcare.88
M en’s Lives
The structure of Afghan families was strongly patriarchal, and Kashani reports
OQ
that until the 1940s, “the father was the sole arbiter whose word was law.” Perhaps 
more metaphorically revealing was the way food was portioned out at dinner.
The men reclined against cushions placed on mattresses. The women sat 
opposite, on carpets but not on mattresses, a long tablecloth (sofre) 
separating them from the men. The food ... was brought by the women to 
the head of the household. He served and no one dared comment if he 
happened to skip anyone ... First to be served were the men, then the
87 Interview with Shulamit Ambalu, London, 30 December 1998. Ms. Ambalu’s father 
immigrated to Israel with his family in 1948.
88 Ibid, 133-4.
89 Kashani 1961,25.
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sons, and only then the women and small children. A menstruating 
woman sat at some distance from the others, wearing special clothes and 
eating from separate utensils.90
All Jewish men prayed communally three times a day as religiously proscribed and 
socially enforced. For example, throughout the community’s settlement in Herat,“[i]f, 
by chance, someone didn’t come, he received a visit in order to find out why he was 
missing.”91 When praying, the men would remove their shoes, and sit on carpets or 
mats. Only in the 1920s were benches placed in the synagogue. After services, the 
men would form groups to study the Torah, Rashi, Talmud, and Kabbalah.92 Seating 
was arranged by social standing, so that the most prominent members sat closest to the
O ' XTorah scrolls. When several additional synagogues were established, one of them 
was reserved for those who belonged to the highest social group.94
Communal Structures and Social Control
As seating in the synagogue demonstrates, the Afghanistani Jewish community 
was rigidly stratified, despite its tiny size. Each level was shaped by its group’s origin 
and dialect. The top stratum was composed of Mashhadis who fled forcible conversion. 
They spoke a dialect of Persian called Gilaki, and became prominent merchants and 
rabbis. Curiously, the Mashhadis who left after 1839 were poorer; since they had little 
to lose, they risked the escape from Persia. The wealthier members of the community 
remained Jadid al-Islam.95 In the middle of the social hierarchy in Afghanistan was the 
small indigenous community, and on the lowest rung were the poorest individuals who 
mainly came from Yazd, and spoke the Persian of that city. One of Herat’s two Jewish 
schools was reserved for this group.96
90 Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 37.
91 Ibid,27.
92 Kashani 1961, 25.
93 Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 27
94 Bezalel 1999, 23.
95 Levy, 10, and Patai 1997, 205.
96 Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 25; and Bezalel 1999, 23.
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Internal communal affairs were organized by a hevra, a group composed of the 
heads of important families. They were responsible for educating the boys, assisting
07the poor, burying the dead, enforcing religious laws, and resolving conflicts.
Individuals could be punished for desecrating the Sabbath or other religious laws.98 
The community was led by the head rabbi, and in Herat, he came from the Gaiji family. 
In contrast to the dispute resolution of the Muslim majority, disagreements were never 
brought before governmental officials or judges. Instead, both sides were forced to 
accept the finality of the rabbi’s ruling. This could include fines, and harsh physical 
punishments like the use of the fallaq or bastinado, which would be hit against the 
offender’s feet. If an individual wanted to bring Jewish communal matters to the 
attention of the larger Muslim society, he was threatened with a type of 
excommunication.99 This included being denied access to the synagogue, shunned by 
all members of the Jewish community, and ipso facto a loss of livelihood.100
Brauer describes the following case involving the death of a child. While playing, 
a twelve-year-old threw a rock at another boy, and killed him accidentally. The father 
of the dead child wanted to involve the Afghan authorities, but was convinced to let the 
hevra or communal council mediate. For his part, the father of the boy who threw the 
stone, a butcher, refused to pay the thousand rupee fine. Consequently, the father was 
excommunicated. “This ban deprived him of his very livelihood, for no Jew would buy 
meat from him, and he was eventually forced to submit.”101 These types of sanctions 
forced individuals to abide by the decisions of the hevra and rabbi. This prevented 
Muslim authorities from using these divisions to insist that the guilty party convert to
1 (Y)Islam, as happened in Bukhara.
97 Hanegbi and Yaniv, 17.
98 Robinson 1953, 30.
99 Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 25; and Bezalel 1999, 20.
100 Robinson, 30.
101 Brauer 1942, p.135.
102 See Burton for various instances of forcible conversion.
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Peddlers and Merchants
In 1919, Amanullah banned the Jews from all occupations except trading. This 
author could not determine Amanullah’s rationale for this decision, though it may have 
had something to do with regulating the position of Jews in society. Clearly, nationalist 
currents had not yet arrived, as it was still considered unseemly for Muslims to be 
engaged in middlemen pursuits. With the establishment of government monopoly
icompanies by the mid-1930s, the Jewish community was prevented from trading. 
Ultimately, these regulations led to the end of a Jewish presence in Afghanistan, as 
most of the community was involved in commerce.
Before delving into the policies of Muhammad Hashim Khan’s regency, it is 
important to understand the economic activities of the Jewish community. The poorer 
members were peddlers who sold their goods in rural areas, and also served as 
intermediaries between the tribes, enabling nomadic groups to sometimes solve their 
conflicts peaceably. Members of the middle class were merchants who imported 
textiles and medicines, and exported skins, furs, and carpets.104 They set up shop in the 
city bazaars or in caravanserais in the outlying areas. The Jews faced stiff competition 
from the Hindu community who pushed them out of changing money and the wholesale 
trade in medicines by the early twentieth century.105 As a result, they diversified into 
shopkeepers, doctors, druggists, and distillers.106
With the advent of a system of government monopolies, Jews found it difficult to 
maintain their previous livelihood patterns. In order to survive, they learned new 
trades, becoming tailors, shoemakers, carpenters, tinsmiths, and tanners.107 By 1944, 
the British reported that half were involved in retail sales, like selling cotton clothing,
103 Landshut 1950a, 68.
104 Hanegbi and Yaniv, 16.
105 Fry, 236.
106 Gregorian, 64-5.
107 Hanegbi and Yaniv, 16.
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tea, spices, and candy; one-quarter were small brokers or servants; five per cent owned
1 ORland, mostly vineyards around Balkh; and twenty per cent were unemployed.
The Jewish community in Afghanistan was founded and shaped by the exigencies 
of long-distance trade. Along with their Hindu counterparts, Jewish merchants reached 
remote regions and sold goods to feuding tribes. Often the Jewish traders would be the 
only ones allowed into disputed areas, as they were neutral and not attached to any 
tribal group. In order to provide for this economic niche, unusual domestic 
arrangements developed. Men would depart for long periods of time from Herat, as the 
journey would have involved too many risks for the entire family to take. After 
travelling along the caravan routes, they would live in smaller towns like Maimana and 
Qal’a Nau, in all-male Jewish caravanserais. They would remain there for much of the 
year, returning to the cities only occasionally. On the eve of Rosh Hashana and 
Passover, caravans would arrive at the gates of Herat bringing men home to their 
families.109 However, some men only returned every few years for several months. 
There were even cases of men who left soon after marriage, and didn’t return until 
grown sons came to bring them home.110 In these settlements, the men cooked, ate, and 
prayed together.111 As mentioned, a similar phenomenon was found among Hindus 
who also lived in all-male caravanserais. In Bukhara, Hindus traded tea and indigo 
from India, as well as local silk, cotton, rice and wheat. They also lent money 
especially to solders.112 The unusual demands of economic sufficieny in a niche c
reshaped the social and cultural norms for these entrepreneurial minorities.
Other communities found similar economic arrangements viable. Another 
religious minority, an Islamic sect called the Ibadi were settled in southern Algeria and 
Jerba, Tunisia, though the men were engaged as merchants in the northern part of these 
countries. Women were not allowed to accompany the men, who only returned home
108IOL L/PS/12/1660,45. Note on the Jews of Afghanistan, 29 December 1944.
109 Gorenberg, 49.
110 Brauer 1942, 123-4.
111 Hanegbi and Yaniv, 16.
112 Vitaly Naumkin, Bukhara: Caught in Time: Great Photographic Archives. Compiled by Andrei 
G. Nedvetsky (Reading: Garnet, 1993), 59 and photograph 60.
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for short periods of time, and then later to retire in old age. Walter Zenner describes
I 1 *5 ' ^
them as “classic sojourners.” Other Jewish communities also followed similar 
domestic and economic arrangements.114 Habbani Jews in the Yemen also engaged in 
regional commerce. All the men in this community were silversmiths who wandered 
between Aden and the edges of Wadi Hadramaut selling their jewellery. They would 
also come home only for Tishri (the month of holidays which commences with Rosh 
Hashanah, the new year) and Passover. In order to keep safe from harm while on the 
road, the Habbani formed alliances with local leaders and tribes.115 Similar patterns of 
alliance were less formalized in Afghanistan, and consequently Jews were more 
endangered. For example, when an English visitor to Balkh asked Bukharan Jews 
about those in Afghanistan in 1880, they replied that: “Their condition is extremely 
unfavourable, since they are completely at the mercy of the numerous princes who deal 
with them as they please.”116 Despite this vulnerability, it is clear that relations were 
close with Turkmen tribes. This will be explored in the next section.
Itzhak Bezalel states that while the three communities of Bukharan, Afghanistani, 
and Mashhadi hidden Jews are all interconnected, the latter two groups are more
117closely linked through dialect and custom. For example, Afghanistani and Mashhadi 
dialects of Judeo-Persian are far closer to each other, than either is to Bukharan Judeo- 
Tajik. This may be because the Bukharans were strongly influenced by Russian and 
Soviet linguistic policies. Perhaps the most detailed description of the all-male trading 
settlement comes from the memoirs of a crypto-Jew from Mashad. While Aqa 
Farajullah Nasrullayoff Livian (1874-1951) came from the Jadid al-Islam group known 
as Talebin al-Islam, (literally, students of Islam) his business experiences outside of
113 Zenner 1991,18.
114 These practices extended to the Americas. In the United States, Ashkenazi immigrants 
engaged in long-distance trade and mercantile activity. For example, one of this author’s more 
flamboyant relatives, Samuel “Navajo Sam” Dittenhoffer spoke the Navajo language fluently and was 
engaged in the rug trade in the 1880s.
115 Laurence D. Loeb, “Folk Models o f Habbani Ethnic Identity,” in ed. Alex Weingrod, Studies in 
Israeli Ethnicity: After the Ingathering (London: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1985), 203-4.
116 “Jews in Central Asia” in Jewish Chronicle, 8 October 1880, 10.
117 Bom to Herati immigrants in Jerusalem, Bezalel has trouble understanding the Bukharans’ 
Judeo-Tajik while it is easy for him to communicate with the Mashhadis, as their Judeo-Persian dialect is 
much closer. Author’s interview with Itzhak Bezalel, Jerusalem, 4 July 2001.
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Mashhad were very similar to that of the members of the Jewish community in 
Afghanistan. It is striking to read Farajullah’s description of the differences between 
the Herati and Mashhadi Jews: “The Jews of Herat enjoyed greater religious freedom 
than the Jadidim of Meshed and observed their feasts openly. They even discussed
• • 1 1 ft •details of their customs with their non-Jewish neighbors.” In noting how allegedly 
different these two communities are their similarities shine through.
After finishing primary school, Farajullah went with his older brother ‘ Abdallah 
to Deregez, 130 kilometres northwest of Mashhad along what is now the border with 
Turkmenistan. Upon arrival, he found that the Jadidim lived in their stores, sleeping, 
cooking, and eating there. He was scandalized to learn that the Jadidi men did not have 
a synagogue, observe the Sabbath, or follow kashrut (dietary laws) in Deregez.119 As 
the youngest in his extended family, Farajullah was in charge of all of the domestic 
tasks. He prepared the tea, and all of the meals, drew water five to six times a day, 
bought firewood, and chopped it into smaller pieces. A few years before his death, Aqa 
Farajullah recalled the difficult labour involved. He wrote:
[E]arly in the morning, before the grown-ups woke up, I had to get up and 
prepare hot water and set the table for breakfast, so that when the grown­
ups got up, everything should be ready. Even in the evening, I had to 
prepare the sleeping places of the grown-ups (in those days they slept on 
the floor), and in the morning I had to gather them. All day long I had to 
prepare, according to their instructions, all kinds of food. I also had to 
clean the store. All this was too much for a child of twelve or thirteen, so190that I never slept enough.
Farajullah was so upset by the desecration of the Sabbath that he asked the six store 
owners around his uncle’s location if they would allow him to light and put out the fire 
on the Sabbath, so that he would be the only one to break that commandment.
118 Patai 1997, 189.
119 Ibid, 113.
120 Ibid, 123.
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In adulthood, Farajullah was responsible for creating a Halachically observant 
Jewish community in Deregez. Farajullah describes how he learned the shehita 
(kosher butchering) laws in the year that he stayed in Mashhad to be married. Upon 
return to Deregez, he started a campaign to encourage kashrut, and religious 
observance:
And to those who ate kosher meat, we said if they go to the houses of 
people who do not eat kosher meat, they should not only not eat there, but 
should not even drink water or tea, and should tell them that since their 
dishes are not kosher, ‘we cannot drink.’ In this manner it took six months 
until all the Jews in Deregez ate kosher, in every respect, had kosher 
utensils, and were praying morning and evening.121
After this occurred, men brought their families to join them, thus changing the 
character of the Jewish trading post to a permanent, more rounded community. In 
three years, (apparently around the time of World War I) fifty Jadidi families lived in 
Deregez, founded two synagogues with Torah scrolls and purchased land for a Jewish 
cemetery.122 A permanent settlement would only be established after a Beit-Din (law 
court), mikvah (ritual bath), Hevrah Kadishah (burial society), and graveyard were 
prepared, so that all aspects of religious observance were maintained.123
Clearly, the religious environment of Deregez was increasingly hospitable as 
warm relations were forged with the Turkman population, and the Russians also f
encouraged regional trade. A similar phenomenon happened with Jadidi settlements in 
the Turkmen areas of Marv, Sarakhs, Kaakhka, and Ashkabad.124 This may be similar 
to the population shift that also occurred in northern Afghanistan when the Jewish 
population in towns like Andkhoi and Maimana seems to have grown.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, extending up to the late 1940s, the 
primary mode of transportation along this part of the Silk Road continued to be by
121 Ibid, 136.
122 Ibid.
123 Bezalel 1999, 22.
124 Azaria Levy, “The Jews o f Mashad in the Early Twentieth Century,” chapter in Levy, 7.
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armed caravan, as it was too dangerous to attempt more solitary journeys. In 1880, 
the Jewish Chronicle published a fascinating description of a caravan that arrived in 
Balkh from the city of Bukhara. Ninety Jews arrived with 200 camels loaded mainly 
with silk clothing and artwork. Several men “were armed to the teeth to protect them 
from the raids of marauding Turkomans.” These Bukharan Jews were described as 
men:
of handsome appearance, and of such great stature, that compared with 
Europeans ... they might be looked upon as giants. They are extremely 
warlike, and in their journeys have had many a victorious encounter with 
the Turkomans, many of whom they have caused to bite the dust. On 
other occasions they had been less successful.126
This was extremely unusual, as in Persian or Bukharan territory Jews would not have 
been allowed to carry weapons, as stipulated under the Pact of ‘Umar. Outside of 
settled areas, different rules clearly applied. Aqa Farajullah provides another example 
of the fortifications a convoy of merchandise would have to prepare. He says that a 
caravan travelling from Bukhara would take six months to arrive in Mashhad, and 
would travel with three to four hundred camels and one hundred armed guards to 
protect the shipment. Farajullah states that the leader of the caravan had to be a 
Turkman who was “known and reliable and accepted by the merchants.”127 If a caravan 
arrived at its destination intact, the merchandise would be sold for no less than three 
times its original price because of all of the dangers and accompanying cost inherent in 
its transport. Because of these circumstances, Jewish merchants would divide up their 
consignments, and send them in three separate caravans with the hope that at least one
n o
made the journey safely. However, in Khorasan, Turkmen tribes did not attack 
Jadidi caravans, as they paid protection money to the tribal chieftains.129 A Persian 
Jewish merchant named N. Mashiah describes a raid upon an Afghan town near the 
Indian border. While this is different from a raid on a caravan, it certainly invokes a 
sense of these attacks. “All of a sudden, hordes of riders came out of the hill area and
125 Gregorian, 367.
126 “Jews in Central Asia,” Jewish Chronicle, 8 October 1880,10.
127 Patai, 124.
128 Ibid.
129 Azaria Levy, “Evidence and Documents Concerning the History o f the Jews o f Mashad,” 14 
and “The Jews of Mashad in the Early Twentieth Century,” 2, chapters in Levy.
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flooded the town. They were brave soldiers ... and in the space of a short time they
1 msimply swept up the place and left it empty.”
Inter-Communal Ties: The Turkman-Jewish Relationship
“[I]s it not striking that Jews have received the most powerful protection among
1 'X1the wild inhabitants o f the desert? ”
The relationship between Turkmen and Jews were particularly warm, and often
the two communities worked in alliance. For example, while the Mashhadi anusim or
forcible converts to Islam identified themselves as Muslim to the Russians, with the
1Turkmen, they identified themselves and were accepted as Jews. Almost 
immediately after Allah Daad in 1839, anusim joined Turkmen tribes and fought 
against the Persians and Bukharans. Joining Turkmen tribes may have been the only 
way to extracate themselves from the difficulties of dhimmitude, and an outlet for their 
anger after the mass forcible conversion. When forces from Khiva were in battle, it 
was reported that one could hear a Hebrew war cry Rabone Shel Olaml (Lord of the 
world), along with that of the Turkman war cry, Serenkl (brave).” Joseph Wolff, a 
former German Jew turned Christian missionary and ardent traveller, was struck by the 
close bond between the Turkmen and the Jews during the 1830s and 40s. He writes 
that the Jews “who are tyrannized over at Bokara and Persia, fly to the inhabitants of 
the desert, at Mowr, Sarakhs, Akhaul, and to the Hazarah in Affghanistaun.”133 In this 
way, they were able to find protection and relief among groups who practiced Islam in 
a more tolerant manner.134 Sprinkled throughout Aqa Farajullah’s memoir are 
references to the close ties he enjoyed with individual Turkmen. On several occasions, 
and sometimes at great personal risk, his life was saved through the intervention of
130 A. Avihail and A. Brin, eds. The Lost Tribes in Assyria (Jerusalem: Amishav, 1985), 29-31.
131 Wolff 1969, 115.
132 Azaria Levy, “The Jews of Mashad in the Early Twentieth Century,” in The Jews o f Mashad 
(Jerusalem: published privately, 1998), 6-7.
133 Joseph Wolff, A Mission to Bokhara, ed. Guy Wint (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1969), 115. (Spelling remains as in the original.)
134 Similarly, runaway slaves would also join Native American tribes in the southern part o f the 
United States.
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Turkmen friends. When he was a youth, a Turkman healer saved him from a puzzling, 
deadly malady, and later on Turkmen guides smuggled him out of Turkestan as the 
Bolsheviks seized power.135
Supplementing individual acts of kindness and bravery were decisions taken by 
the Turkman community as a whole. In 1902, when the Russians wanted to banish 
Jewish immigrants from Turkestan krai, 800 leaders and dignitaries of Turkmen tribes 
in Ashkabad petitioned the Russians to allow the Jews to stay. Previously, the Russians 
had encouraged Baha’i and Jadid immigration as a way to stimulate the economy, as 
both groups were involved in trade and commerce. In this respect, Russian aims may 
have been similar to those of Nadir Shah. Yet, at the end of the nineteenth-century, 
anti-Semitism was rife in the empire. Not inaccurately, the Russians accused the 
Jadidis of being Jews posing as Muslims. Ultimately, the Turkman petition was 
unsuccessful, though so was the Russian policy. By 1910, Jews were allowed to live 
only in the underdeveloped border areas. However, these restrictions soon loosened to 
include Kokand, Margilan, and even Samarkand, the veritable centre of regional 
development.136
The Mashhadi anusim directed much of their economic activity towards supplying 
Turkmen tastes. They made silk clothing in their homes, and traded many items
117including: lambskin, sheep’s wool, carpets, spices, dyes, and precious stones. Azaria 
Levy describes how his grandfather bought carpets woven by the women and karakul 
skins from the Turkmen. Once the skins arrived in Mashhad they were embroidered 
and later sold as far away as Moscow, Nijm-Novgorod, and Istanbul. Central Asian 
Jews also provided a market for Turkman-grown cotton. To facilitate this relationship, 
Patai explains that anusim living in Merv would loan the Turkmen money during the
135 Patai 1997, 114.
136Azaria Levy, “The Jews of Mashad in the Early Twenteth Century,” chapter in Levy, 2 and 12, 
and The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia (New York, 1940), s.v. “Bokhara,” by Anatol Safanov. For 
more detailed information, see Michael Zand, “Les Yahudi de Boukhara” Regards 297(1992): 23-25; and 
298(1992): 15-18.
137 Azaria Levy, “The Jews of Mashad in the Early Twenteth Century,” chapter in Levy, 2.
138 Azaria Levy, “The Azizallahoff-Levy Family -  A History,” chapter in Levy, 2 and 40.
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sowing season, with the agreement that they would receive some of the crop at harvest 
time.139 These kinds of arrangements were common throughout the region.140
While the most detailed information is available for the Mashhadis, similar 
patterns occurred in Afghanistan, especially in the northern rim. After the Russian 
Revolution, thousands of Turkmen found refuge in Afghanistan, bringing seventy-five 
per cent of the total karakul stock in the Soviet-controlled area with them.141 After a 
few years, the skins of karakul lambs became Afghanistan’s most important source of 
foreign earnings. Jewish traders played a predominant role, working in conjunction 
with Turkmen producers to supply the international market. In 1941, a British 
businessman wrote a confidential and detailed note to his government describing the 
workings of the karakul skin trade. He explained the “very great confidence [that] 
existed between the Turkmens and the Oriental Jews ... made credit deals possible.”
He said that before the monopoly system that operated from 1933-1948, everyone made 
the same rate of profit or felt the same loss. This included the “small sheep-owner, the 
small dealer in Turkestan, the big Afghan dealer and the Indian or Oriental [Jewish] 
dealer in Peshawar and London...”142 Close business connections and trust between the 
Turkmen and Jewish communities helped to strengthen the economy from north-eastern 
Persia to Central Asia and Afghanistan, and provided mutual protection for both 
groups.
International Connections through Trade
International trade can be traced to the late eighteenth century among the Jews of 
Bukhara. It may have started earlier, though no records are extant before this time.143 
It seems likely that the Jewish population, especially in the northern rim of
139 Patai 1997, 114.
140 See also Max Vekselman, “The Development of Economic Activity o f Bukharan Jews in 
Central Asia at the Turn o f the Twentieth Century” in ed. Benjamin Pinkus, Shvut: Studies in Russian 
and East European Jewish History (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Publishers, 1995): 63-79.
141 PRO FO 371/18,256, Weekly Summary no.42, 15 October 1934 ,413.
142IOL R/12/160, “Secret Note on Abdul Majid and the Economic Activities o f the Afghan 
Bank,” 7.
143 Burton, 43 and 55.
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Afghanistan, grew as a result of these journeys, as more opportunities for trade became 
available, and men moved in from the Central Asian khanates. In addition to dwelling 
in remote areas, Jewish men in north-eastern Persia, Bukhara, and Afghanistan would 
go on long trading journeys to India, Siberia, Russia, and even into Western Europe. 
Through the trade in textiles, carpets, and especially karakul, they formed business ties 
with distant places.144 The strength of the Jewish merchants lay in having a network of 
connections throughout the Russian and British empires. Sometimes, members of a 
family would each live in a different city along the route of the goods traded. Azaria 
Levy explains how his family conducted business. “One would buy merchandise, [and] 
send it to a brother in another town, who would, in turn, buy local merchandise and 
send it to the others, each living in a different town.”145 Some families maintained 
offices in Kabul, Peshawar, and London in the 1930s, while others spread out to 
Leipzig (before the rise of Nazi Germany)146 and New York, or Jerusalem and Bombay, 
with each male relative managing a part of the trade for the benefit of all. Even today, 
some Mashhadi and Afghanistani families follow these patterns. Notably, they have 
become involved in the coloured gem trade and have offices in Tel Aviv, New York, 
and Bangkok.147
As a result, the community’s isolation eased considerably. Merchants who settled 
in India or the west forged links to Jewish communities and the burgeoning Zionist 
movement in India, Britain, France and Palestine. Though previously overlooked by 
other scholars, a large cache of documents from these networks still exists. The letters 
and telegrams shed light on the Jewish community’s experiences and troubles in the 
1930s and 1940s. The Mirzoeff family may serve as an example. In the 1930s, G. 
Mirzoeff owned a business in Brickhill Lane, and was president of the Boukharian 
Jews’ Association of London. His brother, Y.H. Mirzoeff, lived in Peshawar and 
exported furs, skins, and carpets. Y.H. learned of events in Afghanistan, and
144 Hanegbi and Yaniv, 29.
145 Azaria Levy, “The Azizallahoff-Levy Family - A History,” chapter in Levy, 42.
146 Most furriers in Leipzig were Jewish between 1800 and the 1930s. Zenner, 97.
147 Tibor Krausz, “The Colors of Money,” The Jerusalem Report, 13 August 2001, 30-35.
80
transmitted letters and money from London to the Bukharan refugees in Kabul.148 For 
example, on 25 October 1935, Y.H. Mirzoeff wrote the Joint Foreign Committee at the 
Board of Deputies and asked why Bukharan Jews in Kabul still had not received 
immigration certificates for Palestine.149 Correspondence from these merchants then 
reached the Jewish Agency (Sochnut), and the British Foreign and India Offices. In 
French archives one finds a similar trail of documents through Iran. Jadidim 
communicated with Bukharan Jewish refugees in Mashhad, who then transmitted 
information to the Alliance Israelite Universelle director in Teheran. He in turn 
informed Paris. Once the director of the Alliance was notified, he contacted the Board 
of Deputies in London. Similar channels ran to Jerusalem, and have been examined in 
detail by Israeli scholars.150 The communication between Jewish communities in 
Palestine and the Jewish Agency have been researched, however, the patterns of 
correspondence among Mizrahim settled in the west are almost unknown.
After 1917, the business climate of Central Asia changed dramatically. The 
Russian Revolution made trade and travel within the burgeoning Soviet Union nearly 
impossible. Many fortunes based on Central Asian trade disappeared. Prominent 
Afghanistani Jewish merchants who owned large herds of cattle and warehouses in 
Russian territory lost all of their capital. The community suddenly became much 
poorer, and its situation was aggravated by new trade restrictions within Afghanistan.151 
However, difficulties were temporarily eased by the arrival of Turkmen refugees with 
their karakul flocks in the early 1920s. When the Turkmen shepherds crossed from 
Soviet to Afghan territory, they brought their flocks with them, which soon became 
Afghanistan’s primary means of acquiring hard currency. Corresponding to this 
change, Afghanistani Jews also replaced their Bukharan co-religionists as the primary
1 Otraders in karakul skins.
148 See BoD, ACC/3121/E2/128.
149 BoD ACC/3121/Cl 1/12/3, Y.H. Mirzoeff (Peshawar) to Joint Foreign Committee (London), 25 
October 1935.
150 See appendix one for a diagram of Jewish patterns o f correspondence during the 1930s.
151 Brauer 1942, 125; Raphael Patai, Tents o f  Jacob (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971),
254.
152 Bezalel in ed. Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 21, and Carl Alpert, “Les Demiers Juifs d’Afghanistan” in 
Tribune Juive, no. 639, 26 September- 2  October 1980, 17-8.
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Despite male involvement in long-distance trade, in many respects, Jews in 
Afghanistan were extremely isolated from other Jewish communities. Related to the 
hidden Jews in Mashhad, they continued to resemble them after returning to an open 
practice of Judaism. They received no shalihot (emissaries from the Land of Israel), 
and were the only country where Mizrahim did not maintain ties to either Moses 
Montefiore or the Alliance Israelite Universelle. This contrasts greatly with the 
Bukharan experience. After the Russian conquest, the Bukharan Jews were more 
exposed to modernisation and Westernisation. Afghanistan’s Jewish community first 
made indirect contact with Zionist organisations in the 1920s, almost 130 years after a 
pivotal shaliah arrived in Bukhara.153 Indeed, when the Board of Deputies first learned 
of their existence, they were unsure as to whether Jews in Afghanistan still veiled their 
religion, as did the Mashhadi Jadidim.154
The proceeding chapter steps back in time to examine Afghanistan’s history from 
a general perspective. As works on the Jewish community generally present wider 
trends in Afghanistani history in a cursory manner, the following section seeks to 
rectify these discrepancies.
153 Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 22; Kashani 1961, 25; Burton, 48.
154 See BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1 and 2.
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Chapter Three:
Outline of the Political and Economic History of Afghanistan: 
(1747-1933)
Synopsis
This chapter surveys the general history of Afghanistan from the middle of the 
eighteenth century to the early 1930s in order to provide a further context for the Jewish 
experience. It commences with a sketch of Afghanistan’s foundation and both Anglo- 
Afghan Wars. The reign o f ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), is explored in more 
detail, showing how his personal ruthlessness shattered Afghanistan’s fragile ethnic 
mosaic. Each early twentieth-century ruler’s policies are discussed both in outline, and 
in relation to Afghanistan’s minority communities. A period of restoration under 
Habibullah Khan (r. 1901-1919) was followed by Amanullah’s reforms (r.l 919- January 
1929) and then the revolt that led to the ten-month anarchical rule of Habibullah 
Kalakani (Bacha-i Saqao). Finally the rise of Muhammad Nadir Shah (r. October 1929- 
1933) and development of his economic policies are presented. In particular, his 
foundation of a monopolisation system is analysed. It had severe consequences for the 
Jewish and Hindu communities, as well as Muslim refugees in the country’s northern 
tier.
Afghanistan's Foundation
The modem territory known as Afghanistan was formed in 1747 when the Sunni
[
ruler of Persia, Nadir Shah Afshari, was assassinated. His career, “transient but 
bloody” as Lee calls it, definitively ended the Safavid Empire. In its wake, a far weaker 
Qajar dynasty eventually emerged which reigned over a smaller Persia.1 Ahmad Khan,
1 Lee, xiii.
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treasurer to Nadir Shah, was able to abscond undetected with a considerable part of the 
late ruler’s wealth. Under Ahmad’s leadership, the ‘Abdali Pashtun tribe then was able 
to cut its ties to Persia. After gaining Kandahar, he declared an independent Afghan 
kingdom.2 Ahmad claimed a significant part of Khorasan, sought to emulate Nadir’s 
conquests north of the Hindu Kush, capturing the Punjab, Kashmir and Multan.3
While the new government mixed the administrative structures of the Persian and 
Mughal empires, the system was saturated by what Gregorian calls “the Afghan tribal- 
feudal socio-economic framework.”4 The administrators were various tribal chiefs, and 
the ruler exercised only a limited degree of control. Due to these limitations of 
centralised power, Gregorian argues that Ahmad Shah’s primary failure was the 
inability to develop an urban economy separate from the power of the tribes. The 
Afghan kingdom was also unable to shape a monarchy that maintained centralised 
control.5 This fundamental inconsistency, often seen as a weakness, continued to 
plague Afghanistan for many years to come, and placed particular burdens on the non- 
Pashtun urban dwellers. In many other situations, urban merchants would act as agents 
of change, yet in Afghanistan the elites continued older nomadic, pastoral patterns. 
Meanwhile, the city merchants were often members of both ethnic and religious 
minorities, and therefore unable to assume leadership roles.6
The early nineteenth-century was characterized by war, internecine strife, lack of 
centralized power, and dangerous roads, all of which restricted trade. In 1809, the 
British emissary to Shah Shuja’s court, Mountstuart Elphinstone wrote,
2 Gregorian, 46.
3 Lee, 83.
4 Gregorian, 47.
5 Ibid, 49.
6 See for example, Christine Dobbin, Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities: Conjoint Communities in 
the Making o f the World-Economy, 1570-1940 (Richmond: Curzon, 1996).
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The long civil wars have occasioned a great decline of commerce, 
by rendering the roads unsafe, and exposing whole caravans to be 
plundered; ... otherwise the situation of Caubul, between India,
Persia, Tartary, and Belochestaun, together with the possession of 
Cashmeer, would not fail to give it great advantages.7
Prices clearly show the insecurity of trade routes. In the early nineteenth-century,
o
Indian commodities were 200% more expensive in Kabul than on the subcontinent. 
Staple agricultural products also exhibited dramatic shifts. By the 1830s, trade between 
India and Central Asia was severely disrupted.9 The vast majority of inhabitants 
suffered greatly from fluctuating food prices. These conditions encouraged newly 
settled groups to return to nomadism. While the unstable economic situation affected 
the entire society, traders and merchants were particularly hard hit.
The First Anglo-Afghan War: Encountering the British Empire
During the early nineteenth-century, but particularly during the 1830s, Britain 
became increasingly interested in Central Asia, as the Czarist Empire took steppe land 
and Uzbek khanates in quick succession. Britain worried about the Russian threat to 
India, and the Government of India chose to support Afghanistan’s ruler over the shah 
of Persia.10 Britain felt that the creation of a buffer state might ease tensions between 
the two great powers. With this in mind, the British government started “a policy of 
destabilization” hoping to place a puppet monarch Shah Shuja’ (r. 1803-1810 and 1839- 
1842) of the Sadoza’i dynasty, on the Afghan throne.11 While the British were wooing 
Shah Shuja, the stated cause of their intervention dissolved when Persian forces 
withdrew from Herat.12 Nonetheless, in November 1838, 21,000 British and Indian
7 Elphinstone, 256; and W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study o f Political Developments in 
Central and Southern Asia (London: Oxford University Press), 79.
8 Gregorian, 56 note.
9 Ibid, 59.
10 Lee, xiv. Between 1747-1818 (and also 1839-1842), Afghan rulers were called ‘Shah.’ Dost 
Muhammad changed the title to ‘Khan,’ which remained until 1926, when Amanullah adopted the term 
Shah. (Adamec 1974, 267, and personal correspondence with May Sclinasi, 17 April 2003.)
11 Yarshater, Ehsan, ed. Encyclopaedia Iranica (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), s.v. 
“Afghanistan x. Political History,” by D. Balland, 549.
12 Gregorian, 100.
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troops began to march northward. Kandahar fell in April 1839, and Kabul in 
August.14 By the summer of 1839, the British also concluded a treaty with Shah 
Kamran, the ruler of Herat, bringing it under British influence. As they marched into 
eastern Afghanistan, and commenced the First Anglo-Afghan War, the Russians also 
attacked KJhiva so that British influence would not spread further northward.15 While at 
first the British appeared successful, the war quickly turned into a calamity.16 In the 
retreat from Kabul, during the winter of 1841-2, the entire British force of 16,000 was 
annihilated.17 In April 1842, after a three-year rule, Shah Shujd was killed as well.18
Dost Muhammad Khan: Consolidating Afghanistan's Borders
On December 21,1842, Dost Muhammad Khan, (r. 1819-1839 and 1842-1863) 
returned to Kabul, and regained his throne.19 Seven years later, he entered into an 
alliance with Britain, after giving up his goal of recapturing Peshawar and other parts of 
India. During the Indian Mutiny of 1857, he remained neutral, despite many calls for 
Muslim assistance. Between 1850 and 1863, the amir shifted direction, and 
consolidated Afghanistan’s borders, which have remained fundamentally constant up to 
the present. In the 1850s, he annexed the land between the Hindu Kush and the Amu 
Darya.20 He took Balkh in 1850, and Khulm, Kunduz, and Badakhshan in 1855, and 
the political power of these northern khanates quickly dissolved.21 In 1855, Dost 
Muhammad also captured Kandahar.
On the economic front, Dost Muhammad did not try to shift Afghanistan’s feudal 
system to gain more revenue. Rather, he demanded more taxes from merchants, 
especially Hindus. They had to pay 300,000 rupees for his war effort. All dhimmis,
13 Lesley Hall, A Brief Guide to Sources fo r the Study ofAfghanistan in the Indian Office Records 
(London: India Office Library and Records, 1981), 10.
14 Balland in Yarshater, 549.
15 Gregorian, 100-1.
16 Balland in Yarshater, 549 and 551.
17 Gregorian, 101.
18 Adamec 1974,267; and Balland in Yarshater, 551.
19 Adamec, Dictionary o f Afghan Wars, 1996,252; and Balland in Yarshater, 549.
20 Balland, 551.
2’Gregorian, 82.
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including Jews and Armenians, were required to pay the jizya two years in advance, 
and during times of emergency, merchants were forced to provide Dost Muhammad 
large “loans.” These policies squeezed all the economic potential from the urban areas. 
Minority relations were further strained when Dost Muhammad took the lands of the 
Hazaras. The occupation of the Hazarajat fanned Sunni hatred towards this Shi’i
• » 99community, as it was couched in a religious context.
Shi’i Muslims, especially Hazaras and poor Badakhshanis, were extremely 
vulnerable to be captured as slaves, as they were viewed as non-believers and heretics. 
Turkmen would seize those travelling on the caravan routes between Khorasan and 
Bukhara. Also, rulers would obtain extra income through ransoming captives or selling 
them as slaves. Many areas became depopulated due to wars, ineffective resource 
management, and terrible public health. Life spans were short, children often died, and 
diseases spread quickly through the weakened populace.23 It is interesting to note that 
Jews were not enslaved by Uzbek or Turkmen slave traders because Muslims would not 
buy them.24 This left them free to interact with slave trading groups. For example, the 
community in Panjdeh even acted as intermediaries who paid off the ransoms of those 
enslaved.25 The First Anglo-Afghan War shifted the way the populace regarded 
outsiders. They were now viewed with far more suspicion, and these fears were 
confirmed in the next war.
Second Anglo-Afghan War: Limiting Afghanistan’s Independence
The Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-79) dominated Shir Ali Khan’s reign. 
Worried about Russian gains in Central Asia, Shir Ali asked the British for military 
assistance. Yet, he received no guarantee against Russian attack. Czarist officials were 
far more forthcoming, and one General Stolietoff unexpectedly arrived in Kabul on 22
22 Ibid, 77 and 80.
23Gregorian, 139; Azaria Levy, “Evidence and Documents Counceming the History of the Jews of 
Mashad,” chapter in Levy, 6; Lee, 166 note.
24 Rudolf Lowenthal 1961, 9.
25 Lee, 462, ft. 68.
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July 1878 ready to sign an alliance.26 This turn of events alarmed the British, who 
feared that India’s “Scientific Frontier” would be compromised. General Neville 
Chamberlain was dispatched in response to the Russian envoy’s arrival. However, the 
general and his escort of 1,000 troops were not allowed into Afghanistan. Lord Lytton, 
viceroy of India, therefore declared war on 21 November 187 8 27 Shir Ali hoped to 
receive Russian assistance and fled north. He was bitterly disappointed and died in 
Mazar-i-Sharif on 21 February 1879. The British recognised his son, after Yaqub 
Khan signed the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879, which agreed to allow the viceroy 
of India control Afghanistan’s foreign affairs. This was a key provision of the tethered 
relationship between Britain and Afghanistan for the next forty years. British troops 
arrived in Kabul on 24 July 1879, but six weeks later, their envoy, Louis Cavagnari, 
and his staff, were all killed. At this juncture, Yaqub Khan faced challenges to his rule 
from his brother Muhammad Ayub Khan, who destroyed 3,000 British soliders in the 
Battle of Maiwand, and his cousin, ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan, who just returned from a 
twelve-year exile in Central Asia. Fearful of another massacre, the British backed 
down, and on 22 July 1880, they declared ‘Abd al-Rahman the rightful amir, after he 
accepted British custody of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs.30 This enabled the British 
forces to leave safely while retaining external control.
Shattering Afghanistan’s Ethnic Mosaic: The Rule of the ‘Iron Amir’
As discussed above, both ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan and his son Habibullah Khan did 
not direct Afghanistan’s foreign policies. All decisions about diplomacy and trade, 
especially with Russia, went through Delhi. In practice, this meant that Afghanistan 
maintained isolationism as an active policy. Afghanistan was a highly unusual client 
state, with gradations of British control. These ranged from fully independent internal
26 Ludwig Adamec, Historical Dictionary o f  Afghanistan (MetuchenN.J.: Scarecrow, 1991), 33.
27 Adamec 1996, 198 and 202.
28 Adamec 1991,33.
29 IOL L/PS/12/1321, A Survey o f Anglo-Afghan Relations, Part I, 1747-1919, 6; and Gregorian,
114-5.
30Adamec 1996, 8 and 202; Adamec 1991, 17 and 34; and Balland in Yarshater, 553.
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policies, to completely dependent foreign policies. Documents of the time confirm 
that in the 1930s and 40s, Great Britain saw ‘Abd al-Rahman’s rule as one which 
preserved “the peace of Central Asia for close on 40 years, and permitted the balance of 
power between Russia and Great Britain gradually to find equilibrium on the northern 
frontiers of Afghanistan.”32 However, recent historians see the British manoeuvres in 
the ‘Great Game’ as highly destructive for Afghanistan’s future development. As 
Senzil Nawid says the two nineteenth-century Anglo-Afghan wars, coupled with British 
control of foreign policy from 1878-1919, prevented contact with other countries and 
this isolation “reinforced the ‘inward-looking’ nature of Afghan society and made it 
more resistant to change.”
‘Abd al-Rahman was the only ruler in the nineteenth or indeed most of the 
twentieth-century who did not rely upon a religious seal of approval to rule, but rather 
silenced all opposition with his brutality. His reign produced a series of atrocities, 
details of which would even shock an audience inured to modem examples of genocide. 
Throughout his rule, ‘Abd al-Rahman sought to consolidate his territory. In 1881, he 
captured Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat. He then turned to dominating northern 
Afghanistan, including Maimana in 1884. While he was brutal to all of his subjects, 
those who were not Sunni fared the worst. The conquests of the Shi’i Hazarajat (1891 - 
93) and pagan ‘Kafiristan’ (1896) confirm this.34 Many Hazaras were enslaved or 
exiled, and the members of the non-Islamic indigenous group known as the ‘Kafirs’ 
were all forced to convert to Sunni Islam. Their country was renamed ‘Nuristan’ as 
Islam had “enlightened” them. The amir’s persecution of Shi’i communities, 
including the Qizilbash brought him to the verge of war with Persia as thousands fled 
into Khorasan.36
31 Gregorian, 117.
32IOL L/PS/12/1321,,4 Survey o f Anglo-Afghan Relations, Parti, 7747-1919, 7.
33 Senzil K. Nawid, Religious Response to Social Change in Afghanistan 1919-29: KingAman- 
Allah and the Afghan Ulama (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1999), xviii.
34 Adamec 1996, 8; and Balland in Yarshater, 553.
35 Balland in Yarshater, 553.
36 Lee, 582.
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J.L. Lee provides a v^icgrJerous critique of ‘Abd al-Rahman’s rule. He argues 
that ‘Abd al-Rahman’s rule was disastrous, and “atrocities dominate the folk 
memories.”37 Lee estimates that “as many as 100,000 persons [were] judicially 
executed, whilst hundreds of thousands more perished from hunger, forced migrations, 
epidemics, or died as a result of numerous campaigns.”38 ‘Abd al-Rahman’s most 
important legacy may have been that of ethnic and cultural subjugation. In fact, Lee 
says that one cannot understand Afghanistan’s modem strife without examining ‘Abd 
al-Rahman’s crimes against his people, as the basis of inter-ethnic hatred was sown at 
this time. Lee also blames the British who could not acknowledge the depths of the 
amir’s oppression. He states that ‘Abd al-Rahman never would have mled for over 
twenty years without the “regular and copious infusions of military equipment and 
financial aid from Britain.”
Trade between northern Afghanistan and Russian-dominated Central Asia 
declined from 1889 until 1896 when it virtually stopped. This situation only improved 
after the ‘Iron’ Amir’s death in 1901. In the 1890s, ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan closed the 
Russian border. The amir saw economic underdevelopment as a way to maintain 
political autonomy. If Afghanistan grew wealthy through trade, then it might attract 
more foreign interest and greater colonial intervention. As such, he preferred a poor, 
but independent state.40 Merchants throughout the country, and especially in Balkh 
province, were greatly handicapped as ‘Abd al-Rahman redirected trade south through 
Afghanistan’s three main cities. Lee writes that
The movement of people within, to and from Afghan Turkistan 
was severely restricted. ... Shops were sequestered, the most 
lucrative products, such as karakul skins, pistachios, raisins, grain, 
sheep and cattle, were nationalized and monopolies in individual 
commodities sold off to the highest bidder.41
37 Lee, xxvi.
38 Ibid, xxii-xxvi.
39 Ibid, 543-44, 563, and 599.
40 Ludwig Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967), 9.
41 Lee, 561-2.
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Similarly, the Encyclopedia Iranica argues that a far-reaching state monopoly 
controlled most of Afghanistan’s foreign and domestic trade.42 Consequently, all trade 
ventifres were impeded 43 Since these economic policies were accompanied by extreme 
measures against the populace, the consequences were dire. While monopolisation 
policies from the 1920s to the 1940s particularly harmed some segments of 
Afghanistani society, especially economic minorities, the destruction never reached the 
proportions o f ‘Abd al-Rahman’s rule.
Negotiating ‘ Abd al-Rahman’s Rule: The Challenges to the Jewish Community
As the Jewish community was politically defenceless, and the main occupations 
of its members were derived from trading opportunities, many fled north. They desired 
greater economic and personal freedoms which the Russians offered at the beginning of 
their rule, especially as the economic restrictions, trade monopoly, and widespread 
repression of ‘Abd al-Rahman’s rule were simply too great to overcome.44 While 
paltry, some documentation about Jewish communal life under ‘Abd al-Rahman 
remains. In one account published in 1892-93 to justify his reign as an Islamic 
monarch, the suppression of the sale of alcohol in Kabul is discussed. Gul Muhammad 
Khan writes that before wine was openly sold in the market, but “now the Jewish 
people have fled, and the drinking of wine is forbidden to the extent that it is not even 
available for medical purposes.”45 A similar event occurred in 1944, when many 
Jewish men were arrested in Kabul for producing alcohol. (See chapter 6.) This earlier 
reference certainly suggests that the Jewish population was engaged in producing wine, 
and that their total population declined during ‘Abd al-Rahman’s rule.
Foreign rulers also interceded on behalf of the Jewish community, protesting the 
restrictions on their movements. Fayz Muhammad Katib, the scribe and historian to the
42Balland, 553.
43 Lee, 596.
44 Azaria Levy, “The Jews of Mashhad in the Early Twentieth Century,” chapter in Levy, 8.
45 Gul Muhammad Khan Muhammadza’i, Risalah-yi Maw ’izah (Kabul: 1310 AH), 9. I am 
grateful to Amin Tarzi for sharing this valuable source and the following one with me; and to Jakob Rigi 
for his translation.
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courts of Habibullah and Amanullah Khan, discusses a letter received on 23 May 1887 
or 1888 from!Ali Khanov, the Hakim of Marv, to Qazi Sa’ad al-Din Khan, the Hakim 
of Herat. It includes a complaint from the Jews of Marv who received a letter from 
their co-religionists in Herat. They claimed that the Herati ruler gave orders that Jews 
“in Russian territory must return to their homes within two months. Otherwise all of 
their property will be confiscated, their families will be deported, and their houses 
looted and destroyed.” 'Ali Khanov says that: “If this is true, it is a very ugly way to 
rule your country.” Sa’ad al-Din sent a reply saying: “the assertion is a lie and a lie is 
like a lamp without light.” He said that those travelling to Russia or Persia must have a 
“ticket” [English word used] or a pass. “This way, if something happens to them in a 
foreign land, the state will be able to investigate. ... The document is for their own 
safety. .. .The state is not greedy for anyone’s property.”46
This appears to be the beginning of a rudimentary passport system. Gregorian 
states that under ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan, freedom of movement was restricted to 
increase his power, generate revenue for his personal coffers, and strengten security. 
Officially, all people needed permission to travel with documents for internal and 
external journeys. For example, the residents of Kabul had to obtain permission and 
pay for a pass if they wanted to travel more than six miles out of the city 47 Although 
all those under ‘Abd al-Rahman’s rule faced restrictions upon their movements, the 
consequences were more severe for the Jewish community, because their livelihood 
was based on long-distance trade. Consequently, Herati Jews reacted very strongly to 
the imposition of the ban on travel to Russian territory. It is clear that ’Ali Khanov 
took their anxiety very seriously. The Jews of Herat feared a destruction of their 
livelihood if they were forced to return home within two months. Even if this was not 
the government’s stated intent, this may have occurred through the steep decline in 
trade, endemic warfare, isolation, and repression. In fact, this letter could also be 
viewed as symptomatic of the great fear of the Herati Jewish community. Later the
46 Fayz Muhammad Katib, Siraj al-Tawarikh. Vol. 3 (Kabul, 1331-33 AH [1913-5]), 554.
47 Gregorian, 143.
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reluctance to issue passports and the hindrance of internal movement was generally 
ascribed to the government’s negative feelings towards the Jewish community.48
After facing the onslaught of ‘Abd al-Rahman, it is not surprising that the first 
Jews from Afghanistan arrived in Eretz Yisrael in 1892. By 1900, approximately 100 
emigrants settled mainly in the Bukharan quarter of Jerusalem. The first arrivals were 
sent back to Central Asia as known representatives of their community, in order to 
encourage further immigration, and to raise funds for the Yishuv.49 This was an 
unusual wave of emigration, as the majority of Jews who left Afghanistan settled close 
by in Russian Turkistan. Shi’is sought refuge in Persia, and prominent Pashtun families 
settled in the Ottoman Empire and India.50 At the end of the nineteenth-century, 
ordinary people struggled to survive, and fought against the scourges of poverty and 
famine.51 ‘Abd al-Rahman’s actions reverberated far beyond that of a single 
generation. By the time that he died in 1901, the peoples of Afghanistan,
who had over the millennia established a reasonable modus vivendi with 
their neighbours in a region which, historically, is highly multi-ethnic, had 
become alienated not just one from the other but, in many cases, been 
forcibly displaced from their ancestral lands and dumped down in 
environments that were both alien and hostile. Their sufferings produced 
a lasting distrust, even aversion to centralized government. ... It is not 
surprising, therefore, that tribes and ethnic groups who had been subject to 
such persecution and dislocation became insular, isolationist and 
ethnocentric.52
Thus, some of the causes of future crises in Afghanistan may be traced to the terrible 
sufferings inflicted upon the Afghanistani people under ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan. For
48When the amir’s feelings were more positive (such as under Habibullah, and Amanuallah) then 
the ability to move freely was facilitated.
49 Bezalel in Bar ‘am-Ben Yossef, 31. See also Ben-Zion Yehoshua, “Amour de Sion Chez Les 
Juifs d’Afghanistan” in Sillages 4 (Spring 1981): 104-108 for a traditional Afghanistani view of the 
benefits o f living in Eretz-Yisrael. (Hereafter: Yehoshua 1981a)
50 Levy, 8.
51 Lee, 596.
52 Ibid, xxvii-xxviii. One of the causes of ’Abd al-Rahman’s ashtonishing cruelty may have been a 
medical condition. According to Lee, following the opinion o f Dr. Geraint James, he suffered from 
chronic nephritis among other diseases. (570)
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their part, the Jewish community started to search for alternative homes away from 
Afghanistan.
Habibullah Khan: Edging Towards Full Sovereignity
‘Abd al-Rahman’s son and successor, Habibullah (r. 1901-19) was the first 
Afghan ruler since 1772 whose succession to power was peaceful. He had a pleasant 
temperament, and set about a general reconciliation after the excesses of ‘Abd al- 
Rahman. While his rule has been characterized as laissez-faire, the country clearly 
needed time to heal from the trauma of ‘Abd al-Rahman’s reign. Despite this shift, 
Habibullah followed the foreign policy themes of his father’s rule by balancing the 
demands of his powerful northern and southern neighbours, maintaining isolation and 
garnering as much independence as possible from Britain.54 Internally, Habibullah 
increased the power of the State Council, abolished torture in prisons, and established 
new schools. He also created a printing house, and a bureau of translation.55 These 
innovations occurred a little bit later than similar reforms in Iran, the Ottoman Empire, 
and Egypt. However, the ulama were able to gradually regain their traditional influence 
in Afghanistan through a relaxation of central governmental controls as well as royal 
patronage. Outside pressures were increasingly felt as Asian nationalism and Pan- 
Islamism challenged traditional models of political thought within Afghanistan.
Perhaps Habibullah’s most pivotal early action was granting a general amnesty to 
those who fled during his father’s rule. This had a significant impact on Afghanistan’s 
intellectual life in the twentieth century. As prominent families returned home, they 
brought new ideas and “concepts of Afghan nationhood and Afghan nationality began 
to take shape.”56 Soon Kabul became an active centre of intellectual life.
53 Balland in Yarshater, 554.
54 Adamec 1974, 10.
55 Nawid, 35-6.
56 Ibid, xviii-xix, 31, 35.
94
Two of the most important families to return were both branches of the royal 
Muhammadza’i Pashtun tribe. Each family in turn left an indelible mark upon the 
history of Afghanistan. The Tarzi family spent twenty years in Damascus. Its 
patriarch, Mahmud, was a student of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and became what the 
Encyclopaedia Iranica calls a “militant nationalist fervent supporter of modernism and 
convinced pan-Islamist.”57 Upon return to his native land, Tarzi gathered a group of 
constitutionalist ‘Young Afghans’ who favoured the Ottoman Empire and its technical 
assistance especially over that of England. Between 1911 and 1919, the newspaper 
Siraj al-Akhbar was published under Tarzi’s supervision. It was Afghanistan’s first 
successful newspaper, bringing world politics to a Kabul audience and helping to 
promote modernist Islam. Later Tarzi played an important role in Amanullah’s 
administration. Amanullah married Mahmud Tarzi’s daughter Soraya in 1916, and 
consequently grew closer to the Young Afghan movement. The amir appointed his 
father-in-law to serve as his first foreign minister.
The second approach to modernisation came from another exiled branch of the 
Muhammadza’is. The Mosahiban family returned from India and quickly became 
important members of the Afghan army. They were not proponents of liberal Islamic 
ideals, but rather sought to apply Western knowledge through technology.58 After 
Amanullah’s downfall and the defeat of Habibullah Kalakani (Bacha-i Saqqao), 
Muhammad Nadir Shah, his brother Muhammad Hashim Khan, and son Muhammad 
Zahir Shah ruled from 1929 to 1973. Both families’ experiences of modernity away 
from Afghanistan in the late nineteenth-century left a firm imprint upon the course of 
the twentieth-centuiy.
In the early years of his rule, Habibullah had trouble simply gaining recognition 
from the British government. This was crucial, as his father had agreed to allow the 
British to control Afghanistan’s foreign policy. Despite Habibullah’s insistence that 
their agreement was conducted between two nations, the British argued that it had been
57 Balland in Yarshater, 554.
58 Nawid, 37, 49, 52; Gregorian, 163; Adamec 1974,15; Balland in Yarshater, 554.
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made with an individual ruler, and thus should be renegotiated with each successor. 
Habibullah managed to keep the British at bay for four years until finally he allowed a 
delegation in, and negotiated an agreement that maintained the status quo established 
by his father.59
In 1907, the British and Russians agreed that Russia would only conduct non­
political relations with Afghanistan, while Britain would allow Afghanistan to manage 
its own internal affairs. Habibullah was informed of the Anglo-Russian Convention 
after the agreement was negotiated, and in his fury, refused to sign it. Despite this 
irregularity, the UK and Russia maintained their respective positions.60 In the years 
before World War I, relations normalised between Afghanistan and her powerful 
neighbours. The latter remained cautious, and “refrained from exerting undue 
pressures” on Afghanistan.61 These policies were ultimately quite beneficial, because 
during World War I Afghanistan was able to remain neutral, and experienced relatively 
little social and economic upheaval.
The Jewish Community under Habibullah: A Resumption of Commerce
Habibullah was friendly to the Jewish community, and ties were generally 
close.62 Habibullah was on particularly good terms with the Herati kalantar (secular 
leader), Mulla Aqa Jan Cohen ben Shlomo, and asked him to stay in the palace. 
(Unfortunately, after a sojourn of eight months in Kabul, the kalantar was murdered. 
Clearly some in court circles did not like a Jew enjoying such influence.) Abraham 
Ben Agajan ha-Cohen describes how his father held a banquet in honour of the amir, 
and Habibullah stated that he was descended from the tribe of Benjamin.64 Another
59 Adamec 1974, 10.
60 Adamec 1967, 70.
61 Adamec 1974, 12.
62 Unlike in Bukhara, there was not a specific holiday when the ruler visited the Jewish 
community. Nasrullah liked to visit the home of Rabbi Simha during Shavuot, observing the religious 
ceremony, and sharing in the festive meal. His son, Muzaffar al-Din, chose the night of Hoshana Rabbah 
to visit the Jewish community. Burton, 51.
63 Reuven Kashani, Yehudei Afghanistan (Jerusalem: privately published, 1975), 33-4.
64 Avihail and Brin, 36-7.
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account is also provided, though it may be of the same incident. When Habibullah was 
visiting Herat, the Jewish community received him ceremoniously. The amir asked 
them what tribe they came from, and the heads of the community responded that they 
did not have a family tree. Habibullah responded in turn: “ 4 We do know [that] we are 
from the family Muhammad Zai, all of us of the Benjamin, of the seed of King Saul, 
from the sons of Jonathan, Afghan and Pathan.’” In appreciation of the reception 
Habibullah was shown, he sent 12 khelats (described as golden coats with golden 
turbans) “in honor, with body guards, so the Gentiles would see and respect the 
Jews.”65 Afghan beliefs of Jewish descent, whether or not accurate, could be of great 
assistance to the Jewish community during times of crisis. Jews were perceived to be 
the ancestors of the Pashtun tribe, and therefore worthy of protection. (See chapter 7 for 
further discussion.)
The resurgence of the Jewish community under Habibullah is clearly linked to the 
resumption of regional trade. Afghanistan’s economic relations with her neighbours 
proceeded fairly well under Habibullah. Gregorian credits this to “relative internal 
stability, a degree of economic unity, some attempt to standardize customs fees, 
improved relations with India and Russian Central Asia, and official encouragement of 
trade.”66 Between 1870 and 1917, Afghanistan exported wool and some karakul 
sheepskin to the Russian empire and received chintzes, glassware, sugar, linen, silk, 
cotton goods, cutlery, and paper in return.67 India also exported cotton goods, sugar 
and paper to Afghanistan, but supplemented this with dyes, tea, iron, scissors, needles 
and thread, drugs and machinery. India imported fruits, vegetables, grain, pulses, wool, 
ghee, tobacco, carpets, and horses from Afghanistan. In these simple lists, a hierarchy 
of goods is evident. Afghanistan only exported natural resources and handmade items. 
India and Russia exported goods that required an intermediate level of manufacturing. 
Trade with Persia declined because of political disagreements and Afghanistan’s
65 Ibid, 31-2, account provided by Michael Gul after immigrating to Israel, though no date is 
included. May Schnasi argues that this visit must have occurred in 1907, when Habibullah was touring 
Afghanistan. (Personal correspondence, 17 April 2003.)
66 Gregorian, 198.
67 Ibid, 196.
68 Ibid, 197.
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disorganised customs facilities. Consequently, Herat’s silk and carpet industries fell 
into disarray. Despite some gains, like the establishment of banks and the placement of 
a commercial agent in India, Afghanistan’s economy was still harmed by poor 
infrastructure, communication and banking methods, and the relative lack of diplomatic 
and economic contacts. These deficiencies are evidenced in the first joint stock 
company, the Afghan Motor Transport Company. It was founded with the help of 
Habibullah, and targeted the wealthy as investors. Ostensibly, the handful of lorries 
and automobiles were meant to carry freight between Kabul and India; in practice 
however, they were used by the royal family, and were not allowed to get dirty or 
scratched while driven on the few wide dirt roads in Afghanistan. Only half of the 
taxes collected ever reached the government. Under these conditions, reform was a 
difficult goal. Habibullah did not have enough revenue to modernise, and maintain the 
army, court, and a burdensome bureaucracy.69 Even under good stewardship, economic 
development remained slow.
World War I and its Political Legacy
When World War I commenced, Afghanistan declared neutrality. For the first 
two months of the conflict, this posed little problem for Habibullah. When the Ottoman 
Empire joined the Central Powers in October 1914, the stakes became far higher. 
Suddenly, the leaders of the Sunni world and guardians of the holy places were fighting 
against the British. The mood in Afghanistan was very much pro-Turkish if not pro- 
German, and the British realised that only one man, Habibullah himself, prevented 
Afghanistan from joining Germany. The amir’s neutrality upset both the religious 
community, which wanted to support the Caliphate, and the nationalists who wanted 
full independence from Britain.
Neutrality became increasingly difficult to maintain when a German mission 
appeared on the Afghan frontier, and effectively ended the nation’s isolation.70 In
69 Gregorian, 202.
70 Adamec 1967, 83; Adamec 1974, 27; Nawid, 39.
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1915, a series of Ottoman and German emissaries arrived in Kabul. The German 
Lieutenant Werner Otto von Hentig headed a mission, joined by the Turkish officer 
Kazim Bey and Indian prince Mahendra Pratap. They encouraged Habibullah to start 
military action against India. The Hentig Mission ended Afghanistan’s isolation, and 
upset the governments of Britain and Russia greatly, forcing them to keep troops near 
the Afghan border. Habibullah expected to be rewarded after the war by the British, as 
he had remained neutral despite these overtures.71 While the amir received a letter from 
George V thanking him, with his subsidy increased, Habibullah felt that these gestures 
did not properly reward him for taking the dangerous and difficult position of 
neutrality.
As the end of World War I drew nearer, many were relieved that Afghanistan had 
been spared the ravages visited upon the Ottoman Empire. With the defeat of the 
Central Powers and the burgeoning Russian Revolution, once again the international 
balance of power shifted. Suddenly, the pressure on the northern border that had lasted 
for hundreds of years disappeared (albeit briefly). In some ways, this was even more 
significant than the end of the war for Afghanistan. The Russian Revolution created a 
new geo-political reality, which opened up the potential for a new relationship between 
the fledgling USSR and Afghanistan.
Habibullah was criticized for many reasons. They included his personal 
liberalism, as he allowed the women in his family to wear short veils and ride horses. 
But far more harmful was his continuing alliance with Great Britain without visible 
rewards, in the form of a recognized independence. Habibullah appeared to have
sacrificed the “interests of Islam for the sake of winning Afghan independence” and yet
• • • 11 •had failed to achieve this secondary goal. This was deeply disappointing to the amir.
On 11 February 1919, Habibullah asked for the remainder of the British subsidy 
deposited in the Bank of India. Adamec argues that this shows that the amir may have 
been preparing for a conflict with Britain. Nine days later, he was assassinated in his
71 Adamec 1974, 17, 20-1,41; and Adamec 1967, 85.
72 Adamec 1974,44.
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sleep on a hunting trip.73 Of those vying for power, only his third son Amanullah 
remained in Kabul. This left Amanullah in a good position to become amir - he was far 
from the murder, yet close to governmental institutions.
Amanullah: Imagination without Grounding
On 13 April 1919, Amanullah declared independence from British suzerainty. A 
few weeks later, Afghan troops crossed into India, and the Third Anglo-Afghan War, or 
the War of Independence, as it is known within Afghanistan, commenced. The war 
lasted less than a month, as the resources of the British Empire were exhausted after 
World War I. The most severe military actions came when the Afghans cut the water 
supply for Landi Kotal and Britain closed the Khyber Pass.
At the beginning of Amanullah’s tenure, he used religious rationale to consolidate 
his power. Amanullah was able to unite various power blocks in jihad against the 
British.74 Through this action, he gained the allegiance of the ulama who would have 
otherwise supported his uncle, Nasrullah as the rightful heir to Habibullah. Nawid 
writes that the “sacralization of military action as holy war was highly successful.” 
Amanullah quieted all opposition and emerged as a hero throughout the Muslim world, 
but especially in India.
In the first year, when Amanullah sought to solidify his reign, he clung to Islamic 
values, leading Friday prayers, and giving the sermon. At that time, his popularity 
remained strong. Soon, however, Amanullah shifted his focus to social and economic 
reform. As Afghanistan gained increasing international recognition and established 
diplomatic relations with European powers, Amanullah became enamoured with the 
idea of modernisation, and tried to transform Afghanistan’s society and economy. With 
the help of his foreign minister, Mahmud Tarzi, Amanullah’s nationalism developed 
along a “reformist, secular-equalitarian course that differed from anything Afghanistan
73 Ibid, 5, 42-6.
74 Adamec 1974,48-9, and Balland in Yarshater, 554.
75 Nawid, xix, 54, 64; Adamec 1974, 77.
100
had seen in the past.”76 Though wildly unrealistic, Amanullah imagined a new 
Afghanistan, one that was barely realised forty years later. Unfortunately, Amanullah’s 
dream was grand and unobtainable, though he was an abolitionist who protected the 
rights of minorities, and commenced a veritable renaissance in education. This earned
77him the loyalty of those who were far from being the traditional stalwarts of power.
In February 1923, the Fundamental Law was established. It was Afghanistan’s 
first constitution and set out the duties of the king, ministers, and governmental 
officials, as well as the functions of the state council, advisory committees, organisation 
of the courts, and so on. Afghanistan’s full independence was restated and Islam was 
declared the official state religion. This was done without specifying Sunni Islam, so as 
not to antagonize the Shi’i community. Very important to the tiny non-Muslim 
populace as well as to the Hazaras, Nuristanis, and other ethnic minorities was Article 
8, which “declared that all people residing in Afghanistan were Afghan citizens
7ftregardless of religion or creed.” This had a significant impact for the Jewish 
community. In the 1920s and the 1930s, many Jews were able to travel as they held 
valid Afghan passports. While Muhammad Hashim Khan’s administration later 
contested the validity of these passports, they did provide a certain amount of flexibility 
for their holders, especially those who fled Central Asia during the Russian 
Revolution.79
In her book on Amanullah, Senzil Nawid outlines pivotal sections of the 
Fundamental Law, describing the abolition of slavery, forced labor, and torture, and the 
prohibition of unlawful arrest. Personal property was to be secure, and all citizens were 
deemed equal under the law. However, one of the Constitutionalists’ primary aims, 
limiting the authority of the king was not realised. The ban on slavery and forced 
labour were highly regarded by the populace, yet Amanullah’s support began to
76Adamec 1974, 77
77 Leon B. Poullada “Political Modernization in Afghanistan: the Amanullah Reforms,” in eds. 
George Grasmuck, Ludwid Adamec, and Francis Irwin, Afghanistan: Some New Approaches (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan, 1969), 132; Nawid, 57, 77; Balland, 554.
78 Nawid, 79.
79 See chapter 4 for further information.
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dwindle when his reforms affected the traditional patterns of life.80 Starting in 1923, 
almost until the end of his reign, Amanullah cut spending on the army and increased 
taxes. Thus, while the poor and downtrodden had more protection under the law, they 
also had less income. This caused discontent and corruption, as governmental officials 
were not able to support their families from their salary alone, and thus solicited bribes.
Minorities under Amanullah: A Time of Tolerance
Minorities viewed Amanullah very favourably. He was the only ruler who did not 
attempt to use national unification as a way of ensuring religious homogenization.
Often criticized by the ulama for these policies, Amanullah earned the long-term 
admiration of the Jewish, Hindu, and Shi’i Muslim communities.
Hindus
In many ways, the experiences of the Hindu community matched those of the 
Jews. Perhaps the most spectacular example of religious tolerance occurred for this 
small population. Hindu merchants were principally responsible for Afghanistan’s 
foreign trade. They conducted a large amount of the commerce with Central Asia and
o 1
India, especially Baluchistan. In fact, Hindus were far more competitive than their 
Jewish compatriots, and pushed them out of money- changing and the wholesale trade 
in medicines. In Bukhara, this occurred far sooner, for money lending was already a
89Hindu monopoly in the sixteenth century.
For a brief time in the 1920s, Afghanistan’s geographical proximity to India, and 
Amanullah’s desire for better relations with the Indian populace led to far more 
opportunities for Afghanistani Hindus. In 1920, Amanullah wanted to encourage 
Indian independence from Britain, and used this goal to push for equal rights for 
Hindus in Afghanistan. He saw this as a first step towards building a nation that 
respected the rights of all groups, including religious and ethnic minorities. Amanullah
80 Nawid, 79-80, 83,187.
81 Gregorian, 62-5.
82 Burton, 56.
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enacted a series of decrees that amounted to a form of civil-rights legislation. These 
included permission for the Hindus to attend military school, join the army, own 
property, and rebuild temples. Taxes were also reduced to the amount that Muslims 
paid, and the jizya was cut in half. Hindus were no longer compelled to wear an orange 
or yellow turban, and in the most striking measure of solidarity with the subcontinent, 
killing cows was prohibited in Afghanistan. At this time, there was very little internal 
opposition to these decrees, as the population empathised with the plight of its southern 
neighbour. India was still subject to British rule, while Afghanistan e?(haiilted in her
83 ^newly found full independence.
Three years later, opposition began to mount against these measures of tolerance. 
In the initial reform stage (1919-23) lower-level clergy, especially those in the Pashtun 
tribal region were threatened by Amanullah’s changes. Consequently, they were the 
first to challenge the king. They were unaware of modem Islamic thinking circulating 
throughout the Muslim world, and were upset by these new ideas, especially those 
which protruded into their domain. The ulama were angered that non-Muslims were 
granted legal equality, and that girls were encouraged to receive an education.
Curiously enough, Pashtun mullas thought that after girls went to school, they would be 
sent to Kabul, just as boys were sent into the army as conscripts. This misconception 
does not appear to have been resolved, and in March 1924, the displeasure of the ulama 
continued when new laws were introduced, which they felt also contradicted the 
Shari’a.84
By September 1924, Amanullah was forced to rescind his most liberal measures. 
Article 2 of the Fundamental Law was changed so that Hanafi Sunni Islam was 
Afghanistan’s official religion, and Hindus and Jews would only be protected provided 
that they paid the jizya, wore clothing to distinguish them from Muslims, and did not 
upset “public morale and tranquility.”85 For Hindus, Amanuallah’s rule was very
83 Nawid, 66.
84 Ibid, 92-100, 189.
85 Ibid, 112.
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positive, as the amir held them in high esteem and sought to ease many of the burdens 
which accompanied their dhimmi status.
The Hazara
Despite the backlash of 1924, Amanullah continued to work for the benefit of his 
non-Sunni Muslim subjects, and the Hazara may have been his most faithful supporters. 
As Gregorian notes, he was the first ruler of Afghanistan “who had not capitalized on 
or manipulated Shi’i-Sunni religious antagonisms for political ends.”86 Fayz 
Muhammad Hazara al-Katib, a historian and scribe, was the highest-ranking Hazara at 
court. He remained loyal to Amanullah far into his successor’s reign. Faiz Muhammad 
was grateful to Amanullah for protecting the Twelver-Shi’i Hazara community from 
slavery and “the routine abuse and injustice which they had long endured” in 
Afghanistan.87 (Later, in 1929, Habibullah Kalakani found it very difficult to gain Shi’i 
allies, as he incited hatred against them, and they remembered the tolerance of 
Amanullah.)
Just as in the case of the Hindu community, tolerance towards Shi’i groups earned 
Amanullah the wrath of rural, conservative ulama. Even after the execution of three 
Qadiyani mollas (see full discussion below), Amanullah continued to be taunted as a
oo
Shi’i sympathizer as he had earned the respect of many Hazaras. More liberal 
members of the ulama were moved by the strong level of support shown to Amanullah 
by the Hazara representatives to the Loya Jirga (grand tribal assembly) of 1924, and
• OQthanked Amanullah for showing a “benevolent attitude towards the nation.”
86 Gregorian, 280.
87 R. D. McChesney, translator and editor, Kabul Under Siege: Fayz Muhammad’s Account o f  the 
1929 Uprising (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1999), 41. This is an English translation o f the 
Russian translation of Fayz Muhammad al-Katib’s incomplete history o f life under Habibullah 
Kalakani’s rule. (The original document was destroyed in the Russian invasion or ensuing civil war.) 
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88 Ibid, 159.
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Jews
Like other religious minorities, Amanullah’s rule was mostly a positive time for 
the Jewish community, and he was well liked by them. The folklorist, Zebulon Kort 
who collected thousands of tales, reports that in the years after World War I and before 
Nazi influence entered the country (roughly corresponding to Amanullah’s reign) the 
economic and social condition of the Jews was favourable. In Herat, the gates to the 
Jewish section of town did not need to be locked in fear of an attack.90
The Israeli researcher and founder of Pe ’amim, Itzhak Bezalel writes that 
Amanullah’s rule was a prosperous time where they were able to enjoy “greater 
economic opportunities.”91 However, Amanullah’s economic policy towards the Jews 
appears to have been contradictory. In 1919, just after independence, a regulation was 
promulgated that forced Jews to be traders to the exclusion of everything else. In the 
early 1920s, Amanullah’s administration placed tighter controls over the import-export 
trade. At first, government licenses were required when items crossed the nation’s 
frontiers. Erich Brauer states that an exporting license was only granted to individuals 
“after depositing the value of the goods as security for the return of the money to 
Afghanistan.”93 In 1923, the Minister of Finance, Mir Hashim Khan founded the 
Shirkat-i Amaniye. This organisation appears to have been the predecessor of the 
Ashami Company. Brauer describes it as a “trade association,” which exported entrails, 
hides, furs, and carpets. Amanullah and Mir Hashim Khan were the principal 
stockowners, and the amir claimed a private monopoly over the trade in precious and 
semi-precious stones as well.94 This was the beginning of a system of monopolies, and 
will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. As a contemporary observer, 
Brauer states that the “radical measures” were “designed to concentrate the country’s
90 Zebulon Kort, “ Yehudei Afghanistan v ’Eretz Yisraelf Mahanaim, 114: (Adar II 5728 [spring 
1968]): 83.
91 Bezalel in Bar’am-Ben Yossef, 21.
92 Landshut 1950a, 68.
93 Brauer 1942, 125.
94 Ibid, note 13, citing Bruno Markowski, Die Materielle Kultur des Kabulgebietes (Leipzig, 
1932): 118, 120.
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trade wholly in the hands of its rulers.”95 Consequently, some Jewish merchants had 
trouble maintaining solvency.
Despite apparent economic restrictions, the Jewish opinion of the Afghanistan’s 
first independent ruler did not plummet. Writing in 1929, Abraham Emanuelson, 
originally from Afghanistan but settled in New York, noted that: “Amicable and 
friendly relations ... exist between the Jews and the government.” This warmth was 
kindled under Habibullah, yet Amanullah “exceeds his father in kindness. The Jews 
feel safe under his protection.”96 In 1927, there were perhaps as many as sixty separate 
Jewish settlements -  in major cities, as well as in smaller communities throughout the 
northern rim of Afghanistan.97 Traditional patterns of settlement based on the 
exegencies of trade were firmly ensconced until the murder of Muhammad Nadir Shah 
in 1933.
Amanullah’s Encouragement of Education
Amanullah used increased revenue from higher taxes to build a palace, support 
Afghan missions abroad, and also to fund education. A. Ghani argues that Amanullah’s 
greatest contribution to Afghanistan was his support of secular education. In only four 
years (between 1924 and 1928), 4,823 children finished primary school, while 158
QQ
completed high school and 151 were sent abroad. Amanullah founded three 
secondary schools for boys which used French, German, and English as their respective 
media of instruction. Schools were also founded to train teachers and administrators, 
and encourage the transmission of the arts, foreign languages, and technical skills. In 
January 1921, a girls’ school was founded, it had 800 students by 1928 99 Amanullah 
hoped to facilitate the emergence of an intellectual class and train competent
95 Ibid.
96 Emanuelson, 47.
97 Landshut 1950a, 68, and E.G. Lowenthal, “So viele Juden leben in Afghanistan und Iran,” in 
Revue Juive, no.5, 1 February 1980, 19.
98 Ehsan Yarshater, ed., Encyclopaedia Iranicd’ (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), s.v. 
“Afghanistan XI. Administration,” by A. Ghani, 561. See also, S.Q. Reshtia “Ddvelopement de
1’instruction Publique en Afghanistan,” Afghanistan no. 1 (Jan-Mar 1946): 21.
99 Personal correspondence with May Schinasi, 17 April 2003.
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administrators. The latter goal was achieved to some extent, as graduates of these new 
institutions comprised the backbone of administrators under the rule of the Mosahiban 
family. However, Amanullah had a great deal of trouble convincing the ulama that 
secular education would not contravene the Shari’a.100
Patterns of Jewish Education
Between 1919 and 1923, many foreigners began to arrive in Afghanistan -  
especially technicians, engineers, doctors, and businessmen.101 Some of these Western 
experts were Jewish, and they in turn had an influence on the Afghanistan! Jewish 
community. Before Amanullah declared independence in 1919, Jews interacted with 
their co-religionists in Persia, India, Central Asia, and Russia. Yet the Jewish guest 
workers employed by the Afghan government brought knowledge of Western Judaism 
with them, and explained how Jews were prominent in the economic and political life
in? •  •  •of other lands. This provided a source of inspiration for the local community, parts 
of whom then looked more favourably upon secular forms of education.
Most documented information about Jewish education concerns religious and
1 mprivately financed institutions before and during Amanullah’s reign. The community 
had several different reactions to the educational reforms proposed in the 1920s. In 
Herat, some were open to change, while others remained firmly opposed. One group of 
parents was disatisfied with the scope of their children’s education, as it was confined 
to learning religious subjects by rote. The parents hired a teacher, Rabbi Yehoshua 
Amram who tried to instruct the children using more modem methods. They ordered 
books from Jerusalem, studied in Hebrew, and even learned a bit of arithmetic. Kort 
writes that all of the students in this school did learn something, including many girls
100 Gregorian, 239-43.
101 Nawid, 93.
102 Kort in Mahanayim, Spring 1968, 80.
103 Under Muhammad Hashim Khan’s regency (1933-46), some boys attended state-run Muslim 
schools, especially in Kabul. (Author’s interview with Shulamit and Amanda Ambalu, London, 30 
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who gained literacy skills.104 Despite these innovations, this school was still firmly 
rooted in Judaic traditions. (The Alliance Israelite Universelle tried to establish contact 
with Jews in Afghanistan, and hoped to establish a school. However, the government 
felt this would be too much foreign influence, and stopped their overtures.) Conversely, 
when Amanullah proposed a Jewish school where European languages would be 
taught, the Jewish community refused it. Emanuelson explains that pious Jews feared 
this might lead to conversion -  perhaps this community’s greatest fear.105 In many 
ways, the reactions of religious Jews paralleled that of religious Muslims, yet without 
the political repercussions. Their power did not extend beyond the mahallah.
Despite these fears, one young man did receive a thoroughly modem education, as 
he was part of a delegation sent to Soviet Central Asia for further study. In the 1920s, 
as in the 1930s, and 1940s, the exceptional life of Shmuel Shabtai Dadash gives us 
some sense of what it was possible to accomplish and also endure. Dadash was bom in 
1910 in Herat to a family involved in commerce. His father was the community’s 
kalantar. Extraordinarily, in 1924, Dadash joined an official school delegation. He was 
sent to Samarkand where he stayed for the next six years, studying Russian, Arabic, 
Turkish, and English. In his attempt to learn English, he translated what amounted to 
be an entire dictionary into the dialect of the Jews of Afghanistan. This is a treasure 
trove for the study of the Afghanistani branch of Judeo-Persian. In fact, he was able to 
record a great many details about this dialect before it was strongly influenced by other 
languages, especially Hebrew.106 Later, Dadash endured fourteen years of 
imprisonment during the regency of Muhammad Hashim Khan. Like the rest of the 
Jewish community, Amanullah’s reign was a bright time for Dadash. While 
Amanullah’s plans for Afghanistan were not based firmly in reality, the tolerance he 
showed to all recognised religious minorities is long remembered as a hallmark of his 
reign.
104 Kort in Mahanayim, Spring 1968, 81.
105 Emanuelson, 47.
106 Yehoshua 1981a, 109, and author’s interview with Ben-Zion Yehoshua, 15 July 2001, 
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A Less Tolerated Minority: The Ahmadiyas
Groups viewed as heretics were treated far more harshly, even by a tolerant ruler. 
Amanullah’s grip on power was endangered when he was linked to a schism of Shi’i 
Islam. A 1924 uprising against Amanullah intensified when a rumor started that he had 
become a member of the Ahmadiyah or Qadiyani sect. In the late nineteenth-century, 
Mirza Gholam Ahmad founded this religious group. He came from Qadiyan, a town in
i  r y i
eastern Punjab. Ghulam Ahmad claimed that he was an Islamic prophet. His 
religious movement was very threatening to all normative Muslims, but especially 
Sunnis. Often Qadiyanis are not considered Muslim, as Pakistan declared in 1974. 
Before 1924, Qadiyanis were barely tolerated in Afghanistan, but with the impetus of 
this anti-Amanullah rumor, their entire community was placed in great danger. In 
order to combat these whisperings, Amanullah arrested thirty members of this group 
and had several mullas stoned to death. This action was strongly condemned by the 
Qadiyani community in India and England, as well as by the London Times. Nawid 
explains that the official newspaper Aman-i-Afghan responded with the following 
argument. It wrote that ideologies, which “offend prevailing beliefs,” would be 
upsetting to the populace. Interestingly, the piece cited Article 9 of the Constitution 
that protected religious minorities whose beliefs were “entirely different from Islam,” 
stating that they had been accepted in Afghanistan for hundreds of years.109 This was 
the only apparent exception to Amanullah’s policy of minority toleration. In the new 
penal code promulgated between 1924-25, Article 123 said that: “members of outlawed 
Muslim religious sects (Sabi, Zendiq, and especially Qadiyani) were to be killed.”110 
The Qadiyanis were viewed as heretics rather than ahl al-dhimma and their experiences 
appear to reflect more fiponjlthose of other nineteenth century schisms of Shi’i Islam 
like the Baha’i faith.
107 Nawid, p. 120.
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Reform and Revolt
Despite wide-scale discontent after 1924, Amanullah was committed to liberal 
reform. His attitude towards the ulama hardened, and he strengthened modernisation 
efforts.111 Between 1925 and 1927, while no new reforms were introduced, 
Amanullah’s government returned to its previous goals of central political authority, 
and advancements in education and women’s rights. This time Amanullah brushed 
aside the clergy and appealed directly to the populace.
At this point, Amanullah alienated some of his most important supporters,
especially War Minister Muhammad Nadir Khan of the Mosahiban family.
Muhammad Nadir Khan wanted modem technology and scientific advances to be
110encouraged without accompanying social and cultural reforms. Amanullah thought 
that the war minister assisted the Mangal Pashtuns in their rebellion, and soon found 
himself in a genteel form of exile as ambassador to France.113 Amanullah’s vision of 
Afghanistan did not account for the exigencies of his country’s limited economic and 
social development, conservative ulama, and tribal structures. His hopes grew as he 
embarked upon a grand tour, while the realisation of these dreams became increasingly 
remote.
Between November 1927 and June 1928, Amanullah embarked on a tour of 
Europe and Asia. He visited India, Egypt, England, France, Switzerland, Italy, 
Germany, the Soviet Union, Turkey, and Persia. The trip made headlines throughout 
the world and certainly augmented Afghanistan’s international status.114 Unfortunately, 
the king’s eight-month absence led to a rise in administrative corruption. This greatly 
upset the populace and hastened the spread of revolt in the autumn of 1928. Only an 
ineffective, skeletal staff was left in Kabul, and opposition was able to gain strength 
easily. In spite of these serious issues, Amanullah’s popularity was very high after the
111 Nawid, 105-6.
112 Ibid, 124 and 147.
113 Balland in Yarshater, 555.
]14 The Times, 14 March 1928,18.
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tour. Nawid argues that he could have maintained his rule if he had improved the 
conditions of soldiers, punished governmental corruption, and not insisted upon radical 
changes that contradicted the population’s tribal and religious customs.115
Amanullah wanted Afghanistan to follow the same path as Turkey and Persia, yet 
these two countries had long histories of imperial rule to draw upon. The same cannot 
be said of Afghanistan. With hindsight, in the 1940s, the British India Office blamed 
Amanullah’s fall on the fact that he possessed neither the “dictatorial power of Reza 
Shah” nor “the administrative genius of Kemal Ataturk.”116 Indeed, Amanullah would 
not have needed to be a brilliant dictator or administrator if he had only limited his 
imagination in accordance with some of the realities of his country. Historian Leon 
Poullada states that Amanullah fell because he neglected the four pillars of his power: 
the economy, army, settled populations, and faithful tribal leaders.117
Instead of plying a more moderate course upon returning home in 1928, 
Amanullah felt a renewed zeal for reform. He convened a Loya Jerga whose thousand 
members endorsed a series of liberal measures. This gathering excluded the clergy 
altogether, and subsequently threatened the higher-ranking ulama. Amanullah wanted 
to seize waqf endowments as well as intrude upon the ulama’s power. He also wished 
to substitute a penal code'based on tribal customs andthe Shari’a/for onejbased on
Western law. Yet Amanullah’s most controversial measures all concerned the role of\   ——
women. He wanted to improve women’s education, end forced and child marriages, 
and discourage polygamy, hijab, and purdah. These issues ignited the clergy who 
united with rural mullahs and allied themselves with “militant tribes, dissident groups,
1 1 o
opposition leaders and adventurers.” Amanullah did not provide the army with 
sufficient resources, and this action undermined efforts to achieve some amount of 
unity throughout Afghanistan.119 He also failed to create an urban middle class, which
115 Nawid, 136-9.
116IOL L/PS/12/1321, A Survey o f Anglo-Afghan Relations, 15.
117 Poullada, 125.
118 Nawid, xix, 138, 190-1, McChesney, 13.
1,9 Poullada, 133.
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along with a contented army, could have supported the reforms and defended the liberal 
government.120
t[
j Very upset by Amanullah’s new wave of reforms, four hundred ulama signed a
fatwa against Amanullah in September 1928. They accused him of violating Islamic 
law and claimed that “his innovations {bed’at) amounted to heresy” and thus he was not 
to be followed. On 4 October 1928, Amanullah responded by executing four prominent 
members of the ulama. This action swept away all of the support that he might still
191have retained. Then in November 1928, in response to new regulations that enforced 
the use of identity cards and passports along the southern border or Durrand Line, the
1 99i Shinwari Pashtun tribe revolted. Encouraged by the ulama, they interrupted the
country’s limited infrastructure, halting traffic between Kabul and Jalalabad, and 
cutting telgraph lines.123 They also burned governmental buildings, including 
Amanullah’s winter palace in Jalalabad.124 However, Amanullah’s brother-in-law, Ali 
Ahmad Khan Luynab, the High Commander for the Southern and Eastern Provinces,
19c
was able to reconcile with the Shinwari leaders.
Amanullah was forced to back down from aims his populace could not 
understand, and found threatening. All schools for girls were closed, and the laws
19Aregarding child marriage, polygamy, and unveiling were annulled. By the end of 
1928, few people trusted Amanullah. Both liberal and conservative members of society 
were upset by Amanullah’s careless disregard of widespread social norms, as well as 
high taxes and rampant governmental corruption. Amanullah’s dreams faded into the 
nightmare of his successor’s tyranny and anarchy.
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Habibullah Kalakani: Reign of Terror
“Hiding behind Islamic slogans, they wrought a disaster impossible for the human 
mind to comprehend. ” - Fayz Muhammad al-Katib Hazara127
Instead of life settling down after the Shinwari revolt, insurgent forces descended 
upon Kabul. Afghanistan was confronted with a rebellion led by a Tajik man named 
Habibullah, who came from the town of Kalakan in the Kuhdaman region north of 
Kabul. Kalakani was a highway bandit, and by the autumn of 1928 had “gained a 
reputation as ‘the defender of the oppressed’ akin to Robin Hood.”128 Fayz Muhammad 
reports that Kalakani described himself in the following manner:
‘ I was a poor man, hiding from the government up in the mountains, in
fear of being punished for my banditry. When Aman Allah decided to
undermine the foundations of religion and turn the nation of believers into
1 *20atheists, I opposed him and was victorious.’
Kalakani was the first non-Pashtun ruler of Afghanistan and reigned from 18
130 •January to 13 October 1929. Kalakani was able to couch grievances against 
Amanullah in religious terms. He stated that it was incumbent upon Muslims to oust 
the amir. Indeed, during the latter part of his rule Amanullah failed to overcome the 
normative political discourse, which was framed in religious terms. By November, 
Kalakani blocked the main road to Kohistan as well as that from Kabul to Charikar. He 
also won the support of the ulama of Kohistan and “established himself as the defender 
of Islamic values and [became] a folk hero.” In December 1928, Habibullah Kalakani 
arrived in Kabul, and on 14 January 1929, 16,000 Kohistani forces surrounded the city. 
The Afghan army was unable to defend against this incursion because so many solders
127 Me Chesney, 59 (Faiz Muhammad’s account).
128 Nawid, 165.
129 McChesney, 149-50. Fayz Muhammad reporting Kalakani’s words o f 19 May 1929. I have 
chosen to use call Habibullah by the name of his hometown in order to avoid confusion with the amir of 
the same name, who ruled from 1901-19. Another common name for him, Bacha-i Saqqao, or son o f the 
water carrier is a derisive appellation.
130 McChesney, 1.
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had been sent to Jalalabad to fight the Shinwaris.131 Only a handful of solders fought, 
as officers embezzled their food and pay. Fayz Muhammad reports that they were in a 
“mutinous mood.”132
The immediate cause of Amanullah’s downfall was his neglect of the army. As a 
final desperate measure, Amanullah opened the arsenal and distributed 50,000 rifles to 
the Kabuli populace. Even this did not stop the Kohistanis. The fighting continued, 
and on 14 January, Amanullah abdicated in favor of his older brother ‘Inayatullah 
Khan. However, ‘Inayatullah only lasted three days on the throne. On 18 January, 
Habibullah Kalakani was crowned ruler.
While Kalakani was able to defeat Amanullah and appoint new officials, he 
found it far more difficult to consolidate his rule across Afghanistan. Into the spring, 
Kalakani encountered various challenges to his rule. These included revolts by Hazaras 
in the Hazarajat and Pashtuns in the south. Muhammad Nadir Khan returned from 
France with his brothers and also started to fight against Kalakani. Ironically, by March 
1929, public opinion even among the Shinwari favored Amanullah once again, as 
Kalakani tarnished his reputation by fostering a climate of injustice, oppression, and 
fear.134
The Hazara scribe and historian, Fayz Muhammad al-Katib unequivocally 
detested Kalakani. Throughout his final work, he accuses Kalakani of atrocities 
including “drawing and quartering living people, raping women, young girls, and 
young boys, charging people who had never committed even the smallest misdeed with 
crimes, [and] hanging innocent people....” Fayz Muhammad found Kalakani’s reign 
to be a topsy-turvy world where outlaws became political leaders. In a colourful 
description the Hazara scribe writes:
131 Nawid, 165-6, 170, 189.
132 Me Chesney, 38. (Fayz Muhammad’s account.)
133 Nawid, 170 and Me Chesney, 45.
134 Nawid, 176-77.
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Every seller of eggs, vinegar, grapes, firewood, grape syrup, and dates, 
having now taken up arms and strapped on a bandolier, wanted to be a 
minister, a qal‘ah-begi, an aide-de-camp to the amir, a military high 
commissioner, a governor-general, a field marshal, a lieutenant general, a 
brigadier, a colonel, or a governor. ... It is clear that in such a 
government there is no place for a rational person.135
As a man employed by several royal households, Fayz Muhammad must have felt very 
lost indeed. His position was even more precarious due to his status as a prominent 
Hazara. While religious minorities fared well under Amanullah, they endured terrible 
subjugation under Habibullah Kalakani.
Minorities under Kalakani
Kalakani rode to power on a wave of grievances shaped by the Sunni ulama; thus,
it is not surprising that through his rule “the constant drumbeat of ethnic and sectarian
1loyalties and conflict” was heard. Religious and ethnic minorities were especially 
targeted during Kalakani’s reign. In the spring of 1929, Kalakani encouraged the 
Suleiman Khel Pashtuns to attack the Hazara. In order to legitimise this action, the 
Suleiman Khel declared jihad. Prominent members of the ulama said this was illegal. 
According to Faiz Muhammad, they said that:
[I]n every country under the protection of any government, Christians,
Jews, Zoroastrians, idolators, Buddhists, Shi’ites, Sunnis, pagans,
Isma’ilis, and even all seventy-three sects of Islam live peacefully 
together. ... Each upholds those norms of human conduct that do not 
contradict the holy code of his own religion.137
Despite the concerted efforts of the commission, Kalakani still incited members of the
Suleiman Khel in Kabul, and a veritable pogrom descended upon the Hazara and
1 ^ 0
Qizilbash Shi’i communities.
535 Me Chesney 116, and 234 (Fayz Muhammad’s account)
136 Ibid, 3.
137 Ibid, 151.
138 Ibid, 152 (Fayz Muhammad’s account)
115
Fayz Muhammad’s general description of Hazara persecution under Kalakani is 
strikingly similar to his autobiographical account of being brutalized in June 1929.139 
Interestingly enough, the Persian embassy did provide some assistance. Its military 
attache had been instructed to do everything possible to help Afghanistan’s Shi’i 
community “without interfering ... in a way that might invite an attack upon Iran.”140 
Just as during ‘ Abd al-Rahman’s rule, Persia was willing to go one step short of war to 
protect the Hazara community.
Very little is written about the Jews during this time. Perhaps this is because most 
of the Jewish population lived in Herat during Kalakani’s rule. They resided under the 
only regional official, ‘Abd al-Rahim, who was competent enough to maintain his 
governorship well into Mosahiban rule.141 In fact, it was only at the end of 1931 that 
‘Abd al-Rahim allowed the province of Herat to be governed again by Kabul.142 Even 
in 1934 he would only interact with officials that he had appointed, ignoring the central 
government’s choices.143
Despite the lack of Jewish eyewitness accounts of Kalakani’s rule, in general, 
when a government changed, the community suffered. Some of their experiences may 
be inferred by more general information written during similar times. Until the 1970s, 
Kalakani’s seizure of power was the most dramatic break in the chain of 
Muhammadza’i Pashtun rule. When explaining power transitions, Reuven Kashani 
states that: “The Jewish community [would] endure rape and plunder.”144 Kashani also
139 The scribe was forced to go on a mission to try to convince the Hazaras o f the Hazarajat to 
accept the sovereignty of Habibullah Kalakani. Yet, he betrayed the regime by passing information to 
the Hazara leader Fath Muhammad. Upon returning to Kabul, they ordered him and two others to be 
flogged. Fayz Muhammad describes the beating as follows: “As for me, one stick caught me on the 
forehead and blood drenched my face and beard. I whispered the prayer o f Abu Hamza ... ‘Oh God! 
Save me! Truly, You are the savior!’ Nothing more passed from my lips.” (209-10) Eventually, the 
scribe was brought home and his family was grief-stricken to see his condition. Iodine to clean Fayz 
Muhammad’s wounds was procured from the Persian embassy. (211)
140 Ibid, 211.
141 Bezalel, 17; and Kort, 80.
142 Fraser-Tytler 1967,230. See also PRO/FO/17198, Afghanistan 1932 Yearly Report, 402.
143 PRO/FO/371/18243, Diary for week o f 8 March 1934, 157.
144 Reuven Kashani, Al YehudeiAfghanistan” in Shevet Va’Am Bet [2], (Sivan 5718 [spring 
1958]), 157.
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illustrates what would happen when the crowd would be incited against the Jewish 
population.
[I]n those times when the crowd was wild, they would go into the Jewish 
neighborhoods calling out: ‘kafir’ [infidel] and ‘chuli’ [thief]. The Jews 
would lock their homes and the synagogue and would pray until the time 
passed. The government tried to control the crowds, and only at that time 
would the Jews go out again, and start their lives all over again. They 
would cry over lost people and possessions and would try to resume their 
normal lives.145
In addition to locking themselves in their homes, the Jews also escaped into the 
countryside during times of crisis.146 While this description is not specific to 
Kalakani’s rule, the government intervened only sporadically on behalf of the Jewish 
community.
Muhammad Nadir’s Rise
One week after Amanullah fell, Muhammad Nadir Khan boarded a ship in France 
and started the journey to Afghanistan. He was joined by his brothers Shah Wali, 
Muhammad Hashim, and Muhammad Aziz.147 Muhammad Nadir set out for 
Afghanistan even before Kalakani’s excesses were known abroad. He may not have 
known that Amanullah had abdicated. McChesney argues that he may have returned:
•  •  1 Aft“simply because political opportunity was created by the uprising of the Shinwari.”
In March 1929, Muhammad Nadir finally entered Afghanistan, and at this point it was 
not yet clear whether he intended to support Amanullah. But, in a religious conference 
at Hadda, the Mulla of Chaknawur refused to uphold the reinstatement of
145 Ibid. This paragraph is almost identical to one written by Avraham Kashani entitled “Kehilat 
Afghanistan,” in Mahanayim vol. 119 (Av 5728 [summer 1968]): 134. It is not known if Avraham 
Kashani is related to Reuven Kashani, though it seems probable.
146 Bezalel in Bar’am-Ben Yossef, 21. In Bukhara, a pogrom was averted in March 1918 after 
Jews barricaded themselves in their homes, and the amir sent guards to protect them. Encyclopedia 
Judaica (Jerusalem: Keter, 1971), s.v. “Bukhara,” by Mordechai Altshuler.
147 Balland in Yarshater, 555.
148 McChesney, 88.
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Amanullah.149 Compounding religious opposition was the tribal disapproval of 
Amanullah. At the end of March 1929, Muhammad Hashim Khan held a tribal jirga or 
assembly in the Kurram Valley on behalf of his brother. There the Pashtun leaders 
decided that no one in Amanullah’s family was fit to rule. Instead, they preferred 
someone who would be religiously conservative and widely popular.150 Amanullah 
soon realised that he was fighting against both Kalakani and the Mosahiban family, and 
in despair, he left Afghanistan on 23 May 1929 never to return.
Several weeks after Amanullah’s departure, a fatwa was issued against Kalakani’s 
terror and brutality by Nur al-Mashayikh, a prominent religious figure. The fatwa 
considerably improved Muhammad Nadir Khan’s position. His forces continued to 
gain momentum from the summer and into the fall.151 On 23 September, there was an 
uprising in Kandahar, and by mid-October, Muhammad Nadir was crowned ruler in
1 OKabul. Two weeks later, on 1 November 1929, Habibullah Kalakani was executed, 
and the reign of the Tajik bandit-king came to an end.153 Muhammad Nadir Shah 
consolidated his rule by relying upon the two power bases that Amanullah had alienated 
-  the Pashtun tribes and the ulama. He exempted several tribes from military service 
because of their help fighting against Kalakani, and included clergy in the government.
Outwardly, Nadir Shah acted very differently from Amanullah by appeasing 
traditional holders of power. However, much of what Amanullah had established 
remained in place. According to Senzil Nawid:
With the exception of the penal codes, the Marriage Law, and the 
Constitution of 1923, which were the major focus of religious opposition, 
all other nezam-namas of the Amani period, including those pertaining to 
conscription and identity cards, were reintroduced with slight changes.154
149 Nawid, 177.
150 McChesney, 93 (Fayz Muhammad’s account)
151 Nawid, 184-5.
152 IOL L/PS/12/1321,^4 Survey o f Anglo-Afghan Relations, Part I I 1919-1947, 16 and 
McChesney, 272.
153 Balland in Yarshater, 555.
154 Nawid, 185 and 193.
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Amanullah’s vision was retained in its legal structure. Despite these similarities, the 
twentieth century never again saw a ruler so smitten with the idea of his country’s 
modem progress, and consequent protection of minority rights.
The Rule of Muhammad Nadir Shah: Pacification and Consolidation
Muhammad Nadir Khan entered Kabul and was crowned king on 14 October 
1929.155 Afghanistan was finally free of Kalakani. Nadir reigned for only four years, 
from 1929 to 1933, and in that time his greatest achievement was “the political 
reunification, centralization, and pacification” of Afghanistan.156 He shared governing 
with his brothers and their sons, a pattern that continued even after the monarchy fell, 
until his nephew, Muhammad Daud Khan was deposed in 1978. Nadir’s four brothers 
were placed in the following positions: Muhammad Hashim Khan was named Prime 
Minister, Shah Wali Khan, Minister of War, and later sent to London, Shah Mahmud 
Khan, Minister of War, and Muhammad Aziz Khan was first Envoy to Moscow, and 
later transferred to Berlin.157
In order to strengthen his mle, Nadir Shah had to placate the ulama and Pashtun 
tribes, the sources of Amanullah’s downfall. One way of garnering the support of the 
religious establishment was through political appointments. An important religious 
leader, Hazrat Sahib (Muhammad Sadiq) was appointed as Envoy to Egypt, while 
family loyalties were respected once again since his brothers chosen as Ministers of 
State and Justice respectively. The latter ministry was responsible for enforcing Shari’a 
law. Veiling became mandatory for women, and a religious police force was 
established, which took an especially harsh view of alcohol consumption. Socio­
economic reconstruction commenced.158
Muhammad Nadir Shah faced two particularly demanding neighbours, as well as 
their respective opposition movements. Just as all Afghan rulers since ‘Abd al-
155IOL L/PS/12/1321, A Survey o f Anglo-Afghan Relations, PartII, 15.
156 Gregorian, 340.
157 Adamec 1974,277, and personal correspondence with May Schinasi, 17 April 2003.
158 See Gregorian, 294-96 for details.
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Rahman, he tried to treat both the Soviet Union and Britain as equally as possible, and 
maintain neutrality. Any other course would have been disastrous, as either power 
could have unleashed forces strong enough to topple his government. The Soviet 
Union had the potential to start revolutionary movements in the north, while the British 
could have stirred up the Pashtun tribes against Nadir’s rule. Consequently, Nadir did 
not encourage Pashtun protest against the British or the anti-Soviet, pan-Islamic 
Basmachi movement. A neutrality pact was signed with the Soviet Union in June 
1931.159 Contemporary British sources report that political activities amongst Central 
Asian Muslim refugees were suppressed, and they were removed from northern 
Afghanistan. Consequently, relations with the Soviet Union improved, and trade 
expanded. Soviet goods became widespread in Herat and the north. As noted, relations 
with Great Britain continued smoothly, and Nadir discouraged Indian nationalists. The 
British Minister in Kabul, Richard Maconachie was assured that the border would 
remain calm.160 In fact, opponents to British rule also presented a challenge to Nadir, 
especially the egalitarianism espoused by the Pashtun nationalist-reformist party,
Khudai Khidmatgaran (also known as Red Shirts). Democratic ideals could lead to the 
end of the Afghan monarchy, as well as the British Empire. In the 1920s, Amanullah 
had leaned more towards the Soviet Union’s influence and some early ideals. In 
contrast, Nadir Shah moved closer to Britain.161
The new Constitution of 1931 institutionalised the ulama’s power, while also 
allowing for gradual reforms in the judiciary system. Cases about government
« 1 ftDofficials’ responsibilities were not tried according to the Shari’a. Outwardly the new 
constitution was more progressive to religious minorities. While the Constitution of 
1923 made Hindus and Jews pay the jizya and wear something to distinguish them from 
Muslims, eight years later, non-Muslims were tolerated as long as they did not violate
1 f tXlaws or social norms. Being a member of ahl al-dhimma was no longer legislated. It 
became de facto if not de jure. In 1932, the Statute of Passport and Nationality
159 Adamec, 202.
160 IOL L/PS/12/1688, Political Department, policy paper on Afghanistan, August 1935, 66.
161 Gregorian, 321-23, and 331-33.
162 Ibid, 340.
163 Ibid, 300 citing the Constitution of 1931.
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declared that all those bom in Afghanistan, or whose fathers were Afghan citizens, 
were also themselves Afghan nationals and had to have a citizenship card.164 This is 
particularly important to note, for legally Jews were considered Afghan citizens. 
However, only a few years later, this provision was disregarded. Many Jews, 
particularly those bom in Herat, found themselves unknowingly stripped of citizenship.
A badal or blood feud started between Nadir’s family, the Mosahiban, and the 
Charki family in 1932. The Charkis had been prominent figures during Amanullah’s 
reign, and maintained their alliance to the former amir. Nadir Shah accused Ghulam 
Nabi, former Minister to Moscow, of plotting to overthrow him. Instead of allowing 
the time for a trial, Ghulam Nabi was summarily executed. A wave of bloodshed 
commenced. In July 1933, Nadir’s brother, Muhammad Aziz Khan was assassinated in 
Berlin, and two months later there was an attempt to kill the British minister. The 
gunman stated that he hoped this would spark a war with Britain, as he felt that Nadir 
was too pro-British. On the first anniversary of Ghulam Nabi’s death, 8 November 
1933, Muhammad Nadir Shah was himself assassinated.165
On the day of Muhammad Nadir’s assassination, his teenaged son, Muhammad 
Zahir Khan was crowned shah. Zahir’s uncle, Muhammad Hashim Khan acted as 
regent, and continued his role as Prime Minister until 1946.166 Muhammad Hashim 
Khan conducted domestic and foreign policies on lines similar to those of his murdered 
brother. Neutrality towards Britain and the Soviet Union was espoused, while ties to 
Muslim nations were actively cultivated. A distant industrialized power was sought as 
a way to support economic development, and foreign relations as a whole were directed 
to create a careful and secure policy for fiscal growth.167
164 Ibid, 306, citing the Statute Regarding Identity Cards, Regulations for Passports and the Law 
Regarding Citizenship.
165 Adamec, 195-8.
166 IOL L/PS/12/1321, A Survey of Anglo-Afghan Relations, Part II, 17.
167 Gregorian, 375.
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Economic Policies: The Bank-i Milli and the Rise of the Monopoly System
Gregorian notes that one of the most significant contributions of the Afghan 
monarchy in the first half of the twentieth-century was the way it organized and 
directed the national economy. It was active by: “introducing industries, encouraging 
the development of a modem banking system, and promoting the formation of joint- 
stock companies” which apparently led to capitalist development and the creation of a 
middle class.168 In contrast to the predominant view that this economic development 
was positive for all, this thesis argues that some of these innovations were also 
destructive. They led to the impoverishment and persecution of more marginal 
members of society — minorities and refugees.
One month after gaining the throne, Nadir Shah sought to implement a 
nationalistic economic policy. He turned to ‘Abd al-Majid Khan Zabuli (1902-98), a 
Herati native who had established the first joint-stock company in 1924 to facilitate 
commerce with the Soviet Union. Between 1925 and 1929 ‘Abd al-Majid lived in 
Moscow, as an exporter of Afghan goods to the Soviet Union. During Kalakani’s reign 
this trade was devastated, and his business suffered. When Nadir came to power, ‘Abd 
al-Majid returned to Afghanistan and the king immediately asked him to create a plan 
to restore Afghanistan’s economy.169 According to ‘Abd al-Majid many years later, 
Nadir Shah told him that:
‘Today we see in our own country export, import, transportation, 
brokerage and everything else are all done by foreigners; only 
shopkeeping is left for our own people. This situation is intolerable and 
we must have our own nationals engaged in all these activities throughout 
the country. We must find a way to cut off the hands of the foreigners.’ 170
These lines are significant, and remained a goal far beyond Nadir’s short reign.
168 Ibid, 397.
169 Maxwell J. Fry, The Afghan Economy: Money, Finance, and the Critical Constraints to 
Economic Development (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 82-3.
170 Ibid, 83 citing Report o f Bank Millie’s Activities in 1344 [1965] (Kabul: Bank Millie, 1345).
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‘Abd al-Majid certainly took this charge to heart, and spent most of his working 
life pursuing this task. Nadir wanted ethnic Afghans to control the export trade, and 
“centralize the sources of capital badly needed to start banking, industrial, and
171commercial enterprises.” ‘Abd al-Majid Khan stayed in Kabul for three months and 
prepared an economic plan. He thought of starting a bank, but the Minister of Justice 
was against this idea. Consequently, Nadir acquiesed to the demands of the religious 
establishment. The rest of ‘Abd al-Majid’s proposal was approved.
Instead of a bank, a trading company was established in 1930. Its official name 
was Shirkat-i Sahami-i-Afghan, the Afghan Joint Stock Company, though it was
1 77commonly referred to as Shirkat Ashami (in its plural form). The official rationale 
for its creation centered on the fall of the Afghani as well as the general weakened state
177 •of the economy. Officials decided that local Hindu moneychangers and informal
bankers were to blame, rather than the recent internal strife and global depression. As 
mentioned above, they were also convinced that foreigners were running Afghanistan’s 
economy. Hindu businessmen were told that they could not continue to exchange 
currency, and were given three days to close their businesses. This ultimatum was 
unsuccessful, and was disregarded by the Hindu community who knew that no one 
could replace them.174 However, by June 1931, another new, semi-private trading 
agency was established that was far harder to ignore. The Shirkat-i Islah had a large 
scope. It was founded as a semi-official trading agency that claimed to speak for the 
entire commercial community of Afghanistan, just as the Shirkat Ashami did. The 
contemporary Journal o f Commerce stated that the Shirkat-i Islah’s “chief trade will be 
in wools, furs and skins, particularly astrachan.”175 The position of entrepreneurial 
minorities, both Hindus and Jews, remained secure for several more years until the 
Shirkat Ashami’s power became firmly ensconced.
171 Peter G. Franck, “Problems of Economic Development in Afghanistan,” in Middle East 
Journal 3: 4 (October 1949): 430-31.
172 Fry, xii.
173 Between 1930 and 1932, the Afghani fell from 2.17 to 3.4 against the Indian rupee. IOL 
L/PS/12/1552, Economic Report o f 1937, Annex D, The Organisation of Industry and Trade, 357.
174 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Maconachie (Kabul) to Arthur Henderson (London), 12 March 1931, 563.
175 IOL L/PS/12/1552, “Afghan Trading Agency” clipping from Journal o f  Commerce, 3 June 
1931,556.
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The Shirkat Ashami, along with many other joint stock companies that followed, 
was established as a public-private initiative, with the Afghan government generally 
contributing less than half of the resources, while the private sector provided the rest.
In this case, however, the government provided sixty-eight per cent of the initial capital 
(1.7 million of 2.5 million afghanis). Most individual investors were wealthy 
businessmen and high government officials, whose occupational and personal interests 
coincided. Shirkat Ashami’s goals were the regulation of international trade and 
development of Afghanistan’s economy. ‘Abd al-Majid along with other prominent 
Herati merchants, were granted the monopoly over the import of sugar, petrol, and 
autos, as well as the export of cotton, wool, and karakul. After the Ashami Company 
was established, ‘Abd al-Majid travelled to Berlin to conduct his own affairs, though he 
was called back to Kabul in late 1931, as the trading company was proceeding fitfully.
1 77This time, ‘Abd al-Majid insisted upon the foundation of a national bank.
The Shirkat Ashami was reorganized into the Afghan National Bank or Bank-i 
Milli-i Afghan in 1932. Its primary stated goal was to correct a negative balance of 
trade -  over forty-one million afghanis in March. The bank only became a fully active 
presence in the spring of 1933 when it was fortified by 7.1 million afghanis, sufficient 
capital for national endeavours. The term Shirkat Ashami continued to be used 
throughout the 1930s, and appears to have maintained some separate functions, 
especially in the karakul trade, even after it was officially subsumed under the Bank-i 
Milli. Sometimes it is difficult to determine which organisation is discussed in the 
primary sources, as the terms are used in an overlapping manner especially in the 
1930s. At the least, the Ashami Company was the most powerful shirkat during the 
1930s, trading especially in karakul, but its name may have continued to refer to the 
trading section of the Afghan National Bank beyond 1932. By the 1940s, the place of 
the Bank-i Milli as the centre for monopolisation and national economic policies was 
firmly established.
176 Dupree, 1973, 472-73.
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Preceeding Afghanistan, Iran had established a Bank-i Milli in 1927. It functioned 
both as a state and a commercial bank, issuing currency and directing financial policies. 
Amin Banani notes that German experts helped to turn the Iranian National Bank into 
an avenue for economic development and capital formation.178 Afghanistan’s National 
Bank widened its scope throughout 1933. By mid-June it was reported as having 
secured the monopoly of issuing bank notes, importing sugar and oil products. Also, it 
was given the “first option to exploit mines or to establish industrial institutions,” and 
the bank managed “[a]ll Government dealings in machinery, drugs, metals, textiles and
1 70various sorts of tea.” The Bank-i Milli was also in charge of the exchange policy and
i snthe purchase and sales of bills. By July, it gained the “custody of Government
lOI
treasure ... and all Government revenue [was] paid into it.” In August, the bank
1 87formally controlled all other joint-stock or monopoly companies. The British Consul
in Kabul, Richard Maconachie reported that the company aspired to “an almost
complete monopoly of the export and import trade of the country.” It received
Muhammad Hashim Khan’s support because of the argument that the profits of
European and Indian middlemen would be eliminated.183 At the company’s annual
meeting in 1934 ‘Abd al-Majid Khan (Zabuli) explained that this economic crisis had
“led to the depreciation of Afghan currency, and ... made it imperative that
Afghanistan should embark on a new commercial policy with all possible haste.”184 At
first the company’s capital was set at ten million Afghanis but this was soon raised to
1thirty-five million; half derived from government funds and half from merchants.
178 Amin Banani, The Modernization o f Iran: 1921-1941 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1961), 119.
179IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Diary no.24 for week ending 16 June 1933, 539.
180 PRO FO 371 17198, Enclosure to Kabul despatch no. 69, 21 June 1933, 339.
181 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Kabul Military Attache’s Diary no.28 for week ending 21 July 
1933,442.
182 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Clipping from The Financial News, “Central Bank in Afghanistan: 
Functions o f a New Institution,” 30 August 1933,438.
183 IOL L/PS/12/1552, R.R. Maconachie (Kabul) to John Simon (London), 29 November 1932,
551.
184 PRO/FO/371/18,244, Diary no.26 for week ending 28 June 1934, reporting ‘Abd al-Majid 
Khan’s words at the Ashami Company’s annual meeting, 328.
185 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Economic Report o f 1937, Annex D, The Organisation of Industry and 
Trade. Much of the information contained herein comes from an interview with Abdul Majid Khan, 357- 
58.
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Wealthy Indian and Jewish merchants contributed resources as well. The Afghan 
National Bank was entrusted with all governmental purchases in Europe and India, and 
had the right to “supersede the various distributing agencies [now] operating between
1 QAthe foreign manufacturer and the Afghan retailer.” In other words, it gained formal 
control of the entire import trade.
Maxwell Fry, who published a forty-year study of Afghanistan’s economy, states 
that ‘Abd al-Majid’s goals were congruent with those of Amanullah, for he wanted an 
economic plan and a national bank “which could issue paper currency, provide credit 
and, above all, form the nucleus for the development of entrepreneurial and managerial
1 87talent in the country.” All of Afghanistan’s fledgling official economic efforts were 
enmeshed during the 1930s and 1940s, and the career o f ‘Abd al-Majid became 
synonymous with the monopolisation system. ‘Abd al-Majid was undaunted by 
religious proscriptions, and was able to circumvent the ulama’s opposition to the 
establishment of a bank. Loans were provided without interest, but the lender had to 
purchase a stamp, called a pule tiket (literally: money ticket) which was “attached to 
each repayment receipt thus providing the bank with profit rather than with interest.”188 
Bank-i Milli established branches in Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-i Sharif, Khanabad, 
Jalalabad, Quetta, and Peshawar, and later representatives were placed in Karachi, 
Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, London, Paris, and Berlin. The bank was also granted 
concessions, including extraordinary monopoly rights, which allowed it blanket control 
of the government’s business interests. It could “issue drafts payable at government 
treasuries,” held the monopoly on the “purchase of foreign currency, bullion, and 
government imports [and] it was given the first option on the development of the 
country’s natural resources.”189 In 1937, it also gained the right to export one-third of 
the country’s karakul crop.190 With such widespread powers, the bank paid a twenty- 
eight per cent dividend to its shareholders in its first year. In 1932, ‘Abd al-Majid
186 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Annual Report on Afghanistan, 1932, 549.
187 Fry, 83.
188 Ibid, 83-4.
189 Gregorian, 314-5.
190 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Economic Report o f 1937, Annex D: The Organisation o f Industry and 
Trade, 357-8. While in London, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan made this statement.
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Khan also completed an Overall Economic Development Plan which was accepted by 
the Afghan government. It remained in place until 1938, and it sought to: compile 
financial data, encourage domestic and international trade, improve health, education, 
and the system of communications, facilitate the development of industry, and reform 
agricultural techniques.191
The Bank-i Milli flourished throughout the 1930s, until the bank and its 
prominent shareholders were suspected of reaping too much personal gain. The 
monopoly system was devastating for Afghanistan’s remaining non-Muslim citizens. 
Hindus and Jews were deeply involved in mercantile activities and the export trade. 
Nadir Shah’s avowed purpose (or that of ‘Abd al-Majid Khan) was to “cut off the hands 
of the foreigners,” and if foreigners were viewed as non-Afghan citizens and residents 
of Afghanistan, then this goal was accomplished.192 Both dhimmi communities, as well 
as Soviet refugees living in the north, were harmed by the policies conceived and 
directed by ‘Abd al-Majid Khan. Refugees fleeing Stalinist policies were viewed as a 
potential threat to Afghanistan’s stability, and were often treated harshly, especially 
those who were not Muslim. The political threat and economic challenge posed gave 
‘Abd al-Majid Khan an excuse to pursue discriminative political action through the 
guise of economic development.
191 Gregorian, 315.
192 Fry, 83 citing Report o f Bank M illie’s Activities in 1344 [1965] (Kabul: Bank Millie, 1345 
[1966]).
Chapter Four:
Northern Afghanistan’s Soviet Refugee Crisis (1932 - 1936)
It is but rarely that one hears o f the sufferings which Jews endure in 
several Asiatic countries... Only occasional fragments reach us from  
these countries, and only by piecing them together do we learn the little 
we know.... 1
Synopsis
Chapter 4 examines the refugee crisis in Afghanistan between the years 1932 and 
1936. Individuals fled the Soviet Union before this time, yet by the early thirties, 
numbers began to increase. This was accompanied by a harsh response from the 
Afghan government, who began to see new Soviet refugees as a menace to national 
security and stability. Consequently, domestic policies were quickly reshaped to 
minimise these perceived risks. The following pages examine-the situation of 
Bukharan Jewish refugees in detail, as their treatment directly influenced the course of 
Afghanistani Jewish history. Muslim residents and officials saw Jewish refugees and 
citizens in an increasingly similar manner. As the plights of these communities 
worsened, their fates were wedded. By 1934, the Afghan government wanted to deport 
both the Bukharan and Afghanistani Jewish communities, but the British intervened. 
This was not because of altruistic or humanitarian concerns. Rather, the British agreed 
with Afghanistan’s view of the Jewish community as potential Bolshevik agents and 
did not want them to relocate to India. Still further measures were enacted which 
barred Afghanistani Jews from the northern tier of the country, and revoked their 
passports throughout Europe and Asia. These actions were the first and most decisive 
steps that led to the demise of the Jewish community.
1 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, “Tragedy in Afghanistan,” Jewish Daily Post, 15 July 1935, 122.
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Causes of the Refugee Crisis
When the Soviet Union was established, it provided a source of inspiration for 
Amanullah Khan, who felt that Lenin could help Afghanistan gain independence from 
Britain. In fact, the Soviet Union recognised its southern neighbour one month after 
Amanullah declared independence on 28 February 1919. Both Afghanistan and the 
Soviet Union could unite in their opposition to European imperialism in Asia. This 
honeymoon was short, because of the Soviet Union’s capture of Central Asian territory. 
While the Bolsheviks allowed the amir Sayyid ‘Alim Khan to rule Bukhara, they also 
declared the Czarist Turkestan krai to be the Soviet Republic of Turkestan on 1 May 
1918. Two years later, in the late summer of 1920, Red Army units led by Mikhail 
Frunze overthrew Sayyid ‘Alim Khan and declared the Soviet People’s Republic of 
Bukhara.4 Amanullah considered this an act of treachery that endangered his nation’s 
fledgling independence. He began actively to aid the deposed Bukharan amir and his 
army. By the summer of 1922, Amanullah had to put an end to these efforts because of 
the punitive measures taken against the local population in Central Asia, especially in 
the Ferghana valley. According to the historian Mikhail Volodarsky, this included 
“destroying crops, blocking wells, sabotaging irrigation systems, [and] uprooting 
orchards.”5 In 1924, the Central Asian territories were divided again, this time into the 
Soviet Republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and (in 1929) Tajikistan.6
By the early 1930s, a large number of Central Asian refugees were fleeing into 
Afghan territory. Under the leadership of Nadir Shah, Afghanistan signed a border 
agreement with the Soviet Union that created a corps of border commissars in 1932. 
While some Central Asians settled in northern Afghanistan during the Russian 
Revolution, numbers grew rapidly, because of actions against kulaks, or rich peasants,
2 Mikhail Volodarsky, The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours: Iran and Afghanistan 1917 
-1933  (Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass, 1994), 121-23.
3 Ibid, 125.
4 Vitaly Naumkin, ed. Bukhara: Caught in Time: Great Photographic Archives. Compiled by 
Andrei G. Nedvetsky. (Reading: Garnet, 1993), 14; and Michael Zand, “Notes on the Culture o f the Non- 
Ashkenazi Jewish Communities Under Soviet Rule,” in eds. Yaacov Ro’i and Avi Beker, Jewish Culture 
and Identity in the Soviet Union (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 400.
5 Volodarsky, 128-9, and 136.
6 Naumkin, 14.
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nand the collectivisation policies during the first five-year plan (1928-32). These 
measures wrought havoc with agriculture and caused widespread famine. For example,
o
between 1925 and 1932, approximately two million, or half of the Kazakh people died. 
Approximately 60,000 Soviet refugees reached Afghanistan. Volodarsky states:
They were well received by the Afghan Government. The Muslims were 
spread around the country, were given land, and were freed from taxes for 
the next three years. Refugees from the European part of the U.S.S.R. and 
Bokharan Jews were helped to reach India, whence the Jews tried to reach 
Palestine.9
While this information may have been accurate for the beginning of the 1930s, constant 
pressure throughout the decade changed Afghanistan’s willingness to aid displaced 
communities. As Afghanistan faced continuing waves of refugees, its resources were 
overwhelmed, and policies became harsher, particularly for non-Muslims.
Consequences for Central Asian Jewry
During the seventy years of communist rule no fewer than thirty million 
people, possibly even more, perished in the Soviet Union. In addition 
millions were imprisoned, exiled, or persecuted in other ways. This is an 
absolute historical record.10
As a consequence of war, revolution, collectivisation, and purges, a stream of 
refugees began to flow across the southern borders of the Soviet Union. Sometimes 
entire villages would attempt to escape together. At the Nineteenth Zionist Congress in 
Lucerne, Abraham Emanueli represented Bukharan Jewry. Actually, he was from 
Afghanistan, which is indicative of the close ties between the two communities.11 He
7 Volodarsky, 150.
8 See Kazakhstan’s official web site for further information: www.president.kz. under the history 
section, then chose the historical calendar. Downloaded on 14 November 2002.
9 Volodarsky, 173-4.
10 Anatoly Khazanov, After the USSR (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 71.
11 Interview with Itzhak Bezalel, Jerusalem, 4 July 2001.
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told the congress that approximately twenty per cent of the 40,000 Bukharan Jews in 
Central Asia had starved to death or been killed.12
An eye-witness account sent from Mazar-i-Sharif provides rare detail about
events inside the Soviet Union. As such, it is quoted at length. In the autumn of 1933,
1*3
refugees wrote to Jews in the West, explaining their reasons for leaving Central Asia.
This “Galuth” [exile] surpasses all other persecutions we have suffered in 
all our history and everyday finds things going from bad to worse. We 
pray God to relieve us... Lately a decree was ruthlessly enforced 
compelling everyone to give up all his money and jewelry. The Ogpu 
[secret police] not being satisfied with the results, tortured with all kinds 
of inconceivable machinery and as a result, many people have died and 
their bodies have been thrown into the valleys where dogs prey on their 
mortal remains. In the markets it is impossible to find even one pound of 
wheat or flour and many people eat the residue of cotton seed, as a result 
of which even many well to do people have died hideously. If the once 
wealthy people have suffered, woe to those that are in need. Some who 
still have strength left, run away to Afghanistan and Persia. Many of these 
have fallen victims at the hands of the frontier guards, who confiscate their 
belongings and send them away to remote places, Siberia or deserts, 
where, without even bread and water, they perish. In short, a dog has 
some value in Russia, whereas our Brethren have no value whatever.14
Millions did not survive Stalin’s murderous rule. Of those who did, Turkmen, 
inhabitants of the Ferghana Valley, Bukharan Muslims and Jews, Georgians, Russians, 
Ukrainians, and many others arrived in Persia or Afghanistan with only the clothes on 
their backs.15
12 BoD ACC/312 1/E3/506/2, Letter from Abraham Emanueli, Delegate of the Bukharan Jews from 
Labour Faction o f the Nineteenth Zionist Congress, Lucerne, 20 August 1935.
13 Most Jewish refugees probably left from Uzbekistan. The principal cities inhabited by 
Bukharan Jews were (in decending order): Samarkand, Tashkent, Bukhara, Kokand, Andizhan,
Margelan, Khatirchi, and Sharisabz in Uzbekistan, but only Dushanbe (Stalinabad) in Tajikistan.
Mikhail Zand, “Bukharan Jewish Culture Under Soviet Rule” in Soviet Jewish Affairs 9: 2 (1979): 15.
14 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, “From the Refugees in Afghanistan”, Mazar-x-Sharif, 15 N-n-hem 
(?) [56]93 [late summer 1933]. The Board of Deputies’ records for these events are solely loose papers 
in manila folders. The title o f each document will be recorded as it was written by the author/s. For 
example, while the standardized spelling for Mazar-i-Sharif does not contain an ‘x’, I have preserved this 
as a way to facilitate document recognition. All spelling and punctuation remains as in the original.
15 In the 1980s, the Soviet government was shocked by the return o f Kazakh nomads from China 
who still possessed Soviet passports from the 1920s. I am grateful to Dr. Shirin Akiner for this account.
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Afghan Response to Refugees
In June 1932, local Afghan officers were instructed to return refugees to the 
Soviet Union or deport them to Xinjiang.16 The earliest action against the refugees 
appears to be a firman ordering Soviet Jews to be interned in Kabul en route south to
i oJallalabad and Kandahar, while all new arrivals should be deported. Often, they may 
not have made it all the way to Kandahar, but rather most settled in Kabul. The British 
Charge d’affaires explained that the Afghan government viewed every Soviet refugee as 
“a potential spy.” Almost every consequent governmental action towards Soviet, and 
especially non-Muslim, refugees was based on this perception. The Afghan Foreign 
Minister, Faiz Muhammad, clarified current refugee policy by telling the British 
Minister, W. Kerr Fraser-Tytler, that his government “disliked and feared all Russian
1 Xrefugees and were it possible to do so would return all of them to Russian territory.” 
Despite these sentiments, he felt that Afghans were bound by Islamic law that 
stipulated one could not refuse asylum to Muhajirun.19 These restrictions led to a 
hierarchical system for managing Soviet refugees.
By 1932, the major distinctions in policies toward Muslim and non-Muslim
refugees were in place. It took an additional year for measures regarding Jews to be
clearly stipulated. By the end of October 1933, the British were still uncertain about
00  • •  •Afghan governmental attitudes towards Jewish refugees. At the initial stages of the 
crisis, the Jews had an intermediate position -  treated worse than Central Asian 
Muslims, but better than Georgian or Russian Christians. While Jewish refugees were 
subjected to discrimination, the Afghans may have been familiar with the Jewish
16IOL R/12/61 513/1, Note from Major Fraser-Tytler (Kabul) 30 June 1932,90.
17 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, Aminoff, Azizollah, Mirzoeff, Yadgaroff, Poteliakhoff to Laski 
(President o f the Board of Deputies), 25 September 1933.
18 IOL R/12/61 513/1, Despatch from Fraser-Tytler (Kabul) to Secretary o f State for Foreign 
Affairs (London), 1 November 1932, 155 (or 125, as there are two different numbering systems).
19 Ibid. See also: Astri Suhrke “Refugees and Asylum in the Muslim World,” in ed. Robin Cohen 
The Cambridge Survey o f World Migration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 457-60.
20 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, Mallam (Kabul) to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 26 
October 1933, 310.
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economic contribution, and felt less politically threatened by the co-religionists of a 
long-resident dhimmi population. Muslim and Jewish refugees joined ethnically similar 
groups in northern Afghanistan, while Christian refugees had no contact through 
religious affiliation. They may have been viewed more as a direct political challenge. 
Soon this situation intensified, and by the end of 1933, the British military attache in 
Kabul reported that ‘Russian’ [Soviet, mainly Bukharan] Jewish refugees were to be 
immediately returned to the Soviet Union, and “European Russians (Kafqazis) [were] 
to be sent to Chinese Turkestan.”21
Muslim Refugees
Muslims fleeing the U.S.S.R. in the 1920s and early 1930s due to religious
persecution were allowed to settle in northern Afghanistan, after a background check to
•  •  •  0*)ensure they were “genuine refugees, on whom no suspicion of espionage rested.”
Central Asian Jewish merchants in London told the Board of Deputies that Muslims 
were settled on the land, and allowed to establish homes and open businesses.
Despite a more lenient treatment, Muslim refugees also concerned Afghan officials.
The British military attache in Kabul reported that while Muhajirun were allowed into 
the country, they could not reside within thirty miles of the frontier, and weapons found 
on their person were to be confiscated by the Ministry of War.24 By 1938, the 
government was alarmed by the influx of 16,000 new Muslim refugees from the Soviet 
Union, and considered them a potential military threat, which prompted the order of 
fifty light tanks from Germany.25 Unfortunately, British archives provide very little 
information as to the fate of Muslim refugees. This material must be obtained from 
other sources.26 While the dominant Pashtun majority discriminated against this group, 
they were more integrated into Afghanistan’s Sunni community.
21 IOL L /P S/12/1660, Coll3/93, Diary no.52 for week ending 28 December 1933, by R.M.M. 
Lockhart (British Military Attach^, Kabul), 243.
^IOL R/12/61 513/1, 155
23 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, Aminoff et al. to Laski, 25 September 1933.
24 PRO FO/371/18243, Diary No.52 for week ending 28 December 1933, by R.M.M. Lockhart 
(British Military Attache, Kabul), 61.
25 IOL R/12/164 42/43/N, File “H”: Rheinmetale Borsig (R.M.B.) telegram no. 94, from Pilger 
(German ambassador, Kabul) to Berlin, 13 December 1938, 121.
26 See, for example, Audrey Shalinsky’s work on emigrants from the Ferghana Valley in Kunduz, 
Central Asian Emigres in Afghanistan: Problems o f  Religious and Ethnic Identity, Occasional Paper
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Christian Refugees
Christian refugees were viewed with a great deal of suspicion by the government 
of Afghanistan, as they could be tied to European powers, and therefore pose another 
threat. These refugees were generally allowed to choose if they wanted to return to the 
USSR, or be deported to China via the Wakhan corridor.27 The British Charge 
d’Affaires protested these measures, saying they caused innocent, non-Bolshevik men to 
die from either draconian alternative. Perhaps one example may help to demonstrate 
the position of the refugees. George Bars, a homeless Russian teenager, fled the Soviet 
Union in 1931. In Quetta, the police interrogated him about his journey to India. When 
he crossed the Persian frontier, he was arrested. During his interrogation, Bars said that: 
“the Persians wanted to send me back to Russia, but I lay myself on the ground and told 
them as my return meant sure death, I would rather be shot dead here than return to 
Russia.”28 This young man was a fortunate, early refugee particularly as the Persian 
border guards could be more lenient than the Afghans. The police gave him a goatskin 
to carry water, and set him free with instructions to walk to India, while keeping well 
away from Persian posts.29 Though Bars never entered Afghanistan, his story clearly 
shows the alternatives faced by Russian refugees. In another example from the same 
file, the British representative in Mashhad reported that a Jewish Moscovite told them 
that his three travelling companions were shot to death by Soviet border guards after 
entering Persia. The British concluded that the Persian border guards must have 
directed the Soviets to the refugees’ house.30 Imprisonment, deportation, deprivation 
and death at any stage along the journey were commonplace. Similar events certainly 
occurred in Afghanistan, although they were recorded with less frequency.
no. 19 (New York: Afghanistan Council, December 1979); and Long Years of Exile: Central Asian 
Refugees in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Lanham: University Press o f America, 1994).
27 IOL R/12/61, 513/1, H.A.F. Metcalfe (New Delhi) to R.H. Hoare (Teheran) 20 October 1932,
155.
28 Ibid, Letter from the Superintendant of Police, Quetta -  Pishin and Sibi, 23 July 1931 regarding 
Bars, George -  Russian, 42.
29 Ibid, 43.
30 IOL R/12/61, 513/1, Report from British Representative in Meshed, 28 October 1931, entitled: 
The Conditions of Russian Refugees in Persia, 136.
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Russian Christian refugees may have been the most vulnerable group in 
Afghanistan. They were immediately suspected of being Soviet agents. As they had 
few who would protect their interests, the Afghan government could treat them with 
less concern for the potential international repercussions. Conversely, the Afghans had 
to be the most cautious when Western legations became interested in the plight of these 
very refugees. One particularly unusual incident involved a Mennonite family in 
Afghanistan. The Germans and the British both wanted to represent their interests.
This family entered Afghanistan with Czarist passports and the two male wage earners 
began to work as motor mechanics for the Afghan government, sometime after Stalin 
gained power. When they decided to leave Kabul for India or Canada, their passports 
were not returned, nor were they issued with Afghan papers. Even their request for 
Nansen (refugee) passports was refused. This family was threatened with deportation to 
the Soviet Union.31 Fortunately, they appear to have survived and eventually settled 
with relatives in Manitoba.
Jewish Refugees: Petitioning for Assistance
As explained, the Afghan government clearly framed its refugee policy upon 
religious distinctions. Consequently, Bukharan Jews were a particularly vulnerable 
community, because of prejudice suffered along both sides of the border. Abraham 
Emanueli (who changed his name from Emanuelson after making ‘aliya in the early 
1930s) explained to the Board of Deputies that: “To-day every Jewish refugee from 
Russia is believed to be a Bolshevist propagandist. At the same time ... the Bokhara 
Jews in particular are regarded as industrial capitalists and suspected of hate towards 
the principle of communism.” As the refugees crossed the Amu Darya southwards, 
the characterisations about them were reversed.
At the inception of this crisis, the Union of Boukharian Jews in Palestine urged 
prominent members of the London Bukharan community to petition the British
31 PRO FO/371/17187, Letter from Maconachie (H.M. Minister, Kabul) to John Simon (London), 
26 May 1933, 141-42.
32 BoD ACC/C 12/4, Abraham Emanueli (Binyamina) to Herbert Samuel (London), 28 January
1935.
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government. Soon after, Bukharan Jewish fur traders in Britain began to lobby the 
Board of Deputies. They hoped that British intervention could convince the Afghan 
government to allow Jews to pass through Afghanistan while in transit to Palestine. 
Moshe Shallit of the Jewish Agency (Sochnut) also wrote to encourage the Board’s 
intervention. He alluded to:
the terrible plight of our Brethren [for] those who escaped into 
Afghanistan have been arrested by the Afghan Militia and imprisoned 
under most harrowing conditions. At present there are over 200 of these 
refugees in prisons in Ankhoi, Mazar, and Achja — their wives and 
children being entirely without support.34
This account corresponds with what is known about non-Muslim Soviet refugees at this 
time from British observers in Afghanistan and Persia, andsometimes in India. The 
refugees were initially placed under arrest in order to allow queries to be made 
regarding their antecedents, ensuring that they were bona fide refugees, and not 
Bolshevik agents. Muslim refugees may have also been imprisoned, but perhaps not 
with the same regularity as other groups.35
Certain restrictions against Jews in Afghanistan, over and above those imposed
• •  •  'Xfi  •upon other religious communities, are clearly in evidence. One prominent fur 
merchant in London told the Joint Foreign Committee that the governments of Persia 
and Afghanistan “have taken care of the non-Jewish emigrants, settled them on the 
land, and assisted them to find some kind of livelihood.” This was not the case for 
Jewish refugees who were denied aid, and not allowed to work.38 Emanueli confirmed 
that: “every line of trade and commerce is closed to them.”39 By December 1933,
33 BoD ACC/312 1/E3/506/1, Committee of the Union o f Boukharian Jews in Palestine to 
Bukharan community in London, 11 July 1932; and Assistant Secretary of Board o f Deputies (Brotman) 
to d’Avigdor-Goldsmid (London), 28 July 1932.
34 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, Moshe Shallit to the Board o f Deputies, 13 September 1933.
35 IOL R/12/61, 513/1, 146. A.W. Davis, British Consul at Tabriz to R.H. Hoare (Teheran), 25 
May 1932.
36 BoD ACC/3121/C 12/4, Abraham Emanueli to Herbert Samuel, 28 January 1935.
37 The Joint Foreign Committee was an organisation that represented the Anglo-Jewish 
Association and the Board of Deputies of British Jews in assisting Jewish commuities abroad.
38 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/2, Kestenbaum to Joint Foreign Committee, 4 February 1935.
39 BoD ACC/3121/12/4, Emanueli to Samuel, 28 January 1935.
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Afghanistani Jews expressed anxiety to Central Asian merchants in London about the 
refugees’ continued survival. One anonymous author wrote that: “the position now of 
the 2,000 Jewish Refugees from Russia is appalling as ever. No bread to eat, no clothes 
to wear and shelters from the rigours of the weather. I do not know what is going to 
happen to all these sufferers.”40 Along with restrictions against work, forced relocation 
from Andkhoi, Mazar-i-Sharif, and other towns in Afghan Turkestan to Herat and 
finally Kabul, the refugees were subjected to lesser regulations, such as being forbidden 
from using the public baths. These were meant to humiliate.
One letter from a Bukharan Jewish refugee in Kabul describes the suffering of 
this community in great detail, and is worth quoting at length.
After three months by order of the Afghan Government they drove us 
from Ankhoi to Kabul. They brought us all to a big warehouse41 and told 
us that we have to live there. The plac[e] is full of rats and mice and the 
conditions inside are unbearable. ... We have no home to live in, no food 
for our wives and children, and no winter clothing to protect ourselves in 
this cold weather. We beg of you to help us ... Otherwise we shall 
certainly [die] of hunger and cold.
In Kabul the Government does not allow us to do any kind of work. It 
is impossible for us to write fo [of] all of our sufferings. Our wives and 
children are not left in peace. We are worse off than the Jews in Germany.
Were it possible for us to film our sufferings and miseries and show them 
to you, you would s[u]rely pity us then. Do not forget that God created 
you and made you rich to help us the poor and the crestfallen....
We are sending you this letter from India as we are afraid to send it 
from Kabul.
We beg of you not to print this letter in the newspapers, because if our 
enemies hear of it we would be in a much worse position.42
There is a long tradition of beleaguered communities writing for help. For 
example, the Alliance Israelite Universelle’s archives hold many calligraphied letters in
40 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, received and translated by G. Mirzoeff to Zaiman, 20 December
1933.
41 According to May Schinasi, this could be a caravanserai. Personal correspondence, April 2003.
42 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/2, letter from Yosef — (Kabul), 13 December 1934. After leaving 
Afghanistan, this group continued to be traumatized by their experiences, and remained poorer and more 
isolated than other groups of Jews from Afghanistan in the West. (Author’s discussion with Shulamit 
Ambalu at Beit Klal Yisrael (London) on 4 December 1998.)
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Judeo-Persian. They are often written by a scribe, and signed with dozens of personal 
seals, in order to show the number of families with an interest in the matter. In some 
ways, these seals are like those currently used in East Asia.43 Most letters sent from 
Iran and Afghanistan in the 1930s fall into this pattern. Even when composed in 
English or French, they are written in a set formula, and tens of Hebrew signatures 
close each appeal. Letters written by Afghanistani Jews in London also follow this 
format.
This letter is strikingly different from many others kept in the Board of Deputies’ 
archives. Yosef s appeal is as a solitary voice. While he writes on behalf of others, it is 
not a communal appeal. The author’s voice is clear, and he is angry. It does not 
conform to a standardised pattern. His intended audience is only “Dear” with the rest 
of the line left empty. In some ways, this letter may be one of the most extraordinary 
documents in the Board of Deputies’ archives on Afghanistan. It appeals to 
technology, and arrived at their offices typewritten in English, but signed in Hebrew 
script. Yosef includes his full name, which appears to be Haj ... Hana ... Yosef, 
though the handwriting is very difficult to decypher. Files in the Board of Deputies 
were often translated into English, especially when they arrived in Hebrew or Yiddish, 
while letters in French and German were not. This document differs, as it was 
translated into English in Kabul, or more likely, in Peshawar or Bombay. Letters were 
never presented to the Board in Judeo-Persian without a translation. Perhaps this is 
another reason why the Boukharian Jews’ Association in London provided such a vital 
link.
Viewing Refugees as Spies: Afghan and British Perceptions
In January 1934, the Afghan Minister in London, ‘Ali Muhammad told the 
president of the Board of Deputies, Neville J. Laski, that his government was anxious 
for the refugees to leave, and “was providing every facility for their migration
43 For an earlier example of a communal letter requesting assistance, see AIU microfilm Iran I/C/3 
bobine 4, letter from Kachani Jewish community sent to AIU (Paris) in 1912.
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elsewhere.”44 Laski also learned that the Afghan government threatened to deport all 
refugees back to the Soviet Union unless the British would furnish them with visas 45
The British government also considered Bukharan Jewish refugees as potential 
Bolshevik agents. On the same day that Laski met the Afghan Minister in London, 
Moshe Shertok of the Jewish Agency received a curious letter from the High 
Commissioner in Jerusalem. It stated that among the Jewish refugees in Meshhed, 
many were active members of the Comintern. The letter went on to say that due to the 
Jewish refugees arriving in Palestine from Persia, Bukhara, and Afghanistan, the High 
Commissioner wanted Shertok to be informed of the situation. Despite this, the British 
official cautioned that he could not confirm these suspicions of espionage.46
British and Afghan attitudes towards the Soviet, especially Jewish, refugees were 
sometimes similar. Both governments feared the refugees because they could check 
neither their intentions nor ‘character.’47 In this vein, the British Minister to Kabul 
(1930-35), Sir Richard Maconachie received instructions from Simla to stop Jews 
entering India if he felt they might be Soviet agents. A British official in Simla, Olaf 
Caroe told Maconachie that the precautions taken up to that point were insufficient, and 
“recommendations given by the Jews’ references in Peshawar were generally 
valueless.”48 This was ascribed to the “well-known solidarity that exists between 
Jews,” which invalidated this system.49 British and Afghan governmental officials 
shared a similar mistrust of Bukharan Jewish refugees.
44 BoD ACC/312 1/E3/506/1, Memorandum, 3 January 1934.
45 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, Kestenbaum to Laski, 4 January 1934.
46 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, J. Hathom Hall to Moshe Shertok (both in Jerusalem), 3 January
1934.
47 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, Maconachie (Kabul) to Zaiman (London), sent 30 November 1933 
(received 24 December 1933).
48 Both quotations from: IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, O.K. Caroe (Simla) to Maconachie (Kabul) 
7 June 1935, 124.
49 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, Despatch to Kabul, 26 September 1934, 167. These instructions 
went on to say, “Experience has shown that in nine cases out of ten the Jew resident... gives a favourable 
character to the applicant.”
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Comparing Refugee Policy in Afghanistan and Persia
The situation in Afghanistan serves as a contrast with events inside Persia, a 
nation that was also managing a very similar refugee population. When refugees 
arrived in Persia they were imprisoned, just as in Afghanistan. This was instituted as a 
way to establish “that they are not OGPU agents masquerading as refugees.”50 By 
1933, over 1,000 Bukharan Jewish refugees arrived in Mashhad, out of a total refugee 
population which appears to have been 2,000.51 Officials in Khorasan province wanted 
to expel Soviet Jewish refugees. In some cases, they succeeded. According to G. 
Mirzoeff, president of the Boukharian Jews Association in London, by June 1934, one 
fifth of the Jewish refugee families in Mashhad had been dispersed to “outlying and 
remote places where they are unable to find any means of sustenance.”52 These severe 
actions were considerably mitigated by intervention of the Jadid al-Islam community in 
Mashhad, as in the 1850s. The anusim often helped Jews in the region during times of 
crisis or famine, as they were intimately aware of the difficulty of maintaining a Jewish 
identity. Due to their outward acceptance of Islam, the Mashhadis were often more 
financial successful, because they were subject to fewer regulations and taxes. On Erev 
Rosh Hashana, 21 September 1933, refugees in Mashhad wrote to London and 
described how they had been initially arrested and were currently facing expulsion. 
Already this measure had been delayed a month due to the intervention of Haji Ibrahim 
Aminoff and other community leaders. Perhaps prominent Jadids were able to 
postpone the order considerably longer, until the winter passed, when the refugees 
would be in less danger.
The expulsion order, or population transfer was enacted by the city police, who 
found the numbers of Jewish refugees to be too large, and decided to disperse them in 
rural areas. By February 1934, eight hundred Jews still remained in Mashhad, while
50 IOL R/12/61, 513/1, A.W.Davis (British Consul at Tabriz) to R.H. Hoare (Teheran), 25 May 
1932, 146.
51 AIU Iran IIC 4 bobine 5, M. Daoud (Mashhad) to M. Ezra, 28 September 1933.
52 BoD ACC/3121/E2/128, G.Mirzoeff, president of Boukharian Jews’ Association, London to 
Zaiman, secretary o f Joint Foreign Commitee, 13 June 1934.
53 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, communal letter from refugees in Mashhad, Erev Rosh Hashana 
5694, 21 September 1933.
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ten families were sent to Kashan and another twenty to Shiraz. Those in Shiraz were 
deported from Bushire. Selim Nassi, principal of the Alliance Israelite school in 
Teheran, reported that the refugees’ misery increased in Kashan due to the “clicaneuse 
et avare” (cliquish and avaricious) Jewish community who would not help them at all. 
This may have been due to the stress that the Kashani community was already facing. 
Yet, it was common for Jews from Central Asia and Afghanistan to complain about the 
lack of assistance Persian Jewry extended to them.
The only exception to this trend appears to have been from the Jadidim who were 
more closely tied to their northern co-religionists, and maintained historical contacts. 
Curiously, the Jewish community with the most precarious political situation extended 
the most help to Soviet refugees. Nassi reported that the Mashhadi anusim community 
did all it could, but the refugees’ needs were great and funds were insufficient. The 
situation was exacerbated as most of the refugees were merchants not artisans, and as 
such, they could not find similar employment in Mashhad.54 In some ways, a hundred- 
year cycle was completed. After Allah Daad in 1839, Mashhadi Jewry found refuge in 
the Emirate of Bukhara, and supplemented the local population. Almost a century later, 
the effects of Stalin’s purges brought some Bukharan Jews, perhaps even descendents 
of Mashhadis themselves, back into Persia. This time however, they did not tarry long, 
but hastened westward towards Palestine.
Sometimes, the power of the central government was strong enough to prevent 
regional authorities from conducting their own policy measures. As shown above, 
individuals were able to mitigate difficult situations as well. For example, Selim Nassi 
was a powerful advocate for Bukharan Jewish refugees. He addressed many prominent 
figures in Teheran, including the Persian Foreign Minister, British and French 
embassies. Through the efforts of this Alliance Israelite employee, five hundred people 
were able to leave Persia, and another five hundred were allowed to stay in Teheran, 
Hamadan or Kermanshah, instead of being scattered about in distant villages. Nassi 
considerably softened the effects of the Mashhadi expulsion order. He was able to
54AIU Iran II C 4 -8  bobine 6, Nassi (Teheran) to Hias-Jca-Emigdirect (Paris), 23 February 1934.
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obtain equipment for artisans to support themselves, as well as medical care for the 
infirm.55 Selim Nassi truly behaved as a nassi, or a traditional Jewish communal 
advocate. His diplomatic skills proved very successful, though sadly, Nassi appears to 
have literally worked himself to death.
While the circumstances were similar in Afghanistan, the outcome of the 
Bukharan refugee crisis was considerably different. In Persia, the arrival of Bukharan 
refugees did not cause a backlash for the local commuity. The local inhabitants were 
not drawn into the refugee crisis, and they continued to be recognized as citizens. 
Persian Jews were considered a distinct group from the Bukharan refugees, while 
Afghan officials saw both Jewish communities in the same light. In Afghanistan, the 
populace was much more at the mercy of individual officials. Provincial governors had 
considerable autonomy to carry out their own population transfers, and other extra­
legislative measures, while the community had little recourse. Occasionally, an 
extremely unpopular civil servant could be transferred in Afghanistan, but generally, 
the citizenry suffered under unjust officials.
The Expulsion of the Local Jewish Population
In Afghanistan, new policies affected the local and refugee populations alike. 
Refugees were not the only ones to be removed from the border area, although it took a 
year after the onset of the crisis for Afghanistani Jews to suffer a similar fate. In the 
summer of 1932, the Board of Deputies was warned about their precarious status. 
“Most of them are apparently living a ‘Marrano’ existence and might be harmed by the 
focusing of official attention on them.”56 By the autumn of 1933, this community was 
enmeshed in the refugee crisis.
55 AIU Iran IC  4 -  8, bobine 6, Nassi (Teheran) to Sassoon (AIU head in Bagdad), 28 February
1934.
56 BoD ACC/3121 /E3/506/1, Brotman to d’Avigdor-Goldsmid, 2 August 1932. ‘Marrano’ 
literally means pig, and was used to refer to the Converso community that emerged from the Spanish 
Inquisition.
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A royal decree or firman was declared in September, several months before Nadir
Shah’s assassination that set out measures for dealing with Jewish, Muslim and
Christian refugees. It stipulated: “Afghan Jews who have been removed from Afghan
Turkestan are not to be allowed to reside within 30 miles of the frontier.”57 A telegram
sent from Peshawar on 24 September 1933 to Central Asian Jewish merchants in
London explained that the Afghan government ordered Jews living in the Andkhoi and
Mazar-i-Sharif provinces to return to the towns of their birth within a month. (At this
point, one must recall the peculiar domestic patters of Afghanistani Jews in the early
twentieth century. Women stayed in Herat or Kabul, while men travelled to the
northern caravanserais, which later developed into larger settled communities. All
those of adult age had been bom in a city.58) Hence, the business interests of the
community were being targeted. Jewish delegates travelled to Kabul to petition
Muhammad Nadir Shah to retract this edict.59 Their endeavours were unsuccessful. A
letter sent one week later from Peshawar to London said that the representatives had not
been able to petition Nadir Shah “as obstacles were encountered.” From that point, the
fates of the two Jewish communities, resident and refugee, merged. The letter
explained further that:
the order was referred to by the Minister of Commerce. The latter in turn 
informed them that the order issued by the Mazar and Ankhoi Governors 
was not known to him. It seems that he wishes to delay any attempt to 
have the Order repealed, and the GZERAH [evil decree] appears 
incompatible.60
The delegates returned home unsuccessfully. Without any reason provided, the 
Andkhoi Governor gave the Jewish community one month to return to the towns where 
they were bom (for most this was Herat).61 Unlike the situation in Persia, there were no 
external advocates for this community, and the order was not postponed.
57 PRO FO/371/18243, Diary no. 52 for week ending 28 December 1933, by R.M.M. Lockhart 
(Military Attach^, Kabul).
58 Interview with Shulamit Ambalu, London, 4 December 1998.
59 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, telegram from Peshawar, 24 September 1933.
60 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, extract o f  letter from Peshawar, 1 October 1933.
61 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, Mirzoeff to Secretary of Joint Foreign Committee, Zaiman. 11 
October 1933.
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The northern governors issued the first orders for expulsion two months before 
Muhammad Nadir Shah was murdered. (As previously mentioned, the king was shot 
on 8 November 1933, the victim of a blood feud, during a prize-giving ceremony at the 
German school of Kabul. ) Despite a change of leadership, governmental policies did 
not shift radically. Rather, planned actions were implemented. At the end of 
November 1933, the Jews in Mazar-i-Sharif, Andkhoi and Maimana were all expelled. 
A Jewish observer in Kabul wrote that:
The Government ordered them to leave these towns within two hours and 
with the greatest cruelty, 2000 human beings were forcibly ejected.
Families wandering in the Deserts, having been obliged to leave all their 
belongings, cash and uncollected debts; compelled to endure the terrors of 
this very severe Afghan winter, in the midst of rain, snow, and hailstorm. 
Children, babes in arms, expectant mothers and aged people all enroute to 
Herat.63
The Prime Minister and new Regent, Muhammad Hashim Khan, simply allowed earlier 
policies to continue. Although it is possible that his brother’s assassination further 
aggravated the situation of Jews in Afghanistan, the fate of the community probably 
only changed by a matter of degree.
The reason that the Jews may have been ordered back to the places of their birth 
was an attempt to demonstrate that this community was not indigenous to the area, and 
that they had only recently acquired citizenship through bribes. Before the expulsion, 
the president of the Bokharian Jews’ Association in London, G. MirzoefF wrote to 
Zaiman, the secretary of the Joint Foreign Committee and discussed the ramifications 
of the planned expulsion. “Now, Sir, these Jews have been living in Andkhoi for tens 
of years and have established homes and businesses there and the order therefore 
deprives them of their livelihood, and affects a great number of Jews.”64 Even the 
Board of Deputies reported that: “From the information we have obtained it would 
appear that most of the Afghan subjects referred to have been recently naturalized and
62 Gregorian, 339.
63 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, Letter from Kabul written on 13 Kislev 5694 (1 December 1933) 
inclosed in: G. Mirzoeff to Zaiman, 20 December 1933.
64 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, G. Mirzoeff to Zaiman, 11 October 1933.
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were formally citizens of the Soviet.”65 However, this was only partially correct. The 
great majority of Jews should have been guaranteed citizenship, as they were bom 
within the country’s borders.
There were some occurrences of Soviet Jews bribing their way into Afghanistan 
with the help of Shmuel Shabtai Dadash. As described in chapter 3, Dadash was bom 
in Herat in 1910, and was sent to Uzbekistan as a part of an Afghan student delegation 
in 1924. By 1930 or 1931, he became the inspector general for education in the Pamir 
Mountains, and organized the capture of Ibrahim Beg, one of the last Basl/machi 
leaders. Through this success, he was nominated for political office in Moscow, 
became friends with the Afghan ambassador, Muhammad Aziz, and supplied him with 
alcohol. Between 1932 and 1934, he helped Jews flee the Soviet Union. Ben-Zion 
Yehoshua explains how this exchange worked.
Ces Juifs s’adressaient a Shmouel et avec l’argent des pots-de-vin qu’il 
remettait a l’ambassadeur, de qaurante [sic] a cinquante roubles par 
personne, il leur procurait des passeports afghans qui leur permettaient 
d’emigrer vers differents pays ... Parmi ceux qui obtinerent [sic] des 
passeports se trouvaient des Juifs de Boukharie, de Russie, de Pologne, de 
Bulgarie et de Roumanie.66
Dadash returned to Afghanistan in 1934 to marry, and was arrested after a few months.
• fnUnwittingly, he had been used by the Soviet Umon to spy on Afghanistan in Moscow. 
Later, this bribery scandal may have been used as proof that Jews bought off Afghan 
officials. (See section entitled: Official British Response in London for full details.)
When weighing the evidence surrounding the issues of residency and citizenship, 
it is important to keep in mind the changes in the domestic patterns of Afghanistani 
Jews. As previously stated, at the turn of the twentieth century, men lived in remote
65 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/2, Brotman to Montefiore, 9 November 1934.
56 Yehoshua 1981, 109-110. “These Jews asked Samuel, and with the bribe money that he gave to 
the ambassador, from forty to fifty rubles per person, he obtained Afghan passports which allowed them 
to emigrate to various countries... Among those who obtained passports were Jews from Bukhara,
Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania.”
67 Interview with Ben-Zion Yehoshua, Jerusalem, 15 July 2001.
caravan sites. Some left families in Herat and then traveled to Maimana or Qal’e Nau, 
to conduct business.68 Women did not bear children in the caravanserais of the north. 
However, during Amanullah’s reign, as the routes became more secure, and travel 
became easier, Bukharans began to escape southwards. Entire families then settled in 
the regional towns. By specifying that Jews had to return to their places of birth, the 
Afghan government sought to reinforce the idea that the Jews were ‘strangers,’ and not 
‘native’ to northern Afghanistan. In this way, they could use anti-foreigner sentiment 
to target Jewish business interests and prevent them from trading in karakul fur.
Riot in Herat during the Summer of 1935
After resident Jews were ejected from the northern rim of Afghanistan, they
mainly settled in Herat, home of Afghanistan’s largest Jewish population. This city did
not provide a respite from persecution. By 1935, all of the Jews (long-resident, recently
arrived, and refugee) had to flee once again. This was not because of governmental
action, but rather because of the simmering anger of the Shi’i populace. This hostility
is similar to that found periodically against the Jewish community in other pre-
industrial Muslim societies. It may occur during times of political or economic stress,
when Jews are not thought to be showing proper subservience. One hot summer day,
two youths began to fight. While the original reason for the argument was lost, the
Jewish boy Aba Ben Simon caused a Muslim boy to fall down a flight of stairs, and his
teeth were knocked out. Ben Simon was imprisoned, yet tempers were ignited because
of a rumour that the Muslim boy had been resisting the attempts of forcible conversion
to Judaism. A riot quickly commenced.
[A] large crowd gathered who threatened Jewish shops and houses with 
plunder. During that day and the following three days, all Jews were 
beaten by the mobs. Even in the villages, the Jews were so terrified that 
they closed their shops, and fled to Kabul to their houses to seek refuge 
from the menacing crowds.69
68 Brauer 1942, 122.
69 BoD ACC/3121/Cl 1/13/2, Boukharian community (Kabul) to Boukharian community 
(London), 15 Av 5695 (3 September 1935).
146
Until this point, Jews were allowed to live in Herat and its vicinity. This time, 
however, the effects of this riot lasted for decades. While Herati Jews fled through 
fear, hoping to be less subject to the whim of the mob and regional officials, they were 
forbidden from returning to their place of birth.
In 1935, the daily situation for the Jewish community became particularly cruel, 
and letters detailing sexual assaults against women and children were received in 
Jerusalem and London. A letter in Hebrew was sent to Do 'ar ha-Yom, a Jerusalem 
newspaper, and signed by fifty-five members of the community. Its format was very 
traditional and it was signed by dozens of men.
We, the undersigned, wish to let you know of our afflictions and exile, 
which grows worse daily like a raging sea. They design evil thoughts and 
blood libels upon us every day, and we know not whither we might turn 
for help.70
Letters of this time often spoke of hopelessness and despair. Yet, perhaps what is 
more unusual in this case, is a discussion of the effects of rape upon the community.
Jewish women when marketing or walking in the streets, are insulted and 
grossly abused; their dresses are pulled off them; they are outraged and 
abused. Recently Haim Gah came here [to Kabul] ... they raped and 
forcibly converted her [his wife], and married her to an Afghan. And we 
dare not open our mouths to say more on account of our great fear for 
ourselves. And her husband died of affliction.71
There are older precedents for such events recorded in the Jewish history of 
Central Asia. For example, Mordekhai Batchaev wrote a work describing the life of 
Yaquv Samandar who was bom in Bukhara at the end of the eighteenth century. His 
wife was murdered, and madrassa students kidnapped his two eldest children. 
Samandar’s daughter, Sarah was taken into the family of an Imam for several years. At 
thirteen, she was married off to one of her kidnappers. As a grandmother, Sarah was
70 IOL L/PS/12/1660 Coll3/93, “Tragedy in Afghanistan,” Jewish Daily Post 15 July 1935, 
reprinted from Do ’ar ha-Yom, 122.
71 Ibid.
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able to find one of her relatives, and recount her life story. It is not known what
• 79became of her brother, Mousa who was only eight years old when kidnapped. These 
situations also continued through the 1950s with scattered incidents of kidnapping, 
imprisonment, and forced conversion of children. Such incidents caused the
n ' l
community extreme distress.
Cases of sexual assault involving young men are less frequently found in the 
historical record. Elisha Bekhor Abo Gajar, only aged fourteen, found himself 
imprisoned and threatened with death for resisting rape. A communal letter sent to 
London, and signed by forty-one refugees attested that he had been:
passing a store when several Afghans seized him and attempted to commit 
an indecent assault. His cries attracted the attention of passers by and 
eventually the Police. The Afghans gave evidence that the boy cursed 
their religion and they charged him. The boy was taken before the judge 
chained hand and foot and was severely beaten en route. He was 
imprisoned awaiting sentence.74
A delegation of concerned Afghanistani Jews approached the Foreign Minister Faiz 
Muhammad, who informed them that this was a local matter and he could do nothing. 
Next, they petitioned the King, Zahir Shah and his uncle, the Prime Minister. 
Muhammad Hashim Khan advised them to obtain a visa for Palestine for the boy, and 
he would make sure Elisha was escorted to the frontier safely. As a result of the 
intervention of this consul, another letter reported that “a new trial took place, and the 
boy was again sentenced to imprisonment and to be chained, and we do not know what 
will be the fate of this boy.”76
72 Mordekhai Batchaev, La Vie de Yaquv Samandar ou Les Revers du Destin. Translated by 
Catherine Poujol (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1992).
73 In the summer of 1955, Tova Shamualoff, aged thirteen, was abducted. She was imprisoned and 
beaten until she recited the Shahadah. See chapter 7 for further details, and the latter part o f BoD 
ACC/3121/Cl 1/13/3.
74 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/2 forty-one refugees (Kabul) to the Anglo-Jewish Association 
(London), 25 Tammuz 5695, received in Persian and translated by Kestenbaum, who submitted it to 
Zaiman on 20 August 1935.
75 Ibid.
76 BoD ACC/3121/Cl 1/13/2, Boukharian community (Kabul) to Boukharian community 
(London), 15 Av 5695 (3 September 1935).
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This case presents many contradictory themes. Muhammad Hashim Khan had 
promised to help, and managed to start new court proceedings, yet this time Elisha 
suffered more, as he was not only imprisoned, but also put in chains. While this child’s 
eventual fate is not known, it is clear that many perished from the conditions in prison 
at that time. When Dadash recounted the fourteen years he spent incarcerated in 
Afghanistan, he described the following scene, where forty men were kept “sur un 
dallage de beton par moins de quinze degres, sans possibility de se laver, alors que tous 
etaient couverts de poux.”77 The entire community could be subjected to various forms 
of violence, including sexual assault, without recourse to justice. This is indicative of 
their lack of societal status.
The condition of Afghan Jewry quickly became linked to that of the refugees 
from Soviet Central Asia. Few contemporaries tried to explain this occurrence. One 
exception was Daniel Goll, who stated that the presence of Bukharan Jewish refugees 
increased the Afghan government’s general hostility towards the Jewish community, 
since it feared becoming entangled in an argument with the Soviet Union over them.78 
In January 1934, the Board of Deputies and Joint Foreign Committee noted that the 
reason for the Jewish expulsion from the north was unknown, but involved Bukharan 
Jews crossing the frontier.79 They simply did not have enough information at hand to 
understand the nuances of ethnic politics in northern Afghanistan. Perhaps one 
explanation for treating both groups equally was that as the Afghanistani Jews began to 
help the Bukharans, more attention was focused upon the often-reclusive native 
community. Afghan officials may have concluded that both groups formed a solitary 
unit, separated only by a political border, just like the Sunni Muslim minorities of 
northern Afghanistan (with the exception of the recently converted Nuristanis).
The actions taken by the government up to this point do not explicitly include the 
revocation of Afghan citizenship. Yet the underlying intention was clear as can be seen
77 Yehoshua 1981, 111. “Forty men were kept on a concrete floor at minus fifteen degrees, without 
the possibility of washing, although they were covered in lice.”
78 BoD ACC/312 1/E3/506/2, “Conversation with Mr. Daniel Goll in Jerusalem,” 28 November 
1934. (His name is alternatively spelled as Gol, Gul or even Goul.)
79 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, “Memorandum on Jews in Afghanistan,” 3 January 1934.
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in the expulsions of Afghanistani and refugee Jews from Andkhoi, Mazar-i-Sharif, 
Maimana, and the concentration of the refugee Jewish population in an old Kabul 
warehouse. These actions coupled with the refusal to allow a return to Herat, wrongful 
imprisonment, and being denied access to markets, employment, and communication 
with the outside world foreshadowed their final expulsion from Afghanistan, which 
occurred a short time later. In fact, Jews from Afghanistan did seek refuge in Mashhad 
and Karachi in 1934.80
Implications of the Expulsion of the Afghanistani Jews from the North
On 3 January 1934, Neville J. Laski went to the Afghan Legation in London to 
inquire about the Jewish expulsion from Afghan Turkestan. The Afghan Minister, ‘ Ali 
Muhammad, was not aware of the reason for the expulsion, but thought that it had a 
political or economic rationale.81 An examination of the archival evidence shows that 
this is true. The Afghan government wanted to push the Jews out of their traditional 
economic niche and replace their businesses with those controlled by Pashtuns. During 
this meeting with Laski, ‘Ali Muhammad also mentioned the establishment of a bank, 
the above-mentioned Shirkat Ashanti, which financed the lambskin (or karakul) trade, 
partially through private capitalists and partially by the state.82 The Board of Deputies 
in England then made inquiries as to whether this financing method would benefit the 
government or private individuals more. Its agents reported that: “the Government is 
doing its best to encourage Afghans themselves to participate more largely, as the 
business has up to now been mostly in the hands of dealers in Peshawar.”
The expulsion of the Jews from the north appears to be one of the first indications 
of economic anti-Semitism conducted by the Afghan Government. Its implications 
were enormous. Being banned from the commercial centres of the north meant that the
80IOL L/PS/12/1660 Coll3/93, Legislative Divison o f the Government o f India (Simla) to 
Secretary o f State for India (London), 29 August 1934,185. “[S]ome 400 Afghan Jews, mostly from the 
northern province o f Afghanistan, have, -- for reasons which are at present somewhat obscure, -- sought 
refuge in India.”
81 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, “Memorandum on the Jews in Afghanistan,” 3 January 1934.
82 Ibid, and BoD ACC/312 1/E3/506/1, Zaiman to Lord Swaythling, 15 January 1934.
83 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, Lord Swaythling to Zaiman, 16 January 1934.
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Jewish community was effectively barred from trade and deprived of the means to 
survive. In 1944, the India Office explained in retrospect it was clear that: “The 
expulsion of the Jews from Andkhoi and Mazar-i-Sharif gave the karakul monopoly to 
the Afghans. Later they were refused licenses for wholesale trade and forbidden to 
move about within the country, so that many of them were deprived of their means of 
livelihood.”84 On 11 October 1933, Mirzoeff stated that: “An uncivilized country like 
Afghanistan wishes to use the methods of HITLERISM.”85 Although the author quoted 
was probably not aware of it, it is quite clear that certain segments of the Afghan elite 
were influenced by early Nazi policies. This will be fully discussed in chapter 6.
At this juncture in 1934, the British government knew that the government of 
Afghanistan no longer wanted Jewish citizens in its territory. Muhammad Akram 
Khan, secretary at the Afghan legation in Teheran, told a British official that his 
government was “anxious to clear Jews from Afghanistan. It matter[ed] little how or 
where they went to as long as they went and he was unable to assist Afghan Jewish 
subjects in any way.”86 One year later, the British understood far more of the 
implications and details of this statement. Writing to the British Minister in Kabul, an 
India Office bureaucrat in Simla reported:
It appears ... to be the admitted policy of the Government of Afghanistan 
to get rid of all of the Jews of whatever class by every means, regular or 
irregular, and to prevent their return by refusing to renew passports, by 
impounding their papers and by any other means open.87
Despite a long history as productive citizens, the Jews of Afghanistan were rounded up, 
expelled, deprived of a livelihood, travel documents, and finally of communication with 
the outside world.
84 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, “Note on the Jews o f Afghanistan,” 29 December 1944, 45.
85 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, Mirzoeff to Zaiman, 11 October 1933.
86 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, Extract from Khorasan Consulate Political Diary for April 1934, 
198. With thanks to May Schinasi for highlighting his position.
87 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, O.K. Caroe, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India (Simla) 
to Maconachie (Kabul), 7 June 1935, 124.
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Soon after Jews were expelled from the north, the British representative in Kabul, 
Maconachie discussed the situation of the Jewish community informally with Faiz 
Muhammad, the Foreign Minister. He explained that Afghanistan’s international 
position could be affected by a reputation for “Jew baiting.” Faiz Muhammad replied 
that the Afghan government was not persecuting the Jews, and had no animosity 
towards them. According to this document he confirmed the expulsion from Afghan 
Turkestan. Faiz Muhammad argued that: “Jews from northern provinces had travelled 
mostly by lorry and had greatly exaggerated hardships in order to bring pressure of 
foreign opinion on the Afghan Government.” Yet, he also apparently said: “Former 
Jewish residents of Afghanistan would be allowed to remain in the country but not near
o o
the Russian frontier.” Why were they considered “former” residents? Had their 
citizenship rights been revoked? Despite the denials of the Foreign Minister, this 
appears to be the case.
Six months later, the Joint Foreign Committee approached the Foreign Office to 
ask why prejudice was increasing against the local Jewish community. Laurence 
Collier, of the India Office, wrote that the restrictive
measures hitherto taken appear to be based upon political as well as 
economic motives, but that the attitude of the Afghan Government 
towards the local Jews seems to be growing in exasperation owing to its 
alleged exaggerated (a) propaganda in foreign countries (b) bribery of 
Afghan officials (c) mendacity and immorality. Moreover the popular 
feeling of hostility appears to be due partly to jealousy of their business
•  89interests.
Collier lists many different ‘reasons’ for anti-Semitism. “Propaganda in foreign 
countries” is an allusion to the letters sent by the refugees. While Collier wrote several 
versions of his missive, in the final draft, he told the secretary of the Joint Foreign 
Committee that “the reports reaching your Committee from Jerusalem provide an
88 All four quotations in this paragraph come from IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, Maconachie 
(Kabul) to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, India Office (London), 19 January 1934,244-45.
89 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, Draft letter, Laurence Collier to Zaiman, 18 July 1934,201-202.
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example” of this kind of “exaggeration.”90 At this time, Jews in Afghanistan were not 
allowed to send correspondence abroad.91 To avoid these restrictions, letters were often 
smuggled out to Peshawar, and sent from India to Jerusalem and London. (See 
Appendix 1 for the Patterns of Jewish correspondence in the 1930s.) The charge of 
bribery centres on the procurement of passports, as previously mentioned. “Mendacity 
and immorality” are much more vague condemnations. Yet, Collier was able to easily 
incorporate this perspective into his letter due to the prevalence of anti-Semitism in 
official British circles during the inter-war years.
When using British explanations for Afghan actions, one must be aware that 
British officials may have projected their own sentiments on to those of the Afghan 
government. Other documents show that Maconachie felt that refugee Jews often lied 
and could not be trusted.92 In this respect, the British Minister shared much with 
Afghan officials. While the Afghans wanted all Jews to be given visas for British 
territories, Maconachie would not provide visas precisely because he could not check 
their “character.”
The India Office discussed the issue of whether transit visas for India should be 
given to resident and refugee Jews who already possessed valid visas for residence in 
Syria. Eventually, they felt that this alone was permissible. The Treaty Department 
concluded that, “it is difficult to justify the refusal of a transit visa to the holder of a 
valid visa for the country of his destination.” A month later, Maconachie was 
instructed to use his best judgement, and grant transit visas through India only at his 
discretion; visas to Palestine should not be furnished.
90 Letter received by Joint Foreign Committee is found in: BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/2 Collier to 
Zaiman, 18 July 1934.
91 The letter written by Yosef — (Kabul) 13 December 1934, BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/2 attests to
this.
92 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/1, Maconachie (Kabul) to Zaiman (London), 30 November 1933 
(received 24 December 1933). He wrote that the refugees: “do not improve their prospects by giving, as 
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Walton, 28 January 1935, 157; and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (London) to Maconachie 
(Kabul), sent 4 March 1935, 146.
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If refugees are treated poorly in one place, these attitudes often follow them to 
future residences. Hannah Arendt writes: “We were expelled from Germany because 
we were Jews. But having crossed the French borderline, we were changed into 
‘bodies.’”94 In writing about the Vietnamese boat people, Chan Kwok Bun explains 
that animosity can be internationalised.95 Similar trends emerged in Afghanistan for the 
Bukharan Jewish refugees. After discussion between the Afghan and British 
governments, Faiz Muhammad declared that the Afghans no longer wanted the Jews to 
proceed to Palestine, but only to India.96
British Jewry’s Reactions to the Afghanistani Community
Two weeks after the Board received Collier’s response rationalising Afghan anti- 
Semitism, eighteen Jewish citizen of Afghanistan in Britain wrote to the Board
• 07describing how the Afghan Legation in London withheld their passports. The Board 
of Deputies did not offer assistance, but rather warned them that, “the dissemination of 
exaggerated and unconfirmed reports is likely to aggravate any difficulties which may 
exist in Afghanistan.”98 A few days later, an Afghan diplomat in Paris gave an official 
explanation to the press. He stated that the Jews of Afghanistan enjoy the “same 
footing of equality as ... other citizens ” and the withdrawal of passports “does not at all 
correspond to the facts.” 99 The Board clearly believed this because of its respect for 
the assessment offered by the Foreign Office. In general, the Board felt that the British 
governmental response was appropriate. Much of this deference faded after the 
Holocaust.
94 Hannah Arendt, “We Refugees,” in ed. Ron H. Feldman, Hannah Arendt: The Jew as Pariah: 
Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age (New York: Grove Press, 1978), 61.
95 Chan Kwok Bun “The Vietnamese Boat People in Hong Kong,” in ed. Robin Cohen, The 
Cambridge Survey o f World Migration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 384.
96 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, Maconachie (Kabul) to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
India Office (London), 19 January 1934,244-45.
97 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/2, 18 Afghan Jews in London to Board, 31 July 1934.
98 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/2, Assistant Secretary of Board o f Deputies to Boukharian Jews’ 
Association in London, 7 August 1934.
99 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/2, J.T.A. [Jewish Telegraph Association] report from 11 August 1934, 
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Not all sections of British Jewry acted so conservatively. When reprinting a letter 
from Do ’ar ha-Yom, the editor of the Jewish Daily Post said that if the fifty-five 
members of the Afghanistan Jewish community were telling the truth about their 
condition, then “the absence of any action on the part of Jewish organisations supposed 
to be dealing with such matters [is] unpardonable.”100 The editor continued his criticsm 
in a description of an Anglo-Jewish Association meeting on 14 July 1935. The Jewish 
communities in Afghanistan and Germany were both discussed. He reported that 
people “spoke again and again about Germany as if they were afraid to reveal the 
Jewish tragedy in all its full nakedness, and as if there was sound reason why Jewish 
trouble in one country should be neglected because of the occurrences in another.”101 
This journalist appeared to be profoundly aware of the divisions within Anglo-Jewry -- 
between the well-established community, Russian and Polish immigrants, and the most 
recent Mizrahi arrivals. After the Holocaust many of these internal divisions were 
consciously minimized, but before that time, the class tensions of British society were 
reflected in miniature amongst the Jewish community.
Irrespective of this dissent, the Board of Deputies of British Jews and its associate 
organisations were the official voice of Anglo-Jewry. When trying to raise money for 
the refugees in Afghanistan, the Boukharian Jews’ Association in London encountered 
a series of obstinate replies especially from this organisation. It was unwilling to 
launch a public appeal on behalf of the Bukharans, because they felt the market for 
charitable contributions had been saturated due to fund raising efforts for German 
Jewry. Before giving money in aid of Bukharan Jewish refugees in Afghanistan, 
wealthy members of the Anglo-Jewish community, stipulated that they must be 
informed of the “special measures ... taken against Boukharian Jews by the Soviet 
authorities over and above the ordinary restrictions to which all Soviet citizen[s] have 
to submit.”102 Taking up this challenge, Emanueli explained that Bukharan Jews were 
“both merchants and religious believers - two things abhorrent to the sight of the Soviet
100 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, “Tragedy in Afghanistan” in Jewish Daily Post, 15 July 1935,
122.
101 Ibid.
102 BoD ACC/312 1/E3/506/2, Acting Secretary, Joint Foreign Committee (Brotman?) to 
Kestenbaum, 31 January 1935.
155
Government. [They] suffer therefore more intensely than any other race in 
Bokhara.”103
At the inception of the refugee crisis in Afghanistan, the Board of Deputies 
remained sceptical of firsthand accounts provided by the Boukharian Jews’ Association 
in London, for well over a year. When they did transmit pieces of information to the 
Foreign Office for confirmation, the tone of their letters could be derisive. For 
example, in the autumn of 1933, the chairman of the Joint Foreign Committee asked if 
the British government could make enquiries in Kabul to ascertain if 2,000 Bukharan 
Jewish refugees had actually arrived in the capital, as the Board believed that 
Bukharans in London were exaggerating the crisis.104 The Board of Deputies could not 
listen to Mizrahi voices with confidence. Consequently, other organisations not 
established specifically for the protection of Jewish communities were even less 
inclined to assist the Jews of Afghanistan.
Official British Response
Officials in London first began to deal with Central Asian Jews deprived of 
nationality documents two years before the British colonial government in India 
became embroiled in the issue. This was because of the case of two Afghanistani 
Jewish men the Foreign Office wanted to deport.105 Bessala Poteliakhoff, son of the 
representative of the Boukharian Jews’ Association in London, was due to be deported 
because he had overstayed the period of his visa by two years while his wife was ill.106 
The second was the case of Isaac (or Israel) Davidoff, who was convicted of criminal 
assault and sentenced to a year in prison.107 When the British approached
103 BoD ACC/3121/C 12/4, Abraham Emanueli (Binyamina) to Herbert Samuel (London), 28 
January 1935.
104 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/2, Joint Chairman, Joint Foreign Committee to Under Secretary of  
State at Foreign Office, 18 October 1933.
105 IOL L/PS/12/1674, 108.
106 IOL L/PS/12/1674, translation o f note from Royal Afghan Legation to British Foreign Office, 4 
October 1933, 121.
107 IOL L/PS/12/1674, copy of note from British Legation to Afghan Foreign Ministry (both in 
Kabul), 18 May 1934, 113.
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representatives of the Afghan government, both in Kabul and in London, the Afghans 
stated that neither Poteliakhoff nor Davidoff were Afghan nationals, as both had
10ftfraudulently obtained passports.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1934, Maconachie, the British Minister in 
Kabul, discussed these two cases with the Afghan authorities. According to 
Maconachie’s report, Faiz Muhammad said that the possession of an Afghan passport 
was not proof of nationality “since Jews made a practice of obtaining passports of 
various Governments by bribery.”109 In reference to the nationality status of Davidoff, 
Faiz Muhammad replied that he was:
no doubt a scoundrel, who had obtained an Afghan passport, without 
being entitled to it, from one of the three scoundrels who had been Afghan 
Ministers in the past, Ghulam Nabi, Ghulam Siddiq, or Shuja-ed-daula.
On my [Maconachie’s] suggestion that the question was one of a 
Minister’s official authority than of his private character, Faiz Muhammad 
said that he would enquire by telegram from ‘Ali Muhammad but felt sure 
that Davidoff was a Bolshevik who ought never to have been granted an 
Afghan passport at all.110
Three months later, Maconachie “pointed out that it seemed to me the Afghan 
Government could hardly demand that the authority of their representatives should be 
respected by His Majesty’s Government in future, if they repudiated the official acts of 
these representatives whenever convenient to themselves.” Faiz Muhammad countered 
that they “could not accept as an Afghan subject every person who obtained an Afghan 
passport. Afghan passport authorities were generally corrupt... .”111
Finally, the British Government in London answered these charges. While 
remaining subtle, London invoked some of the retributive spirit also found in
108 IOL L/PS/12/1674, 106 and 115.
109 IOL L/PS/12/1674, 110, Maconachie (Kabul) to John Simon (London), 16 September 1934.
110 Ibid.
1,1 Ibid, 111.
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110Hammurabi’s ancient code. On New Year’s Day 1935, D.M. Cleary was hard at 
work. He consulted the Treaty Department who informed him that there had been 
several recent cases of the Afghan Government “refusing to admit that Jews in England 
with Afghan passports are Afghan subjects. They are accordingly thinking of 
proposing to the H[ome] 0[ffice] that visas sh[oul]d be refused to Afghans in future 
until the Afghan Government will adopt a less intransigent attitude.” This measure 
appears to have been enacted with satisfactory results from the British perspective. On 
20 January 1936, Maconachie sent a letter to London certifying that the Afghan 
government would “take back into Afghanistan, on receipt of detail of the crime, 
Muhajir and Afghan Jews who, having committed a crime in India, become liable to 
deportation.”114
According to a document sent from Simla to Kabul, the British government of 
India realised that Afghanistan was withdrawing passports from Jews and denying them 
citizenship rights. They were aware that “the effect of this policy is to render Jews 
entering India from and through Afghanistan stateless persons.”115 One civil servant in 
India told Maconachie that the Jews were becoming: “a source of embarrassment to the 
Government of India, seeing that a Jew without a passport is a national of no country 
and cannot be deported.”116 At this point, British officials in India began to lobby the 
Afghan consul at Karachi fiercely, not to defend Jewish civil liberties in Afghanistan, 
but rather because British officials in India did not want to manage a refugee 
community that could not be returned or displaced elsewhere.
Just as the Afghans viewed “every Russian as a potential spy” the British were 
also concerned with espionage, and endeavoured to stop Jews from entering India if
112 This Babylonian code prescribed identical punishments for any crime, such as an eye for an 
eye, and a tooth for a tooth.
1,3 IOL L/PS/12/1674, Coll3/101, D.M. Cleary to H.A. Rumbold, 1 January 1935, 104.
114 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll 3/93, Acting Afghan Foreign Minister to Maconachie (both in Kabul) 
20 January 1936, 73.
115 IOL L/PS/ 12/1660, Coll3/93, O.K. Caroe, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India 
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they were “likely to be Soviet agents.”117 To determine this likelihood, they proposed 
to divide Jews into three categories: those with Afghan passports, Iranian passports, or 
“Russian Muhajirs.” Each merited a different treatment. Jews in Iran were viewed the 
most liberally, as the Iranian government showed no indication of revoking the 
nationality of their Jewish citizens.118 The Government of India held Afghanistan 
responsible both for Afghanistani Jews and refugees from the Soviet Union. “Russian 
Muhajirs” were considered the most dangerous as potential Bolshevik agents. Afghan 
Jews also posed a certain problem, as the Afghan government had been withdrawing 
and refusing to renew their passports. Before visas were issued to India, Maconachie 
was instructed to secure an assurance from the Afghan government that any Jew “will 
remain an Afghan national, and that his passport will not be withdrawn and will be 
renewed when it falls due for renewal, so that he will be liable for deportation to 
Afghanistan under the Foreigners Act in the event of misbehaviour in India.”119 
Similar measures were required for Bukharan Jews, confirming that the visa holder was 
not a Bolshevik agent, and in the event of “misbehaviour” in India, s/he could still be 
deported to Afghanistan. These measures were required to “exclude all undesirable 
Jews from India.” The India Office stated that these measures would ensure that all 
Central Asian Jews would be liable for deportation, and it would be “impossible for any
i onJew ... to become stateless.”
Afghan consulates were not withdrawing passports solely from Jews in India, but 
also throughout Europe and Asia. The Alliance Israelite Universelle representative, 
Selim Nassi explained that Jews were being deprived of their citizenship in Mashhad
191under the pretext that these instructions came from Kabul. In Jerusalem, the India 
Office reported that the Afghan consular representative was “indiscriminately
199confiscating the papers or refusing to renew the passports of Afghan Jews.” In 
London, Afghanistani Jews complained to the Board that the Afghan legation had
1,7 IOL R/12/61 513/1, 155; L/PS/12/1660, Coll 3/93, O.K. Caroe (Simla) to Maconachie (Kabul), 
7 June 1935, 124.
118 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, Minute Paper, 20 January 1936, 76.
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120 Ibid.
121 BoD ACC/312 1/E3/506/2, Nassi (Teheran) to Hias-Ica-Emigdirect (Paris), 27 October 1934.
122 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Coll3/93, Minute Paper by Hood, 4 July 1935, 119.
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refused to renew their passports and had “furthermore withheld [them] without giving 
any reason whatever.”123 Similar incidents occurred in Berlin and Paris as well. An 
unnamed Afghan diplomat in France offered some explanation for these measures 
enacted across the globe. He told the press that:
There seem to be some Jews who irregularly acquired naturalisation, and 
who reside abroad. They are, generally, Jews from Bokhara and 
Daghistan, who, for political reasons claim to have adopted Afghan 
nationality. The measures which you speak are aimed at such irregular 
cases.124
One India Office official was aware that these “explanations are not particularly 
convincing and ... the present state of affairs is likely to continue.” By 1935, the 
entire Jewish community, both native and refugee, was assembled in Kabul, on the 
brink of deportation. British threats of retaliation appear to have been the only measure 
that stopped the complete expulsion of the Jews from Afghanistan.
Despite British diplomatic intervention, the situation for resident and refugee 
Jews in Afghanistan as well as Afghanistani Jewish nationals abroad did not improve. 
While the British applied enough pressure to the Afghan government to persuade them 
to withdraw some of their most extreme policy measures, conditions for the Jews 
remained difficult. They were not forcibly expelled from Kabul, nor were the 
Bukharan refugees deported to the Soviet Union. However, their daily lives continued 
to be afflicted by prejudice and hatred. Many escaped illegally to India throughout the 
1940s.
,23 BoD ACC/312 1/E3/506/2, Eighteen Afghanistani Jews (London) to BoD, 31 July 1934.
124 BoD ACC/3121/E3/506/2, Jewish Telegraph Association report which originated from the 
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Conclusion
The situation of the Jews in Afghanistan during the 1930s shines light upon 
levels of mutually reinforcing prejudice. These occur across a range of discursive 
planes, from intra-Jewish communication in England, to the sometimes veiled prejudice 
within the Foreign and India Offices, as well as anti-Semitism present in Afghanistan. 
Accompanying layers of derision meant that this fragile community was put further at 
risk by anti-Jewish sentiment in Afghanistan. Modem resentments played upon older 
prejudices, and the Jewish community was increasingly excluded from Afghanistan’s 
commercial life. The Bank-i Milli’s express purpose was to wrest the karakul trade 
from private, and especially Jewish merchants. This very modem type of prejudice was 
limited to a handful of individuals, and may have been influenced by events within 
Europe. Consequently, the Jewish community suffered greatly, and many long-term 
residents joined Bukharan refugees in fleeing years before the establishment of Israel. 
The end of the Jewish community started early in Afghanistan. Many of the political 
policies excluding Jews from northern Afghanistan were based on economic 
considerations, and strained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The following 
chapter examines this in detail.
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Chapter Five: Afghan Economic Policies in the 1930s
Synopsis
This chapter examines Afghan economic policy in the 1930s, particularly the 
activities of the Bank-i Milli or Afghan National Bank. This was an umbrella 
organisation for a monopolisation (or shirkat) system that transformed the economy of 
Afghanistan before World War II. While a financial endeavour, the bank was formed 
as an organisation which had a distinctly political role. By adopting Soviet techniques 
as a sort of camoflage, it sought to limit the influence of the USSR especially in 
northern Afghanistan. The Bank-i Milli and other joint-stock companies, particularly 
the Shirkat Ashami, severely restricted traditional forms of trade and commerce, 
causing great hardship for much of the population, especially those on the periphery, 
entrepreneurial minorities and Soviet refugees. In 1938, an Indian boycott of Afghan 
fruit brought down the government fruit monopoly, lessening the power of the 
monopoly system in general. In the same year, the Bank-i Milli was further undercut 
when the Prime Minister realised the extent of state profits being taken home by top 
officials. Muhammad Hashim Khan facilitated the creation of Da Afghanistan Bank to 
check the power of the Bank-i Milli, but as the same employees were used, this goal 
was unsuccessful. The human cost of the monopolisation system was very high, and 
many became impoverished as a result.
The Rise of the Shirkat System
The single most important aspect of economic policy in 1930s Afghanistan was 
the system of monopolisation that began at the dawn of Muhammad Nadir Shah’s 
reign. As examined in chapter 3, the Shirkat Ashami or Joint-Stock Company was 
initially an umbrella organisation espousing: “a policy of economic nationalism and a 
system of monopolies in the principal articles of import and export trade.”1 In 1932,
1 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Minute Paper written by E.P. Donaldson on 26 July 1934 regarding 
Maconachie’s survey o f Afghan commercial policy, 1930-34 379a.
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the company expanded to become the Bank-i Milli.2 It built some factories, and 
attempted to enforce governmental control over the pace of industrialization.3 In 1934, 
an article from Islah described its goals as “preventing] the money of the country from 
going into the pockets of foreigners.”4 By making capital available to Afghan 
entrepreneurs, most often the Pashtun elite, the trade minorities, Jews and Hindus, as 
well as Uzbek and Turkmen communities were disenfranchised.5 They became 
increasingly isolated from the commercial interactions that had sustained them in 
Afghanistan.
In 1941, a British businessman active in Afghanistan was asked by his 
government to describe the pattern of trade current under the Bank-i Milli. He provided 
a clear picture of the way various ethnic groups would work together before the advent 
of the shirkat system.
[T]he whole Afghan trade, except the less important fruit trade in 
Kandahar, was formerly in the hands of Indians from Peshawar and 
Oriental Jews (Bokharans and Persians). These people used to buy 
Persian skins in free competition in Mazar, Andchoi [Andkhoi] and 
Achtcha [Aqcha], to bring them to Peshawar or London and then sell them 
to European and American firms. They were intermediaries between the 
Afghan producer and the American or European consumer. I must say 
that very great confidence existed between the Turkmens and the Oriental 
Jews, which made credit deals possible. When the market was up 
everyone felt the advantage the small sheep-owner, the small dealer in 
Turkestan, the big Afghan dealer and the Indian or Oriental dealer in 
Peshawar or London, and did the market decrease everybody felt the 
blow....6
The traditional economy described here was closely linked to that of the Emirate of 
Bukhara and Russian Turkestan before the Russian Revolution. In 1920, when
2 Adamec 1974,203.
3 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Letter from Maconachie (Kabul) to John Simon (London), 21 June 1933, 525 
and 529; and Economic Report o f 1937, Annex D, The Organisation o f Industry and Trade, 357.
4 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Translation o f an article published in Islah, no.27,6 September 1934, under 
the heading: “Economic progress is a factor contributing to the welfare o f a Nation,” 378.
5 IOL R/12/160, Secret note on Abdul Majid and the economic activities of the Afghan Bank, c. 
October 1941, perhaps by a man named Jenkin, 4-5.
6 IOL L/PS/12/160, Secret Note on Abdul Majid and the Economic Activities o f the Afghan 
Bank, 7.
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Bukhara was incorporated into the Soviet Union, seventy-five per cent of Turkmen 
flocks were brought into Afghanistan. Consequently, the country benefited from a 
large increase its share of the lucrative karakul market.7 Karakul skins became the 
Afghan government’s main source of hard currency earnings. The other principal crop 
was dried fruit. However, fruit has to be stored under more controlled conditions, and 
could not be removed from the market if the price was not deemed sufficiently high. 
Karkul skins were able to be stored in any locale as long as it was dry and relatively 
free from pests and excessive heat. If the international market price was not high 
enough, the Bank-i Milli would hold back an entire year’s crop from the market, as 
frequently occurred in the 1940s.
As shown in preceeding sections, often those who were not considered ethnically 
“valid” citizens of the Afghan nation endured a great deal of prejudice. During the 
1930s and 40s, the Bank-i Milli forbid Jews from participating in the karakul trade by 
barring access to northern Afghanistan, and its Turkmen sheepherders. The Bank, in 
conjunction with the Shirkat Ashami, which controlled the karakul trade directly, 
limited the number of skins the Jews could purchase in Kabul and the price they would 
receive for them. Along with much of the Afghan elite, the system of monopoly 
companies and the Ministry of National Economy considered the Jews as the least 
“native” citizens of Afganistan, and the most likely to be Soviet spies. Hindus were 
seen in a similarly hostile manner, yet as Indian and British opinion could impact 
Afghanistan strongly, some amount of caution was required. Ostensibly, the shirkat 
system worked to improve the position of all Afghan traders, while members of the 
Pashtun elite certainly fared the best.
The monopolisation system gained support through nationalist appeals. They 
were mainly aimed at the elites but reached a wider audience through publication of 
speeches in the Kabuli newspaper Islah. At a meeting in 1934, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan 
discussed Indian traders who purchased lorries for 1500 rupees in Karachi and sold
7 PRO FO 371 18,256, Weekly summary no. 42,15 October 1934, 413.
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them in Afghanistan for twice that sum. ‘Abd al-Majid felt this was outrageous, and 
stated:
[W]e have a right not to allow our trade and capital to fall into the hands 
of self-interested persons ... Should we depart even a little from our 
present correct economic policy the capital we at present possess is bound 
to disappear and Afghan trade will go bankrupt.8
Goods were priced higher in Afghanistan than India for a series of reasons, including 
the cost and difficulty of transit, high duties on imports, as well as the risk of raids, 
tribal wars, and insecure markets. Indeed, this was common throughout the nineteenth 
century as well. Only several months earlier, the National Bank had assumed the 
monopoly of car imports for a period of four years.9 ‘Abd al-Majid Khan may have 
been speaking against the open trade of automotive vehicles as a justification for 
previous policies.
In September 1934, ‘Abd al-Majid's rhetoric increased in intensity, as opposition 
to the shirkat system grew amongst the populace. In a newspaper article he wrote that:
The Company have never desired to stand in the way of the trade and 
interests of their countrymen. But as our individual trade has incurred 
terrible losses and is on the verge of destruction and extinction at the 
hands of foreign trade the Company have reluctantly taken control of 
certain affairs and are preventing the money of the country from going 
into the pockets of foreigners.10
Thus, protection was an especially important goal, certainly when arguing for increased 
monopolisation. Patriotic invocations may have been one way to quiet critics.
Until 1936, the Afghan National Bank was engaged in Afghanistan's import and 
export trade. After that point, however, emphasis was placed on developing domestic
8IOL L/PS/12/1552, Enclosure to Kabul despatch 22 June 1934, translation o f an extract from the 
Islah no. 256 of 11 June 1934, and parts of a speech made by ‘Abd al-Majid Khan at the annual meeting 
of the Shirkat-i-Ashami, 393.
9PRO FO/371/18243, Diary no.12, for week ending 23 March 1934, 178.
10IOL L/PS/12/1552, Translation of an extract from Islah no. 27, “Economic progress is a factor 
contributing to the welfare of a Nation,” sent from Kabul on 13 September 1934, 378.
165
industries, and the Bank-i Milli became “something of a national planning centre, 
directing the activities of a host of semi-independent satellite companies.”11 ‘Abd al- 
Majid stated that the national bank attracted capital as it was the first financial
•  •  17organisation to pay out dividends (between six to twelve per cent) to investors. A 
report compiled for the British Foreign Office (by its representative in Kabul and the 
Export Credit Guarantee Department in London) explained that: “Previously Afghans 
who had money to spare either held it on deposit abroad, bought property with it, or 
buried it, but money held in any of these ways yielded a comparatively small income, if 
any.”13
As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, ‘Abd al-Majid felt that eliminating middlemen 
“was one of the first essentials” for successfully nationalising the economy.14 When 
the Bank-i Milli pursued this goal, the existence of the Jewish community was 
endangered. Most of their business involved acting as intermediaries between 
producers and consumers. From September 1933, two thousand Jews were removed 
from the northern province, since they were considered an impediment to the karakul 
monopoly.15 In February 1934, Muhammad Daud Khan expelled Jews from Jalalabad 
and Laghman.16 Further anti-Jewish legislation continued. Hindus in northern 
Afghanistan found themselves in a similar situation. As another ‘middleman’ minority 
dealing in karakul skins, they were also targeted and by the summer of 1934, many
•  17were closing their businesses and returning to India.
As soon as the monopoly companies began to operate, private trading houses felt 
great pressure. The British Minister at Kabul, Richard Maconachie explained that there 
was considerable opposition to the government’s commercial policy. Both Indian and
11 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Export Credit Guarantee Department: Economic Section. First Report on 
Afghanistan, (based largely on conversations with Abdul Majid Khan). Annex D: The Organisation of  
Industry and Trade, 358-9.
12 Ibid.
13 PRO FO/371/18244, Diary no.26 for week ending 28 June 1934, reporting Abdul Majid Khan’s 
comments at the Ashami Company’s annual meeting, 328.
14 Ibid.
15 PRO FO/371/17198, Cover letter to telegram from Maconachie sent 3 October 1933, 106.
16 PRO FO/371/18256, Weekly summary from Peshawar, 28 February 1934,405.
17 PRO FO/371/18244, Diary no. 31 for week ending 2 August 1934, 378.
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Afghan middlemen were reported to be struggling to maintain their threatened 
livelihood.18 Three years later, in 1937, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan claimed to have obtained 
a complete monopoly control of the karakul trade.19 A handful of traders managed to 
retain their employment, though most faced ruin.
In one interview with British officials in Kabul, the Minister of Commerce 
explained that the National Bank would “supply the local shop keeper directly only 
retaining a small profit for itself.” He claimed that it would gain a monopoly of 
wholesale business while reducing retail prices. The British representative present at 
this meeting countered that “a single middleman might be able to raise prices to the 
retailer quite ... effectively.”20 Indeed, the Bank-i Milli appears to have generated far 
greater profits than any of the older import and export companies in Afghanistan. By 
1941, one estimate of pre-monopoly profit rates was between fifteen to twenty per cent,
9 1though the national bank may have gained as much as a 150 per cent rate of return.
Part of this profit was due to the sellers’ ignorance of market prices.
In 1941, a British businessman in Kabul provided an economic analysis for the 
benefit of the British mission. When explaining the karakul market, he wrote that:
The sheep owner gets practically nothing for his skin as he is not supposed 
to know the exact market price. That is why buyers are not allowed up 
north and if you realize that a few hundred thousand people breed sheep 
there, most of them own small flocks, you will understand that the new 
policy has brought misery ... The real producers are not allowed the 
benefit of a rising market. ...22
,8IOL L/PS/12/1552, Minute Paper written by E.P. Donaldson on 26 July 1934 regarding 
Maconachie's survey of Afghan Commercial Policy, 1930-34,279 verso.
19 In July 1937, Fraser-Tytler told Eden that Ashami had control over the entire crop. 
L/PS/12/1552, Comments on memorandum of 15 March 1937, prepared by the Export Credits Guarentee 
Department on “The Economic Position in Afghanistan,” 306.
20 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Annual Report on Afghanistan, 1932, 549. The identity o f this 
official is uncertain.
21 IOL R/12/160, “Secret Note on Abdul Majid and the Economic Activities o f the Afghan Bank,”
8.
22 Ibid.
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By keeping Turkmen shepherds ignorant of prices, they remained artificially low.
When buyers were allowed to proceed directly from Europe to northern Afghanistan, 
prices rose, more accurately reflecting open market conditions. In the early 1930s, 
when the shirkat system was just beginning to assert its monopoly rights, buyers were 
still allowed into the capital, and even up north. Thus, in September 1933, when three 
buyers from European fur trading companies arrived in Kabul, Maconachie reported 
that “competition is fairly keen and prices are rising rapidly.” Yet, when the 
monopolies grew in strength, the open market was severely limited, and traders were 
banned from travel into the northern provinces (where the karakul sheep were found) 
shifting the price down once again. Those who conducted trade in Afghanistan before 
the monopoly system faced great difficulties maintaining their businesses. Very few 
people were allowed to sell karakul skins, as the Bank-i Milli bought most of the crop. 
Although the international market was strong in the 1930s, Turkmen immigrants 
suffered greatly from these policies.24
This British businessman argues that if the karakul trade had been in Pashtun 
hands, ‘Abd al-Majid would not have been able to carry out such restrictive policies, as 
there would have been “risings and insurrections.” When discussing the powerlessness 
and fear of Turkmen immigrants, he states they are not “real Afghans,” and provides a 
window into the ethnic discourse of this time. He explains that while the government 
says that they “don’t recognize tribes, and that everyone living within the Afghan 
borders is an Afghan,” ‘Abd al-Majid would not have been able to pursue such an 
exploitative policy amongst a politically stronger population.25 Just like the Jewish 
community, Turkmen refugees were forced to accept the situation under threat of 
deportation. In 1941, this British businessman estimated that 300,000 Turkmen were 
involved in the karakul trade, while 400,000 Uzbeks grew cotton. He explained that the 
Uzbeks (just as the Turkmen) faced similar measures, forced to accept a low price for
23 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Letter from R. Maconachie (Kabul) to J.C. Walton (London), 2 September 
1933,436.
24 IOL R/12/160, “Secret Note on Abdul Majid and the economic activities of the Afghan Bank,”
8-9.
25 Ibid, 9.
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cotton even though the market was strong. While thousands of documents about the 
karakul trade are found in western sources, this author found very little on the plight of 
Uzbek immigrants. Once again, this underscores the importance of international 
connections in the history of the karakul trade and its Jewish participation.
Political Aims of the Monopoly System: Limiting Soviet Influence
While the shirkat system caused suffering and furthered the exploitation of 
peripheral groups, its primary aims were political — limiting Soviet aspirations for
*)*7economic dominance in Afghanistan, especially in the country's northern rim. In 
1932, the Soviet Union made a concerted effort to regain the karakul market that was 
lost to London at the advent of World War I. The Soviet government encouraged 
smugglers to cross from Afghanistan’s northern border, thus evading customs.28 This 
caused the Afghan government a great deal of concern as it was loath to relinquish any 
of this valuable source of revenue.
These tactics caused the Afghan government to fear that the USSR might “revert 
to the expansionist policies of Czarist Russia.”29 The historian Ludwig Adamec states 
that the Soviet Union was welcome to provide military or economic aid to Afghanistan, 
yet “any measure that tended to lead to economic dependence or political penetration 
was strongly resisted” by the Afghan government.30 It was careful not to openly 
antagonize its powerful northern neighbour, but did not take any opportunity to be 
overly friendly either.
Despite, or perhaps because of this political balancing act, Afghanistan employed 
a curious strategy. It appears to have used Soviet-inspired measures to confront the 
USSR’s foreign economic policies. By creating a large monopoly system, and partially
26 Ibid.
27 IOL L/PS/12/1552, R. Maconachie (Kabul) to John Simon (London), 31 August 1933 regarding 
interview with Faiz Muhammad on 24 August 1933,433.
28 PRO FO/371/17198, Afghanistan 1932 Yearly Report: Foreign Trade and Concessions, 402.
29 Adamec 1974, 232.
30 Ibid.
169
adopting Soviet techniques, Afghanistan was able to control its interactions with its 
northern neighbour more carefully. Afghanistan limited external meddling into its 
domestic economy by following a model clearly advocated for the benefit of the Soviet 
Union. In 1932, the British embassy in Moscow reported that one Russian publication 
advocated the following:
The monopoly of foreign trade also makes it possible to conduct foreign 
trade policy with each individual country according to our economic and 
political relations with that country. This applies particularly to our trade 
with the so-called Eastern countries. (Persia, Afghanistan, Western China, 
Mongolia and Tuva).31
In fact, the Afghan government followed the Soviet Union’s strategies so closely that 
when the Soviet trade organisation came to negotiate for the purchase of 130,000 
karakul skins, rumours and “wild conjectures” circulated in Kabul that the Ashami 
Company was under Soviet control.
During an interview with the Foreign Minister, Faiz Muhammad, Richard 
Maconachie learned that one motive for the monopoly system was “as much political as 
economic. It had really been the necessity of devising some machinery by which trade 
could be carried on with Russia without exposing Afghanistan to permeation by 
Bolshevist propaganda.” Because of the stated political nature of the Ashami 
Company, it received early British support, as the UK, India, and Germany were 
favoured as trading partners over the Soviet Union. Britain was pleased that 
Afghanistan was acting in a defensive manner against Soviet economic infiltration, and 
so the questionable means it employed were overlooked.
National policies were grounded in the context of security. One of the Ashami 
Company’s first interactions with the Soviet economy set a highly protectionist tone.
In mid-February 1934, The Times reported that the Ashami Trading Company had
31 PRO FO/371/17198, Afghanistan 1932 Yearly Report, translation from Vnyeshnaya Torgovlya 
as transmitted with Moscow despatch no. 690 for 3 December 1932,402.
32 PRO FO/371/18244, Diary no. 19 for the week ending 11 May 1934, 257.
33 IOL L/PS/12/1552, R. Maconachie (Kabul) to John Simon (London), 31 August 1933, 433.
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agreed to exchange karakuli skins for sugar with the Suafghantork Company in 
Moscow, a Soviet company designed specifically for trade between the USSR and 
Afghanistan.34 This may have been due to coercion from the USSR. The cost of 
transportation to northern Afghanistan made it impossible for Indian or Javanese sugar 
to compete with the Soviet product. In the autumn of 1933, the Soviet Union raised the 
price and warned that they would not export it to Afghanistan unless they received part 
of the karakul crop.35 The Afghan government apparently acquiesced to Soviet 
demands, and started paying for sugar with karakul skins. Three weeks later, the Soviet 
government was dissatisfied with the skins they received. Now they demanded cash for 
the sugar, and the agreement was suspended, while “the quality of the skins [was] 
referred to arbitration.”36 Later, all bartering arrangements were refused, and the Soviet 
Union stipulated that future purchases were to be paid in gold only. In this respect, 
the Ashami Company dealt very successfully with the Soviet system. By providing 
sub-standard goods for a barter arrangement, they were able to bypass Soviet 
stipulations. As an official state monopoly, it could present a unified course of action, 
thus waylaying further Soviet economic inroads to northern Afghanistan.
Regional Afghan policies are more difficult to explain in this manner. While 
Muhammad Daud Khan was the governor of the Eastern Province, he incorporated 
Soviet-style agricultural production orders directly into his administration. During the 
summer of 1934, he ordered farmers to produce a quota of wheat (3,000 kharwars), and 
then prohibited the residents of a rice-growing area (Wazir Kala) from growing their 
staple crop. These orders were unpopular, and sparked protests.38 Muhammad Daud 
Khan’s rationale is not explained in British sources, though clearly Soviet modelling 
appears to have been taking place in agriculture. Muhammad Daud Khan must have 
seen this option as the best way to obtain high agricultural yields.
34 IOL L/PS/12/1552, “General Election for Afghanistan,” The Times, 17 February 1934, 409.
35 PRO FO/371/17198, Memorandum from Maconachie (Kabul) to HAF Matcalfe (New Delhi),
10 October 1933, 392.
36 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Letter from Maconachie (Kabul) to John Simon (London), 7 March 1934,
397.
37IOL L/PS/12/1552, Economic Report 1937, Annex C, 356.
38 PRO FO/371/18244, Diary no. 31 for 2 August 1934, and Diary no. 32 for 9 August 1934. 
Muhammad Daud Khan was the same man who overthrew Muhammad Zahir Shah in 1973.
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Case study: Jacob Pinhas
The following example provides insight into the difficulties faced by non-Pashtun 
traders. One buyer employed by a British fur company asked for Maconachie's 
assistance after being imprisoned in Kabul. Jacob Hai Pinhas appears to have been a 
Bukharan Jew who obtained Afghanistani citizenship, though he resided in London, 
and was unfamiliar with Afghani laws and recent business practices. Pinhas may 
have obtained an Afghanistani passport during Amanullah or Muhammad Nadir’s reign 
through one of several corrupt Afghan officials in the Soviet Union. As ambassador to 
Moscow (1929-33), Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan was reported to have accepted 
bribes in return for Afghan passports.40 A closer option than travel to Moscow may 
have been available for Pinhas. One British author reported that a corrupt Afghan 
consul in Tashkent could be bribed for visas.41 Other Bukharan Jews were able to pay 
for Persian passports.42
Pinhas travelled directly from London via Bombay, Peshawar, and Kabul to 
Mazar-i Sharif where the karakul sellers congregated. After his arrival, Pinhas was 
interrogated, and his documents were confiscated. He was told to stay in Mazar and 
wait until the trade minister returned to the city. After several days Pinhas sought 
permission to travel to Andkhoi. In his letter to Maconchie, he reported that the Naib 
ul-Hukumat (Representative of the Government) refused to let him continue his 
journey, and said that the price of karakul would consequently increase by ten Afghanis 
per skin.43 Indeed, this was precisely the crux of the monopolisation system. It forbid 
the free interaction between producers and middlemen. Profits were not supposed to go 
into Turkmen pockets, but rather were to be reserved for the Bank-i Milli. In the course
39 IOL L/PS/12/1626, Enclosure to Kabul despatch no. 85, 28 July 1933, copy o f a letter from J.H. 
Pinhas to H.M. Minister (Kabul), written 25 July 1933,53-4. .
40 Yehoshua 1981, 110, and IOL L/PS/12/1867, culled from a report o f Sevodnia, a Riga 
newspaper on 10 January 1933.
41 Robert Byron, The Road to Oxiana (London: Macmillian, 1937), 294.
42 PRO FO/371/18,257, Khorasan Political Diary Nov. 1933, 251. “The Persians issue passports 
to practically anyone who can pay the fees... (including a large number o f Russian jews [sic]...)
43 Perhaps the Naib al-Hukumat was Muhammad Gul. (Byron, 294.)
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of this discussion, a local merchant entered the room and asked if Pinhas had come 
from London to buy karakul skins. Pinhas writes that when this was confirmed, “the 
Merchant addressed me in a bitter tone and said it is a shame that you have come all 
this way into Afghanistan to ruin our business.”44 Pinhas kept quiet, reasoning that the 
merchant did not want others benefiting from the lucrative trade. This merchant may 
have been a rare individual who was allowed to continue trading under the shirkat 
system. In 1937, the India Office estimated that 50 per cent of Afghanistan's foreign 
trade was conducted with the Soviet Union.45 Also, this man may have been upset 
because as more traders came into the area, competition would increase and prices 
would rise, more accurately reflecting the price of a more open market. Clearly, buyers 
not connected with the monopoly system were unwelcome. The hostility that Pinhas 
encountered both from individuals and government officials appears to strengthen this 
view. Making a difficult issue worse was the question of his nationality. While Pinhas 
did have an Afghan passport, it was not recognised by Muhammad Zahir Shah’s 
government.46
Despite being banned from travel and purchasing skins, Pinhas secretly appointed 
agents who bought over 5,000 karakul skins on his behalf in Mazar-i Sharif and 
Andkhoi. The Afghan government seized them quickly, causing his London firm even 
further losses 47 When the trade minister returned to Mazar a few days later, Pinhas 
was arrested and transported to Kabul. While in prison he contracted dysentery, and 
was released on bail for medical care. At that point, he contacted Maconachie. The 
British Minister was uncertain how to proceed because of Pinhas’s ambiguous political 
status, as well as the apparent unseemly details provided in his letter. Eventually, the 
British mission appears to have taken no action. They determined that he was an 
Afghan subject, and trade rivals were responsible for his arrest. In 1936, Pinhas’s 
application for a visa to the UK was turned down on the grounds that he was no longer
44 IOL L/PS/12/1626, Enclosure to Kabul despatch no. 85,28 July 1933, copy o f a letter from J.H. 
Pinhas to H.M. Minister (Kabul), written 25 July 1933, 54.
45 IOL L/PS/12/1552, 347. Economic Report 1937.
46 See chapter 4 for more information.
47 IOL L/PS/12/1626, Enclosure to Kabul despatch no. 85, 28 July 1933, copy of a letter from J.H. 
Pinhas to H.M. Minister (Kabul), written 25 July 1933, 54-5; and Letter from Maconachie (Kabul) to 
John Simon (London), 20 July 1933, 61.
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as closely connected to his firm as he had been three years earlier. This seems to have 
been the inevitable result after being stranded in Afghanistan, unable to either fulfil 
contracts in Afghanistan or renew ties in London. Pinhas remained in Afghanistan at 
least until 1937. He next appears in the India Office documents in 1944 as the 
president of Peshawar’s Jewish Communal Charity Association, though nothing is 
known of the intermediary years.48
Pinhas' account of a buying trip that went wrong also says a great deal about the 
ordinary details of travel and trade at this time. He explains that his route progressed 
from London to Bombay, and then north to Kabul where he stayed with the fur 
company's local agent, Yusuf Camontov [Simantov]. When entering Afghanistan, 
Pinhas carried a letter of recommendation from the London Chamber of Commerce, as 
well as one from the deposed amir of Bukhara. The Jewish Agency also guaranteed the 
good conduct of Pinhas 49 It appears that he chose the wrong allies for his journey, as 
the letter from the amir caused a great deal of suspicion amongst Afghan government 
officials.
The most valuable information in Pinhas’s account relates to the early 
consequences of the monopoly system. Jews who opposed the monopolisation system 
even indirectly could face harsh punishment. While his treatment may have been more 
extreme than most merchants experienced, nonetheless, older trade patterns were 
broken definitively.
Consequences of the Monopoly System: An Economic Downturn
As the previous example demonstrates, very little deviation from official 
proscriptions was allowed for the karakul trade. It was the principal cash crop, and 
with no possibility of spoilage, extremely valuable to the government. In April 1938, a
48IOL L/PS/12/1626, Extract from Diary No. 28 for week ending 14 July 1933, 62; and letter to 
Mrs. Ksia Pinchasoff (Jerusalem) from Government o f Palestine, 28 January 1937, 37-8; and Minute 
Paper from Political Department, Hood to Clauson, 2 January 1936,48. See also IOL L/PS/12/1660 Coll 
3/93,43.
49 IOL L/PS/12/1626, 61 and 48.
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handful of Afghanistan! Jews working in Kabul for firms run by Central Asian Jews 
(holding various passports) in London was investigated by the Afghan Prime Minister's 
office. Their commercial records were seized. One Jewish man working as a lambskin 
broker for the Ashami Company itself was arrested on suspicion of corruption, as he 
may have accepted bribes from karakul producers. This man, simply called Amin, may 
have been cooperating with Dost Muhammad Khan, the deputy of the commercial and 
monopolies section of the Bank-i Milli, and the vice president during ‘ Abd al-Majid's 
absence in Europe.50
Soon after the documents were seized, it was determined that Dost Muhammad 
had accepted bribes, in addition to 30,000 afghanis borrowed from the bank. He was 
dismissed from his post, and along with others, presumably the Jewish merchants 
whose documents were confiscated, he was imprisoned.51 While Dost Muhammad, a 
high-ranking Pashtun official had been given a six-year sentence, the next year he was 
pardoned and appointed head of one of the bank’s manufacturing companies.
The example of Dost Muhammad Khan shows that corruption was widespread 
under the new system. Legally or illegally, a very small number of investors, perhaps 
as few as twenty-five or thirty individuals, benefited from the changes wrought by the 
monopoly system.53 Overwhelmingly, it caused serious upsets both within Afghanistan 
and among neighbouring nations. Legal avenues of trade became nearly impossible for 
individuals and private companies. It appears likely that the black market flourished, as 
it did when Iran embarked upon nationalisation strategies.54 In fact, it is estimated that
50 With thanks to May Schinasi for higlighting Dost Muhammad’s position. (Personal 
correspondence, 17 April 2003.)
51IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Intelligence Summary for the week o f 8 April 1938, 156; and 
Kabul Military Attache’s Intelligence Summary, 22 April 1938, 152.
52 Vladimir Cervin, “Problems in the Integration of the Afghan Nation,” in The Middle East 
Journal 6:4 (Autumn 1952): 412, and Fry, 87.
53 IOL R/12/160, “Secret Note on Abdul Majid and the economic activities o f the Afghan Bank,”
5.
54 “I feared the system would lead to the most hopeless confusion, as it had I believed done in 
Iran, and to intensive smuggling.” IOL L/PS/12/1552, British Minister (Kabul) to Deputy Secretary to 
Government of India in External Affairs Department (Simla), 16 June 1938,48.
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smuggling accounted for one-third of all trade in Afghanistan.55 Those who needed to 
exchange afghanis for Indian rupees encountered great difficulties. In December 1937, 
the Afghan National Bank stopped exchanging currency when the karakul market 
sustained heavy losses. The demand for skins dropped in the west (because of the 
continuing effects of the Great Depression), yet the price which western countries were 
willing to accept did not drop consequently.56 To aggravate the situation, German and 
American buyers refused to fulfil contracts entered into earlier that year. As the Bank-i 
Milli did not want to accept a lower price, they were left with over half a million skins 
(or about half of the karakul crop that year) and had no recourse to hard currency.57
This affected the position of the Bank-i Milli, which was relying upon the sale of 
karakul for foreign exchange. As a result, the bank stopped exchanging currency, and 
issuing drafts for branches outside of Afghanistan (mainly in India). Because of the 
partially self-induced crisis, Afghanistan acted as a closed economy, although it was 
not large enough, and did not have enough resources to support such a strategy. This 
wreaked further economic havoc as the value of the afghani plunged against the Indian 
rupee. It also caused the government great embarrassment, as even pilgrims on Hajj to
r  o
Mecca could not obtain the funds necessary for their journey.
A great many factors contributed to this economic quagmire. British officials in 
Baluchistan suggested that the main cause was corruption, as they learned that 
prominent Afghan officials borrowed large sums from the bank without intending 
repayment. ‘ Abd al-Majid borrowed twenty lakh or 200,000 afghanis. The bank’s y  
agents in Herat and Kandahar, Sayyid Karim Khan and Haji ‘Abd al-Khaliq were each 
reported to have borrowed five lakh (50,000), while Dost Muhammad Khan was
55 Fry, 27.
56The open market price was reported to have fallen from 32 to 20 Indian rupees per skin. IOL 
L/PS/12/1552, 264.
57 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Telegram from Minister (Kabul) to Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs,
India Office 13 December 1937, 271-2; and Extract from Peshawar Weekly Intelligence Summary, 3 
January 1938,245.
58 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Despatch from HM Minister (Kabul) to HM Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs (London), 10 December 1937,264; Telegram from Minister (Kabul) to Secretary o f State for 
Foreign Affairs, India Office, 13 December 1937,270; Despatch from H.M. Minister (Kabul) to H.M. 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 10 December 1937, 264. In Peshawar the exchange rate fell to 385:100.
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reported to have borrowed three lakh (30,000) of afghanis.59 This may have caused the 
bank further instability as governing officials had already depleted a portion of its 
reserves. Other elements also contributed to the crisis. The influence of the worldwide 
depression played a part, as well as ill-advised nationalisation strategies. The Bank-i 
Milli’s goals were economic and political protectionism that focused on benefits for 
members of the Pashtun ethnicity, especially the elite. Other elements within 
Afghanistan's civil society found themselves disenfranchised.
As late as March 1938, ‘Abd al-Majid met with the Kabuli karakul traders, and 
asked them to hand over their stocks. He promised to keep them until the price for 
karakul rose, and claimed that after a while the Shirkat Ashami would be able to sell the 
skins for a strong profit. British officials in Peshawar stated that the traders declined: 
“saying that they have already suffered enough losses at the hands of the shirkat.”60 
Despite their steadfast refusals, for the most part, the Ashami Company (in conjunction 
with the Bank-i Milli) took over the karakul trade and used the earnings to fund 
governmental projects.
Successful Opposition to the Shirkat System: The Fruit Trade
\
As policies became more severe throughout the 1930s, opposition to the monopoly 
system grew. Muslim Kabuli traders asked the ulama to examine the monopoly 
system’s legality from an Islamic perspective.61 Jewish traders also faced great 
hardship, with less recourse to authority figures or legal challenges. They risked 
imprisonment when trying to continue dealing in karakul skins. The government of 
Afghanistan did not tolerate opposition in this area, and dealt harshly with them.
The monopoly system was not as effective when facing the opposition of fruit 
farmers, brokers, and merchants. In January 1938, as the Afghan currency dropped to
59IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Baluchistan Intelligence Bureau Summary, 28 January 1938, 
221. One lakh is the equivalent of 10,000, while one crore equals 10 million. I am grateful to May 
Schinasi for higlighting these officials’ precise roles. (Personal correspondence 17 April 2003.)
60IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Peshawar Weekly Intelligence Report, 28 March 1938, 167.
61 PRO FO/371/18,244, Diaiy no. 37 for 13 September 1934, 436.
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one quarter the value of the Indian rupee, unhappy merchants started to protest 
governmental policies in the north and the Koh-i Daman region. They complained that 
the heavy controls over trade, especially for the karakul and fruit crops, were 
responsible for low prices. Meanwhile in Peshawar, Indian traders were also 
convening. They raised money and selected representatives to lobby on their behalf in 
the Indian Assembly. These delegates even met with the foreign secretary and 
Jawaharlal Nehru asking for their help to stop the Afghan system of monopolies. A 
few weeks later, more drastic measures were taken, as Peshawari traders decided to 
boycott the entire shirkat system. By April, the boycott spread into Kandahar and
fi*yChaman just as the largest harvest in five years arrived, waiting for distribution.
In 1938, turmoil in both the karakul and fruit markets meant that the afghani fell 
to a low of 4.6 against one Indian rupee. This was devastating for the economy in 
Afghanistan. High-level discontent began to become visible. Haji Atta Khan, the 
brother of Muhammad Musa Khan, the director of the Bank’s commercial section, and 
the head of the Shirkat-i Pashtun, accompanied him on a tour to Peshawar and 
Rawalpindi. While there, Haji Atta Khan criticised ‘Abd al-Majid’s policies. It seems 
reasonable to conjecture that Muhammad Musa Khan shared these views, as he did not 
censor his brother's opinions. In fact, one month later, Muhammad Musa Khan told 
British officials that he did not wish to trade with the Soviet Union, and intended “to 
ask the Premier to remove restrictions on the fruit trade so that dealers can dispose of 
their fruit as they like.” With Hashim Khan’s permission the Shirkat-i Pashtun could 
operate in the open market. Representatives of the Indian branches were told to sell 
their stocks at the current market prices. Indian traders were oveijoyed and the 
Secretary of the North West Frontier Chamber of Commerce sent messages of gratitude 
to ‘Abd al- Majid and Hashim Khan. According to the British, some Punjabi
62IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Kabul Military Attache’s Intelligence Summary, 28 January 
1938, 220; Extract from Peshawar Weekly Intelligence Summary, 31 January 1938, 219; and Peshawar 
Extract, 14 February 1938, 207.
63IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Baluchistan Intelligence Bureau Summary, 15 April 1938, 138; 
and Baluchistan Extract, 13 May 1938, 113. On May 4th, the Cabinet met and decided to abandon the 
fruit monopoly. In an effort to thwart this decision, and keep a monopoly system, “Russian interests” 
then placed a large order for dried fruit, and the Cabinet revised its course. Nonetheless, by the end of 
June, no more Russian orders came in, and the fruit monopoly was definitively abolished.
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newspapers also “advised Indian traders to commence agitation against the other 
Afghan Shirkats.”64
The section of the Shirkat-i Pashtun that managed the fruit trade (simply called 
Shirkat-i Mewa or ‘Fruit Company’) collapsed due to a range of factors. These include 
geography (as the main fruit-growing region is in the south, near India), with its 
consequent heavy Pashtun participation, thus the government was more likely to heed 
their complaints.65 This was of particular importance because the Pashtuns are the 
dominant ethnicity in Afghanistan. As Pashtun revolts could undermine the authority 
of the central government, they could not be treated in as poor a manner as Soviet 
immigrants and entrepreneurial minorities. Other crucial factors were less product 
durability, the high number of Indian nationals involved in the trade, and the lower 
relative value or likelihood of obtaining European currency through its sale. The 
government relied less upon the income derived from the fruit trade, and encountered a 
strong Indian opposition which culminated in a boycott supported by the Indian 
Nationalist movement. Additionally, the head of the Shirkat-i Pashtun, Muhammad 
Musa Khan was far more ambivalent than ‘Abd al-Majid Khan. He considered the 
president of the Bank-i Milli a rival, and was more likely to accept compromise with 
unhappy fruit farmers and merchants.66 All of these factors combined with the 
discontent of the cabinet and outright economic losses to force the end of the fruit 
monopoly in June 1938.
After the fruit monopoly was abolished, the British Minister congratulated ‘Abd 
al-Majid on his wise decision. Yet, in the report sent to Simla, Fraser-Tytler wrote that 
it was “difficult to take ‘Abd al-Majid's ‘generous gesture’ seriously” as this action was
f \  7“so obviously dictated by the necessity to obtain exchange at all costs.” In order to
^IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Peshawar Weekly Intelligence Summary, 9 May 1938,115; and 
Peshawar Extract, 27 June 1938, 78.
65 “The fruit trade is in the hands o f real Afghans around Kandahar is being less exploited and 
Abdul Majid takes less interest in it which is significant.” IOL R/12/160, “Secret Note on Abdul Majid 
and the economic activites of the Afghan Bank,” 9-10. (c. October 1941)
66IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Baluchistan Intelligence Bureau, 13 May 1938, 112-3.
67IOL L/PS/12/1552, Letter from Fraser-Tytler (Kabul) to Sir Aubrey Metcalfe (Simla), 17 June 
1938,41-2.
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salvage what remained of the Afghan economy, he had to change course. Adamec 
mentions that the Afghans may have been coaxed into abandoning this monopoly when 
the British provided military materiel.68 Despite this aid, a global economy hampered 
by the depression was uninterested in the luxury of karakul skins, combined with highly 
controlling and protectionist state policies/brought Afghanistan to the brink of a /
A A
financial disaster.69
Da Afghanistan Bank: A Failed Check on the Power of the Bank-i Milli o
When the fruit monopoly failed in 1938, it became very clear that the Bank-i Milli 
was making large profits in other sectors, which were not all funnelled into official 
coffers, or sanctioned by the government. As mentioned above, many private fortunes 
were made. The Prime Minister, Muhammad Hashim Khan became concerned, and in 
order to limit the government’s dependence on the Bank-i Milli, a new institution, Da 
Afghanistan Bank or the Central Bank of Afghanistan was founded. Muhammad 
Hashim Khan also insisted upon a portion of Bank-i Milli’s profits. It began to extend 
a “loan” to the government, which amounted to over twenty-one million afghanis by 
1940. The government’s initial investment from 1932 was repaid, and Da Afghanistan
• 70Bank received sixteen million afghanis, sufficient capital to commence operations.
Vladimir Cervin was a consultant at the Bank-i Milli between 1938 and 1944; and in an 
article written eight years later for Middle East Journal, he hypothesised that there 
might have been a deal between the government and the finance group headed by ‘Abd 
al-Majid. The Bank-i Milli was allowed to continue modified operations in trade and 
industry, as long as a significant portion of the proceeds was extended to the 
government.71 ‘Abd al-Majid Khan then left Kabul ostensibly to seek medical care in 
Europe.
Da Afghanistan Bank or The Central Bank of Afghanistan acted as a “fiscal 
agent” for the Finance Ministry, and its tasks were to: “control currency, regulate bank
68 Adamec 1974, 231.
69IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Peshawar Weekly Intelligence Summary, 27 June 1938, 78.
70 Fry, 151.
71 Cervin, 412-3.
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credit in cooperation with Banke Millie, control foreign exchange, and make
investments in the national interest.”72 It soon began to issue banknotes and at the
height of World War II, it took over foreign exchange. Previously, private notes of 
%
receipt or debt were written among merchants. The Central Bank was unusual in that it 
had no control over other financial institutions, and seldom served the private sector. 
Rather its primary purpose was as the cashier to the Ministry of Finance. Although Da 
Afghanistan Bank was meant to act as a check on the Bank-i Milli, the latter institution 
provided the Central Bank’s staff, and by the end of 1940, the interests of the Afghan 
National Bank, the Central Bank, and government were indistinguishable.73 In the late 
1930s, the economy took a downward turn, as the karakul market crumbled, Afghan 
fruit was boycotted, oil concessions were cancelled, and military expenditures rose due 
to increasing tribal unrest.74 Simultaneously, Afghanistan faced great strains on the 
political front, as the ominous sounds of World War II rumbled closer.
Conclusion
The Bank-i Milli and the monopolisation system shifted the economy from a free 
market base with one to more state control. Afghanistan was never a fully capitalist or 
communist system. Yet, in the 1930s, state planning was favoured for a variety of 
reasons. Most importantly, it was seen as a way to escape domination by the USSR, 
while still conducting business safely with its northern neighbour. By adopting Soviet 
techniques, they attempted to shield the country from Stalin’s aggression. Preventing 
the Jews from engaging in the karakul trade was seen as another way to protect against 
Soviet inroads, as the USSR and the Jewish community were inseparable in the minds 
of many Afghan officials. The monopoly system signalled the rise of nationalist 
sentiment while linked to economic rationale. It was felt that Afghanistan’s profits 
should go into Afghan pockets. Although Muhammad Hashim Khan tried to check the 
power of the Bank-i Milli by establishing Da Afghanistan Bank, he was only partially
72 Franck, October 1949,436.
73 Fry, 86,90, 111.
74 IOL L/PS/12/1678, Weekly Summary from Peshawar, 15 August 1938,48; and Milan Hauner, 
India in Axis Strategy (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), 82.
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successful. The Prime Minister was unable to control its internal practices, and so 
insisted upon garnishing its earnings instead.
National economies can be very fragile, and this was particularly true for 
Afghanistan’s export and import trade during the 1930s. It simply could not withstand 
such drastic change in such a short amount of time. The policies implemented by the 
Ministry of National Economy and ‘Abd al-Majid Khan led to the destruction of the 
Jewish community in Afghanistan, and the continued suffering of many others. These 
consequences did not extend over the entire population as most people were still 
nomadic or subsistence farmers. If they had, it is not certain that the government would 
have survived.
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Chapter Six: World War II’s Impact on Afghanistan
Synopsis
Chapter 6 begins with an assessment of the foreign policy of Afghanistan in the 
pre-war period. While Afghanistan courted the UK, Britain’s economic assistance was 
not forthcoming, and so the government looked to Germany as an alternative.
Germany’s geographic distance permitted more cordial ties than either powerful 
neighbour would allow. It was considered a non-threatening industrialized power, 
which could assist internal development without the fear of invasion. After October 
1935, political relations warmed, and German economic assistance was supplemented 
by technical advice and sales of military materiel. While ties of common Aryan 
ancestry could be invoked, German overtures could be ambivalent. This may have 
been due to the overlapping divisions of power within the Nazi state.
The extent of Nazi influence may be the most contentious aspect of the 
historiography of the Jewish community in Afghanistan. While all sources will never 
be available, this topic is examined in as much detail as the western archival record will 
allow. This author concludes that direct influence of Nazi party members was mostly 
contained in the economic sector, as the UK and particularly the USSR were intolerant 
of other activites. The charge of Afghan anti-Semitism heightened through Nazi 
ideology is more difficult to address. Again, it was mostly contained within the 
economic sector, particularly the Ministry of National Economy. Afghan officials 
applied a syncretic approach to anti-Semitism. Some parts may have been inspired by 
Nazi ideas, while other, older forms were also present. Clearly, the worst excesses of 
the Third Reich never appeared in Afghanistan.
The main negotiator between Afghanistan and the Third Reich was the Minister 
of National Economy, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan. A biographic sketch of this man provides a 
way of understanding the interplay of German influence and anti-Semitism. The 
Ministry of National Economy was key in disseminating anti-Jewish policy, but his
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prejudice was mitigated by the desire for personal wealth. In fact, much of ‘Abd al- 
Majid’s anti-Semitism is linked to anti-Communist sentiments, like other officials in 
many nations, including Germany and the UK. Fear that Jews were communist agents 
appears to be one of the strongest reasons behind the discrimination they faced over 
that of other Soviet refugees and entrepreneurial minority groups in Afghanistan.
In the later war years, as the outcome of the conflict became more apparent, 
official attitudes towards Jews, both inside and out of Afghanistan, changed. The 
particular strain of Nazi-inspired anti-Semitism faded, while the communities in Kabul 
and Herat still faced riots, summary arrest, and deprivation. In France and Turkey, 
Afghan officials began to see Jews more positively, making efforts to protect them 
from the Holocaust and hoping to use the skills of Jewish professionals to further 
Afghanistan’s development.
The changes that World War II wrought were particularly severe in the economic 
sector. During the war, strong demand from India and bountiful harvests provided a 
buffer from ineffective economic policy. However, after the war, demand fell and the 
region faced a drought. Many suffered hunger, and famine loomed on the horizon. At 
this point, a monopoly system was no longer feasible and it crumbled.
Pre-War Anxiety
Before September 1939, Afghanistan was concerned by the prospect of both 
Britain and the Soviet Union fighting against Germany. Her position as a buffer 
between these two large powers was threatened, and this provoked great anxiety. By 
July 1939, Afghanistan was genuinely afraid of being invaded by the Soviet Union. 
Afghanistan accepted economic or military assistance from the Soviet Union as long as 
it did not turn into intervention. Afghanistan also asked for military guarantees from 
Britain, though it did not receive a sufficient response. This led Afghanistan to seek 
support from Germany, whose anti-Communist vitriol may have appeared comforting 
to Afghan leaders, who did not want to be caught between their two powerful
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neighbours.1 Ironically, just when Afghanistan turned back to Britain, the UK realised 
the depth of support for Germany.
While London urged caution towards Germany, in India the British administration 
was more concerned with the Soviet Union. This is significant because the perspective 
of the Government of India generally predominated in British policy towards 
Afghanistan. The historian Milan Hauner, author of India in Axis Strategy explains that 
the British Minister Fraser-Tytler expressly underplayed the significance of German 
economic influence in his reports to New Delhi and London, as he was worried about 
internal crises besetting Afghanistan, and he felt that the Afghan monarchy might fall.2
In November 1937, ‘Abd al-Majid visited London as Minister of National 
Economy, and asked for economic assistance. He said that Afghanistan could not 
develop without help from abroad. He stated that he was turning first to Great Britain, 
and warned that if his call for assistance was unsuccessful, he would turn to Germany. 
‘Abd al-Majid underlined his seriousness with several metaphors.
A man suffering from a disease which may prove mortal will obviously ... 
attempt to use any remedies which may come to his hand, and if his 
friends are unable to help then he will try other people. [Afghanistan’s] 
position was now urgent. People who were well-off did not understand 
the position of those who were starving and were inclined to delay when 
action was urgent. He urged strongly that His Majesty’s Government 
should take a practical interest in the economic development of 
Afghanistan.3
Great Britain made a small offer of assistance. This was insufficient for the Prime 
Minister, Muhammad Hashim Khan and the Minister of National Economy.
Countering this proposal, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan explained that Afghanistan had been 
offered significant loans and help for her export trade from the USSR and Germany, but 
he was wary of accepting this help, as it was “clearly made with a political object.”
1 These two paragraphs rely upon Ludwig Adamec 1974,231-4 and 243.
2 Hauner 1981,74-78.
3 IOL L/PS/12/1727, R.S. Hudson’s minutes of a conversation with ‘Abd al-Majid Khan on 15 
November 1937,42.
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Officials in London conceded that Britain’s offers were smaller, but argued that they 
were more attractive considering no political strings were attached.4
In June 1938, Fraser-Tytler realised that Great Britain had not acted aggressively 
enough to court Afghanistan.5 As a result, Germany gained an increasingly important 
role in Afghanistan. While the British were caught off guard by this rapprochement, 
French and Soviet representatives in Kabul were not. Documents now held at the Quai 
d’Orsay hint at some level of French-Soviet consultation and suspicion of German 
activities in Afghanistan. Both representatives were more attuned to individual 
Germans’ “militant hostility” than British sources indicated.6 Perhaps they had better 
intelligence: it is known that the Soviet Union watched events in Iran very closely, and 
evidence suggests that similar efforts were made in Afghanistan. For example, Ilya 
Svetlov, working under the name Bernhard Schultze-Holthus, was engaged in 
espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union in Germany and Iran, while another agent, 
Bhagat Ram, alias Rahmat Khan, worked in India and Afghanistan.7 In fact, three 
years before Fraser-Tytler’s dispatches take note of the burgeoning German-Afghan 
friendship, the French and Soviet representatives Rene Dollot and Leonide Stark 
noticed a change in relations. They observed three German military officers arriving in 
Kabul in March 1935, and both were concerned that this signalled a shift from Weimar
• # Obureaucrats to Nazi officials.
The French Minister to Kabul, Rene Dollot, was also more carefully attentive to 
Muhammad Hashim Khan’s decisions and their consequences than diplomats from 
other nations. Ironically, this may have been due to the shortcomings of the French
4 IOL L/PS/12/1727, Viscount Halifax, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the India Office 
(London) to Fraser-Tytler (Kabul), 9 February 1937, 86.
5 IOL L/PS/12/1689, Fraser-Tytler (Kabul) to Viscount Halifax (London), 16 November 1938, 94.
6 Adamec 1974, 226-7,233.
7 See Miron Rezun, The Soviet Union and Iran (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 359; and 
Hauner, 335 and 554. Both Ram and Svetlov were multiple agents who appear to have owed their 
primary allegiances to the USSR. We know that Bhagat Ram never accepted bribes from the Soviet 
Union, though Ilya Svetlov probably defected to the British for he was allowed to settle in West 
Germany after the war and publish his highly suspect ‘memoirs.’ See: (Bernhard) Schulze-Holthus, 
Daybreak in Iran: A Story o f  the German Intelligence Service (London: Staples Press, 1954).
8Q d’O Asie 1918-1940, Afghanistan, vol.44, Dollot (Kabul) to Foreign Minister (Paris) 28 March 
1935,23-5.
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legation.9 There was very little work for Dollot’s staff, as most of France’s nationals 
were involved in archaeological or educational positions. Also, the French diplomatic 
service was less encumbered in administrative details than that of other nations, 
particularly the British. Consequently, French sources are more analytical, and aware 
of the larger currents influencing Afghanistan’s policy choices. Dollot was cognizant 
of German military advisors in Afghanistan, but stated that the Prime Minister would 
not allow international intrigues to envelop his government. The French Minister felt 
that Muhammad Hashim Khan would accept German trade credits as long as they were 
useful, and did not compromise his country’s liberty. However, neither Germany nor 
Japan would come to Afghanistan’s rescue, and she had to continue to live within the 
political confines of her geography.10
By the time that Fraser-Tytler clearly expressed his concerns over German 
involvement in Afghanistan, he wrote that the German government would try to 
persuade the Afghans to maintain their neutrality, yet “embroil us with the frontier 
tribes, and so tie up as much of the Army in India as possible.” The British Minister 
speculated that the Germans would offer Afghanistan their eighteenth-century 
irredentist aspirations for the North West Frontier and the port of Karachi.11 He felt 
that “probably the only person in Afghanistan whose loyalty we could have counted on 
in the face of such temptation would have been the Prime Minister.”12 Indeed, this 
appears to have been correct, as it was Muhammad Hashim Khan who was primarily 
responsible for maintaining Afghanistan’s neutrality.
On 1 September 1939, Poland was invaded by Germany. Citing treaty 
obligations, Britain and France declared war against Germany two days later. As in 
World War I, Afghanistan immediately confirmed her neutrality. The government 
restricted the activities of German, Soviet and British nationals. Officially, no
9 Q d’O, Asie 1918-1940, Afghanistan, vol.44, Note from Foreign Minister (Paris), 6 February 
1936, 80.
10 Q d’O Asie 1918-1940, Afghanistan, vol.44, Dollot (Kabul) to Foreign Minister (Paris), 28 
March 1935,23-5.
11 As Britain withdrew from India, this issue became known as the conflict over Pashtunistan.
12 IOL L/PS/12/1689, Letter from Fraser-Tytler (Kabul) to Viscount Halifax, 16 November 1938,
94.
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propaganda (or even opinion from other countries) was permitted, and news of the war
was to come only from the government-regulated newspaper, lslah. After Poland was
invaded, Muhammad Hashim Khan logically concluded that Britain would declare war
1
on the Soviet Union, as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact posed a threat to India. This did 
not occur, as the Soviets had their hands full in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, 
Muhammad Hashim Khan wanted assurances that Britain would help defend 
Afghanistan against a Soviet invasion. He felt that Britain had an obligation to ensure 
Afghanistan’s safety. According to Fraser-Tytler, Muhammad Hashim Khan was 
adamant that Britain must show its friendship for Afghanistan. Fraser-Tytler agreed 
with this assessment, and cautioned his superiors that ignoring Afghanistan’s request 
could mean that while remaining officially neutral, they might: “lend an ear in time of 
trouble to subversive influences in and outside of the country, the result of which might 
seriously embarrass us on the frontier.” If Britain were to give a strong measure of 
support to Afghanistan, then an alliance would become even more valuable.14 Fraser- 
Tytler knew that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact changed the political balance in Central 
Asia. He felt that either the Afghans would want more British support, or they would 
be afraid of incurring the anger of Germany or the Soviet Union.15 Indeed, both 
projections were correct.
In December 1939, Afghanistan backed out of an agreement with Britain, being 
deeply disappointed with the lack of military assistance. Afghanistan was not willing 
to upset the Soviet Union if Britain did not provide full support.16 Until the summer of 
1940, large numbers of Soviet troops were stationed along the border with 
Afghanistan.17 Consequently, Muhammad Hashim Khan refused to allow the British to 
put their agents in Afghanistan for fear they could precipitate an invasion. As a salve,
13 Hauner, 132-3.
14 IOL R/12/113, Fraser-Tytler (Kabul) to Viscount Halifax (London), 7 July 1939, 3-10.
15 IOL R/12/113, Telegram Fraser-Tytler (Kabul) to Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs 
(London), 26 August 1939,20-1.
16 IOL R/12/113, Fraser-Tytler (Kabul) to Viscount Halifax (New Delhi), 17 November 1939, 65- 
70; and Hauner, 89-90, 136,142-8.
17 Adamec 1974,245.
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Hashim promised to share whatever pertinent information he received about the USSR 
with Fraser-Tytler.18
In the spring of 1940, the British Ambassador to Moscow asked Molotov if the 
Soviet Union was considering invading Afghanistan. Molotov thought this was an 
absurd notion. By the summer, British prestige had fallen considerably as Afghanistan 
watched the war in Europe with intense interest. The Afghan government was 
astounded by how quickly Western Europe, and especially France, fell under the Third 
Reich. Now the Afghans became far less concerned with a Soviet invasion, and they 
contemplated the dissolution of the British Empire. However, they were afraid to 
become caught between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and anxious that the 
USSR would be free to conquer territory in the Middle East in return for maintaining 
neutrality in the European conflict.19
Afghan foreign policy was governed by four distinct sentiments in 1940, which 
made for a contradictory series of relationships. The country’s leaders feared the 
USSR, but wanted to maintain neutrality and a cordial relationship with Britain, while 
still conducting commercial relations with Germany. Afghanistan turned back to 
court Germany through the office of the Minister of National Economy and tried to 
solicit the best deal for itself by cultivating a friendly relationship. Despite this, 
however, Muhammad Hashim Khan ultimately decided to side with the Allies. He 
realised that if the British Empire were destroyed, Afghanistan’s rulers and boundaries
91would also change.
On 5 August 1940, Muhammad Zahir Shah publically spoke about Afghanistan’s 
wartime position at the opening of Parliament. He said that his country’s policy was to 
maintain neutrality, and to conduct “political and economic peace-loving relations with 
all friendly governments.” Muhammad Zahir Shah said that Afghanistan has always
18 Hauner 1981, 136 and 141.
19 Ibid, 151-5, and 216.
20 Ibid, 218-19.
21 Ibid, 518-523.
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had an independent foreign policy, and only wished to “safeguard her interests and 
national rights.” He ended by praying that Afghanistan and all Islamic countries would 
remain out of the war and that “the star of peace and tranquillity [would] shine again 
and guide humanity in a better path.”22 At this time, Afghanistan could not endanger 
her independence by openly supporting either the Allied or Axis powers, and simply 
chose to confirm her neutrality.
Exactly one year after France was conquered, Nazi Germany invaded the USSR. 
The Soviets now aligned themselves with Britain, and Afghanistan was surrounded by 
Allied powers. Now Afghanistan no longer had to worry about a Soviet invasion, but 
any diplomatic overtures towards Germany aroused Anglo-Soviet suspicions. 
Immediately after the Soviet Union was invaded, Britain wanted all Axis nationals 
expelled from Iran and Afghanistan. The USSR called for an economic blockade of 
Afghanistan instead. The Soviet Union closed the border in July. During the 
summer of 1941, the UK and USSR worked on a plan to neutralize the potential threat 
posed by elements in Iran and Afghanistan who supported the Axis. Britain considered 
Iran a greater threat. In Delhi, the Government of India worried about the Soviet 
position. It realised that geographically Iran could be divided far more easily than 
Afghanistan. Additionally, the British colonial government feared a hostile reaction to 
the invasion of Afghanistan in India.24 The Soviet Union accurately concluded that the 
elite Iranian army officers were strongly pro-German, wanted to overthrow the Shah, 
and join the Axis powers. Consequently, between 25 and 29 August 1941, Iran was 
invaded by the USSR and Britain. Reza Shah abdicated in favour of his young and 
maliable spn, Muhammad Reza Shah and the country was split into two zones of 
occupation. Afghanistan was left to its own conclusions, if it did not adhere to the 
demands of the Allied powers, it would also face invasion.
22 IOL L/PS/12/1678, Despatch from Minister (Kabul) to Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs 
(London), no. 65, 13 August 1940, includes speech by Zahir Shah on 5 August 1940, at the opening of 
the fourth session of the Afghan State Assembly, 21.
23 Adamec, 245-7, and 253.
24 Hauner, 309, 315-6.
25 Gavin Hambly, “The Pahlavi Autocracy: Riza Shah, 1921-1941,” in Peter Avery, Gavin 
Hambly, and Charles Melville, eds. The Cambridge History o f  Iran vol. 7 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 242; andRezun, 390.
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Muhammad Hashim Khan had to tread carefully between warring powers and 
loyalties. At the height of German power, in the summer of 1941, he told the German 
ambassador Hans Pilger that Afghanistan would be destroyed if the border with India 
was closed, as this would cut off all supplies including gasoline, and the US would 
freeze the Afghan government’s assets. However, if Germany were able to reach the 
northern frontier, Afghanistan would be happy to welcome her. Pilger described the 
meeting to his superiors in further detail saying, “the Government was ready when the 
moment for intervention had arrived ... to let all of Afghanistan take up arms on our 
side. In that case he [Muhammad Hashim Khan] would mobilize 500,000 men 
including the border Afghans.”26 This telegram demonstrates the delicate balancing act 
that Muhammad Hashim Khan performed throughout World War II. If Germany won, 
Afghanistan would join in her victory, but until that time, the Prime Minister needed to 
maintain good relations with Great Britain as well as with the Soviet Union. This 
policy promised Germany a great deal but delivered little, though it vitally kept 
Afghanistan away from the battlefield.
While Muhammad Hashim Khan made strenuous diplomatic efforts, Afghanistan 
started war preparations. Along with the king, he explained the dangerous situation to 
the leaders of the Southern and Eastern Pashtun tribes, asked them to put aside their 
differences, and encouraged everyone to unite to defend the country. As commander of 
the Kabul Army Corps, Muhammad Daud Khan spoke in similar terms to the solders. 
The Faqir of Ipi, a Pashtun tribal leader, who had been sparking uprisings along the 
southern border was placated.27 In order to limit civil unrest, the government attempted 
to control food prices in urban areas.
Despite these initiatives, Britain had the upper hand. Afghanistan was encircled 
by Allied powers, and India controlled the trade routes, and all imported supplies.
26 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. (Hereafter: DGFP) Series D (1937-1945) 
Vol. XIII “The War Years” 23 June -  11 December 1941, no. 169. Telegram from Minister in Kabul to 
the Foreign Minister, 31 July 1941, 270.
27 The Faqir o f Ipi (Haji Mirza Ali) was willing to lead his Waziri forces against the British or 
Afghans. He was popular along the border and viewed as a “defender of Islam and a hero in fighting 
British aggression.” After the war, he was one o f the strongest advocates of the Pashtunistan cause. 
(Adamec 1974, 228, 230)
191
Afghanistan had to comply with British demands. On 30 and 31 October 1941, 180 
Germans, and eight Italians were expelled from Afghanistan via India. They were told 
to be ready to leave immediately, to forestall any British change of heart, such that 
would mean deportation via the Soviet Union. A Loya Jirga was convened in 
November. It retroactively approved the government’s action, but also reinforced 
Afghanistan’s neutrality. The assembly stated that war would commence if the Allies 
tried to challenge Afghanistan’s neutral position.
In the winter of 1941, the German attack on the Soviet Union slowed, while in 
Asia, Japan’s assault quickened. The Allies turned their attention away from 
Afghanistan, and within the country, a “strong sense of relief’ was palpable, as the 
possibility of a British invasion “so much alive in the autumn, had now become more 
remote.”29 By December 1941, officials knew that Muhammad Hashim Khan would 
remain loyal to the British. Fraser-Tytler reported that the Prime Minister had asked 
“to be left to himself to steer his ship as he thought best through the shoals of 
international politics.”30 However, the India Office still worried about particular groups 
in the government that might cause the monarchy to fall. By the end of 1942, the 
German threat through the Caucasus had dissipated, and Afghanistan remained quiet, as 
it did not want to antagonize the Allies.31 In July 1943, Leo Amery, acting Secretary of 
State for India explained that “our victories in the autumn of 1942, and since have 
convinced them [the Afghans] that we shall finally win.” He expressed surprise, 
saying: “they are rather inclined to descend on our side of the fence in so far as they can 
do without laying themselves open to an allegation of subservience to us.” The 
country maintained neutrality mainly through Muhammad Hashim Khan’s leadership.
28 Hauner 1981,319-327.
29 Ibid, 339.
30 IOL L/PS/12/701 A, Kerr Fraser-Tytler: Personal File, note written immediately after leaving 
Afghanistan, 20 August 1941; n.p. [2].
31 Hauner, 522-4, see also IOL L/PS/12/1560, Military Attache (Kabul) to Chief o f the General 
Staff, General Headquarters (New Delhi), 26 March 1943, General Reactions amongst Afghan officers to 
the war situation, 12.
32 IOL L/PS/12/701 A, Personal letter of L.S. Amery, India Office, Whitehall (London) to Fraser- 
Tytler, in retirement (Roxburgh), 8 July 1943.
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Having charted the political course of the Afghan government in wartime and 
seen the strenuous efforts that its leadership made to ensure neutrality and border 
security, it is necessary to further probe the legacies of wartime, and particularly the 
role played by Germany in the internal policies of Afghanistan. The influence of 
Nazism continues to be a focal point in the debate within Judaic studies. Furthermore, 
Nazism is still invoked by some observers as a factor in the ongoing tensions between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. From World War I, Afghanistan looked to Germany as a 
safe economic power to emulate, as it was distant enough to preclude invasion.
German technicians were willing to work for far lower wages than other Europeans 
with equivalent skills. By the middle of the 1930s, relations warmed sufficiently to 
include political and military ties. An ideological element also helped, as Afghans were 
considered Aryan.
Afghanistan’s relationship to Germany was constrained by the power of Britain 
and the Soviet Union, particularly after the invasion of Iran in August 1941. While it is 
difficult to find a direct link between Jewish oppression and Nazi influence in 
Afghanistan, it is clear that some amount of modelling occurred, particularly regarding 
prejudicial economic policy. ‘Abd al-Majid Khan, the impetus behind the 
monopolisation system, spent the war years in Germany and Switzerland, and engaged 
in high-level discussions with Nazi officials, ostensibly, on behalf of his government, 
but also for his own personal gain. As Germany never conquered the USSR, these 
goals were unrealised, along with Afghanistan’s irredentist ambitions for a seaport. 
When evidence of Nazi atrocities against the Jews of Europe became somewhat known, 
it is this author’s supposition that Afghanistan sought distance. While still ambivalent, 
Afghan officials began to see Jews in a new way. An Afghan diplomat in France 
volunteered to assist Central Asian Jews under Vichy, while the Jewish Agency in 
Turkey proposed sending Jewish refugees to Afghanistan as technical specialists.
33 While riddled with inaccuracies, Tariq Ali’s article “The king o f Greater Afghanistan” 
(Guardian, 30 November 2001, 22) gives a sense o f the passion still surrounding this issue.
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German Influence
From the middle of the First World War until the darkest days of the Second, 
Afghanistan took advantage of Germany’s interest in her key geographic position to 
make economic and political gains. Germany viewed Afghanistan as a crucial potential 
gateway to India, while Afghanistan looked for a third power to balance the competing 
rivalries of Russia (and later the Soviet Union) against those of Great Britain. The first 
Afghan-German contact was made in 1915 and 16, when the Neidermayer-Hentig 
expedition tried to create a military threat to British India from Afghanistan. Its goal 
was to keep Indian and Australian troops away from the western front, by tying them 
up along the Afghan border. Another aim was the possibility of forging an alliance 
between the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Afghanistan. While the expedition was 
unsuccessful, it did establish contact between the governments of Kaiser Wilhelm II 
and Habibullah Khan.34
After World War I, Afghanistan chose Germany as the most suitable non-Islamic 
model for economic and military development, because its strength was not based upon 
colonies. Germany enjoyed an unequalled popularity among the elites, as it provided 
options that neither Great Britain nor the Soviet Union espoused.35 Despite being the 
main provider of foreign expertise to Afghanistan in the 1920s and 1930s, it was never 
able to exert the level of control over Afghanistan that both large neighbours achieved. 
Afghanistan permitted Germany to provide services that it could never accept from 
closer, and thus potentially more dangerous, world powers. Francis Nicosia argues 
that Germany’s goals of economic penetration into Afghanistan remained consistent
7^from imperial days through to 1940. However, the desire for economic profit alone 
does not fully account for the Third Reich’s aims since there was very little financial 
reward. Instead, the goal of German diplomacy was to arrive on the threshold of India.
34 Francis Nicosia, ‘“Drang nach Osten’ Continued? Germany and Afghanistan during the Weimar 
Republic” Journal o f Contemporary History 32:2 (1997): 238-9.
35 Adamec 1974,217-218.
36 Ibid, 200.
37 Nicosia 1997,257.
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While not the primary goal, Germany’s unique position as a tertiary power enabled it 
directly to influence key sectors of the Afghan state in the 1930s.
As explained previously, under Muhammad Nadir Shah’s rule (1929-1933), all 
British and Soviet nationals were forbidden from working in Afghanistan, because their
-JO # #
potential for political influence was feared. Consequently, German expertise was in 
high demand, as German nationals were willing to work in difficult conditions for a 
fraction of the wage that other Europeans demanded. In 1932, the British Foreign 
Office reported that twenty-five German nationals were living in Afghanistan apart 
from the embassy staff. Ten individuals were teaching in the German School, ten 
worked for the Afghan government, and five were employed by private businesses.
This is significant because only seventy Europeans had lived in Afghanistan during 
Muhammad Nadir’s rule. As early as April 1933, the German ambassador claimed that 
there was not a single British or Soviet merchant or specialist in Afghanistan, and that 
German expertise was prevalent in education, construction, agriculture, and especially 
technical fields.39 While this statement was premature, it certainly pointed the way to 
future numbers, for nine years later, the German community in Afghanistan increased 
to between 250 and 300.40
After Muhammad Zahir Shah assumed the throne on 8 November 1933, and his 
uncles, especially Muhammad Hashim Khan, helped to govern the nation, German 
technicians and specialists arrived in increasing numbers.41 In 1937, they helped to 
found the Kabul Mechanical School. This institution trained industrial workers, and its 
equipment was a gift from Berlin.42 The next year, the director of the Skoda company 
in Kabul told the British that the German government gave the Afghans a trade credit of 
16 million Reichmarks, with a four per cent interest rate repayable over eight years.
38 Gregorian, 337.
39 Adamec 1974,219, PRO FO/371/17,198, no.283,402, and Gregorian, 337.
40 United States National Archives (hereafter: USNA), General Records of the Department of  
State, Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-44, Box 5814, 890H.00/197, Bert Fish (Cairo) to Secretary 
of State (Washington), “Notes on the Situation in Afghanistan,” 5 February 1941.
41 For example, the engineers in charge of irrigation and roads in the Eastern Province were both 
German in 1934. PRO FO/371/18,244, Diary no. 24 for week ending 15 June 1934, 309.
42 Gregorian, 254.
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Half of the credit was to be used for munitions, and the other half for heavy machinery 
and building equipment.43 These numbers may not be quite accurate as they were 
derived third or fourth hand; nonetheless, they clearly show the general spirit of 
economic cooperation between the two nations.
German specialists encountered many obstacles in Afghanistan, as explored in the 
previous chapter. These problems were similar to those the Soviet Union faced when 
conducting commercial negotiations with the Afghan government. British officials 
who interviewed one dissatisfied German engineer learned that:
though Germany was obtaining a large proportion of the trade with 
Afghanistan very small profits were being made as most of the German 
firms had been compelled to cut their prices to a minimum in order to 
obtain the orders.44
The engineer felt that the Afghan government would continue with this strategy until no 
longer viable and then start over again with another nation.45
Individuals may have become bitter, but making an economic profit was not 
Germany’s primary goal in Afghanistan. As Ludwig Adamec explains in his outline of 
Afghan history, Germany had a “distinctly political role” there, and it sought to gain 
influence in the country that effectively held the keys to India.46 Afghanistan received 
development assistance, and felt Germany’s strength could balance that of the Soviet 
Union and Great Britain; while Germany looked to Afghanistan as a base from which 
an attack could be mounted against Soviet Central Asia or British India 47 In the words 
of Milan Hauner, between the end of the First World War and the eve of the Second,
43 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Intelligence Summary for 1 April 1938,164.
44 IOL L/PS/12/1552, Extract from Kabul Military Attache’s Intelligence Summary, no. 49 for 3 
December 1937,267.
43 Ibid.
46 Adamec 1974, 234.
47 DGFP, Series D, vol.VIII Memorandum o f  the Aussenpolitisches Amt 18 December 1939, 550. 
(Hereafter DGFP)
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Germany went from being an “innocuous cultural presence” in Afghanistan to the
/ I Q
“most important contractor for military hardware.
Between 1933 and 1935, the relationship between Afghanistan and Germany 
cooled. This was less due to scepticism about the Third Reich, and more a matter of 
personal honour among Afghanistan’s rulers. In 1933, the Ambassador to Germany, 
Muhammad Aziz Khan, was a victim of a political assassination in Berlin, probably by 
a supporter of Amanullah.49 As he was the brother of Nadir Shah and Muhammad 
Hashim Khan, avenging his murder was considered more important than affairs of 
state. It was only after the assassin, Sayyid Kemal was executed in Berlin that relations 
between the two countries improved. After revenge, the needs of the military were 
addressed. In October 1935, negotiations over military assistance commenced.50
Economic policy was a different matter, and German expertise was embraced 
readily. Even in 1933, an article describing the formation of the Ashami Company 
stated that “[i]ts functions bear the imprint of expert German opinion [and it] closely 
follows the German model.”51 In 1934, Charles Gaire, the French Charge d’Affaires at 
the Kabul Legation, described the establishment of the Ashami Company as a 
monopoly that masqueraded as a joint-stock company. He said that ‘Abd al-Majid was 
entitled to 300,000 skins, the Minister of Commerce to 150,000, and the Minister of 
War to 50,000. Gaire explained that the Director of the National Bank wanted to fix 
karakul prices and shift the market from Peshawar to Kabul, without incorporating 
mitigating factors like the international depression, competitors, and the whims of 
women’s fashion. The effects of this policy were disastrous, and the price of karakul 
dropped dramatically. In passing, Gaire wrote that: “les Afghans, a Tinstar de HITLER, 
mettent sur le dos de la juiverie intemationale” (At the instigation of Hitler, the 
Afghans blamed international Jewry). He offers no further explanation of the link
48 Hauner, 72-3.
49 Adamec, 196.
50 Hauner, 75.
51 IOL L/PS/12/1552, “Central Bank in Afghanistan: Functions of a New Institution,” The 
Financial News, 30 August 1933,438.
52 Q d’O Asie 1918-1940, Afghanistan, sfrie 48, Charles Gaire (Kabul) to Foreign Ministry 
(Paris), 25 September 1934, 104.
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between Hitlerian anti-Semitism and the Ashami Company, but it is noticeable that this 
connection was described only a year after both projects commenced. In this way, 
Gaire corroborates the accusation of a Central Asian Jewish merchant in London, 
Mirzoeff who wrote to the Board of Deputies that: “Afghanistan wishes to use the 
methods of HITLERISM.”53
In July 1935, Muhammad Zahir Shah invited the cabinet, tribal chiefs, members 
of parliament, and ambassadors to decide the future course of Afghanistan’s foreign 
policy. There were four streams of political opinion: those who leaned towards 
Germany, Great Britain, or the Soviet Union, as well as those who preferred 
isolationism. However, the dominant group was led by Muhammad Zahir Shah, 
Muhammad Naim and Daud Khan, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan, with limited support from the 
Prime Minister, Muhammad Hashim Khan. It asked if “Germany was prepared to 
assume the sole responsibility for the modernization of Afghanistan.”54 Germany 
quickly agreed. According to a German diplomat Georg Ripken, the Afghans intended 
to:
set up a central planning agency to coordinate and supervise all Afghan 
development projects. The agency was to balance the national economy 
by controlling the volume of exports and imports, in addition to examining 
all projects to determine priority and feasibility.55
This agency’s goals sound identical to those of the Bank-i Milli. Not unsurprisingly, at 
this time the bank started to become more involved in the establishment of the internal 
economy of Afghanistan with sugar and textile factories.56
By October 1935, the talks between Germany and Afghanistan turned from 
economic to military matters as Afghan officials watched the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia with growing concern. The government of Afghanistan decided that it needed 
enough military materiel for a wartime division, and asked Germany for the equipment
53 BoD ACC 3121/E3/506/1, Mirzoeff to Zaiman, 11 October 1933.
54 Adamec 1974,219-220.
55 Ibid.
56 In the preface to his work, Maxwell Fry states that the Ashami Company was the forerunner to 
the National Bank.
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to build an ammunition factory, a loan of eighteen million marks, and an additional ten 
military advisors to join the two already based in Kabul. In return, Afghanistan agreed 
to purchase a set amount of military equipment each year, and a joint Afghan-German 
group would be given the concessions to exploit natural resources such as gold, nickel, 
copper, asbestos, and petrol.57
Despite these apprehensions, the Afghan leadership moved closer to Germany. In 
one communication with Berlin, the German ambassador Kurt Ziemke stressed that: 
“the German-Afghan economic and military programs had to be considered as one
CO
inseparable whole of a distinctly political character.” In the spring of 1936, soon after 
the outlines of Afghan-German cooperation were accepted, Foreign Minister Faiz 
Muhammad and ‘Abd al-Majid Khan left for Berlin to finalize the agreement. The 
Defense Minister, Shah Mahmud Khan, and Prime Minister Muhammad Hashim Khan 
also travelled to Germany for operations. While medically necessary for both men, 
these journeys had a clear political dimension. On 2 March 1936, Faiz Muhammad met 
Adolf Hitler who said that he hoped to strengthen the economic and military relations 
between Afghanistan and Germany. Hitler assured the foreign minister that Germany 
would be able to deliver the industrial and military goods that Afghanistan needed.59
Afghans were able to find a place for themselves within the framework of Nazi 
racism, which they would invoke as a way of identifying and connecting with 
Germany. For his part, Faiz Muhammad was reported to have said he hoped 
Afghanistan would receive help from Germany, a nation considered to be “‘an elder 
and more advanced Aryan brother.’”60 US officials stated that after 1937, Afghans 
started eschewing a previously claimed link with ancient Israel, and instead claimed 
that they were “pure Aryans.”61 Faiz Muhammad also met with Alfred Rosenberg, and
57 Adamec 1974,221-2.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid, 222-3.
60 Ibid, 223, citing Militaerangelegenheiten, Note by Dr. Schmidt, 2 March 1936.
61 USNA, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 84, Kabul General Records 
1947, box 11, no. 840.1, 16 April 1947.
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spoke mainly about purchasing thirty batteries of mountain artillery. Alfred
Rosenberg founded the Aussenpolitisches Amt (APA), or the Foreign Policy Office of 
the Nazi Party, in April 1933. Its goals were to fight ‘world Jewry’ and Bolshevism, 
and create nationalist movements to tear apart the Soviet Union.63 As such, the APA 
valued the geopolitical potential of Afghanistan more than the other offices of the Nazi 
state.
The French Ambassador to Berlin reported that when Faiz Muhammad Khan was 
interviewed by Deutsche Zeitung he said that the National Socialist government had 
helped the German people make enormous progress, and that he had not noticed any of 
the ‘repugnant’ facts that the foreign press denounced.64 By the autumn of 1936, 
several protocols were signed between Germany and Afghanistan. These provided for 
an educational exchange, flying instructors, the delivery of arms and weapons to 
Afghanistan, and a credit of fifteen million marks to be repaid partially in goods within 
seven years.65 Perhaps the most important element was an agreement with the 
Organisation Todt, signed on 18 October 1937. Hauner describes the Organisation 
Todt as “not merely a huge road construction firm, but also a vast Nazi institution in its 
own right which probably had no parallel in the world.”66
In the immediate pre-war period, German bids for Afghan contracts were 
significantly lower than other nations. For example, an offer of cotton spinning and 
weaving machinery was thirty to forty per cent lower. This was explained by the 
lighter construction, and smaller capacity of the machines, but also by government 
subsidy and political motives as Germany was determined to obtain these contracts as a 
way to extend its influence in Central Asia.67
62 Adamec 1974, 223.
63 Hauner, 53.
64 Q d’O, Asie 1918-1940, Afghanistan, vol.48, Andre Francois-Poncet (Berlin) to Pierre-Etienne 
Flandin, Foreign Minister (Paris), 14 March 1936, 167-9.
65 Adamec 1974, 224.
66 Hauner, 55.
67IOL R/12/21, Laurence Collier (Foreign Office, London) to F.H. Nixon (Export Credits 
Guarantee Department, London), 30 July 1937.
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The APA’s stated goal was to infiltrate the political and economic structure of 
Afghanistan so it would be easily controlled in the event of an invasion. In December 
1939, the head of Rosenberg’s staff, Amo Schickedans detailed the position of the APA 
in Afghanistan. He mentioned the visits of Muhammad Hashim Khan and other high 
officials to Berlin in 1936 and 1937, as a result of which “a number of basic treaties 
covering military, cultural, and economic matters” were concluded. Schickedans 
highlighted “German-Afghan collaboration,” stating that his department had drawn up
a comprehensive plan for all sectors of the Afghan state and arranged for the 
appointment of German experts to positions in the Afghan government 
service as an essential condition for the successful implementation of the 
plan. By means of such experienced German personnel a network of strong 
points was to be established in the vital positions providing Germany with 
the possibility of utilizing them in the event that Afghanistan should take 
military action with German aid.68
The position of an inspector-general was created to supervise the work of all German 
nationals. This man was to become an advisor to the Afghan government on 
construction and communication projects.69 Despite these efforts, Schickedans and 
others in the APA did not account for the Afghans’ distrust of too much foreign 
assistance. The Afghan government was able to subvert German plans for economic 
domination by limiting control over roads projects and by hiring men of different 
nationalities. Road building was undertaken by Polish employees, while architecture 
was left to the Swiss, and Japanese engineers were also hired.70 These employees were 
not supervised by the Organisation Todt’s chief engineer, but rather directly by the 
Afghan Minister of Public Works. The Todt Agreement was limited further in 
November 1938, to cover only the construction projects assigned to the Germans.71 In 
1941, just before all German citizens except the ten working in the legation were 
expelled from Afghanistan, a man the British described as a “doubtful Czech,” known 
only by his last name, Legat, gave a copy of the Todt Agreement of 1937 to the British.
68 DGFP, Series D, vol. VIII, Memorandum o f the Aussenpolitisches Amt, 18 December 1939,
550-1.
69 Adamec 1974, 224.
70 Hauner, 77.
71 Adamec 1974, 224.
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Legat explained that the Germans had been “double crossed by the Afghans” whereas 
the Afghan officials explained that their choices were made on the basis of “sheer 
merit.”72
Despite invoking the unity of the Aryan race, Germany provided incomplete 
equipment at excessive cost to the Afghan government, apparently showing to a more 
condescending attitude. In Schickedans’ 1939 memorandum, he explains that the Third 
Reich helped to train soldiers, modernize the Afghan army, and increase its potential by 
delivering equipment like: “antiaircraft guns, trench mortars and mountain artillery.” 
When this shipment arrived in July 1940, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan complained that the 
artillery was useless, as ammunition was not included.73 In fact, a man simply called 
“Atik” informed the British that Afghanistan had many difficulties receiving weapons 
from Nazi Germany. Atik accompanied Muhammad Hashim Khan on his trip to Berlin 
in 1936, and reported that after asking for weapons “Hitler immediately began to make 
difficulties.” They soon learned that Afghanistan was charged “exactly double” the 
prices that Turkey and Iran paid for arms, and had to wait almost two years for the 
shipments to begin while the other countries received them promptly. When some 
weapons arrived, they were “incomplete with the most ridiculous results at the Kabul 
end. Guns without breech blocks and so on.”74
Despite these various affronts, German officials continued to make overtures to 
Afghanistan. In August 1939, another agreement was signed which sought to expand 
trade between these two nations, as Germany increasingly valued Afghanistan’s raw 
materials, primarily cotton and wool. While this was potentially lucrative for 
Afghanistan, it still had to consider the inherent political risks. As Germany’s hostility 
to Great Britain and the Soviet Union increased, Afghanistan’s warm relationship could
72IOL R/12/123, 6 October 1941, 23-4.
73 Adamec 1974, 244.
74 IOL L/PS/12/1789, Francis Wylie (Kabul) to O.K. Caroe, Secretary to Government of India, 
External Affairs Department (New Delhi), 24 June 1943, 77-9.
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draw it into conflict with the Allied powers. The Afghan government deemed 
neutrality to be essential at all costs.76
The Nazi Party in Afghanistan
In 1932, Muhammad Hashim Khan became concerned over Hitler’s rise, and 
confided to Herbert Schworbel, the German Minister (1931 to 1933), that he felt this 
would end world peace. He was also alarmed by a Nazi club founded by German 
expatriates in Kabul, and felt it might be necessary to outlaw this organisation, as the 
members could become involved in espionage.77 By 1939, the Nazi party in Kabul 
probably only had eighteen active members. A Swiss informant to the British 
described a meeting that took place on 31 March, at which donations were collected. 
The president of the Kabul branch was an employee of Siemens, named Thomas (again, 
no first name is provided), who spoke about “the duty of every German to give his life 
if and when the Fuhrer demanded it and also that every true German should be grateful 
for what he had done in Czecho-Slovakia and Memel.” At the end of the meeting 
“much enthusiasm was shown, everyone giving the Nazi salute, save Locher who 
brushed a fly off his nose and Major Schenk - military instructor who had difficulty 
with his tie.”78 Later, Nazi party members in Afghanistan conducted mostly 
unsuccessful, independent espionage.
Gabriel Bonneau reported that the 250 to 300 Germans in Afghanistan were 
politically divided. Despite these splits, he told the Americans that a strong and 
successful NSDAP group in Kabul collected intelligence for Berlin. Nazi party 
members sought to act “as intermediaries between the German Legation and prominent 
Afghans, to prepare the way for possible uprisings at the propitious moment and to 
make pro-German propaganda in order to obtain the confidence and good will of the
75 Adamec 1974, 232, 238-9.
76 Ibid, 234, citing Deutsches Auswaertige Amt, Ha.-Pol. Wiehl, Afghanistan, vol. 1,
Aufzeichnung, Ripken, 7 Nov. 1939, W 3 88/39.
77 Ibid, 219.
78 IOL L/PS/12/1689, Extract from Intelligence Summary no. 13 for week ending 31 March 1939,
85.
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Afghans.”79 In 1936, Kurt Ziemke, the German Minister in Kabul, warned Fraser- 
Tytler about the activities of one of his countrymen, Captain Schmidt, who taught 
Afghan army officers and was described as “a fanatical follower of Hitler.”80 Ziemke 
was stationed in Kabul between 1933 and 1936, and must have been considerably 
alarmed by Schmidt’s behaviour to take the extraordinary step of informing the British 
(who then failed to act). Clearly, Ziemke was not a member of the Nazi Party, but he 
was replaced by Hans Pilger (1936 to 1945) who was.
It took another two years after Ziemke’s warning and departure for Fraser-Tytler 
to write openly of his concerns of wider German influence.81 He told the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs at the India Office that prior to this, between 1935 and 1938, 
he had written reports about the rapid rise in German economic activity. While Fraser- 
Tytler was suspicious that the Germans may have had extra-economic motives, he felt 
that he never had concrete evidence of political or military infiltration. By June 1938, 
however, he stated that “German influence has permeated the early stages of industrial 
development” and that there were approximately 100 Nazi party members throughout 
Afghanistan. He wrote that they were “in closer touch with the people than any other 
foreigners, living the life of the country, and no doubt spreading Nazi propaganda and 
pro-German ideas wherever possible.” He then listed the number of Germans living in 
Kabul, and their occupations. Out of eighty-three, twenty-four were engineers, and 
there were two police officers and two military instructors. Other professions 
represented were five professors, four mechanics, three nursing sisters, two master 
dyers, and a female teacher. Yet, perhaps the most interesting numbers are those linked 
to the Afghan civil service. One German was employed in the Purchase Department 
and another in the Finance Department, while there were four in the National Bank.
79 USNA, General Records o f the Department of State, Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-44, 
Box 5814, 890H.00/197, Bert Fish (Cairo) to Secretary of State (Washington) “Notes on the Situation in 
Afghanistan,” 5 February 1941. US archives provide further evidence of French suspicion. In December 
1940, Gabriel Bonneau resigned from his post under Vichy as chargd d’affaires in Kabul, and fled 
Afghanistan. He next emerged as a part o f the Free French forces in Cairo, and renewed his friendship 
with an American diplomat stationed there who debriefed him informally.
80 IOL L/PS/12/1689, Extract from Annual Report on Afghanistan, 1936, 174.
81 IOL L/PS/12/1689, Fraser-Tytler (Kabul) to Viscount Halifax (London), 16 November 1938,
94.
82 IOL L/PS/12/1689, Fraser-Tytler (Kabul) to Viscount Halifax (London), 28 June 1938, 134-5.
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In August 1940, the American consul in Karachi noted a strong German presence in 
Afghanistan, especially in the Ministry of Commerce and the Afghan National Bank: 
“The latter institution has taken in many Germans as clerks since the outbreak of the 
war.”83
The evidence makes it clear that not all Germans in Afghanistan were Nazi 
agents, and numbers of party members may have only reached one-fifth of those in 
Kabul. In 1943, members of the Turkish military mission visited the British Legation 
and explained that most of the Afghan officers who hoped that Germany would win the 
war were those with personal connections. Some may have attended the German 
school in Kabul, visited Germany, or “come into contact with German employees of the 
Afghan Government or Afghans who are pro-German.”84 The connection to 
government employees is surprising. As reported by Fraser-Tytler, most Germans 
worked under ‘Abd al-Majid Khan, or in another economic sphere. In 1936, 
Muhammad Hashim Khan asked for twelve more Germany army advisors, but he had
Of
to turn to Turkey instead, because of Soviet concerns.
Nazi Influenced Anti-Semitism
Perhaps the most contentious claim within the study of the Jews of Afghanistan is 
the allegation of Nazi influence and Nazi-inspired prejudice. Israeli scholarship makes 
strong statements against the Afghan government under Muhammad Hashim Khan. 
While this author found that individual Afghans may have used Nazi ideology to justify 
oppression of the Jewish community, actions taken against Jews through the instigation 
of Germans are very rare in the archival record available. High Afghan officials were 
more likely to follow a syncretic approach to Nazi-inspired anti-Semitism. Some
83 USNA General Records o f the Department o f State, Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-4, 
box 5814, 890H.00/193, C.E. Macy (Karachi) to Secretary o f State (Washington) 7 August 1940, 
“Afghan Notes.”
84 IOL L/PS/12/1560, Afghanistan: Turkey and Turkish Military Mission. Military Attach^, British 
Legation (Kabul) to Chief of the General Staff, General Headquarters (New Delhi), 26 March 1943, 12.
85 IOL L/PS/12/1689, Extract from Kabul dispatch, no. 12, 5 February 1937, 166.
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elements, like economic restrictions were embraced, while the worst excesses were 
rejected resoundingly.
In the historiography of this Jewish community, it is generally argued that there 
was Nazi influence in Afghanistan during the time of the Third Reich. In his book Mi- 
Nidhei Yisrael b 'Afghanistan I ’Anusei Mashhad b ’Iran (From the Lost Tribes in 
Afghanistan to the Mashhad Jewish Converts o f Iran) Ben-Zion Yehoshua devotes 
several chapters to the Nazi link with Afghanistan.86 Among these, is one on Jews 
from Afghanistan in Nazi-occupied Europe, and another on Ashkenazi Jewish refugees 
in Afghanistan. The most historiographically important chapter is entitled: “Germans, 
Nazis and Hatred of Israel.” It uses many of the same German and Jewish sources 
consulted for this study. Much of the chapter reprints original documents, and 
translates them into Hebrew. For example, Yehoshua provides primary source material 
on German military assistance to Afghanistan in 1939, claiming that this is proof of 
Nazi influence in Afghanistan. As the present chapter shows, Yehoshua’s approach 
serves to oversimplify the complexities of the relationship between Germany and 
Afghanistan, and the Nazi influence on Afghan policy. In spite of the high levels of 
persecution in the 1930s and 1940s, the Jewish community of Afghanistan was not 
targeted for extermination. Also, confiscated German documents of the period do not 
contain a single mention of the Jewish community in Afghanistan. Despite these 
incongruities, in order to understand the situation of the Jews in World War II and the 
links to economic anti-Semitism, the influence of Nazi Germany in Afghanistan must 
be examined.
Some of Yehoshua’s later claims are also highly problematic. He says that 1,000 
youths were educated with a Nazi orientation in a country that was ninety per cent 
illiterate. Thus, if Afghanistan had succeeded in obtaining an outlet to the sea, its
QQ
Jewish community would have been the first one to be destroyed. One only needs to 
examine the condition of the Jewish communities in Iran and Iraq during the early years
86 Yehoshua 1992, 189-230.
87 Ibid, 195-6.
88 Ibid, 238.
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of World War II in order to refute Yehoshua’s statement.89 Located on the Persian 
Gulf, both countries faced far more Nazi influence and agitation. While suffering 
persecution, these Jewish communities survived the war years relatively intact. Even 
Iranian officials argued that Iranian Jews should be treated as Aryans in Germany.90 
The same is simply not true for European Jewry.
Other Israeli scholars do not make as extreme judgments as Yehoshua. Itzhak 
BezaleTs description is more typical of the references commonly found. He writes that 
in 1933 “Afghanistan signed a secret pact with Germany that allowed Nazi agents to 
operate within its territory. Under their influence -  and that of other factors as well -  
the Jews were expelled from all provincial towns.” Bezalel explains that the Allied 
invasion of Iran in 1941 “ended Nazi influence in Afghanistan but brought no relief to 
the Jews there.”91 Another scholar, Reuven Kashani writes in a similar tone about 
1933:
The tide of anti-Semitism began to overflow on to Afghanistan with the 
penetration of Nazi agents in the years of World War II. With their 
influence, and as an effect of the systematic incitement administered by 
these agents, Jews were kept away from border areas, dispossessed from 
key positions in foreign trade, and forbidden from wholesale trade inside
i 92the country.
Events before and during World War II are not well differentiated in this passage, and 
in a sense it is assumed that the audience will somehow grasp the effects of Nazism in 
Afghanistan. This passage is typical of Israeli sources, as Nazi influence is mentioned 
in passing, but is not treated in detail. Yet, the closer this influence and its potential is 
examined, the harder it is to categorize.
It is difficult to find a direct link between Jewish oppression and Nazi influence in 
Afghanistan. While this thesis is devoted to carefully examining the multi-faceted
89 See for example, S. Djalal Madani, Iranische Politik und Drittes Reich (Frankfurt am Main: 
Verlag Peter Lang, 1986), 32-43; Ahmad Mahrad, Die Wirtschafts und Handelsbeziehungen zwischen 
Iran und dem nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Reich (Anzali: Gilan, 1979); or Amnon Netzer “Ha- 
Antishemiout be-Iran: 1925-1950,” P e ’amim 29 (1986): 5-31.
90 Madani, 37.
91 Bezalel in Bar’am-Ben Yossef, 21.
92 Kashani 1975,34.
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discrimination that Jews in Afghanistan faced, including expulsion from the north and 
draconian economic restrictions, it does not mean that Nazis directed all facets of 
Afghan prejudice. Nazi influence in Afghanistan had a relatively loose structure. 
Statements about the Zeitgeist are more common. For example, an American official 
wrote that until: “1937 the Afghans called themselves descendants of Jvy [sic] second 
son of the Jewish king Saul, but under the influence of Nazi-propaganda started 
proving, that they are pure Aryans.” Nazi activity within Afghanistan pales in 
comparison to that within Iran, where a periodical entitled Iran-e Bastan was published 
through the offices of Goebbles’ Ministry of Propaganda.94 Many contradictory foci 
can be included in claims of Nazi influence in Afghanistan. German officers trained 
the army and police forces in the latest methods available, however, one was an ardent 
supporter of the Third Reich, while the other, Major Walter Schenk was shunned for 
being half-Jewish. He was not particularly likely to spread racial hatred among Afghan 
officers.95 In fact, Schenk may have passed on intelligence information to the British. 
There was a small amount of German propaganda in Afghanistan, but it does not appear 
to have been focused on anti-Semitic rhetoric, rather it was directed against Britain.
The Germans were more effective at circulating rumours through the bazaars, and 
showing propaganda films to the general population. The films were entitled: “The 
Campaign in Poland” or “Victory in the West” and were shown even outside of Kabul, 
at one instance in the textile mills of Pul-i Khomri.96
One can find circumstantial evidence for almost any theory regarding the degree 
of German influence within Afghanistan during WWII. There were no massacres of 
Jews in Afghanistan, state-sponsored riots, or even luridly anti-Semitic publications. In 
fact, at least one Afghan diplomat in France was also willing to protect Afghan Jews in 
France, though Georgian emigre leaders stepped in first. In his personal account, Asaf 
Atchildi, who helped to coordinate this rescue attempt, wrote: “I owe this man [the
93 USNA, General Records o f the Department of State, Record Group 84, Kabul General Records, 
1947, box 11, 840.1, 16 April 1947.
94 Rezun, 319.
95 IOL L/PS/12/1689, Extract from Annual Report on Afghanistan 1936,174; and Hauner 1981,
231.
96 IOL L/PS/12/335; and Hauner 1981, 227 and note 62.
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chief counselor of the Afghan embassy], whom I do not wish and am not permitted to 
name, admiration and gratitude, although he never had the opportunity to testify on our
Q7behalf: but his intention was humane and courageous.”
Still, the connection between attempts at a totalitarian control of the economy 
coupled with violent measures to keep Jews away from lucrative trade is too difficult to 
ignore. Even British sources note a link. In 1944, they wrote that: “A bad period 
began” in 1934, when ‘Abd al-Majid Khan was “anxious to secure” a monopoly in the 
karakul fur trade. In order to achieve these aims, he played “on racial theories of Nazi
Oftextraction.” Measures against the Jews commenced soon after 4 Abd al-Majid Khan 
arrived home from Europe in 1933, and continued while he was in Europe between 
1936-38. However, wealthier Jews may have found some respite, and were able to 
continue trading illegally, as the acting manager, Dost Muhammad, and other 
employees of the National Bank were amenable to bribery." In July 1942, Muhammad 
Naim Khan spoke to the German and Italian representatives, Pilger and Quaroni, and 
told them that Afghanistan was now willing to provide intelligence about the Soviet 
Union and India. However, the Axis ministers did not believe Muhammad Naim Khan 
and thought that it was a trap. Another example of a pro-Axis official may have been 
‘Abd al-Rahim Khan, a Secretary of State in the Ministry of Public Works, where 
“German experts had previously held great influence prior to their expulsion.”100 
However, no further information is available about this man.
Nazi influence may have been strong in some fields, particularly the economic 
sector, however large gaps mar the archival record. While this author examined 
archives in the UK, France, Israel, the US, and even published German sources, most 
German and Vichy diplomatic files were burned in Kabul between 1941 and 1944.
97 Asaf Atchildi, “Rescue of Jews of Bukharan, Iranian and Afghan Origin in Occupied France 
(1940-1944)” in Yad Vashem Studies VI:(1967): 258-9. Islambek Khoudoidar Khan was the charge 
d’affaires o f the Afghan Legation in Vichy, Shah Wali Khan the ambassador, while Ghulam Ali Khan 
and Muhammad Ali Khan were also staff members. Qd’O, Guerre 1939-45, Vichy, Asie, Serie E, file 65, 
15.
98 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Note on the Jews of Afghanistan, 29 December 1944,45.
99 IOL L/PS/12/1727, Fraser-Tytler (Kabul) to Viscount Halifax (London), 2 June 1938, 11.
100 Hauner, 512 and 516.
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Russian sources (while partially available) were not consulted for this study, due to the 
logistical difficulties of archival research in the former Soviet Union as well as the 
author’s insufficient Russian language skills. However, the most glaring omission is 
the complete lack of access to twentieth-century Afghan documents. At the time of 
writing, it is not clear what documentation still exists or when Western scholars might 
gain access.
It is this author’s opinion that Nazi influence was mostly indirect in Afghanistan. 
Individual Afghans, especially those in positions of authority were able to use Nazi- 
inspired anti-Semitism against Jews in their own peculiar manner. Restrictions in the 
economic sector point to the strongest link to the Third Reich, though the extent of 
German (let alone Germans who followed Nazi ideology) participation in the Ministry 
of National Economy has not been fully documented. Occasionally, economic 
restrictions were mitigated through bribery and joint Muslim-Jewish ventures (where a 
Muslim man acted on behalf of his Jewish partner). Other forms of discrimination, like 
riots, mass arrests, and forcible conversion have far older roots in the Muslim world.
By far the most prominent example of pro-Nazi sentiment within the archival record 
available is ‘Abd al-Majid Khan and other officials within the Ministry of National 
Economy and the Bank-i Milli.101 There may have been others with a similar 
perspective, especially in the police and army, yet economic examples are the most 
documented in Western sources.
‘ Abd al-Majid Khan: Primary Negotiator with the Third Reich
Among Afghan officials, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan was at the centre of overtures 
towards the Third Reich. He was the most forceful impetus behind the monopolisation 
system, and his economic policies did the most to hurt the Jewish community. “Abd al- 
Majid was a Pashtun from Herat, and had no possibility of accruing a tribal following. 
Perhaps as a matter of compensation, he tried to gain power through economic policy,
101 USNA General Records of the Department o f State, Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-4, 
box 5814, 890H.O0/193, C.E. Macy (Karachi) to Secretary o f State (Washington) 7 August 1940, 
“Afghan Notes.”
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and by invoking the idea of who was a “legitimate” Afghan national. ‘Abd al-Majid 
Khan was bom around 1902, and started working in the Herati customs office as an 
adolescent. As discussed in chapter 3, ‘Abd al-Majid established a joint-stock company 
to trade with the Soviet Union in the 1920s. The biography compiled by the British 
Legation says that he became wealthy “exporting and importing contraband with the
i m • •connivance of the customs officials.” When Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Faiz 
Muhammad reported that ‘Abd al-Majid left the Soviet Union “after loosing a great
1 0 3deal of money, and being very unfairly treated by the Soviet authorities.” This 
appears to have left him bitter, though well educated in early Soviet economic and 
political practices. In the early 1930s, he divided his time between Berlin and Kabul. 
When Nadir Shah rose to power, ‘Abd al-Majid returned to Afghanistan, and 
established the Shirkat Ashami in 1930, and the Bank-i Milli in 1932. In 1933, ‘Abd 
al-Majid moved his family back to Kabul to head the National Bank after Muhammad 
Aziz Khan’s assination in 1933.104 Exposure to the waning days of the Weimar 
Republic and the rise of the Third Reich appear to have influenced his thinking. He 
seems to have found elements of fascism appealing, especially in relation to the 
economy.
In 1936, ‘Abd al-Majid travelled to Europe to arrange trade credits and contacts.
On the eve of ‘Abd al-Majid’s visit to London, the Foreign Office explained his
position to the British Government’s Hospitality Fund:
while not holding any official position in the Afghan Government, [... he] 
controls all the Government’s economic and financial activities, 
subordinate only to the Prime Minister himself; and the National Bank and 
State Trading Company, with the Companies connected with them, hold 
the monopoly over practically the whole internal and external trade of 
Afghanistan.105
102IOL L/PS/12/1562, Leading Personalities of Afghanistan, 1948, 3.
103 PRO FO 371 17,198, Letter from Maconachie (Kabul) to John Simon (London) on 31 August 
1933, reporting interview with Faiz Muhammad on 24 August 1933, 371.
104 Fry, 82-3.
105 IOL L/PS/12/1727, Laurence Collier to the Secretary o f the Government Hospitality Fund, 2 
October 1936, 128. The US consul in Karachi also noted that Muhammad Hashim Khan had a close 
business relationship with ‘Abd al-Majid and it was through his influence that he had been included in 
the cabinet where “his business acumen and organizing ability would be an asset to the Government.” 
USNA General Records o f the Department of State, RG 59, Decimal File 1940-4, box 5814, 
890H.00/193, C.E. Macy (Karachi) to Secretary of State (Washington), 7 August 1940, “Afghan Notes.”
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In many ways, this fits the description of an economic eminence grise. While visiting 
Europe, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan attended the Nazi party congress in 1937. By March 
1938, ‘Abd al-Majid returned to Kabul, and he was appointed Minister of Trade six 
months later. In April 1939, his title changed to Minister for National Economy.106 
This title shift may indicate that ‘Abd al-Majid Khan wished to emulate Dr. Hjalmar
1 07Schacht, president of the Reichsbank and German Minister for National Economy.
In December 1939, an internal APA memorandum discussed the potential of an
operation against India. It noted that “personal contacts with the Afghan Government
gained by years of work, as well as the strong German colony which is active in all
spheres of military, economic and cultural life” could be used against the British in
India. ‘Abd al-Majid Khan’s influence was viewed as critical. He was thought to be
“absolutely the most powerful person in the Afghan Government, and one could rely
fully and completely on his efforts to expand steadily political cooperation with 
1 08Germany.” A week later, the head of Rosenberg’s staff, Amo Schickedans, 
expounded on the value of ‘Abd al-Majid Khan, saying: “He assumed a very great 
personal risk in order to put through the pro-German policy in the past few years, but 
always lived up to his promises.” Schickedans continued: “actual developments are 
proof that his confidential information on the weak and strong points of the Afghan 
Government was correct.” According to his analysis, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan did not 
change direction after the beginning of the war, but sent “urgent telegrams ... 
requesting more German experts for the government service.” The author of this 
memorandum felt that “German influence in the Afghan Government has doubtlessly 
greatly increased. The Germans are very popular everywhere in the country.”109
106 IOL L/PS/12/1562, Leading Personalities in Afghanistan 1948,3.
107 Weiner Library, PC 4 34 B, Microfilm roll 92, “German Policy,” in Daily Mail 28 August 
1934, and “Gangster Finance,” editorial in Financial News 28 August 1934; Hjalmar Schacht, Account 
Settled, trans. by Edward Fitzgerald (London: Weidenfeld &Nicolson, 1949).
108 DGFP, series D (1937 -  1945) vol. VIII The War Years (September 4, 1939 -  March 18, 
1940), no. 449,528. Memorandum o f the Aussenpolitisches Amt, Berlin 12 December 1939, Operation 
against India.
109 Ibid, No. 470,551-2. Memorandum of the Aussenpolitisches Amt, Berlin 18 December 1939, 
Afghanistan -  The Objectives of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.
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In June 1940, soon after the defeat of France, the German Minister to Kabul,
Hans Pilger reported to the Secretary of State at the Foreign Ministry, Ernst 
Weizsacker, that ‘Abd al-Majid Khan was making various secret overtures to him. He 
claimed that Afghanistan was “ready to mobilize all opportunities arising among 
sentimental and religious ties, and especially to induce frontier tribes and the Afghan 
population in India to take action against the English.” Pilger speculated that while 
‘Abd al-Majid Khan asked for confidentiality, some Afghan officials had to be aware of 
his negotiations. This is evident as ‘Abd al-Majid Khan asked for Afghanistan’s 
borders to be respected by the Soviet Union, while from the Germans he demanded 
military hardware including tanks and planes, and expected a seaport if they were to 
invade India.110
In January 1941, Abdul Majid left Kabul to seek medical treatment. His original
intention had been to travel to the United States.111 Instead, he changed direction and
travelled to Germany. Adding levels of irony, British policies directly influenced his
choice. The Minister of National Economy’s personal physician, a German Jewish
refugee, George Perlmann diagnosed him as severely ill, and ‘Abd al-Majid Khan
11wanted to be treated in the United States, as his family was already there. Yet, he 
wanted his physician to accompany him on the journey as well. ‘Abd al-Majid Khan
110 Ibid, volume X, The War Years June 23 -  August 31, 1940, no. 30, 29. Telegram from Minister 
in Afghanistan to the Foreign Ministry, Kabul 27 June 1940. Weizsacker noted that “Afghan revisionist 
wishes are directed towards the British possessions” and not the Soviet Union. (Vol. XII, 283. The War 
Years, 1 February to 22 June 1941, no. 158, Memorandum by the State Secretary, Berlin, 12 March 
1941.)
111 IOL L/PS/12/1562, Leading Personalities in Afghanistan 1948, 3.
112 There were other Ashkenazim in Afghanistan during World War II. Walter Kychenthal spent 
13 years in Turkey, before being hired by the Ministry of National Economy in 1940. The English were 
worried that he was a Nazi spy. Kychenthal was friendly with other two German Jews, Dr. Turk who 
also arrived in 1940, and helped to organize Afghanistan’s traffic laws, and Frau Bromberg. (IOL 
L/PS/12/765, Second Secretary, British Legation (Kabul) to Assistant Director, Intelligence Bureau 
(New Delhi), 24 October 1942, and L/PS/456.) US sources note five refugees from the Baltic States who 
were imprisoned until the British granted them visas to Palestine. (USNA, Record Group 84 Kabul -  
General Records, 16 April 1947, 840.1) Also there were a handful o f Czech employees o f Skoda, whom 
the Germans tried to have deported. It is not know what happened to them, though this author feels that 
they may have remained in Afghanistan as the head of Skoda, L.M. Moghadam enjoyed a close 
relationship with the British Legation. (IOL L/PS/12/1791, Squire (Kabul) to Weightman (New Delhi),
23 August 1946, 17.)
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applied for a transit visa through India on behalf of Perlmann, though the Government 
of India refused to grant the doctor permission as he was an enemy national. Fraser- 
Tytler was furious and wrote that Perlmann was “bitterly anti-Nazi” and there was not 
the “slightest risk of his engaging in any form of subversive activity while in India.”113 
As a result of this decision, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan decided to return to Europe where he 
was familiar with the medical system. He may have chosen to receive medical care in 
Germany for a different reason, as US State Department records state that he was 
required to have either his wife or son return to Afghanistan as a ‘hostage’ to the 
government of Afghanistan, to ensure that the Minister of National Economy would 
also return from America.114 While ‘Abd al-Majid Khan may have initially envisioned 
a shorter visit, he only returned to Afghanistan in 1946.
As a result of ‘Abd al-Majid Khan’s extended convalescence, he had many 
opportunities to meet with Alfred Rosenberg and his staff while still Minister of 
National Economy.115 Almost all of the confiscated German files about Afghanistan 
centre on negotiations with ‘Abd al-Majid Khan in Kabul and Berlin. As previously 
mentioned, there is not a single reference to Jews in the published documents. Mostly 
‘Abd al-Majid asked about the possibility of fulfilling Afghanistan’s irredentist dreams, 
as well as German assurances in the case of a Soviet invasion. By March 1941,
Freiherr von Weizsacker, the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry became aware that 
‘Abd al-Majid was not authorized to negotiate officially on behalf of the Afghan 
government. ‘Abd al-Majid Khan countered that he would get permission i f  the 
discussions were encouraging.116 Six months later, there were hints that ‘Abd al-Majid 
Khan was considering leaving the Afghan government.117 Nazi officials were aware
113 IOL L/PS/12/45, the entire file deals with ‘Abd al-Majid Khan; see particularly: notes from 
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 16 June 1941, and demi-official letter from W. K. Fraser- 
Tytler (Kabul) to O. K. Caroe (New Delhi), 31 January 1941.
114 USNA, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-44, 
Box 5814, 890H.00/197, 4. Bert Fish (Cairo) to Secretary of State (Washington), “Notes on the Situation 
in Afghanistan,” 5 February 1941.
115 Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter: CDJC), CXLVI-21, Aktennotiz 
Besuch des Afghanishen Wirtschaftsministers, A. Rosenberg, 1 March 1941.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid, vol. XIII The War Years (23 June to 11 December 1941), no. 289,464. Telegram, 
Minister in Kabul to the Foreign Ministry, 8 September 1941.
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that the overtures which ‘Abd al-Majid Khan made in Berlin were beyond the 
instructions of the Afghan government.118 After a certain point, he was a free agent who 
sought personal gain. This is what the party officials found most appealing.
‘Abd al-Majid Khan did not return to Afghanistan during the war years, though he 
continued to apply for visas to the United States. All applications were rejected. The 
British Embassy in Washington D.C. reported to London that the Americans had been 
told by the former French Charge d’Affaires in Kabul, Gabriel Bonneau (currently with 
the Free French forces in Cairo) that ‘Abd al-Majid Khan was pro-German.119 The 
British reported that the State Department did not seem to mind offending the Afghans,
190and “their view is that the refusal of a visa might have a salutary effect.” The funds
of ‘Abd al-Majid Khan’s wife, Emilie were confiscated in Bermuda as she travelled
1^1
from New York to join him in Germany before his surgery. In 1943, Muhammad 
Hashim Khan ordered him home, and then cut off his salary. ‘Abd al-Majid Khan spent 
the remaining years of the war in Germany or Switzerland, complaining of various
199maladies whether real or invoked. His loyalty to the Afghan government became 
increasingly tenuous, and he appears to have lost a considerable amount of his 
influence over economic policy for the next two years. However, by the end of the war, 
‘Abd al-Majid reconciled with the Afghan government. In February 1946, he returned 
to his old position.
Only four years later, in 1950, ‘Abd al-Majid was fired as Minister of National 
Economy. This was partially because of using excessive foreign exchange for the
118 DGFP, series D (1937-1945) vol. XII The War Years (1 February to 22 June 1941), no. 158, 
283. Memorandum by the State Secretary, Berlin, 12 March 1941.
119 USNA, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-44, 
Box 5814, 890H.00/197, Bert Fish (Cairo) to Secretary o f State (Washington) “Notes on the Situation in 
Afghanistan,” 5 February 1941.
120 IOL L/PS/12/455, telegram from Washington to the Foreign Office (London), 11 June 1941.
121 IOL L/PS/12/455, travellers Censorship, Bermuda Airbase, Censorship Report no. 88, report on 
the Eastbound ‘Yankee’ Clipper, 20 May 1941. Emilie was a member o f the German ethnicity resident 
in the Soviet Union, and Prof. Adamec believes that she may have been Jewish. Indeed, every possible 
permutation of Emilie’s heritage has been offered as proof o f her husband’s policies and prejudices. (See 
Hauner 1981, 87.)
122 Hauner 1981, 325, note 88.
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Helmand project to dam the Arghandab River. The economist Maxwell Franck
argues that even after Muhammad Hashim Khan stepped down as Prime Minister, the
Bank-i Milli was able to obtain special privileges. However, the
underlying economic rivalry between the Banke Millie group and the 
government (which had political overtones because of the absence of tribal 
and dynastic ties within Abdul Majid’s industial-mercantile group) broke 
out into the open when he left the Cabinet in 1950 over a controversial 
exchange allocation.124
By 1953, a new economic policy characterised by the government taking stricter 
control of businesses commenced under Muhammad Daud Khan. ‘Abd al-Majid
196spent the next half of his life in America and died in Boston in 1998.
Link between anti-Communism and anti-Semitism in Afghan Policy
‘Abd al-Majid Khan moulded many of the policies of the Ashami Company, 
National Bank, and Ministry of National Economy in response to his great fear of the 
USSR. He felt that the greatest danger to Afghanistan came from the north, as Great 
Britain was no longer seeking to expand her empire, while the Soviet Union had 
absorbed the Czarist Russian desire for more territory. He did not feel that Afghanistan 
was under immediate threat, but that the USSR would take advantage of “defenseless 
and resourceless” areas like Outer Mongolia or Chinese Turkistan (Xinjiang).127 ‘Abd 
al-Majid Khan believed that all Jews in Afghanistan were potential Soviet agents, and 
used this fear to justify severe policies.
British sources also demonstrate that anti-Semitic policies may have been a by­
product of ‘Abd al-Majid’s fear of the Soviet Union. In 1935, the Minister to
123 Fry, 200-1.
124 Peter Franck, “Economic Progress in an Encircled Land,” in Middle East Journal 10:1 (Winter 
1956), 47-8. Spelling remains as in the original.
125 Ibid, 47-9.
126 Personal communication with Professor Ludwig and Mrs. Rahella Adamec, Tucson, Arizona, 
March 1999. Although the British recorded that ‘Abd al-Majid Khan was bom in 1902, the Adamecs said 
that he died at age 102. Clearly, there is some discrepancy, though he was a very old man.
127 IOL L/PS/12/1727, L. Collier, Foreign Office (London) to W. K. Fraser-Tytler (Kabul), 27 
November 1937, 32-34.
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Afghanistan, Richard Maconachie warned British firms hoping to do business with the
Ashami Company, that “in personal dealings Afghans prefer blonds, prejudice against
Russians and Jews being fixed.”128 The British also hypothesized that Afghan
governmental officials might “admire a fellow autocracy ... and be drawn towards
• 1 ■}<)
Germany by a common hatred of communism, Jews and the Soviet Union.” In 
Januaiy 1935, Maconachie had an interview with the Prime Minister and several other 
cabinet members, though for the most part, it was ‘Abd al-Majid who spoke. ‘Abd al- 
Majid complained about the success of a boycott of Ashami’s karakul skins in London, 
as only 20,000 of 300,000 (or approximately six per cent) had been sold. He felt that 
London merchants had been “deluded” by Jews, and consequently, the Soviet Union 
benefited from Ashami’s losses.
‘Abd al-Majid connected Jewish commercial behaviours with Stalin’s economic
policies. Like British officials, he firmly believed that most Jewish refugees were
Soviet spies. According to Maconachie, he explained that Afghan goods could not be
sold: “owing to the Jewish propaganda in London, which was of course being
supported by the Soviet Trade Agency whose purposes it so admirably served.”130
‘Abd al-Majid was involved mostly in restricting Jewish economic activity and
settlement in the northern tier of the country. Other policies such as being forbidden to
communicate with the outside world, attend state schools, or being employed by the
1
government originated in the political sector. He was aware that Jewish dealers in 
London were boycotting the shirkats because both the fur traders themselves and the 
entire local Jewish population were forbidden from entering the northern provinces. 
The Afghan leadership felt that “every single Russian ... was an official agent” rather 
than a trader.132 This is ironic, as the previous chapter discusses, most karakul sheep 
arrived in Afghanistan with refugees from the USSR.133
128 IOL L/PS/12/1689, telegram Maconachie (Kabul) to Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs, 
India Office (London) 26 January 1935, 262.
129 IOL L/PS/12/1689, secret note by B.A.A. Burrows, 18 December 1936, 196.
130 IOL L/PS/12/1688, Maconachie (Kabul) to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Department 
of Overseas Trade (London), 30 January 1935,122-23.
131 USNA, Record Group 84, Kabul, 16 April 1947, 840.1.
132 IOL L/PS/12/1688, Maconachie (Kabul) to H.A.F. Metcalfe, Foreign Secretary in the Foreign 
and Political Department (New Delhi), 8 February 1935, Extract from note on interview with Prime
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III
| As described formerly, French, American and Jewish sources all comment on the
| influence of German employees at the Bank-i Milli, Ashami Company, and the
| Ministry of National Economy. French archives also contain the first observation from
! a non-Jewish perspective of the link between Afghan anti-Semitism and Nazism. This
I connection grew stronger as the war intensified. Three months before the French
I Republic fell, Gabriel Bonneau, the Charge d’Affaires in Kabul, analysed German
| influence in the Afghan National Bank. He wrote that ‘Abd al-Majid was a great
|
admirer of Germany who helped to enact measures to control the exchange rate and 
foreign commerce through monopolisation, which would force “the Afghan economy to 
change in an autocratic and totalitarian direction.” In his analysis,
The similarity of Afghan and German commercial methods adds to the 
considerable credits given to Afghanistan by our enemies, and also helped 
to assist the development of German commerce in the past few years. The 
National Bank, where one only finds foreign experts who are German, 
revels in having not only German tendencies and preferences, but also by 
applying these politics to the whole country. This is the most important 
factor that caused Germany to conquer Afghanistan’s economy. 4
From this contemporary description and the other available evidence, it would appear 
that the link between Afghan anti-Semitism and Nazi influence in Afghanistan was 
predominantly felt within the economic sector, especially in organisations run by ‘Abd 
al-Majid Khan. ‘Abd al-Majid Khan is the personification of an opportunistic link 
between the Afghan economy and Nazi anti-Semitism. Just as in the Third Reich, the 
expression of his anti-Semitism was coupled with a fear of the Soviet Union. But in 
other respects, his prejudice was different, and more obviously a direct result of the 
desire for pecuniary gain. It is important to note that this anti-Semiitsm was based on
Minister, Foreign Minister, Minister o f Commerce, and Abdul Majid Khan, Managing Director of 
Ashami Company, 22 January 1935.
133 Q d’O Asie 1918-1940, Afghanistan, s6rie 48, Charles Gaire (Kabul) to Foreign Ministry 
(Paris), 25 September 1934, 103. After the fall o f the Emirate o f Bukhara, both Turkmen shepherds and 
Bukharan Jewish merchants fled to Afghanistan, bringing specialised knowledge, which enabled karakul 
fur to become Afghanistan’s most valuable export.
134 Qd’O, Asie 1918-1940, Afghanistan, serie 48, 308-9. Bonneau (Kabul) to Foreign Ministry 
(Paris), 16 February 1940. (Translated by author.)
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the economic role of Jews in Afghanistan, for there is never any mention of slaughter. 
‘Abd al-Majid Khan’s policies did not extend far beyond the limits of commerce, 
though these restrictions brought terrible privation, and an internal refugee crisis, both 
of which caused unnecessary suffering and death.
Replacing German Specialists with Jews: First Contact between Afghanistan and 
the Yishuv
The Afghan government showed differing tendencies towards Jews. In 1943, a 
dramatic shift occurred at the impetus of the Jewish Agency. (This also happened in 
the late 1940s, when Israeli diplomats interceded with Afghan officials at the UN. In 
both situations, personal, friendly contact at the highest level was vital in bringing 
about an amelioration of the condition of the Jews.) Two years after Great Britain and 
the Soviet Union insisted on the expulsion of Axis nationals from Afghanistan, in 
conjunction with the Jewish Agency, the Ambassador to Turkey asked for German­
speaking Jews residing in Turkey to replace these specialists. In January 1943, Faiz 
Muhammad met Charles (Chaim) Barlas, the representative of the Jewish Agency in 
Istanbul at a party in Ankara. Barlas and the host of the gathering, Professor Y. 
Eckstein, worked in concert to convince Faiz Muhammad that Jewish refugees could 
replace the expelled Axis nationals.135 Two months later, Faiz Muhammad received 
permission from Kabul, and wrote to Barlas saying that following orders he received, 
his government has decided to hire fifty-two specialists of “your co-religionists.”
This appears to have marked a dramatic shift from previous policies. After a push from 
the Jewish Agency, the Afghan government may have realised that they could obtain as 
many individuals as they desired with German technical and linguistic skills, at a lower 
salary than other Westerners demanded, while still complying with the Allies’ 
demands. Ben-Zion Yehoshua argues that Barlas was a visionary, and if his proposal 
of Jewish experts for the Afghan Government had been successful, it would have
135 Yehoshua 1992, 214-5.
136 CZA, LI5/90, Faiz Muhammad (Ankara) to Charles Barlas (Istanbul), 9 March 1943.
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created a window of opportunity for some fleeing the Holocaust, as well as creating
•  1 ^ 7unprecedented co-operation between the Yishuv and Afghanistan.
Ultimately, the British blocked the proposal from Barlas, as they considered all 
Jews fleeing Nazi Germany as enemy nationals. However, in March 1943, Faiz 
Muhammad sent a list of positions to be filled, including science instructors for 
secondary and tertiary education, physicians, and engineers.138 Barlas then complied a
|  OQ
list of 50 individuals, all “desirous to leave as soon as possible.” Some of the 
professionals mentioned appear to have been expertly qualified, and could have 
significantly assisted public works projects, higher education, and health care in 
Kabul.140 Despite the support of the British Minister in Ankara, who said that many 
worked for the Turkish government and “have nearly all at one time or another offered 
their services to the allied cause,” the Foreign Office and the India Office were against 
their employment.141 Visas to transit India were refused, on the grounds that: “so called 
anti-Nazis sometimes turn out to be agents in disguise” and that these Jewish 
individuals would be open to the pressure of the German Legation in Kabul.142 The 
Foreign Office felt that a new German colony would be established, and even if Jewish, 
it would send the wrong message to the Afghans. H.A.F. Rumbold underlined the tone 
of the government in London when he wrote:
From a security point of view I imagine that a Jew of enemy origins who 
retains associations in enemy territory would be just as dangerous in 
Afghanistan whether he is at present resident in Turkey or in Palestine 
and it is far preferable that people whom we are doubtful should remain 
in Palestine where we can control them rather than in Afghanistan where
143we cannot.
137 Yehoshua 1992, 222.
138 CZA, LI 5/90, proposal o f the Afghan Government for immigration into Afghanistan, 20 
February 1943.
CZA L I5/90, Charles Barlas (Istanbul) to Faiz Muhammad (Ankara), 1 April 1943.
140 CZA L15/90, E.K. Weber to Charles Barlas (both in Istanbul), 31 March 1943.
141 IOL L/PS/12/1795, telegram from Angora to Government o f India (H. Knatchbull-Hugessen), 
29 March 1943, 66.
142 IOL L/PS/12/1795,1.T.M. Pink, India Office minutes, 2 April 1943, 64; and H.A.F. Rumbold,
6 April 1943, 63.
143 IOL L/PS/12/1795, Rumbold, Foreign Office minute, 20 April 1943, 46; and Rumbold, Foreign 
Office minute, 26 May 1943, 25.
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The most that Rumbold was willing to accept was that three Swiss Jews would travel to 
Afghanistan without dependents.144 Only a small handful of German speaking Jewish 
specialists were able to avoid India, and take the more dangerous land route. They 
traversed the Soviet Union and entered Afghanistan through the northern border.145 
1943 marked a change in Afghan policies towards European Jewry, as they began to be 
seen more favourably and even potentially useful.
The Precarious Situation of Jews in Afghanistan during World War II
In February 1945, the Board of Deputies reported that it had not received any 
communication from Afghanistan since December 1938.146 Throughout World War II, 
the problem of communication with remote Jewish communities was exacerbated. 
However, British diplomats collected copious intelligence reports at this time, which 
help to provide at least some information about events during the war. In May 1940, a 
blood libel occurred in Kabul, which could have led to a pogrom, if not for quick-acting 
officials. “A wild rumour started ... by two motor drivers stating that Jews were 
kidnapping small Afghan boys and murdering them led to some excitement in the city.” 
A crowd of approximately two thousand people gathered outside of Jewish homes, and 
demanded that the kidnappers be arrested. Two Jews were arrested along with the two 
drivers, who “claimed that they had been told to start the rumour by a police officer.”
All four men were soon released.147 This incident brings to light several important 
points. It is known that the police chief of Kabul protected the Jewish community in 
1948, and if the same man was in office eight years previously, it stands to reason that 
he may have acted similarly.148 Yet, the claims of the drivers must also be examined.
In 1939, Nazi officials boasted that the regular and secret police forces in Afghanistan 
had been reorganized along German specifications. Schickedans wrote that: “within a N
144 IOL L/PS/12/1795, Rumbold, Foreign Office minute, 18 May 1943, 31.
545 Yehoshua 1992, 221.
146 IOL L/PS/12/1660, A.J. Brotman, Secretary of Board o f Deputies o f British Jews to Under 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Office (both in London), 19 February 1945,26.
14 IOL L/PS/12/1660, extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary no. 19,11 May 1940, 50.
148 See following chapter for further details.
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short time a hard-hitting, well-disciplined police force has been created which enjoys 
great respect among the population.”149 With the exception of draconian economic 
restrictions, this may have been another way that fascist influence was felt within the 
Jewish community. Curiously, police officers appear to have been responsible both for 
instigating and ending this volatile situation.
Four years later, the Jewish community did not fare as well, since police officers 
were carrying out the orders of much higher officials. In November 1944, a Muslim 
was found drunk in the street, and reported that he had acquired the alcohol from Jews. 
There are several accounts of what happened next. One version comes into British 
archives from a merchant in Peshawar who notified a British Jewish officer in Bombay, 
while the other was reported by an American official in Kabul. Depending on the 
version one follows, either the Kabul police force or 150 soldiers “encircled and 
entered all the Jewish houses, beat the women and arrested one male member of every 
Jewish family except three [families].”150 All kinds of items were confiscated, 
including wine, copper utensils, bottles of vinegar or tomato sauce, as well as materials 
“that may eventually be used for the manufacturing of alcohol, as jams, raisins, juices 
etc.” Forty-six men were imprisoned and chained for two and half months, until the 
women took matters into their own hands. In a letter confiscated by the British, Yakob 
Kalantar, a survivor of the events, wrote later to Jerusalem that “at last our wives made 
a great hue and cry” and thirty-seven men were released upon payment of 71,000 
afghanis. The remaining men were sentenced to five years imprisonment, but were also 
released after a fine of 35,000 afghanis was paid in 1945.151 Afghan officials said that 
collective fines were imposed because the community was “unwilling to cooperate with
149 DGFP, Series D, vol. VIII, Memorandum of the Aussenpolitisches Amt, 18 December 1939,
551.
150 Four years later, an American official claimed that the police were involved in the arrests, 
while the Secretary of the Jewish Communal Charity Association in Peshawar claimed that the men 
involved were soldiers two months after the event. See: USNA Record Group 84 Kabul -  General 
Records, 16 April 1947, no. 840.1, and IOL L/PS/12/1660, copy of letter from Hananael Mirzoeff 
(Peshawar) to Captain M.A. Lew (Bombay), 28 December 1944,43.
151 USNA Record Group 84, Kabul -  General Records, 16 April 1947, no. 840.1, IOL 
L/PS/12/1660, Hananael Mirzoeff (Peshawar) to Captain M.A. Lew (Bombay), 28 December 1944,43; 
and intercepted letter from Censor Station, Peshawar, Yakob Kalantar (Kabul) to Zerubabel Shemuel 
(Jerusalem), 9 April 1945, 17.
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1 ^ 9the authorities in identifying the guilty parties.” The British felt that the punishments 
were decreased because the Jews had petitioned the King and Prime Minister, and 
raised awareness of their plight in the United States and United States, England, India, 
and Palestine.153
Afghan Jews remained united, and thus suffered collectively. The Jewish 
merchant in Peshawar, Hananael Mirzoeff felt that “fascist influences have prompted 
the Afghan Government to take the steps they have in this matter.”154 This is a 
particularly important source, as Jews within Afghanistan had a difficult time 
communicating with the outside world during this time. (It is not known where Yakob 
Kalantar sent his letter, it may have been brought out of Afghanistan through unofficial 
means and posted in Peshawar.) American sources vary in their account of events. 
They explain that the mass arrests occurred when Muhammad Naim Khan, nephew of 
Muhammad Hashim Khan, was acting as Minister of National Economy while ‘Abd al- 
Majid was in Europe.155 British officials offered a range of reasons other than fascist 
sympathies. These included the “well-known Puritanism” of Muhammad Hashim 
Khan, the fact that a relative of the king’s almost died or went blind from drinking 
moonshine, or more simply, that increasing numbers of young men (including
152 USNA, Record Group 84 Kabul -  Confidential File 1947 vol III, box 12, no. 840.1, Ely Palmer 
(Kabul) to Secretary o f State (Washington), 30 May 1947.
153 IOL L/PS/12/1660, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to Anthony Eden (London), 24 February 1945, 28. 
Jewish representatives in Peshawar, Bombay, and Jerusalem were also notified. CZA S25/5291,
Palestine Office (presumably Cynowicz at the Jewish Agency) in Bombay to the Jewish Agency in 
Jerusalem, 22 January 1945.
154 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Hananael Mirzoeff (Peshawar) to Captain M.A. Lew (Bombay), 28 
December 1944,43.
155 USNA, Record Group 84 Kabul - General Records, 16 April 1947, no. 840.1. For example, see 
W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), appendix V. When ‘Abd al- 
Majid went to Germany, Muhammad Naim Khan was named acting Minster o f National Economy, in 
addition to being Minister of Education and assistant to the Prime Minister. He was expected to succeed 
Muhammad Hashim Khan, yet his skills as an administrator came into doubt during the war years. When 
‘Abd al-Majid returned to Kabul in 1946, Muhammad Naim Khan was appointed ambassador at London, 
and two years later, he represented Afghanistan in Washington. In 1950, he was once again Deputy 
Minister of National Economy, continuing his involvement in this ministry. The British openly 
wondered if he had “the brains, physical fitness or strength of character for the task” o f becoming Prime 
Minister. IOL L/PS/12/1562, Leading Personalities o f Afghanistan 1948, no. 58, Muhammad Naim 
Khan, 14. See also USNA Record Group 84, Kabul - General Records, 312 UN Preparatory Mission, 20 
March 1950.
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adolescents) were drinking, and officials wanted to stop the sale of liquor.156 While 
making and selling alcohol was illegal, the government tolerated it among the Jews. 
When the product began to be used by Muslims, however, it was viewed as an 
embarrassing scourge, and then perhaps used as an excuse for further restrictions on the 
Jewish community. Similar occurrences also happened among Christian communities 
in the Middle East.
During the mass communal arrests in November 1944, Muhammad Naim Khan 
sent plain-clothed police officers to Jewish homes to see if they would sell them wine, 
and five men fell for this entrapment.157 Along with making arrests, the Ministry of 
National Economy enacted a further series of business restrictions against the Jewish 
community. Gulam Ghaus Khan, Secretary of State at the Ministry, banned Jews from 
entering the customs house, and abolished all middlemen pursuits. This was in addition 
to Jews being restricted from wholesale trade. Such anti-Jewish measures tend to give 
credence to the idea that the Ministry of National Economy was involved in generating 
income for the Pashtun elite. The British Legation in Kabul felt that these measures 
were justified, because it supported a pro-Pashtun economic policy and often espoused 
anti-Semitic views. The British Minister Sir Giles Squire wrote that: “it was only to be 
expected that the Afghan Government should take the opportunity of imposing further 
disabilities on the Jewish community.” However, Squire mentioned that this would not 
“presumably prevent the Jews from continuing to work as they have done in the past 
under men of straw, but there is no doubt that their position has become more difficult.” 
Two hundred had already applied to emigrate, though the Minister doubted if any 
nation would welcome them.158
One wonders if ‘ Abd al-Majid Khan was already back in contact with Kabul in 
November 1944, or if Muhammad Naim Khan acted entirely independently. While
156IOL L/PS/12/1660, D.M. O’Leary to I.L. Henderson (both in London), 18 April 1945,21; 
USNA Record Group 840.1 Kabul -  Confidential File 1947, vol. Ill, box 12, no. 840.1, Ely Palmer 
(Kabul) to Secretary o f State (Washington), 30 May 1947; L/PS/12/1660, Paul Mason (Foreign Office) 
to Brotman, Secretary of Board o f Deputies (both in London), 4 May 1945, 15; and G.F. Squire (Kabul) 
to Anthony Eden (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Office, London), 24 February 1945,28.
157 USNA, Record Group 84 Kabul -  General Records, 840.1, 16 April 1947.
158 IOL L/PS/12/1660, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to Anthony Eden (London), 24 February 1945, 28.
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‘Abd al-Majid Khan did not return to Kabul until 28 February 1946, some level of 
reconciliation may have occurred between the government in Kabul and ‘Abd al-Majid 
Khan as the war’s outcome became more apparent. ‘Abd al-Majid Khan may have 
begun to involve himself in the workings of the Ministry of National Economy from 
Europe. In 1941, when ‘Abd al-Majid Khan was still on good terms with the 
government in Kabul, he continued to supervise the Ministry of National Economy 
through phone calls, telegrams, and presumably letters. A similar dialogue may have 
occurred after his apparent reconciliation with Muhammad Hashim Khan.159
It is difficult to determine how Jews were able to find any paths to employment 
with so many levels of restrictions. In 1947, a US official offered one explanation:
[T]he Jews are allowed one wholesale-firm and a certain import so they 
are depending on import-companies. These companies charged them 
during wartime the official ceiling-prices, but the Jewish traders had to 
pay in kind, especially in those goods the selling-companies wanted for 
export. These goods were only available on the black-market. And when 
the Government wanted to stop the raising of the prices, Ghulm Gaus 
[Gulam Ghaus] arranged for price-control in Jewish and Hindu-shops.160
It is clear that commerce was fraught with levels of barriers that were renewed 
periodically. In 1947, the World Jewish Congress concluded that the provision against 
involvement in the export trade meant that: “the community has been steadily reduced 
to a condition of impoverishment.”161
Even when ‘Abd al-Majid Khan was not in Afghanistan, the Ministry of National 
Economy continued to act according to anti-Semitic ideas and racist ideology, 
particularly after the mass arrests of 1944. This affected both non-Muslim trading 
communities, Hindus and Jews alike. Acting in the interests of the Government of 
India, the British Minister in Kabul found himself in the role of protector of the Indian
159 IOL L/PS/12/455, Interception of telephone conversations with Berlin sent from Kabul (by P.C. 
Hailey) to H. Weightman (New Delhi), 6 March 1941.
160 USNA, Record Group 84 Kabul-General Records, 16 April 1947, no. 840.1
161 IOL L/PS/12/1660, Eastern Department, Foreign Office (London) to Chancery (Kabul), 8 April 
1947, 9. See chapter 7 for further details.
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community. This experience appears to have changed him. Subsequently, he became 
somewhat more sympathetic to the plight of smaller traders and ethnic minorities 
(though instances of prejudice still remained). In sharp contrast with previous British 
ministers, for the first time, Giles Squire examined Afghanistan’s policies from the 
perspective of the disenfranchised. He noticed that: “the desire to take control of any 
form of commercial activity that shows signs of becoming really profitable persists not 
untinged with jealousy of Indian traders.” The minister was aware that wealthy 
Afghan businessmen wanted to eliminate all Indian competition, and would sometimes 
try to “extend the activities of monopoly concerns” with this aim. On several 
occasions, he was forced to intervene with high officials in order to protect the rights of 
Indian traders. In 1942, many shoemakers and barbers had to return to India, as their 
residence permits were not renewed. They were accused of lacking the proper licenses 
for their businesses, but this was because their applications were always refused. 
Ironically, after August 1947, Afghanistan had a great deal of difficulty maintaining 
trade across its southern border. The Hindu merchants once resident in Peshawar fled 
to India, and Afghanistan’s trading links were severed. Afghanistan was forced to turn 
to the Soviet Union where it traded under the “most disadvantageous terms.” This 
wrecked further havoc with Afghanistan’s exports, aggravating a troubled economy 
which the British described as “at best... chaotic.”
In 1943, another effort to limit the presence of non-Afghans in the workforce 
occurred. Laws were promulgated to limit brokers to those who had a permit, with the 
stipulation that permits would only be issued to Afghan nationals. The new legislation 
also stated that account books had to be written in the language of the country (Dari or 
Pashtun), “a provision which operated particularly harshly on the Indian traders.”164 
Squire told his superiors that Indian merchants viewed these laws with “grave concern 
and regarded [them] as a fresh step for their elimination from trade.”165
162 IOL L/PS/12/1553, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to Anthony Eden (London), 22 Januaiy 1944, 182-3.
163 IOL LAVS/1/1169, Possibility of War between Pakistan and Afghanistan: Draft Report by the 
Joint Intelligence Committee, 8 July 1949, 85.
164 IOL L/PS/12/1553, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to Anthony Eden (London), 22 January 1944, 183.
165 IOL L/PS/12/1553, Report on the Economic Situation o f Afghanistan, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to 
Anthony Eden (London), 22 April 1944, 155.
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First-hand evidence of these restrictions on individual Jews is scarce, but much 
can be deduced about the hardships faced by the community. While some Jews lived in 
Afghanistan for generations, most were not eligible to receive passports until the eve of 
their departure to Israel. (Indeed, according to Rahel Gol, an elderly Herati woman 
resident in Jerusalem, many did not obtain passports at all. They entered Palestine 
illegally in the 1930s and 1940s, and were often imprisoned for a year.)166 Prominent 
international traders in the 1920s and early 1930s would have had travel documents, 
though their passports were only valid for several years. Afghan representatives abroad
1 f \  7were infamous in their refusal to renew the passports of Jews. While this would not 
have directly affected those resident in Afghanistan, the difficulty of receiving 
passports through the consular representatives can be seen as a barometer of 
governmental views towards the Jewish community. These new provisions would have 
been just one more set of obstacles which led to further impoverishment and misery.
Fortunately, Squire was able to mitigate some of the force of this new legislation. 
As British minister, he took “strong exception” to the clause regulating language, and 
after “protracted negotiations” with government officials, the laws were amended. 
Foreign brokers were allowed to obtain licenses, and could keep their books in any 
language they desired, as long as certified translations were provided when the 
government requested them. Squire explained to Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, 
that the publication of these amendments were “hailed with delight by the Indian 
traders” who expressed “their feelings of gratitude at the protection of their interests by 
the Legation.”168
Two points are of special notice here: first, that the British Minister took a pointed 
interest in the plight of Indian traders, and second, that the Afghan government changed
166 Interview with Rahel Gol, Jerusalem, 12 July 2001. See also Heskel M. Haddad, Jews o f  Arab 
and Islamic Countries (New York: Shengold, 1984), 47.
167See BoD ACC 3121/Cl 1/13/2, Secretary o f Board of Deputies to A. Mundy, Jews’ Temporary 
Shelter (both in London), 14 June 1939.
168 IOL L/PS/12/1553, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to Anthony Eden (London), 22 January 1944, 183; and 
Report on the Economic Situation of Afghanistan, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to Anthony Eden (London), 22 
April 1944, 155.
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its economic policy because of his intercession. As previously stated, ‘Abd al-Majid, 
the architect of the shirkat system, resided in Germany and Switzerland during the war 
years, and because of his “prolonged absence” the process of monopolisation and the 
“movement towards totalitarian trade” slowed down.169 Larger neighbouring powers 
also intervened, as Afghanistan was surrounded by, and consequently cooperated with 
the Allies. By June 1944, when the likely outcome of the war was becoming more 
apparent, levels of commitment to the Allies markedly increased, Afghanistan was 
anxious to express its desire for the “improvement of mutual relations and development 
of commercial ties.”170
Britain, for her part, sometimes placed Afghanistan’s “monopolistic tendencies” 
aside. The wartime necessity of maintaining “tranquillity in the country” and along 
Afghanistan’s southern border came first. As Squire explained, in this pursuit, “every 
assistance has therefore [been] given for the preservation of the country’s equilibrium.” 
The basic needs of Afghanistan were ranked alongside those of India, and provided for 
accordingly. Britain even helped to broker the sale of 10,000 tons of Afghan wool for 
transport to the Soviet Union.171 Such actions gave the United Kingdom even more 
leverage with Afghan government officials, especially regarding economic planning.
In recognition of the assistance of the British government, Afghanistan changed some 
of its nationalistic economic policies. Squire wrote that Afghanistan’s realisation of the 
importance of maintaining good relations with Great Britain and India “led to a 
considerable improvement in the position of the Indian trading community.” He was 
unsure if this more egalitarian spirit would last long, but at least it was temporarily “in 
abeyance.”172
As has been described previously, the experiences of Indians in Afghanistan 
paralleled those of the Jewish community. In this instance, the Jews did not often
169 IOL L/PS/12/1553, R. Peel 16 February 1944, in a handwritten aside to the Report on the 
Economic Situation 1943, 178 verso; and Squire (Kabul) to Anthony Eden (London), 22 January 1944, 
182-3.
170 IOL L/PS/12/1553, Economic Report for the Period April-September 1944, 123.
171 IOL L/PS/12/1553, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to Anthony Eden (London), 22 January 1944, 180-3.
172 IOL L/PS/12/1553, Report on the Economic Situation o f Afghanistan, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to 
Anthony Eden (London), 22 April 1944, 150.
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receive direct British protection although the Indians did. Nonetheless, after World 
War II, as American influence increased in Afghanistan, the position of the Jews 
improved. Just as Britain protected the Hindus, the United States came to play a very 
similar role for the Jewish community, through the convergence of serendipity and 
necessity.
The War-Time Economy: Stresses Masked
Throughout the war, Afghanistan’s economy faced great challenges due to a 
dramatic reduction in trade with Germany and the Soviet Union, and the continued
1 71reign of poor management. However, nature alleviated some troubles by providing 
abundant rain in the winters, which meant that crops and animals did well, as herdsmen 
did not have to pay for fodder.174 Active British support and attention also helped, for 
the British saw a stable Afghan economy as another way to bolster India’s defences. 
Afghanistan compensated for its trading deficit by sending more goods to India. Yet, 
when the post-war patterns of trade shifted, Afghanistan had difficulty compensating. 
This lack of flexibility, combined with crop failure, brought widespread hunger to 
Afghanistan after the war’s end. As the state struggled to help the people feed and 
clothe themselves, the Shirkat or monopoly system started to dissolve. It failed to 
alleviate the sufferings of the people and consequently a freer market policy was 
introduced. While this was good news for ethnic minorities, it came as pyrrhic victory.
During the war, Giles Squire described Afghanistan’s monopoly system as 
totalitarian, despite ‘Abd al-Majid’s claims of inclusive economics. Squire noted that 
this system had “prospered beyond expectations” where dividends ranged from fifteen 
to 150 percent. This policy’s goals were two-fold: it aimed to improve and standardize 
products, and concentrate all “important lines of business in Afghan hands to the
173 See for example: IOL L/PS/12/1553, Economic Report for Afghanistan 1946, 50; or IOL 
R/12/113, Fraser-Tytler (Kabul) to Viscount Halifax (London), 17 November 1939.
174 IOL L/PS/12/1553, Minister of National Economy (Kabul) to F.H. Nixon, Export Credits 
Guarantee Department (London), 20 February 1940,209-10.
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1 7^exclusion of foreigners trading in the country.” Both targets were met. However, 
very little wealth found its way to improve the lives of ordinary people. The British 
reported that “discontented voices” were saying that the wealth of Afghanistan was 
“being utilized for the benefit of a coterie of Sardars [prominent Muhammadza’i 
personalities] by means of the State monopoly system of trade.”
Squire criticised the shirkat system by saying that it would not have been so bad if 
it had been fully run by the state. However, wealthy individuals bought most of the 
shares. The profits were not used by the government for the “amelioration of the 
people.” Thus the classic paradigm of the rich becoming richer and the poor becoming
1 77poorer occurred with the help of the state. As the US became increasingly active in
Afghanistan, its representatives confirmed this perspective and added that the “national
1 78Government [became] stronger.” Throughout much of the 1930s, when the warning 
bells of national discontent were sounding the danger of the shirkat system, British 
sources had not been very critical. This changed when World War II commenced, and 
and especially afterwards, when the entire population suffered as a result of these 
policies.
As mentioned, the stresses upon Afghanistan’s economy in World War II were 
partially masked by abundant rain and fruitful harvests. Unlike their Indian and Iranian 
neighbours, in 1943 Afghanistan produced bumper crops throughout the country. The 
wheat harvest may have been the largest in fifty years. Despite this bounty, Squire
1 70estimated that the cost of living might have tripled during the war years. After the 
war, academic research confirmed this hypothesis for the years between 1938 and 1949,
175 IOL L/PS/12/1553, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to Anthony Eden (London), 22 January 1944,181. It 
goes practically without mention that Jews were considered foreigners both by ‘Abd al-Majid and the 
Foreign Office who would place quotation marks around the term British when it referred to Jewish 
traders in the region.
176 IOL L/PS/12/1678, Weekly Summary from Peshawar, 15 August 1938,46. Sardar is a Persian 
term meaning “‘supreme military commander’ literally chief or leader.” Encyclopaedia o f  Islam, 1995 
ed., s.v. “Sardar.” With thanks to May Schinasi for pointing out the nuances o f this term’s usage.
177 IOL L/PS/12/1553, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to Anthony Eden (London), 22 January 1944, 182.
178 USNA, General Records of the Department o f State, Record Group 84, Kabul General Records 
1948, box 17, file 850, Economic Matters, “Importance o f the Shirkat System to the Development o f  
Afghansitan,” by David B. Wharton.
179 IOL L/PS/12/1553, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to Anthony Eden (London), 22 January 1944,188-90.
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and the economist Maxwell Fry noted that there had not been an equivalent rise in 
salaries. This left most of the populace below the level of subsistence, especially in 
urban areas.180 The British Minister explained that prices were uneven due to the 
difficulties of transportation, but often high, especially for imported items like tea, 
sugar, kerosene and cloth. This caused “considerable anxiety and distress.” The 
government tried to control the prices of imported necessities, yet other official actions 
may have aggravated this delicate situation, or even precipitated hunger. Squire 
reported that people were very angry about their increasing impoverishment, inflation, 
and being compelled into “forced labour for Government work.” They resented being 
restricted to growing only cotton and (sugar) beetroot instead of food grains; and then
1 0 1
being forced to sell them to monopoly companies at fixed prices. Several years later, 
this policy combined with a drought led to a famine.
The consequences of World War II changed Afghanistan’s economic landscape. 
During the war, some weaknesses were mitigated through allied intervention. There 
were some problems, though not as severe as during the post-war years. Most 
importantly, the government could not supply the populace with sufficient food or 
clothing, and a black market arose. At this time, the Bank-i Milli worked closely with 
the government to “salvage whatever possible of the pre-war industries and trading 
concerns.” By 1940, ‘Abd al-Majid was appointed both Minister of National Economy 
and Governor of Da Afghanistan Bank. This effectively eliminated the reason for the 
latter institution’s creation, which was to lower the incidence of corruption by 
managing the banks separately. In fact, all of Afghanistan’s financial institutions were 
closely linked.182 An article written in 1940 forecast that World War II would severely 
affect Afghanistan’s development projects, as the European market for karakul would 
dry up.183
180 Fry, 190-1.
181 IOL L/PS/12/1553, G.F. Squire (Kabul) to Anthony Eden (London), 22 January 1944, 188-90.
182 Ibid, 87-9, 106.
183 Ibid, 40; citing A.E. Hudson and E. Bacon, “Inside Afghanistan Today” in Asia, 40: 3 (March 
1940): 122.
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Between 1939 and 1942, Afghanistan’s economy was in recession, and from 1942 
to 1949, government revenue declined rapidly. Afghanistan experienced severe 
inflation during World War II, as the prices of food, clothing, and rent increased over 
three hundred per cent. The government exacerbated the crisis by printing too much 
money. In 1935, twenty million afghanis were in circulation, in 1939, there were 180
1 R4million, and by 1946, 600 million afghanis in circulation. Franck listed some of the
problems facing Afghanistan’s economy during the war. In addition to those already 
mentioned, he noted the: “excessive concentration of exports in a few agricultural 
crops,... soil exhaustion [and] an inadequate supply of fuel and power.” Some 
shirkats dissolved, “while others became mere facades for proprietary business 
activites, promotion schemes, and outright profiteering.” In order to regain control of 
Afghanistan’s economy, the Bank-i Milli controlled the shirkats more closely and 
encouraged traders to invest in “sound projects.”
The Post-War Economy: Facing Scarcity and Famine
The post-war years brought further suffering. Between 1937 and 1955, the cost of
1 87living index in Kabul increased six fold, without an equivalent rise in wage earnings.
Fry explains that the severe inflation was “caused by deficit finance, a balance of
payments surplus and wartime scarcities” all of which combined to wreck “havoc with 
1 88the fiscal system.” The British representative at Kabul did not write an economic 
report during 1945, because of lack of staff. The report for 1946 was only patched 
together in the summer of 1947 after the Afghan economic picture was very bleak.
184 Fry, 41; and Gregorian, 390.
185 Peter Franck, “Problems of Economic Development in Afghanistan,” Middle East Journal, 3:3 
(July 1949): 295.
186 Ibid, 3:4 (October 1949): 432. In the 1960s, an American advisor to the Afghan government 
noted that it: “is prone to intervene in industrial and business decisions without having an adequate basis 
for determing the effects o f such intervention.” While this critique referred to projects carried out much 
later, it is also relevant for activities which commenced even in the 1930s. See Fry, 46 citing Nathan 
Associates, Economic Advisory Services Provided to the Ministry of Planning, Royal Government of 
Afghanistan, September 1961 to June 1972: Final Report (Washington D.C.: Robert R. Nathan 
Associates, mimeograph, July 1972), 156.
187 Peter Franck, “Economic Progress in an Encircled Land,” in Middle East Journal 10:1 (Winter 
1956), 51.
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Despite these omissions, it is a valuable source of information. With the help of 
secondary sources that draw from official Afghan government publications, it is 
possible to see in detail the shortcomings of the post-war economy.
‘Abd al-Majid returned to Kabul in February 1946, after spending the war 
‘convalescing’ in Switzerland. British intelligence reported that he was very 
disappointed by what he found. He claimed to be frustrated by the lack of social 
progress that had been made, as apparently this had been one of his goals in creating the 
shirkat system. He found that the monopoly system led to the enrichment of a few 
traders, instead of the population as a whole. In retrospect, this is quite incredible as 
surely ‘Abd al-Majid must have been intimately aware of the problems of the grand 
scheme he fashioned. On his journey back to Afghanistan, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan said to 
a British diplomat that seeing the war in Europe had changed him and that he sought to 
“reorganise the economic structure of the country, reversing his previous policy of
1RQmonopolies in favour of freer trade.” One may theorize that the Minister of National 
Economy did indeed change his perspective by witnessing the destruction of Europe, 
grappling with his own ill health, overcoming his prejudice towards ethnic minorities 
and Soviet refugees, or even becoming alert to the contradictions inherent in fascist 
economics. Yet, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan held significant shares in many of the monopoly 
companies. He was forced to change his policies only after they were dramatically 
unsuccessful, and even then he issued further limitations on traders.
After speaking privately of his economic epiphany, and almost immediately upon 
arrival home, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan started another monopolistic enterprise. His stated 
goal was to alleviate the country’s cloth shortage. Instead of improving the situation, 
his actions turned a severe shortage into a full-blown crisis. ‘Abd al-Majid formed the 
Central Cooperative Depot to purchase and distribute cloth, and acquired 8.1 million 
yards of material to commence rationing. Merchants were told to sell their stocks of 
clothing within six weeks, and not to import any more items. While traders were told
189 IOL L/PS/12/1562, Leading Personalities of Afghanistan 1948, 3.
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that this was a short-term solution meant to last six months, the depot continued 
running for a year and a half until widespread discontent brought about its end.190
i
‘Abd al-Majid was very concerned about widespread discontent, especially in the 
north “where [the] shortage of cloth is so acute that women have practically nothing to 
wear and people fall easy prey to Communist propaganda.” Also, he threatened to 
resign if help did not come from the Government of India, for he felt that he could not 
be responsible for the consequences of Soviet activities. Squire was aware that ‘Abd 
al-Majid was exaggerating, yet he reported to London that “Soviet activities certainly 
give grounds for anxiety” and the situation was grave, for the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister “have never struck quite such a note of panic.”191 Domestic revenue 
fell to one-quarter its 1939 value in 1948.192
Hunger also loomed on the horizon. While previously Afghanistan could feed 
herself, this was no longer the case, causing terrible anxiety as the price of wheat flour 
rose to unknown levels. Consequently, there was “much distress among the poorer 
classes and the Government was compelled to release its stocks of flour for sale to the 
public.”193 By January 1947, Squire wrote that the lack of wheat combined with 
“predictions of an unusually hard winter and the consequent dislocation of 
transportation made the future look dreadful.” The situation became a national crisis, 
and the army released many of its lorries, along with all other means of transportation 
available, to bring American flour from Peshawar into the areas suffering famine. This 
alleviated some suffering. By the summer of 1947,100,000 tons of flour were 
imported from the United States. Farmers stopped growing cotton for export and 
started growing wheat again.194 Afghanistan had to import wheat and flour from the
190 IOL L/PS/12/1553, Report on the Economic Situation o f Afghanistan 1946, 60 and 62.
191 IOL R/12/166, Telegram from Minister (Kabul) to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
(London), 19 March 1946.
192 Fry, 155.
193 IOL L/PS/12/1553, Report on the Economic Situation o f Afghanistan 1946, 56.
194 IOL L/PS/12/1553, Monthly Report on Economic Conditions during January 1947, 109-10; 
Notes by the External Department of the Indian Office (London), 30 June 1947, 50 verso (this was issued 
in response to Afghanistan’s Economic Report o f 1946); and Monthly Report on Economic Conditions 
during May and June 1947,22.
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United States again in 1953 and 1954. Generally, Afghanistan’s annual production of 
food grains was three million tons. This placed the country on the edge of agricultural 
sufficiency, where droughts and other events could endanger the populace.195
Alongside the shortage of food and clothing, the international karakul market 
dropped. The price of karakul fur fell, from $13.50 to $9.00 per skin. As a result, none 
was exported during much of 1947.196 In April 1947, Squire reported that two million 
skins from 1944 and 1945 were still unsold, along with the entire 1946 crop, which was 
not expected to sell until 1949. Yet, in that year, eighteen million skins remained 
unsold in New York, along with an additional four million in Afghanistan.197 By 1947, 
traders were thought to lose as much as 140 million afghanis.198 When karakul prices 
were low, generally Afghanistan would export more dried fruits and nuts to India. 
However, in January 1947, all pistachio nuts bound for India were turned back, as large 
amounts of them remained unsold and the price dropped by sixty per cent. After the 
war, countries did not have to produce as much, and the demand for imported goods 
dropped.199
Another endeavour to sell raw cotton also failed. While farmers were forced to 
grow the crop, its quality was not high enough for export.200 The American embassy in 
Kabul explained to Washington that cotton and sugar beet production led to the 
enrichment of the elite, while the soil became increasingly depleted 201 By the spring of 
1947, four years of surplus wool also remained unsold in northern Afghanistan. The
195 Franck 1956,43.
196 This includes the months o f February, May, June, and July.
197 Ali Mohammad, “Karakul as the most important article o f Afghan Trade,” Afghanistan: Revue 
Trimestrielle IV:4 (October-December 1949), 51.
198 L/PS/12/1553, Monthly Report on Economic Conditions during April 1947, 40.
199 IOL L/PS/12/1553, Monthly Report on Economic Conditions during February 1947, 96; 
Monthly Report during April 1947,40.
200 IOL L/PS/12/1553, Monthly Report on Economic Conditions during March 1947, 86; and 
notes by the External Department o f the Indian Office (London), 30 June 1947, 50. (Issued in response to 
Afghanistan’s Economic Report of 1946.)
201 USNA, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 84, Kabul General Records 
1948, box 17, file 850, Economic Matters, “Importance of Shirkat System to the Development o f  
Afghanistan,” by David Wharton.
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economy was collapsing, and the Afghan government had a very difficult time 
obtaining the hard currency necessary to make urgent purchases.202
These examples illustrate the fragility of an economy that should have been more 
robust. While the largely agricultural, rural means of production were clearly subject to 
the precarious whims of nature, they also faced the onslaught of ‘Abd al-Majid’s 
macro-economic policies. In 1947, a US report on the shirkat system stated that it had 
done “little to improve the condition of agriculture and nothing to alleviate the poverty 
of the farmers.”203 The economist Maxwell Fry argued that the central problem of the 
Afghan economy was its severe fragmentation, along with a geography that made travel 
difficult. The public sector was not linked to the formal or informal (bazaar) private 
economic spheres, both of which were in turn isolated from one other. Fragmentation 
affected the entire breadth of the economy from the agricultural, construction, industrial 
and foreign trade sectors to subsistence farmers. Paradoxically, government 
involvement made the situation worse. The attempt to guide the economy impeded 
development.204
Trouble that had been brewing for fifteen years bubbled over at the end of World 
War II. The economies of Europe collapsed. Afghanistan was no longer of vital 
importance in protecting the British Empire, since it was rapidly dissolving. 
Consequently, European powers were unable to subsidize the mistakes of the Ministry 
of National Economy, as their own markets collapsed after the war. Against the 
backdrop of a regional crisis, where India also suffered from famine, the 
mismanagement of the Ministry of National Economy became starkly apparent. It is 
ironic that when fruit and nuts, wool and cotton were all lying in warehouses unsold,
202 L/PS/12/1553, Monthly Report on Economic Conditions during April 1947, 40.
203 USNA, General Records of the Department o f State, Record Group 84, Kabul General Records, 
1948, box 17, file 850, Economic Matters, “Importance o f  Shirkat System to the Development of  
Afghanistan,” by David Wharton.
204 Fry, 44-5, citing Nathan Associates, Economic Advisory Services Provided to the Ministry of 
Planning, Royal Government of Afghanistan, September 1961 to June 1972: Final Report (Washington 
D.C.: Robert R. Nathan Associates, mimeo, July 1972), 5-6 and 156.
205 IOL R/12/21, Laurence Collier (Foreign Office) to F.H. Nixon (Export Credits Guarantee 
Department) both in London, 30 July 1937.
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the people of Afghanistan were hungry and struggled to clothe themselves. Although 
the weather may not have been ideal in the late 1940s, human error and gross 
mismanagement were greater factors in this terrible crisis.
Not surprisingly, by the early summer of 1947 the policies of the Ministry of 
National Economy were under heavy criticism and the public protested and demanded 
radical changes. Calls were made to abolish the shirkat system. The wool monopoly 
was dissolved early, in March, as four years of supply remained unsold. By July 1947, 
the parameters of the entire monopoly system shrunk considerably due to massive 
losses. No karakul was exported between May and July 1947, whereas in comparison, 
during May 1946, 10.6 million skins were exported. The government’s balance of 
trade shifted from a surplus of 2.1 million (Indian) rupees in 1946 to a deficit of 4.7 
million rupees in 1947. The British Minister, Squire confirms that the complete 
monopoly on karakul skin and cotton piece goods was abolished in the summer of 
1947. The Central Cooperative Depot’s activities were sharply limited to procuring 
material from abroad, while internal trade in cotton clothing was restored to “normal 
channels.” Nonetheless, cloth merchants were still encouraged to form groups to 
absorb the depot’s remaining stock at controlled prices. For two more years, the 
government maintained some control over the export of karakul fur, as merchants could 
not sell a consignment of less than 5,000 skins abroad. This policy was considerably 
less restrictive, and when the karakul monopoly could no longer pay for an entire year’s 
crop, it lost control of Afghanistan’s market.207 By 1949, the karakul monopoly was 
completely abolished, as Afghanistan struggled to compete with the Soviet Union and 
South Africa. These nations were better able to sort and prepare their skins for sale,
^ A O
principally for export to the United States.
206 IOL L/PS/12/1553, Monthly Report on Economic Conditions during March 1947, 86, and 
Report on the Economic Conditions during May and June, and July 1947, Appendix A, 26 and 10.
207 IOL L/PS/12/1553, Report on Economic Conditions during July 1947,6 and 8; and Report on 
the Economic Conditions during May and June 1947, 19.
208 “Karakul as the most important article of Afghan Trade,” by Ali Mohammad in Afghanistan: 
Revue Trimestrielle, IV:4 (October-December 1949), 51.
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In 1946, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan ‘negotiated’ with Jews for the first time. He spoke 
to the Kabuli community, and offered them permission to export and import goods -  
with the exception of karakul, furs, and carpets -  if they were sure to maintain a 
positive balance of trade. In return for this concession, the community had to agree to 
buy half a million afghanis worth of shares in the Bank-i Milli. By April 1947, Jews 
were allowed to buy shares of any new factory, as long as their amount remained under 
thirty per cent to preclude management rights.209
In an attempt to achieve some degree of development, small entrepreneurial 
minorities in Afghanistan were pushed aside. The economic patterns that both Hindus 
and Jews followed traditionally could have provided a blueprint for progress, and 
shown larger groups in Afghanistan how to achieve economic success in a very 
complicated financial climate. While karakul flocks were Afghanistan’s main source of 
hard currency earnings in the period studied, the flocks of sheep only became a part of 
Afghanistan’s bounty after the Soviet Union was fully established in Central Asia. 
Afghanistan gained this valuable source of income precisely because it provided a 
refuge to those fleeing intolerance and oppression. Turkmen shepherds fled with their 
flocks, along with Bukharan Jews who were expert in preparing the lambskins, and 
finding markets throughout the world. While the skins themselves were valued, these 
groups of people, and their sets of skills were not. Consequently, the quality of karakul 
skins consistently declined. This was a result of Turkmen immigrants remaining 
marginalized and very poor, while an orchestrated campaign was carried out against 
Bukharan Jews, which quickly grew to encompass all Jews in Afghanistan. Ironically, 
in 1935, the British noted that forcing the Jewish community out of the north meant that
•  9 1 n •“the only class of trader with expert knowledge” disappeared. For the Jewish 
population, fifteen years of prejudice directed at them, in addition to a desperate 
economic situation was too much to tolerate. Many tried to escape illegally into Iran or 
India.
209 USNA, Record Group 84 Kabul - General Records, 16 April 1947, no. 840.1.
210 IOL L/PS/12/1553, H.M. Minister (Kabul) to H.M. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
(London), 24 January 1935, 520 verso and 521.
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Chapter Seven:
4Aliya1: Messianic Zionism and Leaving Afghanistan
“We hope for your salvation and also for your response. ”
Synopsis
This chapter examines the process of mass Jewish emigration from Afghanistan. 
While some members of the community left during the 1930s and 1940s, 4,500 
remained in Herat and Kabul, and the vast majority departed in the early 1950s, after 
Muhammad Zahir Shah authorized legal departure. In 1949, communal letters were sent 
to Israeli authorities describing their longing for the Holy Land and an intense desire to 
be a part of the religious and cultural renewal of Zion. The majority of sources in this 
chapter come from the Central Zionist Archives, and like these communal letters, this is 
the first time that they have been brought to the attention of an audience in English. 
Augmenting religious reasons, Jews in Afghanistan based their desire for ‘aliya on 
economic rationale, with the continuation of restrictions against the community even 
after the demise of the shirkat system, and as poor harvests and famine blighted the 
region. Departure was also based on social factors, with young people facing 
denigrating army service and instances of forcible conversion.
Even before the community left Afghanistan, it was upset by the inefficient 
Yishuv bureaucracy which allowed Jewish prisoners to remain incarcerated. Afghan 
authorities were willing to release them, with the provision that they were furnished 
with visas for Palestine. The Jewish Agency was not forthcoming, and the men 
languished in a Kabuli prison. In an exceptional gesture, however, the British Minister 
to Kabul gave three hundred visas for India to Jews in 1946. Sir Giles Squire’s change 
of heart may be attributed to increased empathy based on his advocacy on behalf of 
Hindus, or perhaps a re-evaluation of the high cost of anti-Semitism. In January 1947,
1 'Aliya literally means ‘ascending’ or ‘going up’ and is used specifically in reference to the Holy 
Land, Eretz Yisrael. The antonym is Yerida or ‘descent’.
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all Jews from Afghanistan in Peshawar were deported, and this increased the anxiety of 
those who found refuge in the courtyard of a Bombay synagogue. At that point, the 
offices of the Yishuv, along with other Jewish organisations, took their fears of 
deportation seriously, and used diplomatic channels to avert a forced return to 
Afghanistan. After this crisis, the conflict between the Jewish Agency and the 
Afghanistani va’adot in Eretz Yisrael intensified. The officials of the Yishuv wanted 
only healthy young people, whereas the refugees in India wanted to immigrate en 
masse -  irrespective of health or age.
In 1949, the position of the Afghan government shifted dramatically, and legal 
emigration was permitted. A series of reason are responsible for this shift. They 
include a change in leadership, as Muhammad Hashim Khan and ‘Abd al-Majid Khan 
both left office. Afghanistan advocated v<f)Sefetbusly for an independent Pashtunistan, 
and became more amenable to international pressure in seeking support for this 
position. Muhammad Zahir Shah, now ruling without a regent, also had positive 
feelings towards the Jews. This may have been based on the ethnogenesis myth that 
Pashtuns are one of the ten lost tribes of Israel. Politically Muhammad Zahir Shah also 
wanted improved relations with the US, which encouraged Jewish civil rights in 
Afghanistan. Small groups of Jews began to leave in 1950 via Iran. After arrival in 
Teheran, they experienced a great deal of disillusionment with Israeli bureaucracy as 
they remained for months in abject poverty, menaced by the local police force. By 
1953, most were able to arrive in Israel, where they faced new challenges. The 
situation of those who remained in Afghanistan improved during the 1960s and 1970s, 
though they also felt the need to leave, particularly after the Soviet invasion.
First Contact with the Israeli Government
In the late 1940s, the Jewish community of Afghanistan still had internal refugees 
(after being forbidden from living in all but the three main cities), were banned from 
most forms of employment, and faced post-war shortages and famine along with the 
rest of the population. Exact figures are impossible to obtain, but the Jewish Agency’s
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envoy in Teheran estimated that 4,500 Jews lived in Afghanistan after World War II.2 
Some engaged the services of smugglers and escaped by way of India or Iran, but much 
of the community remained in Afghanistan -  especially in the city of Herat.3 However, 
the greatest impetus to leave came with the creation of the state of Israel, when Zionism 
coursed through the community. One Jewish resident of Kabul explained that when the 
community learned of Israel’s establishment “our joy knew no bounds.”4 S. Landshut 
explains that the foundation of the state of Israel brought a “new spirit of hope -  almost 
Messianic in its fervour -  reminiscent of that among Jews in other remote Muslim 
countries.”5 An examination of letters sent to Israel from the community show that the 
expectations of Afghanistani Jews were not partially but rather fully Messianic.
At this time of great happiness and rejoicing in the creation of the state of Israel, 
the community was put in clear physical danger, as many individuals in Afghanistan 
viewed the small community as an enemy of the Muslim world. In Kabul, the chief of 
police risked his own life to stop an imminent mob attack.6 In Herat, the Jewish 
community did not fare as well. Soon after the declaration of Israeli independence, a 
knife-wielding assailant entered the women’s section of a synagogue, killed three 
women and two children, and injured four others. He was only stopped after the men in 
the synagogue were able to capture him. Ten months later in Kabul, two young Jewish 
men were attacked by ten Muslim assailants. They were first robbed and then beaten to 
death. In an apparent effort to hide their bodies, they were secretly buried on the 
grounds of the American embassy. (US officials were unaware of this crime.) Only 
after the assiduous efforts of the young men’s parents were their bodies exhumed and 
given a Jewish burial.7
2 CZA S6/6787, Report on the Situation of Afghan Jews by Sassoon Siman-Tov, envoy to the 
Department of Middle Eastern Jews o f the Jewish Agency in Teheran, 19 September 1950.
3 Haddad, 47.
4 Avihail and Brin, 58-9.
5 Landshut 1950a, 70.
6 Avihail and Brin, 77.
7 CZA S6/6787, Report on the Situation of Afghan Jews written by Sassoon (SiSi) Siman-Tov, 
envoy of the Department of Middle Eastern Jewry at the Jewish Agency in Teheran, on 19 September 
1950. Copies distributed to high officials including Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.
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Despite these attacks, the Jews in Afghanistan were oveijoyed by the creation of 
the State of Israel. For fifteen years, (between 1934 and 1949) the Jewish community 
of Herat was unable to communicate directly with the outside world. In the late 1940s, 
the position of the Afghan government relaxed towards the Jews. Finally, sending 
correspondence abroad was legal, and the leadership was able to post a letter to Tel
A •
Aviv. The spelling, vocabulary, grammar, structure, and style of this letter are infused 
with ancient and prayer book Hebrew. It provides a baseline, and in one sense, it is the 
beginning of Afghanistani Jewry’s direct interaction with the outside world after being 
isolated, and forbidden from international commerce and travel. Some letters are kept 
in the Central Zionist Archives, and provide a wonderful insight. This is the first time 
they have been brought to the attention of an audience in English. In what is perhaps 
the first letter sent openly to the government of Israel, Yosef and Shmuel Cohen wrote 
on behalf of the Herati community. This document provides a clear view of the 
community’s feelings. It is an extraordinary letter, part prayer and part request, with 
great hope for religious and physical redemption. An unabridged copy of this letter is 
provided in the appendix.
To Your Honour, the High and Mighty Government of Israel -  Shalom!
... Now, in the end of days, from a flight of trouble and distress, G-d has 
enlightened the people Israel with salvation and bravery. .. .Your Honour, 
we are in the darkness of bitter exile, and do not feel the sweetness of the 
shining light upon us, and it is like we are dreaming. ... We believe that 
G-d has sworn an eternal covenant to bring us back to the Land, and even 
if this day of wandering was very long, and our people were scattered 
from one side of the heavens to another, we still hope that the time has 
come to return to our homeland, and to renew our youth in the land, like 
an eagle. ...
[W]e have to let you know, Your Excellency, how horrible our low 
situation is. Everyday our exile becomes greater, we are left without 
work, all the doors of commerce are locked to us, all the gates of the land 
are closed to us. Nobody can come or go, neither from inside nor from 
outside. Exile causes us such grief, we don’t have any more strength to 
suffer, to make a livelihood, or provide for the necessities of life. We 
sold all our household goods, and we are left with empty hands, and we
8 Landshut 1950a, 67.
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don’t know what will become of us, and therefore we turn to you, asking 
Your Excellency to help us as soon as possible, for if our exile continues 
for more months, all of us will be lost from lack of means to support 
ourselves. Please, please, please we beg you that as long as we are still 
alive, spare us, have mercy upon us. ...
This is the day that we hope for, let us rejoice in it, it has been for 
2,000 years that the people Israel has been in exile, and now the time has 
come for the prophets’ visions to come true. ‘To gather you up from 
heaven with me.’ Now this day of salvation has come to the entire people 
Israel who are in exile. Yet, this time is troublesome for us, as we are in 
great danger in the midst of the exile of Ishmael, but we hope we will be 
saved from that through the grace of G-d and through Your Honour’s 
help, and we hope for your salvation and also for your response. May 
you have peace forever, amen.
Signed by the humble Yosef Cohen and the Cohen of the pitied 
community, Mr. Shmuel Cohen.9
This letter displays extraordinary messianic longing. The community in 
Afghanistan saw the creation of Israel through a biblical lens, if they could arrive in 
Eretz Yisrael, they would find salvation. Later letters show some awareness of political 
Zionism, yet the initial ones are full of religious fervour. While the community was 
exposed to the forces of other ideologies like communism, capitalism, and nationalism, 
these were often filtered by the interpretations and reactions of those in Afghanistan. 
With Zionism, the exposure was far more direct, as the Jews interacted with some of 
the key figures in the establishment of the state of Israel, without the communication 
delays of earlier times. Consequently, their reactions shifted in a matter of months, as 
opposed to years. At first, the leaders of the community saw David Ben-Gurion, Chaim 
Weizman, and other top Israeli officials as viewed as intermediaries to the Messiah, yet 
this quickly changed to disappointment as the bungled efforts of the Jewish Agency 
became apparent.
The Jews of Afghanistan sent several more letters infused with prayer in 1949. 
Their beauty is unrivalled, and they deserve a careful examination. While the Cohens
9 CZA S5/11616, Letter of 23 Sivan 5709, 20 June 1949 from the Jewish community o f Herat to 
the Government of Israel, a type-written copy provided by the Va’ad Hitahadut Olei Afghanistan, Tel 
Aviv. With special thanks to Nili Heled for help translating this document.
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received a quick reply from Israel, that letter was not preserved, however their next 
missive is. Much of the second letter repeats the information of the first one, yet in 
order to show its importance, it is signed by seventy rabbis and leaders of the 
community. New points include an even greater fear of anti-Semitism: “In this country, 
they look upon us with evil. And it is a surprise that in the nineteenth century [sic for 
twentieth-century], after World War II, that there are still anti-Semitic and fascist 
countries left in the world.” They go on to say that the Holocaust took place in “the 
democratic, moral, and cultured world on the continent of Europe,” but that these Jews 
feel themselves to be living in the “exile of Ishmael, a people ... without culture at 
all.”10 This derisive comment implies that they feel their situation is far less hopeful. 
This maybe due to the news they received about the Holocaust. Nevertheless, the 
leaders of the Herati Jewish community are convinced that they are about to face 
another Shoah and implore the Israeli government to get them out.
Interestingly enough, the Jews of Bahrain expressed similar sentiments to the 
Jewish Agency. They felt that they too, faced persecution more severe than that of the 
Third Reich. Ezra Zeloof smuggled out two letters (in care of a friend in New York) to 
Jerusalem. He described an anti-Jewish riot that the community endured there in the 
winter of 1947. “Each house has its own story of how brutally the Arabs have treated 
them and how their houses were completely swept away and looted. ... If the Germans 
have done harm to the Jews the Arabs are doing more.”11 The community in Bahrain 
was even smaller than that of Afghanistan, comprising only several hundred 
individuals. Zeloof s letters speak in a voice far less infused with religious language, 
yet still very poetic. He directly addresses the struggle for a Jewish state as well as 
those killed in the Holocaust. “This home should be attained at all cost. If we have lost 
three million Jews in Europe let a few of us be sacrificed here. We shall be proud to 
take part in your troubles in a small way. But I think that it would no[t] be impossible
10 CZA S86/75, copy o f a letter sent by the Jewish community o f Herat, to the government of 
Israel, received in Jerusalem on 3 July 1949 (6 Tammuz 5709).
11 CZA S25/5291, Ezra Zeloof (unsigned) in Bahrein to the Secretary o f the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine, Jerusalem 20 January 1948. See also Ezra Zeloof (Bahrein) via Nathan Scott (Syracuse, New 
York) to Secretary, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 13 December 1947.
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for you to save this small community here.”12 Jews in Afghanistan also wanted to be 
saved and even redeemed by the new Israeli state.
Religious and Economic Rationale for ‘Aliya
Four months before Jews in Afghanistan were able to write directly to Israel, 
those in Kabul contacted the Israeli Ambassador in Moscow, to ask if it were possible 
to secure transit for ‘aliya or emigration to Israel via the Soviet Union. This was during 
the brief spring of Soviet-Israeli relations, and they hoped that their request would be 
granted, as “the Government of Russia is one of those who love us.” This letter clearly 
expresses the community’s feelings about Israel, the Holocaust and the desire to 
emigrate.
Dear Sir! Every day we read the papers and every night we listen to the 
radio from all the countries of the world, and when we hear the words: 
Government of Israel, Country of Israel, Army of Israel, we cry in the 
midst of our joy. But it is our regret that we are not able to do something.
Dear Sir, seven years continuously we have sat mourning and crying for 
the six million of our brothers and our flesh who were destroyed at the 
hands of the Nazis. After the proclamation from the Government of 
Israel and the freedom of our homeland, and the rebirth of our people and 
the gathering of our exiles, we do not hope to win and to see the building 
of our lovely land. It is because we are captive behind an iron wall, and 
cannot leave. Dear Sir, we feel very humiliated that we are not able to 
participate in the freedom of our land.
This extract summarizes the main reasons for ‘aliya, not only amongst the Jews of 
Afghanistan but also among communities throughout the world, namely the fervent joy 
over the creation of the Jewish state, the sorrow over the Holocaust and an intense 
desire to be a part of this religious and cultural renewal.
12 Ibid.
13Letter written to the Israeli Ambassador in Moscow from Jews in Kabul and sent on 6 February 
1949, as reproduced by Reuven Kashani, “ 'Aliyat Yehudei Afghanistan I’Eretz Y israelB a-M a ’arakha 
233 (May 1980): 12-13, quotingMordechaiNamir, Shlihot b ’Moskva, 349.
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Most Jewish communities in the Muslim world began to dissolve with the 
creation of Israel. However, some of the rationale behind the departure of the 
community in Afghanistan is distinct -  most notably long-term economic restrictions. 
They started with the foundation of the shirkat system, and remained in effect even in 
the 1960s. It appears that under Amanullah, Jews were forbidden from all sectors of 
economic activity except trade, and only a few years later, this occupation was severely 
restricted. In 1950, it was reported that Jews were only allowed to be cloth merchants, 
due to its shortage.14 In fact, one informant, Leah Dil explained that her father sold 
cloth in Herat in the 1950s.15 Another, Eliahu Bezalel, recounted that between the time 
Muhammad Daud Khan was the governor of the Northern province and when he ruled 
Afghanistan (1933-1974), Jews were officially forbidden from international trade. 
However, they would circumvent this restriction by taking a Muslim partner, who 
would then be the front for the company. He would receive ten percent of the profits 
for following directives -  and the Jewish businessman would avoid the high tax rate of 
forty per cent imposed on non-Muslim businesses. Thus, both parties were pleased by 
this arrangement, and eventually, the Muslim front man would learn enough to 
establish his own company.16
As discussed in the previous chapter, the deteriorating economic situation within 
Afghanistan in the late 1940s certainly increased the desire to emigrate. After World 
War II, Afghanistan along with neighbouring India, faced a famine, and karakul 
stopped being exported altogether in 1947. As the Jewish community had already 
withstood years of state-directed impoverishment, this must have been another terrible 
burden to suffer. In July 1945, Daniel Gol, chairman of the Jerusalem Va’ad explained 
to the Board of Deputies that Jews in Herat had been reduced to a state of penury. He 
wrote that almost all households sold their “meagre belongings” for food, but now,
14 Landshut 1950a, 68.
15 Interview with Leah Dil, Holon, Israel, 9 July 2001
16 Interview with Eliahu Bezalel, Ramat Gan, Israel, 12 July 2001.
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I “there are no further sources to satisfy their hunger. If assistance is not offered to them
j promptly, the future holds out only the certainty of total destruction.”17
ii|
| Jews left Afghanistan also because they felt that the government was strongly
j influenced by Nazi Germany, before and during World War II. As chapter 5
I demonstrates, much of this may not have been direct Nazi influence, but after
| experiencing so much suffering, they may have feared that their fate would be the same
I
| as that of European Jewry. In one example, refugees in Bombay wrote that Nazi
| propaganda increased greatly during World War II and brought Muslim governments to
the side of the Axis powers.18 On the other hand, the Tel Aviv Va’ad19 indulged in 
some strongly felt (but inaccurate^iyperbole when it said that Afghanistan’s Jewish 
population endured a greater torture than that of the Holocaust, “for the Nazis 
concentrated them in camps and fed them, but in the Afghanistan purgatory they walk 
about freely but cannot earn their living. This is even worse than an annihilation 
decree.” The Tel Aviv Va’ad referred to Lamentations: “‘It is better to be the prey of
onthe sword than the prey of hunger.’” Individuals believed that their persecution was 
inspired by the Third Reich, and so they identified closely with the fate of European 
Jewry.
Indeed, the Jewish communities of the Yishuv, Britain, and America began to be 
very concerned about the worsening condition of Mizrahim. In 1945, a book published 
by the Jewish Trades Advisory Council claimed that the Jews in Muslim countries were 
“the most suffering members of the Jewish people outside countries previously 
occupied by the Nazis.” The author then called upon world Jewish community to “be
17 BoD ACC/3121/Cl 1/13/3, Daniel Gol, Va’adEdat Yehudei Afghanistan b ’Eretz Yisrael, 
(Jerusalem) to Selig Brodetsky (London), 5 July 1945.
18 CZA S6/5404, letter from the Afghanistani Jewish refugees in Bombay to the Head o f the 
(World) Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, received on 14 January 1948.
19 The full name of this organisation was: Va ’ad Hitahadut Yehudei Olei Afghanistan or the 
Committee o f Jewish Immigrants o f Afghanistan in Tel Aviv and Jaffa, and it was founded in the late 
1940s.
20 CZA C2/1659, letter to World Jewish Congress from Committee o f Jewish Immigrants o f  
Afghanistan (both parties in Tel Aviv), 22 January 1950; original Hebrew version found in CZA S6/6787 
but sent to the Jewish Agency instead of the World Jewish Congress.
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71ready to stand by for the protection of Jewish rights.” After the Holocaust, the 
amount of visible intra-Jewish prejudice declined as various communities realised the 
necessity of working cooperatively to achieve common goals, especially the protection
77of endangered communities and the establishment of the modem state of Israel.
The Appeal of Zionism
Oppression continued and may have been increasingly difficult to endure, as it 
seems there was an intense desire to immigrate to the Land of Israel. Before the 
establishment of the state of Israel, options included emigration to colonial India or the 
British Mandate of Palestine. Yet afterwards, most of the community no longer wanted 
to remain in diaspora. Afghanistan’s Jewish community dissolved for the most part 
after it felt hopeful. They became far more impatient to leave once they saw other Jews 
travelling to the source of what they believed was their spiritual and physical
7Tredemption. While their circumstances had been very difficult since 1933, they 
became intolerable in the late 1940s. At the same time, political Zionist movements 
across the world found fertile ground for secular ideals that could be closely linked to 
traditional religious values. In a sense, this was the genius of political Zionism; it was 
able to take traditional and secular Jews from across the world, living in vastly differing 
circumstances, and unite them in an ideological and religious belief system that almost 
all found meaningful. Among Afghanistan’s Jewish population, the shifts from fully 
religious Zionism to one more influenced by secular ideals occurred very quickly, and 
even before their arrival in the Holy Land. The Jews of Afghanistan travelled to Israel 
for the same reasons that traditional Jews all over the world left their homes -  they 
believed that the reestablishment of the ancient Jewish homeland signalled the coming 
of a messianic age, and they wanted to participate in this event, and feel “the sweetness 
of this shining light upon us.”24
21 N[oah] Barou, Jews in Work and Trade (London: Trades Advisory Council, 1945), 32.
22 For evidence o f the Board of Deputies’ dramatic change, see file BoD ACC/Cl 1/13/31, entitled 
Jews in Moslem Countries: Aden, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Morocco.
23 Interview with Eliahu Bezalel, Ramat Gan, Israel, 12 July 2001.
24 CZA S5/11616, letter of 23 Sivan 5709,20 June 1949, from the Jewish community in Herat to 
the Government o f Israel, copy provided by the Tel Aviv Va’ad.
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Jews within Afghanistan were unable to set up a Zionist organisation, as that was 
simply too dangerous. Thus, they had community members in Bombay serve as their 
agents. In June 1948, Pinhas Amram of the Afghan Commercial Company in Bombay 
wished to form a Zionist organisation with the hope of stimulating this movement 
within Afghanistan. The idea was warmly welcomed in Jerusalem. An official in the 
Zionist Organisation’s Executive appreciated the desire of Afghanistani Jewry to 
“identify themselves with our national aspirations and the reestablishment of the Jewish 
people in their ancient home.” Amram was told that the price of a shekel (which 
functioned as a fund-raising certificate) was fixed at one rupee both in India and in 
Afghanistan.25 One wonders how the offices of the Zionist Organisation would have 
absorbed the Afghan currency, as it was difficult to exchange even in Peshawar at this 
time.
In the autumn of 1950, a communal letter was sent from Kabul to the President of 
Israel, Chaim Weizman. It was signed by at least twenty-two men. While 
maintaining much of the religiously infused language of the letters from Herat, it 
signals a dramatic shift. This letter is typewritten in Hebrew, and it has an angry tone. 
The author(s) play upon the word ‘Chaim’ which is used to refer to the president and 
also evokes its literal meaning of ‘life’. This is highly significant as only the year 
before the leaders of Israel had been described as almost akin to the Messiah. Now, 
this letter plays with the marked informality of addressing the President of Israel by his 
first name. The document shows a much greater awareness of journalism and literature 
than previous letters as it commences almost like an epic novel.
25 CZA S5/1338, letter from L. Taube, Executive o f the Zionist Organisation, Jerusalem to Pinhas 
R. Amram, c/o Afghan Commercial Company, chairman of the Afghan Zionist Society, Bombay, 28 
June 1948.
26 CZA S6/6787, letter signed by at least 22 members o f the Kabuli Jewish community to Chaim 
Weizman, President o f Israel, 12 [Mar]heshvan 5711 (approximately Oct-Nov 1950).
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The noble voice of 5,000 souls of Israel, pillaged and plundered, is 
surrendered under a foreign yoke. During 2,000 years, they did not 
forsake their religion or nation in the midst of exile. And waiting .. .for 
the Day of Salvation to arise, from the distant land across the Hindu 
Kush, from the land of Afghanistan, they appeal before the Great Leader 
Doctor... CHAIM WEIZMAN!27
It then continues in direct, factual manner, explaining events clearly and in a 
chronological manner. The letter explains that 2,000 Jews from Afghanistan 
immigrated to the Holy Land between 1925 and 1950, and describes how all those 
remaining have relations in Israel. During World War II, the community was closed 
off, surrounded by “metal walls.” While in the summer of 1950,1,500 people were 
granted permission to leave Afghanistan, very few had arrived in Israel. Most were en 
route or resident in Iran. The authors explain to Israel’s president that every day they 
receive letters from those in Iran describing their difficult situation. These Kabuli Jews 
are angry that after so much sacrifice -  enduring even famine -  their brethren remain in 
Iran, with only fifty people per month being granted permission to leave. The letter 
then describes the mood within families in Afghanistan, and how the consequent social 
structure has shifted.
In each house there is a war of brothers over crossing to the Land of 
Israel -  a son [fights] with his father, and a man with his wife [imitates 
this strife]. Many women left their husbands and went with their sons. ...
Women sold items from their houses ... so that they could emigrate as 
soon as possible.28
The patriarchal social structure exhibited cracks as younger people and women were 
more certain about leaving. In the letter, fear is expressed for their children’s future, as 
they want them to grow up “with the blessings of wisdom and culture” in the Land of 
Israel. Another way to view these statements is that anxiety about cultural and 
economic breakdown is expressed as family disputes. The letter also asks Weizman 
to instruct the Jewish Agency in Teheran to increase the quota of those allowed to make
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 With special thanks to Caitlin Adams for bringing this insight (along with countless others) to 
my attention.
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‘aliya from Teheran. The last line of the letter plays upon the president’s given name in 
the form of an urgent, personal prayer and supplication: “Return our Remnant to the 
Land of Israel, to see the face of the Messiah, the G-d of Jacob, in light, the face of the 
King. Chaim!”30
Jews from Afghanistan were disappointed by the failings of the Jewish Agency 
even before they left Herat or Kabul. This letter is significantly more aware of Western 
patterns of description and prose. It displays anger while at the same time is less formal 
and discusses non-religious concerns. The letter shifts dramatically from the first 
missives sent to the Israeli government, and shows how the honeymoon of 
uninterrupted adoration did not last long. Increased communication presented a more 
realistic view of the Government of Israel’s weaknesses as well as strengths.
Along with the desire to reach the state of Israel, some conditions became 
increasingly intolerable to the community in Afghanistan. This included drafting of 
Jewish men into the army. In the Islamic world, Jews and Christians were considered 
‘ahl al-dhimma or protected people under the Pact of ‘Umar. This meant that they 
faced a series of restrictions, including the payment of extra taxes, and wearing 
distinctive marks to show that they were not Muslims. They were also forbidden from 
joining the army. (Clearly, this was one restriction that had a positive angle.)
However, by 1945, Jewish men were drafted into the army for the first time, while still 
having to pay the jizya, or head tax on non-Muslim residents. Army service turned into 
an opportunity for humiliation. Young Jewish men now shared the burden with the rest 
of the urban Muslim population, but were only allowed to perform the most menial of 
tasks, such as cleaning stables and streets, and paving roads. They were not trusted 
with a weapon, and faced animosity from other soldiers. It was also reported to 
Sassoon Siman-Tov of the Jewish Agency in Teheran that Jewish soldiers had to turn
30 CZA S6/6787, letter signed by at least 22 members of the Kabuli Jewish community to Chaim 
Weizman, President of Israel, 12 [Mar]heshvan 5711 (approximately Oct-Nov 1950).
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over their small wages to their commanding officer as protection money, to ensure their
■> 1
safety from attack.
Instances of forcible conversion of young people also occurred. These events 
shook the community to its foundation, especially as they were able to do very little to 
regain their children. Siman-Tov reported that between 1935 and 1950, three young 
men and two young women were compelled to accept Islam. Some of them were 
charged with committing a crime against Islam, and given the choice of conversion or
39death. Siman-Tov stated that they converted because of “hypnosis and fear.” While 
these occurrences were limited, each instance reinforced the community’s fear and 
isolation. According to Leah Dil, who was a child in Herat during this period, girls did 
not attend school for long, or venture out too far from home because of this ever­
present worry.33
Anger at an Inefficient Bureaucracy and Enquiries by the World Jewish Congress
By February 1946, the Afghan authorities agreed to release some long-term 
Jewish prisoners, if they could immediately leave the country. They included Shmuel 
Dadash Shabtai and Shmuel Ben Hanania Yekutiel who were charged with espionage 
in 1933. Dadash had indeed unwittingly assisted the Soviets in the early 1930s while 
working in Moscow.34 (See chapter 4 for further details.) The Jerusalem Va’ad 
contacted the Chief Rabbi in Jerusalem and asked him to assist in the effort to obtain 
visas for these two men, as it was of the highest urgency. The Jerusalem Va’ad also 
wrote to the British Minister in Kabul. Squire reported that the prisoners might have a 
hard time being granted permission to enter India because of the Jewish refugees from 
Afghanistan already in Bombay. But, if the Jewish Agency would give immigration
31 CZA S6/6787, report on the Situation o f Afghan Jews written by Sassoon (SiSi) Siman-Tov, 
envoy of the Department of Middle Eastern Jewry at the Jewish Agency in Teheran, on 19 September 
1950; see also Yehoshua 1992, 236-7.
32 Ibid.
33 Interview with Leah Dil, Holon, Israel, 9 July 2001.
34 Interview with Ben-Zion Yehoshua, Jerusalem, 15 July 2001.
35 CZA S25/5291, Daniel Gol o f the Va’ad Edat Yehudei Afghanistan (Jerusalem) to Chief Rabbi 
Ben-Zion Meir Hai Ouziel (Jerusalem), 5 July 1945.
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certificates to those refugees already in India, then this might facilitate the Government 
of India’s willingness to accept those imprisoned. After being approached by Daniel 
Gol, a prominent member of the Afghanistani Jewish community in Jerusalem, Yitzhak 
Ben-Zvi, the head of the Va’ad Leumi, wrote to the director of the ‘Aliya Department at 
the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem. He asked for certificates to be granted to the refugees 
so that the prisoners, most importantly Dadash and Yekutiel, could also be released. 
Once again the Jewish Agency refused.36 The precise reason for this refusal is 
unknown, however one can surmise that it is because requests from Afghanistan were 
not viewed with as much urgency as those from Holocaust survivors in Europe.
The Jerusalem Va’ad became incensed. Daniel Gol wrote to the ‘Aliya 
Department, saying: “IN EIGHT YEARS YOU HAVE NOT GIVEN US EVEN ONE 
CERTIFICATE. I would always present requests, and you would push me away.” Gol 
was furious that the Jewish Agency did not provide assistance for the refugees in 
Peshawar, Karachi, and above all, Bombay, when they were forced to camp in the 
courtyard of a synagogue. Gol claimed that the Afghanistani Jews in Eretz Yisrael 
were the first to help protect the homeland, and only when asking for immigration 
certificates were they pushed away. In response, the ‘Aliya Department managed to 
procure a paltry five certificates.37
One year before the crisis commenced, in October 1945, an agent of the World 
Jewish Congress’ New York branch, Arieh Tartakower, wrote to the Jewish Agency in 
Jerusalem and asked if his organisation could assist the Jewish community in 
Afghanistan, either politically or materially. Tartakower wanted to know if the World 
Jewish Congress could bring public attention to the situation of Afghanistan Jewry or 
ask for international pressures to be brought to bear. He also offered to send food,
36 CZA S6/1431, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Director of the Va’ad Leumi (General Council) o f the Jewish 
Community in Palestine to Moshe Shapira, Director of the Department o f ‘Aliya, Jewish Agency, 18 
February 1946.
37 CZA S6/1431, Daniel Gol o f the Va’ad Yehudei Afghanistan b’Eretz-Yisrael to Moshe Shapira 
Department o f ‘Aliya, Jewish Agency (both in Jerusalem), on 18 February 1946; and Secretary o f the 
‘Aliya Department, Jewish Agency to the Irgun ‘Olei Afghanistan (both o f Tel Aviv), on 12 March 1946.
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clothing, and medicine to Afghanistan. This is precisely what the communal 
organisations of Afghanistani Jewry in Palestine had been asking Jewish institutions of 
the Yishuv to procure. In July 1945, the Jerusalem Va’ad wrote to the Chief Rabbi of 
Eretz Yisrael, Ben-Zion Meir Hai Ouziel and asked for his intervention with the Jewish 
Agency. They wanted the Joint Distribution Committee, a Jewish American 
philanthropic organisation, to open an office in Kabul or Peshawar or to send money 
through their group to Herat as they expected that a famine was about to strike 
Afghanistan.39 Soon it did. Although the Chief Rabbi wrote strenuously worded letters 
on their behalf, no office for the benefit of Afghanistani Jewry ever opened.
The Jewish Agency in Jerusalem’s response to Tartakower explains the course of 
Afghanistan Jewry’s experiences for the next seven years. The Jewish Agency said that 
it would take care of the material needs of Afghanistan’s Jews through its office in 
Bombay, but that the World Jewish Congress should organize political action.40 
Despite these assurances, the Jewish Agency appears never to have sent aid into 
Afghanistan, and provided very little of it to refugees waiting in Bombay or Teheran. 
But at the end of 1945, a far larger refugee crisis engulfed Europe, as Holocaust 
survivors were unable or unwilling to return to their countries of origin. Some who 
arrived home in Eastern Europe found another round of persecution waiting for them.
In Poland, there were occurrences of Jews being murdered by their neighbours after 
returning from the concentration camps 41 For obvious reasons, the Jewish Agency 
chose to spend its limited funds on the survivors of the Shoah. As bad as the 
experiences in Afghanistan were, they still paled in comparison to the planned and 
regulated destruction of European Jewry.
38 CZA S6/4659, Arieh Tartakower o f the World Jewish Congress in New York to Eliahu Dobin at 
the Jewish Agency for Palestine in Jerusalem, 2 October 1945.
39 CZA S25/5291, Daniel Gol of the Va’ad Edat Yehudei Afghanistan (Jerusalem) to Chief Rabbi 
Ben-Zion Meir Hai Ouziel (Jerusalem), 5 July 1945.
40 CZA S6/4659, Dobkin, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) to Tartakower, World Jewish Congress 
(New York) on 25 Shevet 5706,4 February 1946.
41 In July 1946, all 42 Jews who returned to Kielce, Poland were murdered. See [Chief Rabbi] 
Jonathan Sacks, “The Hatred that won’t die,” Guardian, 28 February 2002, 19.
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Eliahu Dobkin, an official of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem explained to 
Tartakower exactly how to speak to Afghan diplomats. He quoted from a letter written 
by the Jerusalem Va’ad that said one should never threaten or pressure Afghans, but 
rather speak softly to them as friends.42 This would be the only effective strategy. 
Tartakower followed this advice, and counselled others to do similarly. This culturally 
appropriate strategy achieved extraordinary results, far faster than the Jewish leadership 
in Palestine and later Israel, could even regulate. It is unfortunate that Dobkin did not 
want the World Jewish Congress to intervene materially for the benefit of the Jews in 
Afghanistan. This author feels certain that some of their suffering would have been 
alleviated, thereby easing the tremendous pressure upon the Zionist offices in Bombay 
and Teheran as refugees streamed across the frontiers.
Refugee Crisis in India: A Precarious Medical and Legal Situation
In the late 1940s, Afghanistani Jews encountered a dramatic range of events, in 
the land of their birth as well as in Iran and India. The chronology is not altogether 
clear, as many occurances were simultaneous, and the information they transmitted to 
the outside world was sent to three different continents in at least as many languages. It 
is certain, however, that in 1945, the British Minister’s actions towards the Jews in 
Afghanistan changed dramatically. This may have been due to the Holocaust, or the 
anti-Semitism he witnessed directly. Perhaps Sir Giles Squire’s role as protector of 
Indian traders alerted him to ethnic prejudice in Afghanistan. In an unprecedented step, 
Squire granted travel facilities to 300 Jews on medical grounds. While it was true that 
Jews were denied access to the few hospitals in Afghanistan at this time, the consul’s 
rationale was not about health care. He felt that if the Jews remained in Afghanistan, 
they would be in “danger of personal attack and serious persecution, albeit 
unofficial.”43
42 The original letter is found in CZA S6/4659, Daniel Gol of the Va’ad Edat Yehudei Afghanistan 
(Committee of the Afghanistan Jewish Community in Palestine) to the Jewish Agency (both in 
Jerusalem), on 11 Tevet 5706 (approximately January 1946).
43 CZA C2/1659, Jewish Relief Association (Bombay) to Norman Bentwich (London), 29 March
1948.
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A censored letter that survives in the Central Zionist Archives provides more 
detail as to the precise situation of the Jews in Afghanistan immediately following 
World War II. Captain M. Makin at the British Military Hospital in Colaba, Bombay, 
wrote that he was involved in Zionist work, but that unexpectedly, he had been thrust 
into assisting refugees. He said that several days previously, seventy Jews from 
Afghanistan had arrived in Bombay, but that several hundred more were rumoured to 
be on their way. Makin said that they left Afghanistan because of “Moslem fanaticism 
and fierce anti-Semitism there. Some of the women had had acid thrown on them, 
some men had been sent to prison for seven years for keeping wine for Kiddush, etc.”44 
They had nowhere to stay, and so they slept in the compound of the Byculla Synagogue 
of Bombay, and begged for food.45
The last part of Makin’s letter is the most interesting, as he describes the socio­
medical condition of the refugees in relation to the needs of the Jewish Yishuv in 
Palestine. He writes that they all want to go to Palestine, “but I must admit they are 
very poor material. Uneducated, diseased, without trade or occupation. The children 
are all scabetio, with septic sores and impetigo, and present a sorry picture.” He writes 
that he was “given pretty well a free hand” in dealing with the refugees, and that he was 
now “engaged in medically vetting all the people there.”46
No more letters appear from Makin in the files of the Central Zionist Archive, and 
so one must surmise what happened next. Perhaps Makin’s recommendations made 
officials in the Yishuv cautious about the emigration of Jews from Afghanistan. They 
worried about the transmission of communicable diseases and their inability or 
unwillingness to treat them. These concerns were viewed as an unnecessary drain on 
precious resources. Indeed, several letters were written to Bombay by the Jewish
44 CZA S6/4659, extract from a private letter intercepted and censored from Capt. M. Makin, 
R.A.M.C., British Military Hospital, Colaba, Bombay, India Command, to Walter Ettinghausen, dated 31 
October 1945.
45 A photograph o f children from Afghanistan waiting for a meal in the Bombay synagogue is 
found in the: Jewish Chronicle, 25 July 1947, 17.
46 CZA S6/4659, extract from a private letter from Capt. M. Makin, R.A.M.C., British Military 
Hospital, Colaba, Bombay, India Command, to Walter Ettinghausen, dated 31 October 1945.
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Agency imploring the Zionist Association there to only send young and healthy people 
to Eretz Yisrael.47
It is important to note that Makin’s letters were intercepted and censored by 
British authorities either in India or Palestine. Consequently, the detailed information 
about the poor level of public health among the refugees in India may have made them 
even more cautious in authorizing immigration. Among officials of the Yishuv, the 
precarious state of the refugees’ health was widely known. When Sassoon Siman-Tov 
wrote about the health of Afghanistani Jews in Teheran in 1950, he claimed that “[t]he 
health situation of the Jews is generally satisfactory,” and stressed that all were 
observing the dietary laws.48 This suggests that Siman-Tov wanted to avoid further 
prejudice against the emigrants, as certainly they could not be fully healthy after 
enduring years of displacement, poverty, persecution, and famine.
Causes of Refugee Crisis
As Makin reported, Jews started to stream across Afghanistan’s southeastern 
border after the close of World War II. Their numbers grew, for the reasons mentioned 
above, such as a military draft, arrest for previously legal activities, and the harassment 
of women.49 Perhaps the Tel Aviv Va’ad explained the situation most poignantly when 
they wrote that these Jews in Afghanistan left, because they were:
persecuted and have all kinds of libels against them, and because of true 
danger to their lives [sakanat nefashot], and they trembled. ... They sold 
their property quickly, almost for free, because they were ready to go to 
Eretz Yisrael. As they did not receive permission to make ‘aliya, they 
stayed in India.50
47 CZA S6/5404, J.N. Behar, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) to J. Gubbay, Bombay Zionist 
Association, 19 April 1948.
48 CZA S6/6787, Report on the Situation o f Afghan Jewry from Sassoon Siman-Tov, Jewish 
Agency, Department of Middle Eastern Jews (Teheran), 19 September 1950. As a young man, Siman- 
Tov was chosen to assist the refugees as his family came from Afghanistan and Mashhad
49 CZA S6/5404, H. Gubbay, Afghan Jewish Relief Committee, Central Jewish Board o f Bombay 
to Shabtain Rowson, Jewish Agency (London), 16 October 1947.
50CZA S25/5246, Va’ad Hitahadut Yehudei Olei Afghanistan (Committee of Jewish Immigrants 
of Afghanistan in Tel Aviv and Jaffa) to Golda Myerson, Director of the Department o f State, Jewish 
Agency (Tel Aviv), 27 January 1947.
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By 1947, 280 Jews from Afghanistan lived in “semi-permanent hutments” in a 
compound at the Byculla Synagogue in Bombay. The Palestine Post reported that their 
conditions were “most appalling ... without proper shelter or means of livelihood. 
Many of the children died from infectious diseases.”51
While not the main factor, the Jewish Agency certainly helped to precipitate an 
unplanned and premature emigration. As the evidence shows, it exacerbated a refugee 
crisis in India by providing inaccurate information to the Afghanistani Jewish 
community in Palestine who then transmitted it on to Afghanistan. Ultimately, the 
diplomatic initiatives taken to assist these unfortunates helped to change Afghanistan’s 
attitude to its remaining Jewish population -  yet this provided little comfort to those 
suffering in Bombay. In January 1947, after Jews in Peshawar were sent back to 
Afghanistan, the Tel Aviv Va’ad wrote to Golda Myerson (later Meir), the director of 
the Department of State of the Jewish Agency in Tel Aviv.
About two years ago, we turned to the Office of Immigration of the 
Jewish Agency, and informed them of the suffering and persecution of 
our brothers, and they assured us that every Jew of Afghan [sic] who 
would come to India would have arrangements made to make ‘aliya. So, 
we wrote to our brothers that they should make arrangements to come 
from Afghan [sic] to India, and by the time that our brothers arrived in 
India, we turned to all of the institutions, and to the Department of 
Immigration and we did not find one open ear.52
The Tel Aviv Va’ad was incensed that it had been misled into believing that Jews from 
Afghanistan who entered India would be allowed to immigrate to Israel immediately. 
As a result, they transmitted faulty information to Afghanistan, which may have led to 
the deaths of their community members on their return to Kabul. The Tel Aviv Va’ad 
appealed to the Jewish Agency not to discriminate against them. “We ask you to stand 
on our right side ... We are also Jews who have suffered from exile, and have drunk 
from the poisoned cup of anti-Semitism.” The letter ends on a harsh note, with a
51 CZA S5/11616, “The Jews of Afghanistan,” Palestine Post, 17 February 1950.
52 CZA S25/5246, Va’ad Hitahadut Yehudei Olei Afghanistan (Committee o f Jewish Immigrants 
of Afghanistan in Tel Aviv and Jaffa) to Golda Myerson, Director of the Department o f State, Jewish 
Agency (Tel Aviv), 27 January 1947.
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warning that was also a recrimination. “This is a matter of life and death, and you are 
leaving them a bitter fate if our request isn’t fulfilled.”53 This letter had some effect, 
and when the next period of anxiety commenced for those residing in Bombay six 
months later, Golda Myerson (Meir) began to contact the British authorities in Palestine 
on their behalf.54
This was not the only occasion when misinformation was transmitted to desperate 
Jews in Afghanistan. In 1949, the leaders of the Kabuli community wrote to the Israeli 
ambassador in Moscow. They informed Mordechai Namir that Zvi Cynowicz of the 
Jewish Agency Office in Bombay had told them that if they could get to Bombay, he 
would send them on to Israel. However, the Afghan authorities did not give these 
community members passports and the Pakistanis would not grant transit, so they were 
stuck in India.55 This also happened the following year in Iran, and Jews in 
Afghanistan only stopped arriving there after their landsmen warned them that there 
were no facilities to expedite their emigration from Iran.
Deportation from Peshawar
In January 1947, several groups of Jews living in Peshawar were deported to 
Afghanistan. The authorities in India alleged that they were overstaying their visas, 
even though Squire was supportive of their plight. This action considerably shifted the 
relations between the refugees in India and various Jewish organisations in Palestine, 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Suddenly, it became clear that the 
Government of India would expel Afghanistani Jews, and the voices of those in 
Bombay facing similar edicts rose in urgency.
In order to raise the alert, Daniel Gol sent a translated letter to the Jewish Agency 
and the Va’ad Leumi from Jews in Peshawar. It explained that they had contacted
53 Ibid.
54 CZA S25/5246, Goldie Myerson, Executive o f the Jewish Agency to Fox-Strangeways (both in 
Jerusalem), 10 September 1947.
55 Letter written to the Israeli Ambassador in Moscow from Jews in Afghanistan (unspecified as to 
the individuals or their residence) and sent on 6 February 1949, as reproduced by Reuven Kashani,
Aliy at Yehudei Afghanistan I ’Eretz Y isra e lB a -M a ’arakha, 233 (May 1980): 12-13, op cit Mordechai 
Namir, Shlihot b ’Moskva, 349.
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Nehru’s secretary at the Indian National Congress, the Office of the Interior, the 
Peshawari regional government, and the secret police asking if the deportation could be 
postponed until after the harshest part of winter passed. This was refused, as was the 
next request to delay the expulsion by a week in order to gather food and the 
appropriate clothing. Faced with the choice of being dumped on the other side of the 
frontier, the community hired a lorry to transport thirty-six people, including the 
elderly, infirm, women and children. All had lived in Peshawar for at least three years.
A second convoy returned to Afghanistan soon afterwards.56 (The inclusion of women, 
and those on the edges of life’s spectrum shows that Peshawar was not simply a male 
economic colony.) The unidentified author(s) in Peshawar asked Daniel Gol to “bring 
this matter before high institutions” as the Afghanistani Jewish refugees in Bombay 
(resident there for four to five years) were also being targeted for deportation. It was 
feared that the Jews of Afghanistan would be lost, as the British Consul in Kabul was 
not giving more exit visas to India for Jews. As in so many other cases, the letter ended 
with a supplication:
Our cry must penetrate your hearts. There are no words to describe the 
amount of our suffering. Do all that you can, and maybe with the help of 
G-d and with your help, the hour of our redemption and salvation will
57arrive.
International Jewish organisations were unable to assist the Peshawari community in 
time to avert their deportation. The community’s proximity to the Afghan frontier 
made them simply too vulnerable.
Even the long-resident community in Peshawar was unable to survive the 
violence that accompanied Pakistani independence. Nearly a year after the expulsion of 
Afghanistani Jews in the city, the rest of the community, approximately forty families,
56 CZA S25/5246, letter from Daniel Gol (Jerusalem) to the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad Leumi 
(Jerusalem) 12 Shevet 5707, transmitting a letter from Afghanistani Jews in Peshawar written on 15 
January 1947.
57 Ibid.
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also had to flee. In the beginning of December 1947, Muslims entered Jewish homes, 
and the ensuing violence left one Jewish woman, Mrs. Hananel Mirzaioff, murdered, 
with her husband and daughter seriously wounded.59 By the time that the Pakistani 
High Commissioner’s office in London explained to the World Jewish Congress that 
the “motive was quite obviously robbery” the entire Jewish community was assembled 
in Karachi, waiting to cross into India, having lost all of their possessions.60 These 
Jewish residents of Peshawar joined those waiting for ‘aliya in Bombay. This was a 
further blow to the Jewish community in Afghanistan as many of those in Peshawar 
came from Afghanistan, and these family members acted as a link to the outside world 
by relaying news and perhaps assisting financially.61 On a much smaller scale, the 
experience of the Jewish community in Pakistan was similar to that of the Hindu 
community, as partition meant the end of their residence.
After the deportation from Peshawar, refugees’ concerns in Bombay appear to 
have been taken more seriously by the Jewish Agency in Palestine. The next alarm bell 
rang in the summer of 1947. Abdur Rahman, Indian Delegate to the United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine, wrote to the Chief Rabbi of Palestine, saying that the 
Jews from Afghanistan had to leave India by 30 September. He said that they came to 
India on “false pretenses” two years earlier and had been granted favourable treatment 
in this time. Abdur Rahman went on to say that visa extensions were only given for 
reasons more substantial than “vague allegations of fear of ill treatment,” and that the 
government in Afghanistan had neither anti-Semitic policies nor legislation. Abdur 
Rahman did not feel that those dwelling in a Bombay synagogue’s compound were 
authentic refugees and to show his contempt of that concept, he placed quotations
58 CZA S25/5291, Telegram from Cynowicz, Central Jewish Board o f Bombay to Myerson,
Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 7 December 1947.
59 BoD ACC/3121/Cl 1/13/3. Telegrams from Bombay to London, 5 and 9 December 1947.
60 CZA S25/5284, M. Ahmad, First Secretary, High Commissioner for Pakistan to L. Zelmanovits, 
Secretary General, World Jewish Congress (both in London), 17 December 1947; and CZA S6/4577 
Yitzhak Ben-Zvi’s notes of a meeting with Mr. Borukov, 15 January 1948. For a description o f the 
Jewish community in Karachi, see Daniel Schonfeld, letter to the editor, Jewish Chronicle, 18 July 1947, 
13.
61 CZA S6/5404, Cynowicz (Bombay) to Behar (Jerusalem), 18 December 1947.
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AO fiXaround the term “refugees.” This letter set off a flurry of activity. The Jewish
organisations grappling with this crisis became even more aware of the precarious state 
of the Jewish refugees in India.
Negotiating with British Authorities
British officials in Jerusalem felt that the claim of those in Bombay was not as 
urgent as that of displaced persons in Europe or those interned in Cyprus. They would 
not give immigration certificates to Afghanistani Jews as an alternative to the Jewish 
displaced persons in Europe. However, they were willing to give certificates to 
Afghanistani Jews which would normally been allocated to European refugees in
r
Cypriot camps. The British stipulated that these exceptional circumstances must be 
explained clearly to the European Jews refused entry into Palestine and interned on the 
island.64 Golda Myerson agreed with V. Fox-Strangeways, of the British Chief 
Secretary’s Office in Jerusalem that the situation of Afghanistani Jews was not worse 
than those in European camps; however, she felt that there was “serious risk that their 
state may be considerably worsened” if they were sent back. It was only nine months 
later, after the condition of the Jewish refugees in Bombay became even more dire, iand 
they were on the brink of deportation, that the Jewish Agency gave them more 
certificates.65
Initially Myerson wanted their certificates to come from the general quota rather 
than the one from Cyprus. This was refused. Then she asked for a smaller allocation of 
fifty certificates to convince the Indian authorities to postpone the scheduled mass
62 CZA S25/5246, Abdur Rahman, Delegate of India, United Nations (Geneva) to Chief Rabbi 
Meir Hay Ouziel (Jerusalem), 29 July 1947 “on the subject of Jewish “refugees” from Afghanistan en 
route to Palestine now detained at Bombay.”
63 “Indian Threat to Jewish Refugees,” Jewish Chronicle, 29 August 1947, 1.
64 CZA S25/5246, V. Fox-Strangeways, Chief Secretary’s Office, Government o f Palestine to I. 
Ben-Zvi, President o f the Va’ad Leumi (both in Jerusalem), 6 June 1947; and V. Fox-Strangeways, Chief 
Secretary’s Office, Government of Palestine to Jewish Agency (both in Jerusalem), 4 September 1947.
65 CZA S6/5404, H. Gubbay, the Jewish Board o f Bombay to Shabtain Rowson, Jewish Agency 
for Palestine (London), 16 October 1947.
262
deportation.66 In this matter, the British partially acquiesced, and sent twenty-five
(\ 7certificates. They did not promise any further certificates.
British officials in Jerusalem echoed the Jewish Agency’s sentiment that these 
twenty-five certificates might help reverse the Indian government’s planned 
deportation. Interestingly, these authorities thought that Afghanistani Jews in Bombay 
were there illegally, as they were threatened with deportation. However, the President 
of the Bombay Zionist Association informed the Jewish Agency in a post-script that he 
wished to state “emphatically” that Jewish refugees from Afghanistan were in Bombay 
legally, as they had been given six-month visas by the British Consul in Kabul which 
were periodically renewed in India. J.J. Gubbay, president of the Bombay Zionist 
Association asked that the Jewish Agency inform the Chief Secretary’s Office of this 
oversight, as it might have the effect of increasing the number of visas granted. At the 
end of November 1947, twenty-five more certificates were made available for refugees 
in Bombay, as British officials in Palestine looked more favourably upon Jewish 
refugees in Bombay than British officials in England did.69 Indeed, the High 
Commissioner of Palestine tried to help those in Bombay, but the Colonial Office 
vetoed his actions.
As the date of the pending deportation drew closer, the offices of the Yishuv 
turned to prominent American Jews for assistance.70 Congressman Emanuel Celler of
66 CZA S25/5246, Goldie Myerson, Executive of the Jewish Agency to Fox-Strangeways (both in 
Jerusalem), 10 September 1947.
67 The British authorities in Palestine initially promised fifty certificates, however, the 
Immigration Department opposed this decision and so the Colonial Office halved the allocation. CZA 
S6/5404, H. Gubbay, the Jewish Board o f Bombay to Shabtain Rowson, Jewish Agency for Palestine 
(London), 16 October 1947.
68 CZA S25/5246, Executive of the Jewish Agency to Chief Secretary, Government o f Palestine 
(both in Jerusalem), 8 October 1947; and CZA S6/5404, G.G. Grimwood, Chief Secretary’s Office, 
Government of Palestine to the Executive o f the Jewish Agency (both in Jerusalem), 26 September 1947.
69 CZA S6/5404, J.J.Gubbay, President, Bombay Zionist Association to J.N. Behar, Secretary, 
Immigration Department, Jewish Agency for Palestine (Jerusalem), 16 October 1947; and J.J. Gubbay, 
to J.N. Behar, 27 November 1947.
70 For instance, the Afghan Jewish Relief Committee in Bombay also knew that they could rely on 
the assistance of Jewish organisations and leadership in other nations. “We are telling our friends all over 
the world not to relax their efforts and to do all in their power to secure visas for these hapless people.” 
CZA S6/5404, H. Gubbay, the Jewish Board o f Bombay to Shabtain Rowson, Jewish Agency for 
Palestine, London, 16 October 1947.
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New York City cabled the new Prime Minister of India, Jawarharlal Nehru, and asked
if the 280 Jews mostly living in Bombay could stay a short time longer until they could
reach Palestine. He hoped that India would “act in [the] true spirit of humanity” by
giving this small pocket of refugees some more time. Nehru agreed, and the new
71departure date was set for 31 December 1947. However, this date would not be 
extended further, and it was shifted partially due to the difficulties of transportation in
77Northern India because of the enormous upheaval that ensued after partition.
Conflict between the Jewish Agency and Afghanistani Va’adot in Eretz Yisrael
After the immediate crisis was averted for several more months, arguments 
between the Jewish Agency and those representing Afghanistani Jewry commenced. 
Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, President of the Va’ad Leumi asked the Jewish Agency to ask the 
British for 250 more certificates for refugees in Bombay. He said that the Indian 
government had already been approached several times, but that this was the last time 
they would extend the deadline. Ben-Zvi warned that there were only two more months 
before the refugees’ visas expired, and encouraged the Jewish Agency to act 
immediately. The position of the Jewish Agency did not change dramatically.
The Jewish Agency wanted young people who were healthy, could perform hard 
physical labour, and had relatives in Palestine to take care of their material needs. They 
stated: “Under no circumstances should certificates be allotted to persons who do not 
comply with our health regulations. The candidates should pass a thorough medical 
examination, and only such persons who are healthy in mind and in spirit can be
•  7 0considered as nominees under these certificates.” While these parameters were not 
binding for their representatives’ choices in India, it was still very important that the 
people chosen had private means of assistance. This decision proved too difficult for
71 CZA S25/5246, Copy of Emanuel Celler’s telegram to Jawarharlal Nehru, 2 September 1947; 
and I.S. Chopra, Secretary at the Embassy of India (Washington, D.C.) to Emanuel Celler, 28 October
1947.
72CZA S6/5404, H. Gubbay, the Jewish Board of Bombay to Shabtain Rowson, Jewish Agency for 
Palestine (London), 16 October 1947.
73 CZA S6/5404, J.N. Behar, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) to J. Gubbay, Bombay Zionist 
Association, 19 April 1948.
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the Bombay Zionist Association. Later, the Jewish Agency complained that Bombay 
sent unfit immigrants, and some who had contagious diseases.74 However, in 1947, the 
Palestine Office in Bombay simply wrote that it did not possess a means to choose 
fairly, other than “‘First in - First out.’”75 J.J. Gubbay wrote that all 300 refugees 
claimed the twenty-five certificates for themselves. They felt “bitter disappointment” 
after waiting for two years, and were also distraught at the prospect of returning “to the 
hell from which they thought they escaped.” Gubbay explained that his offices were 
being treated something like the Western Wall, where groups of ten to twenty refugees 
would visit throughout the day, each clasping telegrams from their relatives in Eretz 
Yisrael.76
Further problems were caused by the restrictions of the Afghan Consul in 
Bombay. In October, he refused to break up multi-generational family passports, and 
recommended that anyone who wanted to divide the family passport should return to 
Afghanistan.77 One month later, when the first twenty-five certificates for emigration 
to Palestine were distributed, the Afghan consul refused to renew their passports or 
include Palestine in the countries they were allowed to visit. This was very much like 
the actions of Afghan diplomats in Europe in the 1930s. The Bombay Zionist 
Association was upset by these actions, and hoped to be able to obtain visas from the 
Indian government without the “formalities” of the Afghan Consul’s participation.78
Severe monetary constraints facing the Jewish Agency were another factor 
delaying ‘aliya. It was very concerned about the financial costs of immigration, and 
sought to do whatever possible to limit these expenses. Officials asked if emigrants 
from Afghanistan could pay for their flights and traveling expenses. This appears to 
have been a highly unusual request that caused a great deal of anger, as other groups 
did not pay for their airfare. The Jewish Agency also wanted to know the names of
74 Ibid, 2 October 1947.
75 CZA S6/5404, H. Cynowicz (Bombay) to J. Behar, Secretary o f the Immigration Department, 
Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 18 Decmeber 1947.
76CZA S6/5404, J.J. Gubbay, President of Bombay Zionist Association to J.N. Behar, Jewish 
Agency (Jerusalem), 16 October 1947.
77 Ibid.
78Ibid, 7 November 1947.
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relatives in Eretz Yisrael, so that it could approach and encourage them to support the 
newcomers’ absorption process.79 This theme also appears in the early 1950s, when the 
head of the immigration department, Yitzhak Rafael, also pressured the Afghanistani 
Va’ads by saying that they would have to cover all of the expenses of absorbing the 
new immigrants.
Only three days before the refugees in Bombay were scheduled to be deported, 
Golda Myerson cabled the Jewish Agency in Washington D.C. and asked if Emanuel 
Celler and “other friends” could contact Jawarharlal Nehru.80 At the last minute, the 
congressman was once again cabling India’s Prime Minister regarding the plight of the 
refugees in Bombay. Nehru agreed that they would be able to stay four more months,
O 1
until 30 April, but that this extension would be “absolutely final.” After this point, 
the Government of Palestine reiterated the official British position, that extra 
certificates would not be granted to the refugees in Bombay, but that their entry into 
Palestine would mean that they were taking places allotted to refugees in Cyprus. The 
British reasoned that if the Jewish Agency felt that the plight of the refugees in Bombay
• • 4 O')was truly grave, their certificates should come from the Cyprus allocation.
Soon Zvi Cynowicz of the Palestine Office in Bombay and Bombay Zionist 
Association began to argue for this very solution. He wrote that: “the question of 
Afghan Jews in India should be given priority even over those who are stranded in 
Cyprus and other displaced persons camps as their situation is self explanatory.”83 By 
the end of March, the Immigration Department at the Jewish Agency finally concurred. 
However, the Chief Secretary’s office insisted that the inmates of the camps had to be
79 CZA S6/5404, Va’ad Hitahadut Yehudei Olei Afghanistan (Tel Aviv) to the Jewish Agency 
(Jerusalem), 28 November 1947. “It costs more than 80 pounds per person for the flight, and we don’t 
have that money. They have large families with many children, and can’t take any o f their belongings. 
You need to find a way for them to get out;” and J. Behar, Secretary o f the Immigration Department, 
Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) to [J.J.] Gubbay, Zionist Association (Bombay), 2 October 1947.
80 CZA S25/5284, Myerson (Jerusalem) to Epstein (Washington), 28 December 1947.
81 CZA S25/5246, Epstein (Washington) to Myerson, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 19 January
1948.
82 CZA S6/5404, V. Fox-Strangeways, Chief Secretary’s Office to Rabbi Nathan, Va’ad Leumi 
(both in Jerusalem), 27 February 1948.
83 CZA S6/5404, H. Cynowicz, Palestine Office for India (Bombay) to Charles Barlas, Director of 
the Immigration Department (Jerusalem), 2 March 1948.
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in agreement with this proposal.84 One week later, the Central Committee of the Jewish 
Refugees Camps in Cyprus sent a letter to the Jewish Agency. Its members viewed 
“with apprehension and deep compassion the fate of their unhappy brethren ... who are 
in immediate danger of being expelled and sent back to Afghanistan where implacable 
death awaits them, and decide unanimously to forego in their favour one hundred 
Immigration Certificates” of the April 1948 quota.85 Thus, 150 certificates in total were 
procured for the refugees, which encompassed roughly half of those languishing in 
Bombay. The Jewish Agency hoped that this would cause the suspension of the 
deportation order.86 Indeed, it appears to have done so, as the Indian government 
allowed Jews from Afghanistan to stay in Bombay until 31 July 1948, provided that 
arrangements for their ‘aliya were made.87 The logistical difficulties of finding a way 
to Israel continued. Though, deportation was far less feasible, as India no longer shared 
a border with Afghanistan. Despite the concession granted by Indian authorities 
allowing the Jews to stay, with the outbreak of war in May 1948, transportation from 
India to Israel ceased and by August, the Jerusalem Va’ad reported that only seventy-
oo
five had been able to emigrate. Nonetheless, a few hundred Jews dwelling quietly in 
a synagogue courtyard would have been very low on the list of priorities for the Indian 
government at this time. It was grappling with terrible crises, violence and the largest 
population transfer the world had ever witnessed. By the end of June 1949, over half of 
the Jews waiting in Bombay were able to arrive in Israel. Three hundred and eight 
individuals were flown via Aden, where Yemenis joined their flight. In a strange 
historical twist, Afghanistani Jews became part of the famous journey known as
84 CZA S6/5404, G.G.Grimwood, Chief Secretary’s Office, Government o f Palestine to J. Behar, 
Jewish Agency (both in Jerusalem) 24 March 1948.
85 CZA S6/5404, Letter from the Chairmen o f the Xylotymbon and Caraolus Camps in Cyprus, 31 
March 1948. Jews interned in Cyprus were allocated 750 certificates a month.
86 CZA S6/5404, J.N. Behar, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) to J. Gubbay Bombay Zionist 
Association, 19 April 1948.
87 BoD ACC/3121/Cl 1/13/3, V.K. Krishne Menon, High Commission for India to the Secretary of 
the Board of Deputies of British Jews (both in London), 1 June 1948 and D. Mowshowitch (London) to 
Jewish Relief Association (Bombay), 4 June 1948.
88 CZA S6/5404, Daniel Gol, Va’ad Edat Yehudei Afghanistan to the Jewish Agency (both in 
Jerusalem), 26 August 1948.
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Operation Magic Carpet, when approximately 50,000 Yemeni Jews were airlifted to 
Israel.89
Legal Emigration from Afghanistan: The Role of Jewish Organisations
The decriminalization of Jewish emigration from Afghanistan occurred as a result 
of assisting refugees in Bombay. The role of the World Jewish Congress in delaying 
deportation from India also facilitated the departure of Jews from Afghanistan. The 
Central Zionist Archives have documents which show that in September 1949, the 
Israel Executive of the World Jewish Congress met with two Jews from Afghanistan, 
Avraham Jasdi and Agedjan.90 Jasdi informed those assembled that the situation of the 
Jewish community in Afghanistan had not improved in the post-war years. Arieh 
Tartokower, a representative from New York, was also present. He felt that the Afghan 
government should be contacted initially via the American State Department, and 
induced to grant exit visas to members of the Jewish community. Tartokower argued 
that this was the most important step, and that “some Jewish personality who is an 
American citizen” could travel to Afghanistan or Iran. He volunteered for this task, but 
it is not known if the journey occurred.91 It is more likely that the second American 
ambassador to Afghanistan (1949-1951), Louis Dreyfus managed this task on his
92own.
By the end of October 1949, Jerusalem received word that the Afghan 
government had issued passports for a “certain number” of Jews for the first time since 
the early 1930s. The Indian government also granted transit visas to these same, most 
likely wealthy, individuals 93 This decision represented a radical departure from 
previous policies. However, it was limited in scope. One month later, an Israeli 
representative in Teheran, Zion Cohen, informed immigration authorities in Tel Aviv
89 Landshut 1950a, 69.
90 Perhaps M.H. Aqajan of the Va’ad Hitahadut Olei Afghanistan in Tel Aviv, though no other 
names are specified. Jasdi may be an alternate spelling of Yazdi, therefore indicating his family’s 
origins.
91 CZA Z6/244. Minutes o f Meeting o f the Delegation o f Afghanistan Jews, 28 September 1949.
92 Adamec 1974,276.
93 CZA Z6/244. Minutes o f the Israeli Executive Meeting, 30 October 1949.
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II
that he was working with Afghan authorities to grant passports to all Jews who 
requested them. Cohen coordinated with American officials in Iran, and had asked 
Louis Dreyfus to help in this effort as well. Cohen built the foundation for a mass 
migration, as he worked with Iranians, and targeted Afghan officials. By the end of 
November 1949, Cohen managed to procure transit visas for Herati Jews who wished to 
immigrate to Israel. His actions on their behalf do not seem to have been founded in a 
full understanding of the plight of the Jewish community in Afghanistan. Cohen wrote 
to the Department of Immigration, and said that they were suffering persecution, were 
very poor, and could not pay for their journey.94
The process of coordinating ‘aliya was often disorganized. Even the efforts of 
Zion Cohen appear to have been unknown to Jewish representatives in Bombay. In 
February 1950, Zvi Cynowicz of the Bombay Zionist Association wrote to the Political 
Department of the World Jewish Congress in New York, and said that the Afghan 
ambassadors in Washington, London, Paris, and New Delhi should be contacted 
simultaneously to allow the Jews to leave freely with their property intact. The 
following weeks brought higher-level discussions. Robert Marcus, Political Director of 
the World Jewish Congress wrote to Muhammad Naim Khan, Afghan ambassador to 
the United States, and asked if they would abolish the prohibition against Jewish 
emigration.95 The Israeli Mission to the United Nations also contacted the Jewish 
Agency to see if the time was right to pressure the Afghan delegation to allow a Jewish 
departure. The Director of the Immigration Department, Yitzhak Rafael concurred, and 
hoped that their ‘aliya could commence in May with small groups leaving at a time.96 
The Israeli Foreign Ministry advised its UN delegation to negotiate cautiously and 
informally, following the same course of action that the Jerusalem Va’ad had 
recommended four years previously. The delegation was told that a formal declaration 
was not necessary, as the Jewish Agency did not have an office in Afghanistan. Rather,
94 CZA S6/6787, Zion Cohen (Teheran) to Mosad l’Aliya - Immigration Department (literally: 
institution) (Tel Aviv), summary of several letters, most notably those o f 24 and 26 November 1949.
95 CZA C2/1659, H. Cynowicz, Bombay Zionist Association to World Jewish Congress, Political 
Department (New York), 1 February 1950. He volunteered to meet with the Afghan ambassador in New  
Delhi; and Marcus (New York) to Sardar Muhammad Naim (Washington, D.C.), 10 February 1950.
96 CZA Z6/327, Goldman (New York) to Y. Rafael (Jerusalem), 21 February 1950 and CZA 
S6/6787, Y. Rafael (Paris) to Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 26 February 1950.
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friendly meetings without official authorization should occur as the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry felt that unofficial channels would obtain the best results.97
On 25 February 1950, Cynowicz had a meeting with the Afghan ambassador in 
New Delhi. For this discussion, he negotiated under the aegis of the World Jewish 
Congress, without reference to his position as the head of Bombay’s Zionist
QO
Association. The notes he sent to the offices of the World Jewish Congress in New 
York provide insight into the rationale behind political decisions that the Afghan 
government took regarding its Jewish population. This encounter led to a series of 
surprising revelations that had positive consequences for the Jewish community. The 
Afghan ambassador said that his government treated all citizens equally, and that Jews 
did not face discrimination. If there had been discrimination in the past, it was only 
directed towards Bukharan Jews. The ambassador referred to recent World Jewish 
Congress press reports that “burst anti-Afghanistan elements.” Cynowicz was surprised 
as the Afghan ambassador attributed these statements to the hostility of the Pakistani 
government. The ambassador was convinced that Pakistan was behind negative reports 
about Afghanistan. This is highly significant and demonstrates one reason why 
Afghanistan may have opened the doors of emigration for the Jewish community: its 
leaders did not wish to be maligned by Pakistan.
According to Cynowicz, the ambassador was aware that Jews wanted to 
immigrate to Israel, but stated that Afghanistan was still “hesitating to facilitate such a 
movement as [the Afghan government was] bound by religious ties and gentleman’s 
agreement with the Arab States not to encourage and promote mass immigration of 
Jews to Israel.” He continued by saying that his government was cognizant of the 
creation of a Jewish State, and expressed the hope that the political situation in the 
Middle East would improve, and relations could be established between Israel and the 
Arab world. This would then lead to a change in the Afghan government’s attitude “in
97 CZA S6/6787, Foreign Ministry (Ha-Kirah, Israel) to Gideon Rafael, Israeli mission to the UN  
(New York), 12 December 1950; and CZA S6/4659, Daniel Gol, Va’ad Edat Yehudei Afghanistan 
(Jerusalem) to Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 1 Tevet 5706 (approximately January 1946).
98 CZA S6/6787, Y. Shimoni, Asia Department, Foreign Ministry (Ha-Kirya) to A. Nadad, 
Weinstein, and M. Cherbinsky, 19 June 1950.
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regard to all aspects of the Jewish problem.” The discussion turned to the provision of 
travelling documents if the Afghan authorities were to allow emigration. Cynowicz 
was very pleased with this meeting, which he believed (wrongly) was the first ever 
given to a Jewish organisation by a high representative of the Afghan government."
In the course of his meeting with the Afghan Ambassador, Cynowicz commented
that Turkey, Iran, and even Yemen had recently allowed Jewish emigration. Indeed,
Turkey was the first Muslim state to establish diplomatic ties with Israel. Iran’s
relationship was more informal, though still friendly.100 Jews fared the worst in
independent Arab countries, particularly Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.101 One example of the
fear and suffering that Jews in the Muslim world experienced after Israel was declared
is encapsulated in a tiny aerogram sent to the Chief Rabbi in London and found in the
archives of the Board of Deputies. It described a “pogrom [that] took place in Cairo.”
The anonymous author then continued: “Over 500 jews [sic] were killed, mutilated,
wounded & missing. Shops were burned & looted. Nothing of this was published in the
10')local news papers. ... Could anything be done before it will be too late? Please.”
Elie Eliachar, the head of the Sephardi Community in Israel summarized the situation 
from Morocco to Pakistan:
The Aden Community was destroyed and the great majority of survivors 
are now destitute; the small Bahrein community was ransacked; the 
Damascus and Aleppo (Syria) communities are living under duress after 
their property, including 15 synagogues in Aleppo were burned to cinders, 
In Egypt, which is by far the most advanced and ‘democratic’ Arab 
independent state, a large number of leading Jews were imprisoned and 
their property ‘sequestrated.’ ... The massacres in Tripolitania and those
99 All references to this meeting come from CZA C2/1659, H. Cynowicz, Bombay Zionist 
Association to Robert Marcus, World Jewish Congress (New York), 7 March 1950. While Cynowicz’ 
meeting may have been the first on the sub-contintent, it certainly was not true in London where Jewish 
representatives met with members of the Mosahiban clan in the early 1930s.
100 Gideon Rafael, Destination Peace: Three Decades o f  Israeli Foreign Policy, A Personal 
Memoir (London: Weidenfeld andNicolson, 1981), 78.
101 BoD ACC 3 121/Cl 1/13/31, Notes from Foreign Affairs Committee, consultation on position of 
Jews in Moslem countries, 2 February 1948.
102 BoD ACC 3121/Cl 1/13/31, Notes from Foreign Affairs Committee, consultation on position of 
Jews in Moslem countries, 2 February 1948. Aerogram sent to Rabbi I. Brodie, Chief Rabbi, London, 
from Cairo (approximately summer 1948). See also Gudrun Kramer, The Jews o f  Modern Egypt, 1914- 
1952 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989).
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of Morocco, conditions in Afghanistan, and events in Karachi, give us the 
feeling that a catastrophe is imminent for all our brethren residing in Arab 
countries unless something is done in time to prevent it.103
In Yemen, Imam Ahmad may have allowed the Jews under his sovereignty to leave for 
reasons similar to those of the Afghan government. His precise rationale is not known, 
though those involved in ‘Operation Magic Carpet’ hypothesised that he was angry at 
Iraq, whose agents killed his father. Also, he may have wanted to spur other members 
of the Arab League, and show his independence.104 For its part, Afghanistan may have 
found more reassurance in joining the non-aligned movement championed by India and 
Iran, after the British Empire crumbled. Some branches of the Jewish Agency helped 
to facilitate the departure of the Jews from Afghanistan, especially Sassoon Siman-Tov 
in the Teheran office. Siman-Tov was well equipped to assist emigration from 
Afghanistan as he was from Mashhad and therefore knowledgeable about the region 
and its particularities. Other branches of the Jewish Agency were less helpful, and even 
disseminated inaccurate information that furthered the suffering of those refugees 
waiting in India and Iran. The efficacy of Jewish organisations was mixed. While 
ultimately successful, there was a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding in the 
late 1940s.
Afghan Rationale for Legal Emigration: Gaining Support for Pashtunistan
When Afghanistan sought to distance itself from the policies of the Muslim 
world, the door to Israel opened for the Jews of Afghanistan.105 What follows is an 
explanation of why Afghanistan’s policy shifted to allow legal emigration.
One of the principal factors for allowing emigration had less to do with the Jews 
and far more to do with Afghanistan’s strong support and lobbying on behalf of the idea 
of Pashtunistan, or an independent territory for members of the Pashtun ethnic group
103 BoD ACC/3121/Cl 1/13/31, Elie Eliachar, President of Sephardi Community in Jerusalem to 
Edward Warburg, Chairman of the Board o f Directors of the American Joint Distribution Committee 
(both in New York), 13 July 1948.
104 Shlomo Barer, The Magic Carpet (Lonodn: Seeker and Warburg, 1952), 178-9.
105 CZA S6/6787, F.W. Pollack (Bombay) to Y. Shimoni (Ha-Kirya), 12 June 1950.
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living in India. This cause gained currency in the 1920s, when the British established 
the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). A political party named Afghan Jirga 
merged with the local branch of the Indian National Congress party in 1931 to become 
Khuda-yi Khidmatgar, dominating the political life of the NWFP for the next sixteen 
years. In 1947, at the time when the vote for partition occurred, the party’s leaders 
realised that there was little support among the people for joining India. Instead, they 
advocated an independent Pashtunistan. However, neither independence, nor joining 
Afghanistan was made an option on the ballot. Khuda-yi Khidmatgar called for a 
boycott of the plebiscite in July, and less than half of the population, possibly as little as 
ten percent, cast a ballot.106 Nonetheless, those voting overwhelmingly chose to join
1H7Pakistan. Afghanistan continued to demand an independent territory.
Afghanistan’s animosity towards Pakistan grew, based on irredentist hostility over 
territory taken by Indian rulers in the eighteenth-century. In 1960, an official 
publication of 1960 meant to gather support for the creation of Pashtunistan, the 
Afghan government stated that: “Any claims made by Pakistan on Pakhtunistan [an 
alternate spelling], as heir or successor to the British Indian Empire, is ... void and 
invalid. Britain did conquer and occupy parts of Pakhtunistan, but she was never in 
possession of the country as a whole.”109 Clearly, the ramifications of this ‘Frontier 
Question’ considerably embroiled Afghanistan’s foreign policy. In September 1947, 
the Afghan delegation cast the only vote against Pakistan’s admittance to the United 
Nations.110 The tension was such that the British Ministry of Defence thought that 
there could be war between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and diplomatic relations between 
the two countries was cut in 1955 and 1961.111
106 Rahman Pazhwak, Pakhtunistan: A New State in Central Asia (London: Royal Afghan 
Embassy, 1960), 24.
107 C.E. Bosworth et al, eds. Encyclopaedia o f  Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993), s.v. “Pashtunistan” 
by Malcom E. Yapp. Afghanistan even “encouraged the emergence o f a phantom national assembly” 
with the Faqir of Ipi presiding.
108 Adamec 1974,261.
109 Pazhwak, 25.
110 Adamec 1974,264.
111 “Pakistan cannot establish her dominion in Pakhtunistan and hold the people in bondage. If her 
denial o f the legitimate right of the people of Pakhtunistan is continued, the inevitable consequences will 
be a responsibility resting on her shoulders alone.” (Pazhwak, 27) See IOLIVWS/1/1169, 89-105.
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Anger over Pashtunistan may have made the Afghan government more amenable 
to foreign opinion. As already described, the Afghan ambassador to India clearly felt 
that the charge of anti-Semitism was a Pakistani plot to discredit Afghanistan. In the 
ambassador’s eyes, this was an issue of conspiracy. He felt that the Pakistanis showed 
they were against Afghanistan by accusing them of anti-Semitism in the Jewish 
world.112 While quite a bizarre notion, this delusion may have been helpful for the 
Jewish community, as they gained another ally by default. The ambassador’s outburst 
demonstrates that he may have lobbied in favour of treating the Jewish community 
well, and letting them leave if they so chose, as a way of subverting alleged Pakistani 
propaganda.113
As a corollary to hostility towards Pakistan, Afghanistan became friendly with 
India, and more open to its influence. The editor of a Jewish magazine in Bombay 
learned that Afghanistan wanted to coordinate its foreign policy with Iran and India. As 
a result, he tried to convince an official of the Home Department in New Delhi to 
pursuade Afghanistan to allow its Jewish population to leave.114 India managed 
previous waves of Jewish refugees from Afghanistan, and wanted this occurrence to 
end. Legal departure from Afghanistan could be directed towards Iran, though illegal 
departures (at least before partition) tended to go via Peshawar and ultimately to 
Bombay. India may have also wanted to encourage Afghans to show tolerance to the 
other remaining religious minorities in Afghanistan - Hindus and Sikhs.
In addition to conflict with Pakistan, the political leadership of Afghanistan 
changed. Several key Afghan leaders stepped down. Muhammad Hashim Khan and
Possibility of War between Pakistan and Afghanistan: Draft Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, 
8 July 1949. C.E. Bosworth et al, eds. Encyclopaedia o f Islam (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1993), s.v. 
“Pashtunistan” by Malcom E. Yapp.
112 CZA C2/1659, Cynowicz (Bombay) to Marcus (New York), 7 March 1950.
113 “Transit visas have been refused, it is because o f the general bad feeling between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.” Instead, Pakistan asked that the Jews proceed to Teheran instead of Karachi. CZA 
C2/1659, A.L. Easterman (London) to M.L. Perlzweig (New York), 23 February 1950.
114 CZA S6/6787, F.W. Pollack (Bombay) to Y. Shimoni, Director o f Asian Division, Foreign 
Office (Ha-Kirya), 12 June 1950.
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‘Abd al-Majid Khan, architects of the economic system with clear anti-Semitic 
overtones, left office. In May 1946, Muhammad Hashim Khan resigned as regent in 
favour of his nephew, Muhammad Zahir Shah, and two years later, ‘Abd al-Majid Khan 
Zabuli went to America (ostensibly for medical care), taking a considerable fortune 
made under the auspices of the Ashami Company.115 Another reason that the leaders of 
Afghanistan allowed the Jews to leave may have been simply because they were 
pleased to have an impoverished, non-Muslim community depart.116
After the retirement of his regent, Muhammad Zahir Shah began to rule in his 
own name. He was more amenable to international pressure, while Afghan foreign 
policy became independent from Great Britain’s influence. When Afghanistan was 
applying for membership to the United Nations in 1946, the American ambassador, Ely 
Palmer, asked if Jews there were persecuted. An undersecretary in the Foreign 
Ministry replied that they were allowed to practice Judaism openly, and that they did so 
with much clamour.117 On other occasions, Afghan representatives stated that the 
Jewish community was free from persecution. Regardless of the veracity of this 
statement, the fact that they had to answer such questions meant governmental 
representatives became aware of the importance of this issue for the United States.
After admittance to the UN, Afghanistan was more exposed to international currents 
and organisations. Later, this opened a window for Israeli diplomacy and the 
representations of the World Jewish Congress.
The king of Afghanistan also may have allowed Jews to leave due because of his 
own positive feelings towards them. There are many stories current among immigrants 
in Israel about his protection and generosity towards the community in Afghanistan. It 
is clear that they maintain great affection for him. A newspaper article written in 1980 
reported that one of the few possessions an immigrant family kept from Afghanistan
115IOL L/PS/12/1562, Leading Personalities o f  Afghanistan 1948, 3; and Adamec 1974, 274.
116 Regarding Jewish refugees in Bombay, the Jewish Agency reported that, “Afghanistan is not 
keen on having them back.” CZA S6/6787, A.Gance, Immigration Department, Jewish Agency 
(Bombay) to Y. Vainstein, Immigration Department, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 17 April 1951.
117 Landshut 1950a, 69.
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was a coloured lithograph of Muhammad Zahir Shah.118 One informant told this author 
that at a state dinner, the king publicly chastised a relative for displaying anti-Semitism, 
reminding him of the belief that the Pashtuns were once Jews. This businessman,
Eliahu Bezalel also confirmed the story of a German Jewish eye doctor who treated the 
king. In gratitude, Muhammad Zahir Shah asked what he wanted as a reward. The 
man asked for no payment, only that the king should treat his Jewish citizens well.119
Prejudice against the Jewish Community Lessened through Afghan Myth of 
Ethnogenesis
Anti-Semitism was sometimes mitigated by Afghan folk beliefs and origin myths. 
In the period of this study, this was of particular assistance when Jews were in the 
process of leaving Afghanistan. Some Pashtun tribes, especially the Durrani,
Yussufzai, and Affidi, trace their descent to King Saul. In an article about the medieval 
Jewish community of Afghanistan, Guy Matalon notes that both Pashtuns and local 
Jews traced their ancestry to ancient Israelite tribes. This may have created an unusual 
set of complementary cultural identities. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
British found these traditions intriguing.120 Henri Vansittart took parts of the Al Asrar 
al Afghan written by Khair ad-Din and translated it in an attempt to learn about the 
origins of the Pashtun tribe. He states: “They are very proud of their ancient origin and 
the fame of their tribe, but other Muslims absolutely reject their pretentious pride.”
Due to this hostility, sometimes these folk beliefs were downplayed.121 In the late 
1930s, Nazi influence shifted the ethnogenesis beliefs of the Afghans. Louis Dupree
118 Rafael Gaon, “Beit Abba-Ima b ’Afghanistan,” (Dad and Mom’s Home in Afghanistan) Al Ha- 
Mishmar, 1 February 1980, 4.
119 Interview with Eliahu Bezalel, Ramat Gan, Israel, 12 July 2001. Perhaps the physician arrived 
through negotiations carred out with Faiz Muhammad Khan in Ankara. While it is true that German 
Jewish physicians were practicing in Afghanistan at this time, this account could also be an urban legend. 
Caitlin Adams brought to my attention the biblical texture o f this narative, and how similar it is to the 
Book o f Esther.
120 Guy Matalon, “The ‘Other’ in ‘Afghan’ Identity: Medieval Jewish community o f Afghanistan” 
originally published in Mardom Nama-e Bakhter also found on line at: www.afghan- 
web.com/historv/articles/iews.html. Jewish Encyclopaedia (London: Funk and Wagnalls, 1925), s.v. 
“Afghanistan;” and Encyclopedia Judaica (Jerusalem: Keter, 1971), s.v. “Afghanistan.”
121 Henri Vansittart, Sur /'Origine Hebraique des Afghans, extract from Tome II, (Calcutta: 3 
March 1784), 12 land 123.
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writes that: “many Afghans sought their origin in the legend of the lost, wandering tribe 
of the ancient Beni Israel,” until German propagandists “injected a new bit of racist 
folklore into the Afghan mainstream” and told the Afghans that they were “the original 
Aryans.”122 Older folk beliefs partially resurfaced after Nazi Germany’s defeat.123
Whatever the origins of this myth of ethnogenesis (or its accuracy), there can be 
no doubt that these beliefs provided links between the two groups, and could lead to 
some relief for the beleaguered Jewish community.124 For example, Musa Morduf and 
Moshe Cohen Ambulo, two immigrants from Afghanistan living in Israel reported that 
when community members presented the Kabuli chief of police with a token of their 
thanks for his protection, he said that Afghans: “were of the Sons of Israel. When 
Muhamed came they had no other religion besides Judaism. You remained Jews and 
we accepted the religion of Muhamed.” Michael Bar Yosef was a Bukharan refugee
living in Kabul during 1948, and along with most of the resident Jewish population, he 
wanted to emigrate. This was difficult because the Afghan Government “did not give 
Jews exit visas easily, especially during the days of [the] battle of the War of 
Independence, when it was considered reinforcements for the Jews.” One day during 
the summer of 1948, Moshe Bar Yosef was sitting in a Muslim coffee house when three 
Afghan officers started a conversation with him. One of them said:
122 Dupree 1973,479.
123 One visitor to Kabul in 2000 asked younger members o f the Taliban if  they knew about the 
Pashtuns’ alleged Jewish roots. They had “never heard o f such things and reproached me for asking a 
ridiculous question.” However, frequently, “their elders intervened and put them right. ‘Yes, a long time 
ago our people were Jewish,’ they said.” Michael Rubin, “Tea (and Prejudice) with the Taliban,” 
Jerusalem Report, 19 June 2000, 37.
124 See, for example, Shalva Weil, “Our Brethren the Taliban?” Jerusalem Report, 22 October 
2001, 22.
125 A. Avihail and A. Brin, The Lost Tribes in Assyria. (Jerusalem: Amishav, 1985), 76-7. This 
book was pubished by an organisation, Amishav, which is dedicated to finding and learning about the 
dispersed of Israel. The aim of this book is to show that Pashtuns are a lost tribe of Israel. As a by­
product o f this research, many Jews from Afghanistan were interviewed, including some also 
interviewed or studied by the present author. Clearly, this text must be used with caution, however some 
individuals expressed sentiments and recounted events that can be confirmed in other sources.
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I always thought the Jews were cowards and the Arabs brave like us, and 
now I [am] surprised to hear the opposite. How do your Jews win?” At 
first I hesitated and thought whether to answer them but all at once I 
became brave and said: “your opinion of the Arabs that they are brave is 
incorrect, they were never brave like you. They are cowards. Only the 
Muslim religion is common to you. But you are not of Arab stock, for 
you are of Jewish stock, and you received the religion at a later date.”
Hearing my answer two of the officers got very angry, but the third one 
quieted them saying -  why do you boil up? This Jew speaks the truth. I 
myself heard from my father, that we are Afghans descended from the 
tribes of Israel. And then the officer beside him said -  if  we are truly of 
Jewish stock, the Jews are our relations and brothers and we should help 
them against the Arabs. These same officers helped me later to get 
papers for my immigration.126
While it was quite a risky strategy, Bar Yosef was able to use Afghan origin myths 
effectively to his great benefit. These beliefs were also current among the highest 
echelons of government and probably included the king himself.
Muhammad Zahir Shah may have seen the Jews as ancient kinsmen and therefore 
took special measures to protect them during times of unrest. He sent in the army to 
shield the Jewish communities in Herat and Kabul during Arab-Israeli wars, especially 
in 1956 and 1967. The government posted guards at the synagogues, and made 
everyone stay at home until the danger had passed. After some time had passed, men 
would go to the synagogue to pray and later they would open their businesses for a few 
hours each day. Only after the situation was sufficiently calm would women and 
children venture outside of the home. Despite these fears and precautions, it is clear 
that those who remained in Afghanistan during Muhammad Zahir Shah’s post-war rule 
experienced far better conditions than at any other time — except perhaps during 
Amanullah’s reign. Remembering those years, Leah Dil told this author that the Jews 
were treated specially at the royal gardens in Paghman. When Muhammad Zahir Shah 
wanted to visit the gardens, ordinary citizens would have to leave, but the Jews were 
permitted to stay. As the king strolled through the gardens, he would ask, who are 
those people over there? When told that they were Jews, they were allowed to remain. 
He would go over and greet those picnicking, and ask after them. Leah Dil recalled
126 Ibid, 58-9.
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that Muhammad Zahir Shah would ask the schoolboys if they were having any trouble,
197or being bullied. If an incident occurred, the children were to report it to him. Dil 
remembers greeting the king on many occasions in Paghman. She would also help to 
make elaborate trays of sweets for the royal family on the occasions of their children’s 
marriages. Dil mentioned that Muhammad Zahir Shah told them, “As long as I am
p o
king, you will be protected.”
An even greater influence upon Afghanistan must have been its desire to cultivate 
friendship with the United States. As early as 1921, Afghanistan turned to the United 
States as an alternative to Germany, to fill the role of a territorially disinterested third 
power. However, Afghanistan’s overtures were consistently turned down for two 
decades. When asked to establish a diplomatic mission in 1930 and 1935, the US 
refused. It viewed Afghanistan as part of the British sphere of influence, having a 
similar role to its own in Latin America, and consequently wary of treading on British 
interests. In 1937, Afghanistan even offered a lucrative concession for oil exploration 
to an American firm with the hope that this would stimulate involvement, and a US 
diplomatic mission would be established. Only one year later, the Inland Oil 
Exploration Company abandoned its concession, citing the “worsening international 
situation.” However, in July 1942 an American legation was established in Kabul, 
after Germany’s attack through the Caucasus, “endangered Allied communications
190across Iran” but left Afghanistan unfettered. After the war, in the absence of 
Germany, and with strategic advantages now clear to both sides, relations between the 
US and Afghanistan warmed.
America never expressed territorial ambition in Central Asia, and after the 
Holocaust, it often appealed to countries to protect their Jewish communities. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the United States sold 100,000 tons of flour to 
Afghanistan in 1947 to alleviate widespread hunger. Most of Afghanistan’s imports in
127 Interview with Leah Dil, Holon, Israel, 9 July 2001.
128 Ibid. After Muhammad Zahir Shah was overthrown in 1973, Leah and her husband Levi Dil 
applied for, and received special medical permission to leave Afghanistan. They felt that the situation 
would not be stable enough for them to remain.
129 Adamec 1974, 237 and 258.
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the late 1940s came from the United States, particularly grains, cloth, oil, and 
automobiles.130 New York replaced Leipzig and London as the international centre for 
karakul sale.131 Thus, the United States quickly became Afghanistan’s main trading 
partner in the post-war period. In 1948, half of the 700 foreigners in Kabul were 
American. ‘ Abd al-Majid travelled to Washington to negotiate a commercial 
agreement, hoping for financial advisors, an improved market for Afghan goods in the 
US, and an American supervised commercial school in Kabul. To show how eager 
Afghanistan was for American support, it placed a $30 million road contract with the 
US firm Morrison-Knudsen to construct dams on the Kabul, Helmand, and Arghandab 
rivers.132 In 1949, Afghanistan was hoping for a large loan from the United States, and 
by December 1950, the American Export-Import Bank extended $21 million to 
Afghanistan.133
Just as Afghanistan began to rely on the economic assistance of the United States, 
between 1949 and 1951, the American ambassador in Kabul was Jewish. Before being 
promoted to ambassador, Louis Dreyfus worked with international Jewish organisations 
while posted in Iran, and maintained these connections in Afghanistan. In November 
1949, the Jewish Agency in Teheran contacted him, and asked him to appeal to the 
Afghan government to overturn its ban on granting passports to Jewish citizens.134 It 
appears that he was successful, and he seems to have played a pivotal role in allowing 
the legal exodus of Jews from Afghanistan. His letters survive in the National Archives 
of the United States, and they are friendly and convivial. Dreyfus must have been well 
received among Afghan officials, who welcomed his opinions, and responded in
130See for example, IOL L/PS/12/1554, Appendixes A-D, 7-14, which dramatically shows how the 
United States sold 20.4 million of the total 27.9 million rupees (or 73%) of all products imported into 
Afghanistan in 1947.
131 IOL L/PS/12/1553, Report on the Economic Situation in Afghanistan 1946, 54.
132 USNA, General Records o f the Department o f State, Record Group 84, Afghanistan: Kabul -  
General Records 1948, box 16, no. 800 Political Afghanistan, “U.S. Influence Grows in Afghanistan,” 
Christian Science Monitor, 17 December 1948; “Calendar o f H.E. Abdul Majid Khan’s meetings in 
Washington;” and New York Times, 27 November 1948.
133 IOL LAV'S/1/1169, Possibility o f War between Pakistan and Afghanistan: Draft Report by the 
Joint Intelligence Committee, 8 July 1949, 86.
134 CZA S6/6787, Zion Cohen (Teheran) to the Department of ‘Aliya (Tel Aviv), 24 November 
1949, written as a summary of letters on 6 December 1949.
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kind.135 Permission for the Jews to leave may have been granted out of personal 
courtesy towards Louis Dreyfus.
Emigration Commences
Several months after diplomatic initiatives started at the World Jewish Congress 
in February 1950, and at the United Nations, the Tel Aviv Va’ad learned that the 
Afghan government had changed its policy. It started to grant passports to five Jewish 
families every week. Numbers were kept small because Afghanistan wanted to be 
considerate of the position of the Muslim world towards Israel, and did not want to 
make a bad impression upon them. In response, the Tel Aviv Va’ad sent similar letters 
to the World Jewish Congress and the Jewish Agency, each differing in tone. It 
thanked the World Jewish Congress for its fruitful efforts, and told the congress to 
share the good news with all interested institutions. One week later, the Tel Aviv 
Va’ad contacted the Immigration Department, and simply asked if the agency could 
arrange for ‘aliya through their Teheran offices.136 This cool tone underscores the 
difficulties inherent in the relationship between the Jewish Agency and groups
1 3 7
advocating on behalf of Afghanistan! Jewry.
When the Tel Aviv Va’ad sent these two letters, it underscored the importance of 
not publicising this relaxation of Afghan policy. In September 1950, the newspaper 
Ha-Boker enquired about Bukharan emigration from Afghanistan. The Jewish Agency
135 The files of the American embassy are peppered with references to social interactions with 
Muhammad Zahir Shah, Shah Wali Khan, Muhammad Naim Khan and other high officials, reflecting an 
informal, helpful tone, which I have not encountered in British sources. See for example, USNA,
General Records of the Department o f State, Record Group 84, Afghanistan -  Kabul 1947, box 13, no. 
843, Women’s Welfare Society.
136 CZA S6/6787, M. H. Agajan, Va’ad Hitahadut Yehudei Olei Afghanistan to the head o f the 
World Jewish Congress (both in Tel Aviv), 30 April 1950; and Va’ad Hitahadut Yehudei ‘Olei 
Afghanistan (Tel Aviv) to Y. Rafael, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 5 May 1950.
137 Interestingly enough, some o f these same tensions are present today over Jews from northern 
Ethiopia remaining in a compound in Addis Ababa. Those settled in Israel and groups like the North 
American Council on Ethiopian Jews lobby the Israeli government for more ‘aliya, yet the government 
resists these appeals. This is possibly due to an overly conservative rabbinate, which has Halachic 
questions about their ‘legitimacy’ as Jews, as some did convert under duress. It may also be due to 
racism. Similar impediments were not placed in front of Soviet Jewry, although there are estimates that a 
significant minority o f those currently in Israel are not Halachically Jewish.
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told the paper that while it negotiated with the Afghan authorities, the agency was not 
allowed to fly a plane into Afghan territory. The Immigration Department warned the 
editorial board of the newspaper not to publish an account of the “flight” of Jews from 
Afghanistan, and especially not to describe their departure as “fleeing.” Ha-Boker 
followed these instructions.138
A short time later, Zvi Cynowicz, the well-meaning chairman of the Bombay
| ™
Zionist Organisation, broke the story, which was then carried by the Jerusalem Post. 
Cynowicz had sometimes been criticized within the internal documents of the World 
Jewish Congress for his lack of reliability and exaggeration. The head of the London 
office of the World Jewish Congress, Alexander Easterman, wrote to New York about 
his concerns over Cynowicz. Easterman noted “the motif of his periodical and 
spasmodic calls upon us to take emergency action in crises which seem to crop up in 
obscure parts of the Orient. I have never regarded this gentleman as being a model of 
exactness or a purist.”140 As an example of this, in 1950, Cynowicz claimed that his 
organisation was appealing on behalf of the Jews of Afghanistan “as their only 
spokesmen and their only liaison with the outside Jewish World.”141 This was certainly 
an overstatement. It may have only been accurate between 1947 and 1949 for the 
Jewish community in Kabul after Peshawar was abandoned. When Jews in Kabul wrote 
to the Israeli ambassador in Moscow, they specifically mentioned that they could be 
contacted through Cynowicz.142 Regardless of the difficulties he encountered in 
convincing his superiors to act, Cynowicz worked tirelessly on behalf of Afghanistani
138 CZA S6/6787, Secretary of the Immigration Department, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) to the 
editorial board o f Ha-Boker (Tel Aviv), 29 September 1950.
139 CZA S5/11616, “Afghan Jews on Their Way,” Jerusalem Post, 2 November 1950.
140 CZA C2/1659, World Jewish Congress correspondence, Alex Easterman (London) to Maurice 
Perlzweig (New York), 23 February 1950, and also letters between Perlzweig (New York) to Easterman 
(London), 20 February 1950, and Easterman (London) to Robert Marcus (New York), 13 February 1950.
141 CZA C2/1659, Cynowicz, Bombay Zionist Association to World Jewish Congress, Political 
Department (New York), 1 February 1950.
142 Letter written to the Israeli Ambassador in Moscow from Jews in Kabul and sent on 6 February 
1949, as reproduced by Kashani (May 1980): 12-13, quoting Mordechai Namir, Shlihot b a ’Moskva, 349.
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Jews in Bombay, to the point of physical collapse. He drew attention to their plight 
when many others were silent.143
Hostility to Mizrahim is linked to derogatory references to American Jews. The 
British critic of Cynowicz, Alexander Easterman, was also harshly disposed towards 
the political director of his own organisation’s New York office. Easterman felt that 
Robert Marcus had an “irrepressible impulse to indulge in diplomatic cannonades on 
the slightest provocation and on the flimsiest pretexts.” He thought that Marcus fed the 
sensationalism of the American Jewish press, assuming that their readers were:
just gasping to know about the ills and troubles of the Jews of Timbuktu 
and what not, that a quiver of excitement runs through the five million 
American Jews when they read that Dr. Marcus, P.D. [Political Director] 
of the World Jewish Congress has written to the Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary of the Deputy Assistant Vice Under Secretary of 
the State of Dahomay.... Never mind, if my geography is all askew and 
my diplomatic titles mixed up.144
Another letter written ten days previously also expresses personal hostility that 
Easterman was not consulted when Marcus wrote to the Afghan Ambassador in 
Washington. Easterman clearly felt slighted.145
These intemperate letters from Easterman illustrate some of the factors that can 
shape institutional dynamics, especially when different agencies and offices try to 
coordinate policy across continents. It also offers a window into intra-Jewish 
‘wrangling’ and the difficulty of co-ordinating diverse sets of suffering and needs, from 
the aftermath of the Holocaust to the exodus of Jews from the Muslim world.146 As the 
above example demonstrates, individual egos were also involved, and the slight that 
Easterman felt translated into condescension.
143 CZA S6/5404, J.J. Gubbay, President o f Bombay Zionist Association to J.N. Behar, Jewish 
Agency (Jerusalem), 16 October 1947.
144 CZA C2/1659, A.L. Easterman (London) to M.L. Perlzweig (New York), 23 February 1950.
145 CZA C2/1659, A.L. Easterman (London) to R.S. Marcus (New York), 13 February 1950.
146 “Israel to claim billions from Muslim states for 900,000 Jewish refugees” Jerusalem Report, 16 
December 2002, 6.
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Mizrahi communities often faced prejudice when interacting with Jewish 
organisations, and after arriving in Israel. Evidence of this discrimination is certainly 
present for the Jews of Afghanistan, notably when visas were denied for Shmuel 
Dadash and the other prisoners. In the 1930s, Anglo-Jewish prejudice was directed 
against Mizrahi communities as a whole. The Jews in Afghanistan fared particularly 
poorly, as the Board of Deputies and the leaders of Anglo-Jewry followed the advice of 
the British Foreign Office and diplomatic corps. The experiences of the community in 
Afghanistan were not well understood, and as a small, remote group, they were easy to 
dismiss. Perhaps what is most amazing is how much of their suffering was transmitted. 
One of the lessons absorbed by the Holocaust was that all Jews, religious and secular, 
practicing or converted, even Christians with one Jewish grandparent, shared the same 
fate. The Jewish world took this lesson to heart. After the European community was 
decimated, Jewish organisations dramatically shifted their focus, and started lobbying 
on behalf of Mizrahim with even more unity and passion.147
While Anglo-Jewry embraced the plight of Mizrahi communities, Mizrahim now 
looked to the government of Israel, particularly the Jewish Agency and the Immigration 
Department. When the mass exodus started in Afghanistan, the Jewish community 
found itself increasingly frustruated. Some of this discontent was channelled through 
the va’adot, or organisations established by Jews from Afghanistan in Israel. The 
va’adot were concerned that Israeli authorities were allowing their relatives to suffer 
needlessly in Teheran while they waited to make ‘aliya.
Afghanistan! Jews Entering and Languishing in Iran
Despite official permission being granted, there were still many obstacles to 
‘aliya. After permission was secured, most Jews in Afghanistan prepared to leave the 
home of their birth in the summer of 1950. Travel was far easier in the summer 
months, and they were afraid that the government would reverse its position. The
147 For a British example of post-war attitudes towards Mizrahim, see BoD ACC 3121/Cl 1/13/31.
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Jewish Agency encouraged its contact in Herat, Mullah Asher Gargi, to send 
community members through Iran and not India. On 8 June Yitzhak Rafael, the 
Director of the Immigration Department explained that the department was waiting for 
immigration to begin from Afghanistan. He knew that a small migratory movement 
had already commenced, and now he expected groups of around one hundred each to 
start on their way.148
The logistics of thousands of hungry, poor Afghanistani Jews converging on 
Teheran meant that a crisis larger than the one that Bombay’s Jewish community faced 
was about to commence. Once again, misinformation was transmitted and weakened 
individuals suffered needlessly. Yitzhak Rafael notified the Jerusalem Va’ad that the 
first group of fifty ‘olim or immigrants was to be arriving via Teheran in August 
1950.149 He continued, “We hope that the ‘aliya will continue in larger dimensions. ...I 
ask you to help and support them. The members of your community will need to 
support them in their process of absorption.”150 One wonders if this letter may have 
also precipitated a refugee crisis in Teheran, which was to become very much like the 
one in Bombay several years earlier. Perhaps the Va’ad wrote to Jews in Afghanistan 
and told them to get ready to leave as they did in 1947. It is more likely that the 
community inside of Afghanistan needed very few external stimuli to encourage 
emigration, as they had wanted to leave for many years.
According to letters found in the Central Zionist Archives, by the autumn of 1950, 
the organisations of Jews from Afghanistan in Israel were getting increasingly upset. 
They worried that their relatives in Teheran were at risk of starvation. They were also 
concerned that the gates of ‘aliya might close just as suddenly as they had opened, and 
wanted to make sure that all could get out in time. The quota of only fifty allowed to
148 CZA S6/6787, Daniel Gol, Va’ad Edat Yehudei Afghanistan to Yitzhak Rafael, Jewish Agency 
(both in Jerusalem) 24 Av 5710 (7 August 1950); and Yitzhak Rafael, Jewish Agency to Va’ad Edat 
Sefardim (both in Jerusalem), 8 June 1950.
149 ‘Olim (pi.) are those who are literally ‘ascending’ or making ‘aliya.
150 CZA S6/6787,Yitzhak Rafael to Daniel Gol, 26 Av 5710 (9 August 1950).
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emigrate each month was deemed woefully inadequate, as 3,000 wanted to leave.151 At 
this time, the Joint Distribution Committee was also aware of the Jewish Agency’s 
shortcomings. Its members wondered why there were no links between the agency’s 
welfare offices and those of immigration. As one source says, this was considered ill 
advised, and could “cause ends which aren’t good.”152 The Joint Distribution 
Committee wanted immigration to be linked to assistance, so that ‘olim would not be 
placed in jeopardy. Yet, they did not want to be the only organisation providing for 
those in Teheran. The committee felt it was best if emigration from Afghanistan would 
be limited to the number of Jews allowed to enter Israel each month.
•  •  1 ^However wise, the Jewish Agency was unable to achieve even this simple goal. 
Just as in Bombay, the employees of the Jewish Agency transmitted faulty information 
that caused further suffering. In fact, it was only after those who were suffering hunger 
and homelessness in Teheran wrote to their relations and warned them to remain in 
Afghanistan or even Mashhad, that the tide ebbed. The Tel Aviv Va’ad told Rafael that 
they received worrying letters from Teheran detailing the emigrants’ difficulties: how 
most stayed in Iran a long time, and how the Jewish Agency showed little concerned 
for them. The Va’ad reminded him of the condition of Afghanistan’s Jewry. Its letter 
concluded by saying: “We are an exceptional community. Not one of us leaves Israel 
[after arrival]. We do all kinds of jobs and professions through the love of the 
homeland. We are asking you to get them out of Iran as soon as possible.”154
A new va’ad formed in Tel Aviv echoed these concerns. The Committee to Care 
for Immigrants from Afghanistan wrote a memo in the autumn of 1950 (presumably to 
the Jewish Agency, though it is not clear) entitled “Saving the Jews of Afghanistan
151 CZA S6/6787, Daniel Gol, Va’ad Edat Yehudei Afghanistan to Yitzhak Rafael, Jewish Agency 
(both in Jerusalem), 27 Tishri 5711 (Fall 1950)
152 CZA S6/6787, S. Passman, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (Tel Aviv) to 
Yitzhak Rafael, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 24 October 1950.
153 Ibid, and CZA S6/6787, Afghani Refugees (Teheran) to the Director o f the Immigration 
Department, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 30 January 1952.
154 CZA S6/6787, Va’ad Hitahadut Yehudei Olei Afghanistan (Tel Aviv) to Yitzhak Rafael 
(Jerusalem), sent 21 Av 5711, received 24 August 1951.
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from the Danger of Expulsion from Iran and their ‘Aliya to the Land [Israel].”155 This 
described how Jews from Afghanistan had flowed into Teheran for the last five months, 
but that no one helped them. Only one hundred of the 1,000 waiting arrived in Israel by 
November 1950. The writers felt that the Jewish Agency did not show the same level 
of concern for them as it had showed other communities. The va’ad asked “and what if 
their blood drops? They are also Jewish!” They were furious that the Jewish Agency 
failed to carry through with its promises, as Jews from Afghanistan were liable for 
deportation from Iran if they did not leave within three months. The va’ad was worried 
that if the immigrants returned to Afghanistan, their route to Israel could be blocked for 
a long period of time, as it had been fourteen years since the border was last open to 
Jews. One last item angered the va’ad, which was how residents of Teheran, at no risk 
of homelessness or deportation, were allowed to immigrate before those far more 
vulnerable.156
Another letter sent from ‘plitei Afghanim ’ or literally “Afghani refugees” in 
Teheran to the immigration department in Jerusalem details their conditions and 
frustrations of life in Iran.
We are Afghan refugees who arrived in Mashhad after great suffering 
... There we received information by telegraph to come to Teheran. It 
has been eight months that a part of our people has been wandering 
around Teheran without accommodation or medical care, living in filthy 
[lit: pestilence] rooms, paying 400-600 rials per month as rent. ... There 
remains nothing for us to cover our bodies from the elements, such is the 
hard shame that is found in Teheran.
The Jewish Agency in Teheran did not extend a helping hand to us, 
and did not support us in any way. They once gave us 12,800 rials, but 
took out 2,800 to arrange our passports. In this country, we are under 
pressure of the government, as soon our passports will expire. I ask of 
you to consider our present situation and to care for the wretched 
Afghans like you care for Jews from other countries. For twenty years, 
we lived under the pressure of the Afghan government and in that entire 
period, they stole from us the right to engage in the export-import trade.
We have become wretched in Iran.
155 CZA S6/6787, letter entitled: “Saving the Jews o f Afghanistan from the Danger o f Expulsion 
from Iran and their ‘Aliya to the Land,” Ha-Va’ada l’Tipul b’Olei Afghanistan (The Committee to Care 
for Immigrants from Afghanistan), 1 November 1950.
156 Ibid.
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We see our only hope, principally from G-d, and after that from you, 
leaders of the people. Do something for us, for the sake of G-d, Moses, 
and Our Holy Torah. Find some remedy for the crushing of our hearts, 
because we are unable to take more of this situation here in Teheran.157
This letter clearly describes conditions the agency was ignoring, and explains how 
misinformation propagated by the Jewish Agency led to further sorrow for Jews from 
Afghanistan.
The identity of the Jews from Afghanistan also shifts. This letter is almost fully 
secular, in stark contrast to those received from the Herati and Kabuli communities 
several years previously. Individuals began to identify themselves as Afghans 
[literally: Afghanim -  using a Hebraicised plural] instead of simply as Jews from 
Afghanistan. This shows the beginning of a recognition of the way they are viewed 
outside of Afghanistan. In preparation for joining an environment overwhelmingly 
Jewish, the community distinguishes itself through its origin in Afghanistan.158 In 
leaving, one allegiance shifts back to the land of their birth.
Various associations of Afghanistani Jews in their land of origin, or further 
removed in Iran, India, and to a lesser extent, in Israel, all tried to project their 
conception of a kehilah kedosha — a holy community or congregation on to the 
framework of the emerging state of Israel.159 They expected that the state would care 
for its citizens and troubled Jews around the world in a way that was similar to their 
own internal parameters of mutual support. While Socialist ideals were incorporated 
into the foundation of the state of Israel, they were in no way as elaborate as the 
mechanisms for support within the Jewish community in Afghanistan. As shown in the 
above example, Jews from Afghanistan who were waiting in Teheran were upset that
157 CZA S6/6787, communal letter from Afghani refugees (Teheran) to the Director o f the Office 
o f Immigration, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 30 January 1952.
158 In some ways, this may be similiar to the way Hazaras are also called ‘Afghan’ in Iran.
159 CZA S6/6787, Va’ad Hitahadut Yehudei Olei Afghanistan (Tel Aviv) to Yitzhak Rafael, 
Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 21 Av 5711, received 24 August 1951.
288
the offices of the Jewish Agency did not appear to be concerned about their welfare.160 
They were disappointed, as the transferring of communal values on to a nation-state 
proved impossible. It was a harsh awakening, and these individuals were shocked to 
find fellow Jews behaving so poorly towards them. In January 1952, those waiting in 
Teheran asked Yitzhak Rafael to “find some remedy for the crushing of our hearts, 
because we are unable to take more of this situation here.”161 After some time in Israel, 
and with the foundation of several va’adot, the immigrants from Afghanistan began to 
be aware of the Jewish government’s limitations. Then, this emphasis shifted to 
targeting policies that appeared to be inherently unfair, and dependent upon geography. 
The va’adot drew attention, for example, to the partial treatment that they felt 
Ashkenazim received over Mizrahim. It is undeniable that European Jewry received
1 A1)better treatment than those from Africa or Asia.
The shortcomings of the Jewish Agency became starkly apparent outside of
Teheran. In Bombay, Zvi Cynowicz also was concerned, and transmitted his feelings
to Yitzhak Rafael. He wrote that at the rate the Jews from Afghanistan were being
absorbed into Israel, it would take fifty months for all to arrive there, and they were
afraid that the government would forbid emigration once again. Cynowicz noted that
they made the journey to Teheran independently, but that once they arrived in the city,
their situation became even more difficult. He noted that they did not go to the
m a'abarot (rudimentary tent cities for new immigrants, similar to refugee camps) but
1almost all were cared for by family or community members. Yitzhak Rafael 
informed Cynowicz that the ‘aliya from Afghanistan started in December 1950, when 
the first group left Teheran for Tel Aviv. He hoped that in January one hundred to 150 
more would be allowed to emigrate. Rafael wrote that due to the “pressure from other
160 Ibid.
161 CZA S6/6787, Afghani refugees (Teheran) to director o f department of immigration, Jewish 
Agency (Jerusalem), 30 January 1952.
162 Prof. David Rabeeya of Bryn Mawr College described being sprayed with DDT on the tarmac 
after his arrival from Bagdad at the Lod airport. Immediately afterwards, the family’s name was 
changed, and they were dropped off at a camp near Beersheva. Though a child, he did not attend school 
again until after completing the army. David Rabeeya, The Journey o f  an Arab Jew in European Israel: 
An Anthology (published on the web by Xlibirs, February, 2001). Barer also describes how Yemeni Jews 
were sprayed with DDT and inoculated before making ‘aliya. Barer, 51.
163 CZA S6/6787, Zvi Cynowicz (Bombay) to Yitzhak Rafael (Jerusalem), 10 December 1950.
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places, we can’t allocate more for Afghan Jews. There is no place for a hurried exit 
from there.” He described meeting new arrivals from Afghanistan and told Cynowicz 
“all those who have influence must use it, as the exit will be slow.” Rafael mentioned 
Iranian police brutality, and ascribed their suffering to the lack of a timely movement to 
Israel. Still, he showed no willingness to speed up their immigration process.164
It is ironic that the brutality of the Teherani police force was responsible for a 
swifter migration. In Teheran, Jews from Afghanistan were joined by those fleeing 
Iraq. The situation endured by Iraqi Jews was far more violent than that of 
Afghanistan, and they suffered greater privation in fleeing to Iran. In 1935, teaching 
Hebrew was declared illegal, and Jews were forbidden from employment in the public 
sector. In 1941, when Rashid Ali’s pro-Axis government fell, there were riots against 
the Jews in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and other towns.165 In Baghdad alone, it was 
estimated that 150 were killed, 700 wounded, 900 homes burned, and 600 businesses 
looted. Another pogrom occurred in July 1946. In May 1948, the community was 
subjected to further terror, including widespread arrests, torture, and extortion. An 
Egyptian newspaper noted approvingly that the municipality had gained more revenue 
from targeting its wealthy Jewish citizens than it had from “all the measures hitherto 
taken by the Egyptian authorities.” Consequently, many in the Jewish community 
risked a long prison term, and fled. In November 1949, Zion Cohen reported that 400 
were in camps in Teheran and another hundred had just crossed the border. He 
expected that more would arrive as winter conditions worsened, for there would be 
fewer border guards on patrol.166 Martial law had been enacted on 14 May 1948, and 
being a ‘Zionist’ meant a seven-year prison sentence along with a confiscation of all 
property. In December 1949, martial law and mass arrests ended, yet thousands 
continued to flee. On 9 March 1950, the government allowed legal emigration i f  Jews 
would give up Iraqi nationality. This meant that the state gained all Jewish wealth and
164 CZA S6/6787, Rafael to Cynowicz, 15 January 1951. “Those gathered in Teheran and 
Mashhad have met great suffering and persecution from the police, because they haven’t been able to 
emigrate quickly.”
165 For a description o f events, see Robinson, 56.
166 CZA C2/1659, Memorandum on the Treatment o f the Jewish population in Iraq, from World 
Jewish Congress, New York City, 22 October 1949.
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property, as adults were only allowed to take fifty dinars out of the country. 
Approximately $200 million was collected between May and August 1950, when 
110,000 immigrated to Israel.167 Sometimes immigration took longer, and on 14 
February 1952, it was reported that of the 3,000 waiting in Iran’s capital, 400 were 
from Afghanistan, and 2,000 were Iraqi. Ten days later, the Teheran office noted that 
ninety-two had flown out, and they were trying to have them leave as quickly as 
possible because the police did not want them in the city.168 Efforts were speeded up, 
and most Jews from Afghanistan and Iraq were able to leave.
Some authors who rely upon media accounts state that legal Jewish immigration 
from Afghanistan began in 1951.169 However, a widespread relaxation of policy, with
1 70legal immigration to Israel allowed, commenced in October 1950. Perhaps, the 
international press became aware of this new situation early in 1951, as other 
newspapers took notice of the articles published in the Jewish (especially English- 
speaking) press. By 1952, most reached Israel.171
A case study may serve to illuminate the experience of this migration. One
family, interviewed by the newspaper Al Ha-Mishmar twenty-eight years after their
immigration to Israel in 1952, told the following story to the journalist:
they sold their possessions for a small amount of money and got on their 
way. From Herat they traveled by bus to Salam-Kala [Eslam Qal’a].
Then they crossed the border to Yusuf[a]bad. There they took a bus to 
Mashhad, and waited for four months until their time came to go to 
Teheran. They spent four months in Teheran, as there was a long line at 
the offices of the Jewish Agency. They slept in the streets and then 
afterwards rented a room with three other families. Finally, their time
167 Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971 ed., s.v. “Iraq.”
168 CZA S6/7301, telegram from Datner (Teheran) to Rafael (Jerusalem), 14 February 1952; and 
Y. Datner to Y. Rafael, 24 February 1952
169 See for example: Antony Lerman et al, eds. The Jewish Communities o f the World (London: 
Macmillian, 1989), 1.
170 Ludwig Adamec, Historical Dictionary o f  Afghanistan, (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 
1991), 259.
171 According to Yehoshua 1992, 303, citing the Yearbook o f the Central Office o f  Statistics in 
Israel, 2,303 Jews arrived from Afghanistan between 1948-1951, and 795 between 1952-54. Yet, these 
numbers do not seem to match those found in the documents of the Central Zionist Archives. Perhaps, 
the majority of Jews in Afghanistan reached Israel by 1952, but 1951 seems slightly premature.
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came to emigrate by airplane, and the journey took six hours. They 
arrived in the Promised Land -  it was like a dream.172
Several points are particularly interesting in this account. While the family was 
initially homeless in Teheran, nothing is mentioned of their time in Mashhad. One can 
then assume that their conditions were better, due to the assistance of the Jadid al-Islam 
community. The director of the Department of Immigration, Yitzhak Rafael asked the 
Mashhadis to care for the Afghanistanis like brothers, but in fact this was unnecessary
» 17^as they had been caring for Jews from Afghanistan since at least 1856. In February 
1952, a Jewish Agency employee in Teheran noted that the Mashhadis had been paying 
for everything that the Afghanistanis needed, and wondered if they should receive 
reimbursement. (One may be justified in assuming that they did not.)174 Also 
remarkably, while they seemed to describe most of their journey in a dispassionate way, 
the joy of arrival was expressed in a more emotional, immediate way. One can be 
almost certain that it is in their voice, as the phrase is in keeping with the traditional 
model of the arrival of G-d in Zion.175
Situation Improves After 1952
The story of the Jews of Afghanistan is in some ways a micro-history. During the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, Israeli immigration authorities were overwhelmed by two 
waves of Jewish refugees, those from war-torn Europe and those (600,000) fleeing the 
Arab world. Jews from Afghanistan only represented one per cent of those who left
1 7AAsia between 1948 and 1972. Not all Jews left in the 1950s, and small communities 
remained in both Kabul and Herat until the Soviet invasion in 1979. Despite 
considerable improvements, they were still bound by some vestiges of the shirkat
172 Gaon, 4.
173 See chapter 2.
174 CZA S6/6787, Y. Rafael (Jerusalem) to Yaacov Weinstein, Department of Immigration 
(Teheran), 23 May 1950; and Eliezer Ben-Dov (lieutenant chief o f the Department o f Immigration 
(Teheran) to the Department o f Immigration, Jewish Agency (Jerusalem), 28 February 1952.
175 CZA S5/11616, Herati Jews to the Government o f Israel, 23 Sivan 5709.
176 According to Yehoshua and the Yearbook o f  the Central Office o f Statistics in Israel, 333,868 
came from Asia with 3,757 of them from Afghanistan. Yehoshua 1992,303.
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system, which did not allow Jews legally to partake in international commerce.177 
However, their social and economic position was significantly better than that faced by 
previous generations. When crises occurred, the community had considerably more 
ability to effect change than they had in the 1930s and 1940s.
Forcible Conversion in the 1950s: Tova Shamualoff s Kidnapping
Perhaps the most significant event recorded in British archives after most of the 
community made ‘aliya, was the kidnapping of a teenaged girl in Kabul. This incident 
was made known to the Board of Deputies, and was apparently the impetus for one of 
their last endeavours to assist the Jewish community in Afghanistan. In November 
1955, the Board of Deputies received a translated copy of a letter sent from Kabul by 
the father of the thirteen-year-old in question. Mayer Shamualoff describes how his 
daughter did not return home from school on the first day of Ramadan. He went to the 
police immediately, and they searched for his daughter Tova throughout the night. By 
the next afternoon the police commissioner informed him that his child had been 
located, but that she wished to convert to Islam. For the next two weeks, the police 
took no further action. However, Shamualoff learned that Tova was:
in the lock up and was denied any food or bedding. Further she was being 
beaten with canes ... and being compelled to accept Muslim faith. She 
was further told ... that she had already been declared to have accepted 
Islam and if she now said that she wanted to become a Jew again ... she 
would be tortured, treated by brick bats and stones and killed in this way.
The information leaked out to us from the lock up that my daughter was in 
great trouble, and in a very helpless condition.178
As he told the Board, the father, Meyer Shamualoff then went to the Deputy Prime 
Minister of Kabul, Wali ‘Ali Muhammad Khan, who also promised to help, but then did 
nothing. In desperation, Shamualoff visited the King’s summer palace at Paghman, and 
presented his petition as Muhammad Zahir Shah passed in a street procession. The next
177 Interview with Eliahu Bezalel, Ramat Gan, Israel, 12 July 2001.
178 BoD ACC 3 121/Cl 1/13/3, letter from Meyer Shamualoff o f 5 Elul 5715 (23 August 1955), 
commencing “For Immediate Attention and Indulgence of Jew Brethren.”
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day, Shamualoff was summoned to the King’s garden and waited for three or four hours 
as the Deputy Prime Minister deliberated. Finally, it was agreed that Tova would be 
returned to her family. Yet, despite these high-level discussions and promises, she was 
still not returned. The heartbreak comes through clearly in the father’s final statements to 
the Board (spelling and grammar as in original):
On Afghan Independence Day my wife went to Ladies garden and 
accidently met our daughter there. She beseeched her to get her freed 
from these people as she wanted to meet her father and family members 
and come back to them. I am a middle class man and have spent all my 
resources to get back my beloved child. We are totally upset with her 
separation and her torture and distress. I have been threatened that if I 
took any further steps to get back my daughter, the Mohammdens at Kabul 
would attack all jews and kill them all. So I have neither strength nor 
voice and influence as there is no democratic or lawful rule in Kabul 
where I could place my grievence and be heard. I therefore humbly 
approach and request jewish brethren outside, to use all means at their 
command to restore my beloved child to me.179
After receiving this letter in London, the Board asked to meet with the Afghan 
ambassador. Najibullah Khan explained to the Secretary of the Board of Deputies that 
as Tova had reached the age of “legal majority” she was entitled to “adopt a way of 
life” of which her parents might disapprove. The Afghan Ambassador went on to 
outline the official government position towards its Jewish population. As the 
community ebbed away throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the government’s position 
certainly softened. Such a conciliatory letter would not have been written twenty years 
earlier.
[T]he Jewish community enjoys all the rights and privileges of an Afghan 
citizen and there is no communal distinction in Afghanistan. We have 
Afghan Moslems, Hindus, Sikhs and Jewish people living side by side 
and enjoying the same rights. Our Jewish friends abroad may have 
noticed that, notwithstanding a lot of problems between Jews and non- 
Jews, there was not a single case in Afghanistan so I can assure you and
179 Ibid.
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your friends that we consider our Jewish nationals as loyal citizens of the
1 ROcountry and as dear to us as any other national community.
This exchange shows that the idea of civic equality began to be recognised. Strikingly, 
Najibullah Khan stresses that all religions in Afghanistan have the same rights. This 
was simply not the case, as one could not even imagine an equivalent outcome if a 
Muslim schoolgirl proclaimed her wish to convert to Judaism. Nonetheless, 
Afghanistan may have been acceding to some of the values subscribed to by the larger 
community of nations in the late 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, it is extraordinary that 
Meyer Shamualoff was able to petition the Deputy Prime Minister and the King, and 
that his concerns were addressed even in a cursory manner.
There is no further documentation of Tova’s plight, in the London Metropolitan 
Archives or elsewhere. However, Leah Dil who emigrated in the mid-1970s, told the 
author of the outcome. According to her account, during that fateful summer day in 
1955, Tova got to know a young Muslim boy, and went home with him. She may have 
wanted to marry him, or this may have been forced upon her. It is uncertain what 
precisely happened (since Leah Dil’s account differs from that of the letter in the Board 
of Deputies’ archives.) The extent of the boy’s participation in Tova’s kidnapping is 
unclear. It is agreed that eventually her family, assisted by the entire Kabuli Jewish 
community, bribed some officials, and on the very evening that the bribe was given, 
Tova was returned home.181 As an adult, Leah Dil lived on the same street as Tova did 
in Kabul. She felt that the Kabuli community’s strength explained how they were able 
to secure Tova’s release. In earlier generations, children abducted from their families 
would be lost forever, but Tova’s case shows that in the mid-1950s, some amount of
1R9legal resource was permitted, while police bribery ultimately prevailed.
180 BoD ACC 3 121/Cl 1/13/3, Najibullah Khan, Royal Afghan Embassy to A.G. Brotman, 
Secretary Board of Deputies (both in London), 18 November 1955.
181 Tova’s later life has been marked both by ancient customs and modem warfare. Her first 
husband, who was Jewish, was killed during the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan, and she then married his 
brother in a levirate marriage. She now lives in Israel with her four or five children.
182 See Mordekhai Batchaev, La Vie de Yaqicv Samandar ou Les Revers du Destin. Translated by 
Catherine Poujol (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1992).
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In Herat, however, it was more difficult, as the community was poorer and 
therefore weaker, and Shi’i animosity was far greater. Also, being only a regional centre, 
the Herati community did not have direct access to the highest levels of government.
Leah Dil told this author that when she was growing up in Herat in the 1950s, not all girls 
went to school, and those who went did not attend for long. This was due to the 
widespread fear that they might be abducted. They did not attend secondary school, and 
when Dil ventured outside of home, her grandmother would tell her to cover her two long
1 87plaits, and not go too far away, as Muslims might steal her.
The Last Two Jews in Kabul
By 1960, only several hundred Jews remained in Afghanistan, and by 1971, this
number had fallen to twenty-five families in Kabul and Herat.184 Many left after 1967,
during the Six Day War when soldiers had to be called in to protect the two remaining
communities. One informant also explained that Israel’s capture of the Western Wall
was viewed as a continuation of biblical prophecy, hastening the arrival of the 
1 8^Messiah. The last rabbi left in 1988, and communal prayers (which require a quorum 
or minyan of ten adult men) were last said in Afghanistan in 1990. A few families who 
had remained throughout Soviet rule left by 1992. At the time of writing, there are 
currently two older men living in Kabul, named Isaac Levy and Zebulon Simantov, 
who both claim (to foreign journalists) the role of sole caretaker to the synagogue and 
cemetery. While living on the grounds of the synagogue, and sharing a kitchen, the two 
are engaged in an elaborate feud, which appears to have originated over the ownership 
of once-communal property. Each one blames the other for personal woes, including 
arrest and imprisonment under the Taliban, as well as confiscation of the community’s 
last Torah scroll. According to the journalist Tim Judah, Levy was also imprisoned 
after being accused of the crime of reading women’s fortunes. The younger of the two, 
Simantov left Afghanistan in the early 1990s, and settled for a time in Turkmenistan 
with his wife and children. After they immigrated to Israel, however, he returned to 
Kabul in 1999. Levy has never left Kabul, and has refused several offers of
183 Interview with Leah Dil, Holon, Israel, 9 July 2001.
184 Kashani 1961,25; and E.G. Lowenthal, 19.
185 Interview with Eliahu Bezalel, Ramat Gan, Israel, 12 July 2001.
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transportation to Israel. While the story of the last two cantankerous remnants of this 
commuity makes for colourful reading, there are fewer Jews in Afghanistan now than 
perhaps even after the Mongols decimated the region in the thirteenth-century.186 Most 
Jews who originated in Afghanistan live in Israel, though there is also a community in 
New York. Some are even found as far away as Bangkok, engaged in the colored gem 
trade, preserving some of their forebearers’ ancient economic patterns in a new, distant 
setting.187
186 Tim Judah, “A Very Private War,” Guardian Weekend, 5 January 2002, 36-8; and Tasgola 
Karla Bruner, “Home Alone with the Taliban,” Jerusalem Report, 3 January 2000, 32-3.
187 Tibor Krausz, “The Colors o f Money,” Jerusalem Report, 13 August 2001, 30-34.
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Conclusion
The two synagogues o f the ‘Jewish Mosque ’ are dusty and empty. Birds 
have built nests in the lamps, and prayer books and ragged talets [sic]
(prayer shawls) lie unused on the shelves along with a shofar, or ram's 
horn, that in happier times was used on high holy days. In one o f the 
synagogues are stacks o f mouldering possessions belonging to people who 
have long since left or died.1
This recent journalistic description of Kabul’s crumbling Jewish infrastructure is 
symbolic of the fate of the community. Congruently, the aim of this thesis was to 
reconstruct the history of Afghanistani Jewry from a wide number of sources, before it 
also fades away. Despite modem decay, and the limits of memory, some of the detail 
and wealth of past events can emerge through patient research. It is hoped that by 
linking the history of the Jewish community to that of Afghanistan, both are further 
enriched.
Often the history of the Jews is too small to be found in general works on 
Afghanistan or Mizrahi Jewry. However, the modem history of the Jews in 
Afghanistan is also directly linked to trading opportunities. As a result of commerce, 
business and family ties were established with distant places. This enabled the record 
of this community to be preserved, while so many other histories in Afghanistan remain 
obscured. Through international commercial connections, the Jews of Afghanistan 
formed an unusual link to Europe and Eretz Yisrael. When their plight worsened, they 
were able to inform British, American, Indian, and Israeli officials through elaborate 
channels of communication based on the karakul trade. Economic ties are the only 
reason why this social history has been preserved. As such, it is unusual and precious; 
for so many other recorded histories of Afghanistan have been lost.
1 Judah, 37.
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By tracing the economic patterns of the 1930s and 1940s, the experience of the 
Jewish community is brought into further relief. This approach has not been utilized 
before, though it provides vital information as to the reasons for expulsion from the 
northern tier of Afghanistan and the hostility the community endured under the weight 
of nationalistic economic policy. Without an understanding of the Jewish economic 
niche, and atypical domestic arrangements, it is difficult to understand the severity of 
the restrictions imposed against them, and why they led to the demise of the 
community.
The ways that economic development was pursued in Afghanistan caused the 
impoverishment and persecution of marginal members of society. The monopoly 
system was devastating for non-Muslim minorities. This thesis has argued that the 
Ministry of National Economy and monopolist ventures like the Bank-i Milli, pursued 
discriminative political action through the guise of economic development. The 
monopolist system linked the economy to nationalist rationale. The structure of 
economic development pursued by the state of Afghanistan had a distinctly political 
role, to limit and protect against Soviet influence. This was particularly devastating for 
the Jewish community as they were often suspected of owing their primary allegiance 
to the Soviet Union, and working on its behalf.
Ernest Gellner’s description of Diaspora nationalism provides further depth to a 
study of the Jews of Afghanistan. He explains that economic strength and a distinct 
culture combined with political and military weakness can lead to suffering and even 
the destruction of a community as the impact of development changes the attitudes of 
the elite and majority population. The government may choose to appease wide 
swatches of the population through the persecution of entrepreneurial minorities.2 In 
Afghanistan, entrepreneurial minorities could have paved the way towards 
development, but their marginal status precluded participation. In fact, nascent 
economic nationalism led to the downfall of the Jewish community. Jews were unable 
to become part of the conception of an Afghan nation.
2 Gellner, 105-7.
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Part of this estrangement may have been based on Afghan elites taking Germany 
as a model for nationalism. On the basis of material available, certain Afghan leaders, 
notably ‘ Abd al-Majid Khan, attempted to follow Germany. The Minister of National
Economy’s importance cannot be jmderOstimated during Muhammad Hashim Khan’s
! /'
regency. ‘Abd al-Majid Khan was consumed by the goal of ridding ‘foreigners’ from 
Afghanistan’s business community, to the extent that older systems were destroyed. 
While the theme of economic nationalism was invoked, its benefits did not reach 
beyond the Pashtun elite. Much of the populace suffered needlessly from inflation and 
shortages, and radical programs were approved as a way of containing the Soviet 
Union’s influence in Afghanistan. This fear of communism meant that strategies based 
on far more developed economies were applied -  to disastrous results. ‘Abd al-Majid 
Khan was also allowed to pursue political action through the guise of economic 
development. Consequently, Jews and some Central Asian Muslims who settled in 
Northern Afghanistan became internally displaced, and refugees once again.
In the search to root out ‘foreigners,’ different groups of minorities suffered. The 
experiences of the Hindu community often mirror those of the Jews, yet even fewer 
sources appear to be available on that history. Other non-Pashtun groups also were 
considered to be outside the Afghan community, and consequently suffered 
discrimination. They included large portions of the general population, especially those 
ethnicities of the north who absorbed refugees, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen, along 
with Hazaras and Nuristanis.
Nazi influence is the most contentious aspect of the historiography of this 
community. While difficult to verify, it was certainly present in the economic sector. 
‘Abd al-Majid Khan was a pivotal figure in the dissemination of modem, racial anti- 
Semitism. Some of his prejudice was clearly motivated by a desire for personal wealth, 
and a fear of communism. However, when examined along with larger currents in 
Afghanistan, one can find a syncretic approach to anti-Semitism. Traditional forms of 
religious anti-Semitism found in the Muslim world were accompanied by newer
300
European forms especially those invoked by the German conception of an Aryan race. 
As the war continued, and the atrocities of the Third Reich became apparent, racial 
anti-Semitism as espoused by the elites faded, while older, popular forms thrived. This 
was especially true when the urban population suffered from a chaotic economy and a 
drought. Guiding the economy actually worsened the situation and impeded 
development.
When the state of Israel was established, the Jews had a series of religious, 
economic, and social reasons to leave Afghanistan. They were oveijoyed by Israel’s 
creation, and waves of messianic Zionism coursed through the community. Heartfelt 
letters infused with religious language were sent to Israeli officials, describing the 
tribulations they faced, including discrimination and deprivation. Soon, however, the 
Jewish communities in Kabul and Herat were disappointed as the bureaucratic 
inefficiency of the Jewish Agency became apparent. Those waiting to make ‘aliya in 
India felt the full weight of these difficulties, and their situation deteriorated into a full­
blown refugee crisis. As the process of immigration was disorganized, arguments 
between the Jewish Agency and the va’adot representing Afghanistani Jewry in Eretz 
Yisrael increased. By 1949 the most significant impediment to ‘aliya disappeared, as 
Muhammad Zahir Shah allowed legal emigration from Afghanistan. This may have 
been due to a series of reasons, including the desire for American friendship, 
international support for the creation of Pashtunistan, and belief in a link between the 
Afghans and the ancient lost tribes of Israel.
This work fits easily into Judaic studies, and supplements studies done on Iranian 
and Bukharan communities, as well as that of other isolated Mizrahi groups. It 
augments the earliest ethnographic research of Jewish communities, and gives a deeper 
context to the pioneering work of Erich Brauer. This is the only study on the Jewish 
community of Afghanistan which uses archival material in English, especially the 
Board of Deputies of British Jews, the India Office, and the National Archives of the 
United States, and fully explores the economic history of the community.
301
There are rich congruities between the political and economic history of 
Afghanistan and one of its smallest minorities, though this connection has not been 
previously explored. This thesis provides a detailed example of what can happen to 
entrepreneurial minorities when the larger society begins to confront nationalism and 
industrialization. It contributes to the history of Afghanistan by providing a detailed 
description of the forces that brought about the destruction of the Jewish community. 
With the exception of Vartan Gregorian, no wider history of Afghanistan has described 
the Jewish experience correctly. It is hoped that this thesis will be used by other 
scholars of Afghanistan, as a way to provide accurate historical information about the 
Jewish community, and the political, social, and economic forces they encountered.
This work distinguishes itself by concentrating on a detailed historical accounting 
of the demise of the Jewish community. It is almost a micro-history, however, by 
concentrating on the details of a small group’s experiences, a great deal of clarity 
regarding larger trends emerges. In fact, their history may be seen as a microcosm of 
the convulsions of the twentieth century. The community’s experiences also 
foreshadow the larger traumas of the emerging Afghan nation -  of great suffering and 
dispersal.
This thesis has recounted the last chapter of the Jewish community in 
Afghanistan. It linked Jewish history to the larger currents through archival research. 
Generally, the Jewish and Muslim histories of Afghanistan have been recorded 
separately. In Judaic studies, a cursory, often inaccurate examination of larger trends is 
presented, while the descriptions of the majority history generally ignore minority 
experience. While two works have been translated into English, the history of the Jews 
of Afghanistan has been written in Hebrew, and this thesis represents the most 
significant contribution made outside of Israel. It is hoped that this work supplements 
the history of minorities in Afghanistan, and that in future, those with stronger language 
skills will be able to uncover sources in Dari, Pashtun, and Russian, filling in additional 
information, and leading to more complete explanations.
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I
'
This work is a case study of the failure of Afghanistan to absorb the talents of its 
non-Islamic minorities. A microcosm of future failures can be viewed within this 
limited history. Perhaps one source of these lost opportunities may be traced as far 
back as the reign of ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan in the late nineteenth-century. When this 
I amir chose to eschew economic development to retain more political autonomy, and
i
I destroyed traditional patterns of co-existence and tolerances, he passed on a bitter
legacy. These policies were reinforced by other leaders, and continued to have 
detrimental effects throughout the twentieth century. While later witnessed on a mass 
! scale, even in the 1930s and 40s, these patterns were apparent in miniature, through the
history of the Jewish community. In many ways, Afghanistan still faces challenges 
surrounding this legacy, as questions of political autonomy, economic development, 
tolerance for ethnic minorities and the last, largest group of those with ‘protected, yet 
second class status’ -  women, are far from being resolved.
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Appendix 2: Letter from the Jewish Community of Herat to the Government
of Israel, 20 June 1949
To Your Honour, the High and Mighty Government of Israel -  Shalom!
With great pleasure we send to the heights of the mountains of Zion to 
Your Excellency, our original, hearty, and eternal greetings. We express 
with a full heart our feelings that you [...] will be triumphant forever. We 
bless you with the blessing ‘[G-d] who has kept us alive, sustained us, and 
enabled us to reach this day.’ For thousands of years, the People Israel 
were in exile and scattered, under a foreign yoke. Their wandering feet 
did not find rest, and their hope was to find the day of salvation and now 
this day has come. ‘This is the day that G-d has made for us, let us rejoice 
in it.’ Now, in the End of Days, from a flight of trouble and distress, G-d 
has enlightened the People Israel with salvation and bravery. The Holy 
People of Israel was filled with bravery to achieve its precious land and sit 
on its throne of high governance -  the Excellency of ‘the Messiah -  G-d of 
Jacob.’ Your Honour, we are in the darkness of bitter exile, and do not 
feel the sweetness of the shining light upon us, and it is like we are 
dreaming. As it is written: ‘When G-d returns to Zion, we will be as if 
dreaming.’ We believe that G-d has sworn an eternal covenant to bring us 
back to the Land, and even if this day of wandering was very long, and our 
people were scattered from one side of the heavens to another, we still 
hope that the time has come to return to our homeland, and to renew our 
youth in the land, like an eagle. From now on, we have no choice but to 
pray before G-d and the One who brings Salvation, to strengthen the hands 
of those who defend our country, the Holy Land, and to raise up our 
Messiah and to draw together all the members of our scattered people,
Amen.
After all this, we have to let you know, Your Excellency, how horrible our 
low situation is. Everyday our Exile becomes greater, we are left without 
work, all the doors of commerce are locked to us, all the gates of the land 
are closed to us. Nobody can come or go, neither from inside nor from 
outside. Exile causes us such grief, we don’t have any more strength to 
suffer, to make a livelihood, or provide for the necessities of life. We sold 
all our household goods, and we are left with empty hands, and we don’t 
know what will become of us, and therefore we turn to you, asking Your 
Excellency to help us as soon as possible, for if our Exile continues for 
more months, all of us will be lost from lack of means to support 
ourselves. Please, please, please we beg you that as long as we are still 
alive, spare us, have mercy upon us. You have a duty and a mitzvah to 
take care of these thousand souls of Israel, as it is expressed in the 
Gemarrah: ‘If one saves a life of Israel, it is as if the whole world has been 
saved.’
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Until now, we have not sent you a letter of greeting and request, because 
there was no post between the government of Israel and the Afghan 
government, and also we are in danger in the midst of our Exile. For all of 
this we ask your pardon, it has been for the past fifteen years or more, that 
the majority of our population emigrated to the Land, and we were 
separated: a man from his brother, a father and a mother from their son, 
and a brother from his brother and sister. We received news from them 
that some joined the Israeli army or other governmental offices, and we 
did not know what had become of them, until a letter came from the 
community of Afghanistan in Israel that among those who died [in the 
1948 war], twenty-four were from the our community, and they were 
murdered, may G-d avenge their blood, and the blood of all of our 
brothers. When this sad news arrived in our community, one eye shed 
tears, and the other eye was happy that they were killed for our people, 
and for the cities of our G-d in our native land [moledet]. May G-d save 
their souls. And what is more, their government takes care of their 
relations and gives them their reward. Yet, we cannot take care of all of 
our needs. If the style of this letter is not beautiful, we beg your pardon, 
and we will keep it short, instead of prolonging it, and therefore, we pray 
to G-d that we shall soon see each other and the face of ‘The Messiah, the 
G-d of Jacob’ and the rest of the ministers of the government of our land, 
the Land of Israel. Shalom from the Holy Community [k’k] of Herat, 
Afghanistan.
This is the day that we hope for, let us rejoice in it, it has been for 2,000 
years that the People Israel has been in exile, and now the time has come 
for the prophets’ visions to come true. ‘To gather you up from heaven 
with me.’ Now this Day of Salvation has come to the entire People Israel 
who are in exile. Yet, this time is troublesome for us, as we are in great 
danger in the midst of the Exile of Ishmael, but we hope we will be saved 
from that through the grace of G-d and through Your Honour’s help, and 
we hope for your salvation and also for your response. May you have 
Peace forever, Amen.
Signed by the humble Yosef Cohen and the Cohen of the pitied 
community, Mr. Shmuel Cohen.3
3 CZA S5/11616. Letter o f 23 Sivan 5709,20 June 1949 from the Jewish community o f Herat to 
the Government o f Israel, an accurate copy provided by the Va’ad Hitahadut Olei Afghanistan, Tel Aviv. 
With special thanks to Nili Heled for help translating this document.
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